Given how the battles of Riga and Moon Sound turned out, the predreadnoughts were enough for the Baltic.
But there was no pre-dreadnoughts (or pretty much anything else serious) left on the Baltic after RJW so
something had to be built. Quite agree that this would not have to be the dreadnoughts: as long as the primary goal was coastal defense, the smartly built smaller ships with a good armor and heavy artillery probably would do, especially if competently used in combination with the coastal fortifications.
The fundamental problem, judging by some publications for the dummies like me, was that the Russian dreadnoughts were not too good due to the technological issues. As I said, RE had to develop technology as a top priority.
And given that neither the Russian or the Ottoman squadrons in the Black Sea really did much of note after the initial raid, that turns out to have been a needless expense.
Quite agree. With the Black Sea being a dead end, anyway, wasting money and resources on a whole series of dreadnoughts was plain stupidity. Surely, Russian top priority in WWI was not capture of the Straits even if,
in theory, this could open an otherwise blocked supply route. Which, IMO, would be “dentistry Russian style” (pulling tooth through a rectum). Much cheaper would be
before the war to have a normal gauge RR from Archangelsk, to build RR from Murmansk and to do build a bridge across the Amur for TransSib (and on a remaining change to buy more locomotives and RR equipment) rather than doing all these things during a war.
A squadron of submarines lying in wait for the Ottomans just north of Constantinople would be a far more cost-effective investment for defense than a squadron of battleships.
And setting the mine fields outside Sevastopol, Odessa, etc. would not cost much either. Probably using few fast destroyers or whatever to set mines outside the Bosphorus was not going to cost a fortune either. But it
seems that the naval brains did not work this way. Even Kolchak, who by the end of WWI got reputation of one of the world’s leading specialists in a mine warfare, had been making disparaging remarks about the submarines and other non-exciting ways to conduct a naval war. Do not forget, he was one of the leading figures in a design of the first Russian dreadnoughts and his stated goal was to create a “perfect gun platform” (resulting in noticeable design problems). So, prior to wwi there was no meaningful opposition to the dreadnought mantra.
The main task of a strategic debate is to determine how best to finish a war should you find yourself stumbling into one.
Yes, I know. Within a debate of “how to best finish a war if you have the allies that are going to screw you” probably a part “how you can make your military effort independent from the allied supplies” should be #1 followed by “define
your own realistic tasks”, “how to disregard the allied demands for help if these efforts will be ruinous for you”, “how to organize war propaganda” and “how to mobilize all branches of the economy for a war effort”. In OTL all of the above had been done other way around and the results are well-known.
An offensive strategy that relies on keeping the Polish salient should also keep the majority of the army in the western districts and generally do everything it can to optimize for having as many troops available on the front in Day 1. A strategy which intends to do this, but makes all the preparations necessary for a defensive plan instead, is going to end up worse than either a pure offense or a pure defense. And a pure offense would be best, since the fortification system the defense relies on is outdated and not getting upgraded, and going full passive in the opening stages would just let the Germans concentrate on their enemies one at a time.
Alternatively, go to a defense against Germany with the western front type tens lines of the trenches augmenting existing fortifications, while keeping enough good quality reserves to parry the German attacks and go aggressively against AH with enough resources to make this strategically meaningful forcing the Germans to patch the holes thus weakening them elsewhere.
Defense against Germany may involve some offensive operations with the limited goals but, let’s be realistic, short of some ASB-related miracle, OTL RE circa 1914 could not successfully fight an offensive war against Germany: its equipment was not adequate for the task and OTL attempts to resolve the problem by the piles of corpses did not work . In 1915 the German artillery was pretty much annihilating the Russian positions with a minimal opposition: not only did not Russian army had heavy field artillery, it also suffered from a severe shells shortage all the way to 1916. The famous Brusilov Offensive started with a very strict shells limits (partially, thanks to this a successful breakthrough formula came to life). So even the defensive scenario would require a much better pre-war preparedness. Shells, barbed wire, infantry helmets and even the machine guns were not high-tech items requiring sophisticated tools and could be produced in mass quantities in the machine tool shops. Surely, the Mosin rifles, which were in production since 1891, could be produced and accumulated in the numbers excluding a need to beg the allies for supplies of obsolete rifles, etc. The
strategic planning had to address issues like that, not just the battle schemas which you can’t implement anyway without all necessary hardware.
And, among other things, not wasting huge resources on the navy together with certain things that had been done during the war and could be done before it, may provide an ability for an army to face Germany on better terms than in OTL.