CalBear said:
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Hitler was fixated on Calais,
That's contrary to what I've read. Hitler and Rommel thought the invasion would come in Normandy but that was a minority view and not enforced so the bulk of the forces were at Calais.
Hitler waffled several times, often in response to the latest (false) intel via the London agents. In late May he decided the main attack would be at Pas de Calis & held on to that until August when it no longer mattered. This is why he was slow in releasing the Panzer Reserve, in releasing mobile formations from other armies, and particularly the reserves of the Fifteenth Army guarding the Calais region. In late July there were still couple field divisions & a corps HQ group sitting idle north of Calis & two Pz Divisions in southern France.
There were other deception ops underway as well. The old Anvil Op was used in June as a deception op to keep the 19th Army reserves in place near Marsailles. In July that was dropped and two new deception ops started. One was aimed at Genoa, to keep the Ligurian army reserves in the Po River Valley. The other was aimed at Bourdeux to pin the 1st Army reserves. Hilter bought off on both those & When Patton broke out of Normandy there were still five infantry field divisions and the 11th Pz Div in Army Group G.
Aimed at Norway 'Fortitude North' was a deception intended to keep some 90,000 field troops and 300+ aircraft far from France. This included a hint that the Allies might just invade Demark instead of Norway. A field infantry division remained on garrison duty in Denmark through the spring and summer of 1944.
Fact is from early 1942 Allied deception ops had Hilter leaping after shadows all across Europe. The Soviets were every bit as a effective as the Brits or US. A large part of their operational and strategic success derived from genius Hitler following the many rabbit trails they laid out for him.