I was super busy with finals, so I’m just getting back to this now.
Maybe Chiang gets the upper hand later in the civil war, having liberated more territory by itself without the Red Army's help.
The catastrophic effects of Operation Ichi-Go will probably be butterflied away too, meaning that the Nationalists' position will be much stronger in both material and psychological terms.
I would be very surprised if these things didn’t happen. Even with ROC forces wrecked from seven years of fighting and almost completely cut off from WAllied aid, Ichi-Go barely worked. The Japanese lost 20% of their force KIA alone. Against even a couple divisions equipped to the level of Force X? Forget it. And yeah, the single biggest reason that the ROC lost the civil war is that their forces and areas of support were just absolutely wrecked during WWII.
The big question is "Just how much freight can move over the Burma Road?"
And my guess is that unfortunately, not a lot. It's a two lane road through very rough country. I doubt if it was paved; and even if it, heavy truck traffic would break it down. All fuel has to be hauled up the Road from the base.
My WAG is maximum 1,000 tons/day. This would be a big boost to the Chinese army, but not enough to bring the whole army up to US standards (of equipment).
However, it would be enough for the RoC to begin to push back against Japan, particularly in south China, which Japan largely did not occupy, and establish positions on the coast. Once US forces reach the Philippines, supply can land on the coast, and much larger deliveries are possible. There were Japanese garrisons in several large ports, but the rest of the coast would be wide open.
Consider the amount of effort that was needed for the airlift over the Himalayas without the Burma Road. As of December 1943, there were over 140 aircraft working the Hump route, and they were delivering 12,500 tons a month at that point and by the end of the war, and by late 1945 that number had tripled, as well as each individual aircraft being more capable.
With the Burma road open, assuming the 1000 tons/day as above, the Chinese will be getting a lot more materials delivered from day one. Assuming a similar level of support, that means that Slim/14th Army would probably be getting a lot more material support from the US just to keep the Road open and to improve its carrying capacity.
I wonder if the allies would still end up flying the hump anyway as there was limits on the Burma road even if the supplies delivered was much higher than OTL.
This. The Burma Road is a single unpaved, unsurfaced road running through appalling terrain - and half the year in appalling weather as well. Stories from the OLT Ledo Road talk of bulldozers dragging trucks through fender-deep mud - and the Ledo Road was built to higher standards than the pre-war Burma Road.
What crippled the Hump operation was the logistics pyramid - sure, the numbers sound impressive, but a high proportion of that were the supplies and fuel needed to maintain the operation itself. A road supply line won't suffer as badly - but you're still going to be sending fuel convoys to China to fuel the convoys coming back from China, and these convoys themselves will need fuel...
1000 tons/day sorta sounds reasonable - but that's 400 deuce-and-a-half trucks every day. Are there even that many motor vehicles in Burma?
And everything sent up the Road, plus the fuel burned on the way, plus supplies for maintaining and securing the road has to come up the railway from Rangoon which is itself capacity-limited, and everything that goes on the railway has to be landed at the port of Rangoon which is also supplying the Allied forces in Burma. Maybe in 1944, after a lot of engineering work, the Road can get close to those sort of numbers - but by that time Nimitz is in the Marianas and the US is wondering if China-Burma-Indochina is really worth the effort.
Plus, unless there's a major US policy change, the majority of supplies coming up the Road will be earmarked not for the RoC army but for US airbases in China. The plan was to bomb Japan from China, not build up a Chinese army to drive the Japanese back. OTL, this proved impractical due to logistics and the B-29s ended up flying from the Marianas. TTL, we might see the 14th Air Force conducting strategic bombing missions, which in turn might push the Japanese into an earlier Ichi-Go.
Plus, this is the RoC we're talking about, and by 1942 it is not in a good state. Expect Chiang (who always regarded the Communists as the real enemy) to hoard his American goodies and dribble them out to subordinates as a way of controlling them, area commanders to concentrate on securing their own influence rather than fighting the Japanese and American advisors to go quietly (or in Stillwell's case noisily) nuts fighting the solid mass of inefficiency, corruption, patronage and self-interest that was the RoC administration. Sure, with 20-30 well-equipped, well-trained, well-fed, loyal divisions Chiang could change the whole balance of the war - but starting from 1942, I don't see him getting them in a useful timeframe, even if the road stays open.
Potentially, the RoC benefits enough that it can stop a "Hasty Ichi-Go" in 1943 or defeat/deter Ichi-Go in 1944. That will leave the RoC in a stronger position for the post-war, with butterflies down the line. But ideas of a Chinese army driving to the coast in 1944-5 are fantasy, IMHO. The Chinese have too many problems, and a single road doesn't do enough to change them.
These comments fail to take into account the Burma-Yunnan Railway, which was scheduled to be finished in late 1942 IOTL (I’m guessing this could probably be increased to mid-1942 with war mobilization). The Burma Road was only even built to support the construction of the railway, it was never meant to be China’s MSR. When that railway gets finished, everything changes. Undoubtedly the Japanese will bomb and sabotage it wherever possible, but assuming the Chinese can get an average of even three trains a day, that means (a SWAG of my own) probably 5-6k tons of freight moving over it daily. Add the 1k from whatever crosses the Burma Road (which doesn’t take account any engineering work that could be done to increase capacity) and suddenly, the ROC is getting quite a bit of stuff indeed.
Merrick, with regards to your last paragraph, I think that displays the common ah.com fallacy of being way too ungenerous to Chiang Kai-Shek. The guy was pretty much cut off from significant outside aid after the Indochina route was closed in May 1940, and he was completely cut off after Burma fell. The Hump just couldn’t meet the quantities needed. He also unavoidably lost China’s wealthy, industrialized, and completely indefensible coastal areas that were his main area of support, forcing him to rely on the warlords. That did lead to corruption, patronage, and pork, but it’s not like he had any other options. In spite of all that, he was politically skilled enough to keep everyone in his military coalition on side and to win about half of the 22 major battles of the war. That is an incredible achievement.
On a related note, it’s a myth (if not outright historical libel by the CCP) that Chiang was more concerned with fighting the Communists than with defending China. In reality, it was almost exactly the opposite. Mao reached a detente with the Japanese and built up his forces while the ROC bled. Peter Vladimirov, who was the USSR’s official liaison to the CCP from 1942-1945, said in his reports that he never saw their forces engage the Japanese a single time. Out of the 22 major battles of the Second Sino-Japanese War involving 100k men or more on each side, the Communists took part in exactly one, the Hundred Regiments Offensive. The ROC fought in 21 out of 22, and threw their best German-trained divisions into the fighting at Shanghai straight off. In the end, the ROC’s forces were wrecked from fighting WWII while cut off, and Mao built his up, then was given the most industrialized and least war-torn area, Manchuria, by the Soviets. He also received a mountain of aid, while the west pretty much cut off the ROC. That, more than any other factor, is why they lost the civil war.
Chiang was a competent leader, the fact that he put Taiwan on the course that he did as soon as foreign invaders and his own countrymen stopped trying to blow up everything that he built is testament to that. Stilwell never understood or cared to understand what he was up against, and he did plenty to make his situation worse.
Oh, and here's on final knock-on. If the RoC liberates south China and also the Shanghai-Nanking area by mid-1945, Chinese troops could be available for the invasion of Japan. US commanders might not want them for various reasons (logistical complications for instance), and there would be fighting for them to do in China instead. But Chiang would want to get in on the final conquest of Japan. And it could scare even the hard-line Japanese. They imagined that they could inflict heavy casualties through banzai tactics that would "shock" the "soft" Americans into a negotiated peace. By this time, they would know that they can't scare off the Chinese that way.
I think the American commanders would want them, because everyone knew the casualties of an invasion of Japan would be ghastly. Even as cannon fodder, just having them would help diffuse the cost of the butcher’s bill. I can’t decide whether this would make Japan more or less likely to surrender. On the one hand, it would as you say introduce an enemy of theirs with virtually inexhaustible manpower that simply couldn’t be worn down with attrition. On the other, if China is invading Japan, that almost certainly means they’d have to be given an occupation zone, and the idea of being occupied by the Chinese might be too much for even the the OTL peace faction of the Imperial Cabinet to bear.
Another big knock on of keeping burma would be reducing the Bengal Famine to a small scale food shortage. That in of itself would change British strategy a lot, freeing up the traffic in Bengal for British supplies to pass into China.
Right you are.
Just the butterfly effects of that alone would be wild. Bengal was the wealthiest part of the Raj, and while its downward slide since then can’t be completely attributed to the 1943 famine, it was a major contributing factor. That not happening will make it significantly better off. British policy there was also a major motivator for the Quit India movement, and Gandhi and the other INC leaders’ response to the denial of the boats in particular was a big part of why Linlithgow ordered their arrest. That in turn led to the INC boycott of elections and the rise of the Muslim League during the war. It’s very possible that none of that happens without the INC’s (justified, to be clear) response to the famine and with the British being a lot less jumpy due to not having the Japanese right next door. In short, this might actually butterfly the partition of India.
Everything being transported over the Burmese railway system and over the Burma Road has to come in through the Port of Rangoon. In a scenario where the Allies have managed to hold onto Burma the main problem becomes trying to prevent the Japanese from sinking any merchant or transport ship attempting to reach Rangoon.
In 1942 how strong a naval protection can the British and Commonwealth navies provide for escorting freighters sailing to and from Rangoon? Using what limited assets the RN had in the Bay of Bengal? They are going to be travelling right on the door step of Japanese occupied Malaya and Thailand. A sizable portion of the IJN is based at Singapore and smaller warships can be staged out of small ports on the West coast of Malaya. There is also the airfields located in Northern Malaya and in Thailand.
The Japanese could set up an effective blockade of the Port of Rangoon using not much more then a half dozen second line destroyers and some patrol planes. With the paucity of British naval strength available in the Bay of Bengal trying to send freighters to Rangoon would be a situation worse then the club runs to Malta. I think this would be the situation in 1942 and likely 1943 as well. Unless someone decided more RN assets could be spared from other theatres. Is that likely?
One possible work around. Build an overland link from Chittagong that connects up with the railroad in the Irrawaddy valley near Mandalay. This involves extending the railroad from Chittagong to the base of the Arakan mountains. Building another road through the passes that would connect up to the Burmese railroad. From there freight is run up to Lashio.
Yes, this means building a second Burma Road. But is also means supplies can be shipped over a more secure overland route. Supplies that are being off loaded at the secured Port of Calcutta. Same place all the supplies for the Hump airlift are coming from by railroad. This overland connection from India to Burma also provides another logistics route to keep the Allied armies in Burma supplied in the event of another attempt by the Japanese to invade Burma to cut the overland supply route to China.
Which would be the more difficult and costly task? Building a connecting overland route or trying to protect freighters attempting the " Bengal Club Run" to Rangoon?
There have been this and other threads discussing the advantages gained by the Allies being able to hang on to Burma. Including being able to keep using the Burma Road.
However, AFAIK my previous posting was the only time it's been pointed out that Rangoon and its harbour, the entry and initial point for all land transportation in Burma would likely be unusable due to a Japanese naval blockade. A blockade that I think the British and Commonwealth navies would not have the available naval strength in 1942 and 1943 to break.
Is this an accurate assertion? Would it be too costly and dangerous for the Allies to run convoys into Rangoon under the circumstances described in this thread?
The allies can always run coast hugging convoys. It's always dangerous and difficult to operate on the enemies coastline.
I agree that the logistics aren't great, almost whatever happens.
On the topic of Japanese interdiction of convoys into Rangoon, I think it depends how much effort Japan puts into trying to stop them and so in turn how important Japan considers them. I also suspect large regular convoys above those needed to sustain the defence of Burma aren't really possible until the British have a fleet based in Sri Lanka, and if I remember correctly this doesn't happen until early 1944 (after the fleet is released from the Med). Of course, this depends somewhat on how close the Japanese get to Rangoon.
If substantial supplies can be brought in from 1944 then I think the best use of the Burma road wouldn't have been military equipment but rather civilian supplies to try to establish a functioning economy and increase public support for the republicans. However, I doubt this would have happened due to US priorities or would had much effect if it had happened due to the scale of needs, local corruption and local politics
The Japanese and the other Axis powers were always pretty shit IIRC at interdicting Allied convoys from the air though, and Japanese submarine doctrine (which emphasized targeting warships) was ill-suited for this. Then, add in the fact that the entire route (assuming they coast hug) is within easy range of Allied air cover. I don’t see them being very successful at stopping the flow of supplies to Rangoon.
This is one where butterflies are the kind that snack on Alien Space Bats, except the big ones which eat galaxies.
If you can use the Burma Road you have a rail line to Myitkyina then road over the mountains. Couple of consequences - you can run the occasional convoy to Rangoon move it all by rail fast and the 1000 t a day is the limitation of the road element not the whole supply chain.
But it also means the British have effective control of the central valley and its rice production which is then used to feed not just India and Burma but as pre war exported to Africa where there is also a famine OTL alleviated by importing wheat from north america at inflated cartel parices in dollars, - so Britain has larger USD reserves and many many many midwestern farmers are impoverished and longer term the urbanisation of West Africa based on imported US wheat dumped on the local market does ot happen, leading to many many midwestern farmers being impoverished.
Also the IJA in Burma starves over 42/43. I mean beetle eating bark chewing cannibalism or fall back into Thailand and the Kra.
The Closest IJN base of scale would be 1100 nautical miles away and the IJN cannot be in two places at once - if its facing off the USN in the Solomons is not blockading Rangoon. If they deploy forces in 42 ole Frank Jack goes postal on the IJN island bases and strategic recon assets. If deployed in the wider Pacific to stop this well after Midway the IJN is kinda short of carriers.
By contrast in May/June 42 i.e. about the time of MIdway the RN has deployed off the African Coast for Ironclad Warspite, Illustrious Indomitable, Formidable, Revenge, Resolution Royal Sovereign, Ramillies. They will not all stay for long Pedestal and then Torch are priorities but after Torch for a 6 months there are no major naval operations so its a question of priorities. A pair of Fleet carriers with a BB escort is likely feasible. This or even the potential of it gives the IJN major issues if used aggressively but unlikely to be ( its 1100 nm from Rangoon to Singapore) but defensively it going to stop anything but the entire remaining IJN carrier fleet from intervening in a meaningful way. As to Submarines well if you want t deprive the Fleet of its eyes fine bit there is a substantial ASW force in the region its just that OTL its more concerned with Western India and the cross Indian Ocean traffic. If the IJN subs are much further east the escorts need to be much further east - although as the whole shebang is an American fetish King can pony up the escort force.
For the IJA its slightly worse. If you have been stopped and the Burma Road/Rail system is intact the brits have the ability to move supplies by rail the length of their front and to break that will require crossing the beaten zone of increasing numbers of .303 machine guns div. artillery pieces backed up by armour and motorised reserves. Personally I cant wait for the India Pattern carrier with the quad .50 on top. If its Intact in 42/late 43 the Eastern Army/XIV Army has at least 5 ID and an armoured BDE it also probably has the 1 Burma div and 7th Amd Bde Group. And 2nd British infantry division formed in Southern India. Indian 32 Amd Div is around as is 43 Amd, now not a lot of use for these on the Indian Border, on the central plain of Burma whole other thing.
Now the Burma road increases supplies to China so taking troops from their possible but weakens the immediate situation otherwise its from Bew Guinea or the Solomons in terms of active forces and there is the whole starvation thing.
But if you are looking at NG or the Solomons you are either not reinforcing Guadalcanal or not putting troops into the New Guinea offensive and charging them across the plain with an Armoured corps waiting for you.
Later on the US effort that went into transport fleets over the Hump will go into something else not quite sure what but airlift is increases and ofc the Brits are now in a position to launch an airmobile operation deep behind Japanese lines ( where there is conveniently only one road to Burma). The basics of Burma are that its really hard to supply an army anywhere in Burma except the central plain, where its very easy. The next bases you can supply from are Bangkok and Singapore or Cox's Bazaar/Chittagong Imphal on the other.
As to what Chiang would do with his supplies - bugger all. Apart from the US navy Marine corps and entire population of the United States howling for blood he now also has XIV PanzerArmee with a Airmobile Assault Corps and at least one amphib trained British Division engaged on his southern flank.
This is a good analysis. I hadn’t even considered the possible effects on U.S. farming. Overall, I seriously doubt it would hurt American farmers that much because government policy at the time after the Great Depression was firmly in favor of subsidies, price support, etc. A lot might actually go to China, which certainly needed it.
I think the most likely place for Chiang to attack would be the Japanese coastal pockets in southern China, a goal the U.S. would be EXTREMELY supportive of. Those were China’s wealthiest and most populous areas, and the Japanese pockets there didn’t have that many troops garrisoning them and couldn’t mutually support each other. If the ROC takes them back, it allows the WAllies to establish air and submarine bases in southern China perfectly positioned to interdict Japanese shipments from the Southern Resource Area, as indeed they initially planned to do IOTL.
Nah, Uncle Sam is buying whatever is grown anyway during the War, so that food gets LL'ed elsewhere. Average Farm income went from $700 to over $2000, with wheat production increased over 25% from pre-war levels
Agreed.
OTL Culverin is much later and after the USN had made Truk untenable as a fleet base In 42/43. It also at the date proposed would be from India not Rangoon. Whats more likely to be proposed is an offensive toward the Yangon to turn the IJA position in Burma then the Zipper/Mailfist/Jurist sequence. The IJN problem is even if they do put heavy units there ( and do not oppose whatever the USN has planned there is no reason why the British army does not just start the engines and drive to Singapore - or at least close enough to bomb it. Now what force depends on the date you want but lets suppose this is from October 42 - May 43. i.e. Midway and Coral Sea have happened the USMC is on Guadalcanal and the IJA are attempting an end run at Milne Bay. OTL the British would have launched first Arakan and Longcloth. I would also assume that the criticisms of Eastern Army ( after Arakan) are much less warranted they have more trained personnel and the admin is better given their easier circumstances and the route from Rangoon to the Yangon mouth is easier than the Arakan. Most things are.
The Air forces in terms of fighter if not bomber strength ( this is whole theatre inc Australia) is quite close to the Middle East air forces and the data point is about the time 300 a/c were intransit from the Middle east mostly Bombers so they dont seem to appear on either list I have with at least 1st and possibly 2nd AVG. and the RAF has the pre war airfields the IJA some but not as many and further away.
So OTL this would be contemporary with Kokoda, Buna Goa, Wau Bismarck Sea, the Whole Guadalcanal campaign and I Go which is a maximum effort for the IJN and just before Cartwheel.
OTL the IJN is engaged in the Solomons mainly and the heavy units in Japan or Truk No reason they cant move some or all to Singapore but that means giving up Guadalcanal.
I think the best the UK could do at the time would be an offensive towards Yangon which probably goes better than Arakan. and unless the IJA really does start shooting admirals the IJN and limited IJA forces fight on on the Solomons and the IJA in New Guinea for 42/3 season and in May 43 operations slow down for 6 months because of the Monsoon. I suspect that both IJ air forces are weaker as a result of fighting on an additional front on any given day but overall losses about the same.
Which brings into question Cartwheel The New Guinea campaign has secured Australia. and there are now 4 competing anti Japanese operations. The Central Pacific which allows you to blockade the Home Islands, Matterhorn which allows you to bomb the HI, Zipper which deprives japan of the oil rubber and materials they need to fight war and assists the blockade or Cartwheel which massages the ego of MacArthur until the additional USA divisions needed for an assault on the PI are available - late 44 early 45. Now there is a good reason for keeping MacArthur out of the USA until then so he can't run against FDR but give him a planning role and promise he cant resign in a huff, and credibly run. So cancel everything in Cartwheel after Postern and cancel Shingle which gives a probably enough sealift to bypass the Kra and unless the IJN intervenes (or whats left of it ) by charging heroically up the Malacca straights through the minefields and submarine patrol lines, past the strike aircraft. And why would they be in Singapore, OTL its safe, TTL its at the margins of Wellington range and definitely in the range of B17s.
it wasn't LL is was sold. The good news is without the vast I mean truly vast expense of flying over the hump the US can give the farmers a tax break or turn it into corn syrup earlier
Interesting ideas.
And oh great, what have I wrought, now the U.S. obesity crisis starts in the 1940s…
