Because the Japanese used their submarines as auxiliaries to the fleet, not as commerce raiders. It was the way they were used not the quality of the boats or crews that made the Uboats such a threat.
And the numbers, don’t forget the numbers.
Because the Japanese used their submarines as auxiliaries to the fleet, not as commerce raiders. It was the way they were used not the quality of the boats or crews that made the Uboats such a threat.
Because the Japanese used their submarines as auxiliaries to the fleet, not as commerce raiders. It was the way they were used not the quality of the boats or crews that made the Uboats such a threat.
So if the Japanese use their submarines like the Germans to target merchant ships instead of capital ships they could be a dangerous problem to allies merchant ships in Pacific?Pacific submarines had pathetic operating depth on both the Japanese and American side. On the higher end it approached a 100 meters, that is 90 on Gato class. Germans could go down to 230 meters. Most submarines would not go down to 90 and stay at that depth for prolonged period of time. Pacific was also clear and calm allowing submarines to be spotted easily by planes even at 100 meters depth.
The Japanese misuse of their own submarines to target capital ships instead of merchants guarantees that no matter what you give them they’ll not make good use of them.
Because the Germans knew how to use their submarinesWhy were the allies not afraid of Japanese submarine and afraid of German submarines
AFAIK the Soviet S-class (Stalinets) subs were pretty good for their size.
Good maneuverability, same torpedo tube arrangement as the Type IX, quite fast with good underwater range, better range than the Type VII.
The only significant drawback of the S-class is it's low test depth, which can be attributed to the use of rivets in the pressure hull. A fully welded version of the S-class would have a better test depth.
And it was designed by NV Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, a shell company that was part of the German rearmament effort.
The blueprints for the S-class were given to the USSR in late 1933.
IMO the Germans should have just taken the blueprint of the S-class, modified it slightly and made it into the ITTL Type VII instead of the OTL Type VII. A better sub with a shorter design time because the blueprints were ready in late 1933. Modifications would take about 1 year at most and construction can begin.
The Japanese could have also used the S-class design, I think they would have benefited from it.
A few reasons exist for why the U-Boat was feared more then a IJN sub,
First off the Atlantic had a LOT more merchant shipping going on. As well as troop transports and such so the pickings were richer.
The Atlantic is smaller so easier to find targets.
GB being an island needs supplies from outside. The Major Alied positions in pacific. Not so much. You are not staving the US or Australia even if you sink 100% of the merchant ships.
The US did not have as strong a navel fleet in the Atlantic (in general)
The US and GB viewed the Atlantic as a defensive war (stop Germany from sinking merchants) but the Pacific was an offensive war.
So it was not the submarines that made the s difference in the reputation but the way the two campaigns were fought
The problem with turning Japanese submarines loose against the sea lanes was one of capacity. Japan operated a total of 174 submarines in the whole war. The Germans built over 700 Type VIIs alone.
I would argue they had the right idea in using their submarines as high value asset killers and in 1942 they were effective in that role keeping Saratoga out of three of four carrier battles, sinking Wasp in the weeks before Santa Cruz, and making sure Y-Town did not get back to PH after Midway.
The problem was that US capacity eventually made itself felt and they pushed them away performing ancillary missions like supplying isolated garrisons, flying reconnaissance planes over South African and US west coast cities (seriously why?), and attacking British shipping in the Indian Ocean.
So if you were put in charge (and also as insane as they were) of the Japanese Navy in 1930s you'd recommend they simply copy the American submarine plans?
And the numbers, don’t forget the numbers.
Pacific submarines had pathetic operating depth on both the Japanese and American side. On the higher end it approached a 100 meters, that is 90 on Gato class. Germans could go down to 230 meters. Most submarines would not go down to 90 and stay at that depth for prolonged period of time. Pacific was also clear and calm allowing submarines to be spotted easily by planes even at 100 meters depth.
The Japanese misuse of their own submarines to target capital ships instead of merchants guarantees that no matter what you give them they’ll not make good use of them.
So if the Japanese use their submarines like the Germans to target merchant ships instead of capital ships they could be a dangerous problem to allies merchant ships in Pacific?
So if the Japanese use their submarines like the Germans to target merchant ships instead of capital ships they could be a dangerous problem to allies merchant ships in Pacific?
The sling/trolley/whatever it is was pretty unorthodox but it supposedly gave decreased the height of the battery compartment, freeing space for the crew.Based on the sling carry crawlers that served the battery compartments? Ugh... No. Also, their periscopes and radios were lousy as was their version of Gertrude. Sonar was substandard, too. Torpedoes? Ehhhh... The 53-38 torpedoes were direct copies of the Fiume torpedo (53.3 cm (21") W 270/533.4 x 7.2 "F"). Hull leaked because of shoddy workmanship.
Last sentence is the key, especially for the Japanese. Even where they were totally on the defensive and lacked the capital ships need to even attempt the "decisive battle" strategy they never turned their boats loose on the vast American supply lines that snaked across a quarter of the planet.
So if the Japanese use their submarines like the Germans to target merchant ships instead of capital ships they could be a dangerous problem to allies merchant ships in Pacific?
It would be more about blockading the United States from its possessions in the Pacific, IMHO. After all, it's not like there was a magic portal allowing them to teleport oil, machinery, and other supplies from the continent to Hawai'i and thence out to everywhere they were fighting; it had to travel by ship. I don't think this would really be terribly effective, but it could certainly impact American operations if they have to take more care with their supply lines.No, USA, unlike UK, can sustain and expand its industry with the resources on the American continent. Blockade would not be too effective against USA.
The IJN submarine force had a few spectacular successes (I-19 had arguably the best single attack in the history of warfare, sinking the Wasp, crippling the DD O'Brien with damage that eventually sent her to the bottom months later, and putting one torpedo in the North Carolina, the repairs took her out of the war during the major surface engagements of the Guadalcanal Campaign, five hits with six torpedoes) but it was damaged by the attitude of its commanders. They largely didn't see any merchant ship as a "worthy" target and regularly didn't pursue cargo ships even when contacted, preferring to wait for a warship.It would be more about blockading the United States from its possessions in the Pacific, IMHO. After all, it's not like there was a magic portal allowing them to teleport oil, machinery, and other supplies from the continent to Hawai'i and thence out to everywhere they were fighting; it had to travel by ship. I don't think this would really be terribly effective, but it could certainly impact American operations if they have to take more care with their supply lines.
It would be more about blockading the United States from its possessions in the Pacific, IMHO. After all, it's not like there was a magic portal allowing them to teleport oil, machinery, and other supplies from the continent to Hawai'i and thence out to everywhere they were fighting; it had to travel by ship. I don't think this would really be terribly effective, but it could certainly impact American operations if they have to take more care with their supply lines.
Firstly, Japan would need high quality steel and welders to make the boats, an asset already in short supply in Germany.What if the Japanese goverment in 1930s build 20+ VII Uboats under license from Germany and have a German military mission train the crews(let's say the Japanese navy see the potential of German Uboats)?how much effect woul Japanese navy having 20+ VII Uboats have on the early years of the pacific war ww2?
Firstly, Japan would need high quality steel and welders to make the boats, an asset already in short supply in Germany.
USN has near universal equipment of destroyers with radar and two years of lessons from the RN fighting U-boats at the start of the Pacific War.
Surface attacks are near suicide against radar equipped ships. Why would you copy such tactics?
The deeper diving is the only asset. USN does not get depth finding sonars till ‘44. It like the RN treated anti-submarine as a 2D problem. As subs dive deeper you need depth finding (3D solution). to make Hedgehog and Mk9 an effective weapon.
Detecting a submarine with hydrophones was quite difficult, and detecting it with sonar was all but but impossible. Sonar was highly directional. This allowed sonar to get a good bearing on its target, but it also limited the usefulness of sonar for search, since it took several seconds to listen for a return on a single bearing. The sonars of the Pacific War were thus fire control systems rather than search systems, with effective search sonars not becoming available until 1946. Range was also limited, rarely exceeding 3000 yards (2700m) even under the most favorable conditions. Sonar was generally ineffective at speeds over about 10 knots, requiring "sprint and drift" tactics in which the antisubmarine warship had to periodically slow almost to a stop to make best use of its sonar. Sonar could not determine depth with any accuracy and was unable to track a target immediately underneath it. Thus, a submarine could sometimes evade a depth charge attack by maneuvering sharply just as the attacker passed overhead and lost sonar contact. The depth charge explosions themselves blinded sonar, and a submarine that survived a depth charge attack could sometimes break contact behind the "wall" of sonar interference created by the depth charges.
The British developed the "creeping attack" to overcome these deficiencies. One antisubmarine ship would maintain sonar contact with the sub while guiding a second antisubmarine ship that closed in at low speed with its own active sonar turned off. This form of attack was extremely difficult for the submarine to evade.
1946 and the British ASDIC did not have the capability either until then.
Until then it was 2 element creep barrage, and BGAG tactics.
The sonars of the Pacific War were thus fire control systems rather than search systems, with effective search sonars not becoming available until 1946.