What if the Germans in 1942 only seized Stalingrad in 1942 and did not go south.

[Snake Featherston]

Blair, you repeated yourself for a fourth straight time and offered no explanation of how, only another reptition of the exact same point in spite of repeatedly asking that you not do that. I'm giving up on this at this point as once again it's clear that there's no discussing logistics with someone whose only answer to questions of how this solves the problems of getting shells from point A to point B and how his plan allows for Soviet actions is to continually repeat himself. Enough is enough. Repeating for a fourth straight time the direct Nazi plan of 1942 isn't going to make it succeed any more the more you repeat it. So.....I've had enough of asking you not to do something and to provide something of substance and getting nothing.

Blondie, how does that solve anything of logistics for either the Germans or the Axis? How, for that matter, does a mass of troops that size feed itself or retain morale and discipline just sitting in a small area for that long a period of time? For that matter, what happens once the Stalingrad population is massacred in terms of Soviet morale? Or in terms of the impact this has on any civilians unfortunate enough to be next to Hitler's savages?

 

[BlondieBC]

Um, no. Just....no. Generalplan Ost was targeted to the entire Soviet population. The Germans would have been the minority intent on eradicating the majority, that majority being the Slavs in that discussion. And in practical terms the seizure of Stalingrad means the entire population of the city will be butchered in a different Nanking in Europe scenario. Any Wehrmacht general that bucks Hitler on this is going to be sacked and replaced by one who will go along with him. I'm not the one confused here, you and he are. You and he also are under the impression that the Nazis are waging 1) a rational war, and 2) going to ever consider a realistic peace with the Soviets, both of which are false assumptions, and in practical terms after Stalingrad becomes Europe's Nanking, Germany will be a ruin postwar, regardless of any moral reality about the suffering and collective punishment involved.

Again, your scenario only works if Germany's led by a Kaiser, under Hitler it won't stop. It didn't have the ability to do that.

And I repeat my question, did either you or he miss the part where the OP specified there is nothing going to happen in the Caucausus, full-stop?

If you stopped bringing up topics irrelevant to the thread, it would be easier to figure out what position you are trying to defend. I have no idea how SS execution units or the SS death camps impact operational orders ITTL compared to OTL. Exactly what in the Ost plan prevents German from not accelerating the attack to the South? Or prevents German GHQ from attaching some extra units to the 6th Army for a full week? The Germans reassigned units all the time.

I don't see how long discussions of various minorities classifications in the USSR help on this thread.

I don't see how any reprisals against a losing Germany in 1945 or later changes the German GHQ decisions in 1942/43. Hitler did not worry about consequences of losing.

Now to a relevant point. I am not assuming Hitler is running a rational plan. I am assuming he stops at his stated goal of the AA line, which also matches his orders IOTL in 1942.

On the the attack to the south, I thought I made if very clear. If German GHQ achieves the full Volga line, the attack to the South is delay or cancelled depending on how one writes the TL and the butterflies. The harder the Soviets counter attack, the more likely the attack to the South is cancel.

 

[BlairWitch749]

Blair, you repeated yourself for a fourth straight time and offered no explanation of how, only another reptition of the exact same point in spite of repeatedly asking that you not do that. I'm giving up on this at this point as once again it's clear that there's no discussing logistics with someone whose only answer to questions of how this solves the problems of getting shells from point A to point B and how his plan allows for Soviet actions is to continually repeat himself. Enough is enough. Repeating for a fourth straight time the direct Nazi plan of 1942 isn't going to make it succeed any more the more you repeat it. So.....I've had enough of asking you not to do something and to provide something of substance and getting nothing.

Blondie, how does that solve anything of logistics for either the Germans or the Axis? How, for that matter, does a mass of troops that size feed itself or retain morale and discipline just sitting in a small area for that long a period of time? For that matter, what happens once the Stalingrad population is massacred in terms of Soviet morale? Or in terms of the impact this has on any civilians unfortunate enough to be next to Hitler's savages?

what shell shortage? what logistic problem? case blue had been prepared for more than 16 weeks; all of the units were fresh and fully supplied

ive explained how the logistics work better; logistics were not the problem anyway; it was traffic. instead of the 20 divisions of the 6th army crossing the bend in the don the 14 divisions of the 4th panzer army, reinforced by the 6th army's quatermaster and engineer companies cross the don; leaving the 6th army on the don to wait till the bridges are all built... 14 is less than 20 and therefore they will take less space on the roads, require fewer bridges etc etc

i've given you the two reasonable soviet counter moves to such an action; reinforce voronzeth and attack hoth from the north; both of which the soviet's didn't do in OTL because they had the opportunity to build a defensive line on the don which would not exist here; if you have an alternate defensive plan or counter attack you think would be reasonable for them to adopt in the context of the POD i'd be delighted to hear it

 

[Snake Featherston]

what shell shortage? what logistic problem? case blue had been prepared for more than 16 weeks; all of the units were fresh and fully supplied

ive explained how the logistics work better; logistics were not the problem anyway; it was traffic. instead of the 20 divisions of the 6th army crossing the bend in the don the 14 divisions of the 4th panzer army, reinforced by the 6th army's quatermaster and engineer companies cross the don; leaving the 6th army on the don to wait till the bridges are all built... 14 is less than 20 and therefore they will take less space on the roads, require fewer bridges etc etc

i've given you the two reasonable soviet counter moves to such an action; reinforce voronzeth and attack hoth from the north; both of which the soviet's didn't do in OTL because they had the opportunity to build a defensive line on the don which would not exist here; if you have an alternate defensive plan or counter attack you think would be reasonable for them to adopt in the context of the POD i'd be delighted to hear it

Blair, if you're unaware of the degree to which OTL Case Blue was launched on a shoestring, I have to seriously question if you've actually read a thing about the campaign written since say, the height of the Cold War. Both David Glantz *and* more modern German-POV histories note this. You're continuing to ignore the issue and repeat yourself, and I'm not interested in that as I've already told you. Logistics very much was the problem, especially in terms of the bigger offensive, but it would also apply to a more limited one where this is a build-up much too vast for a simple drive to the Volga. Endlessly repeating the OTL German strategy isn't going to alter the OTL result of that strategy, especially because all your view allows for in Soviet action is "because I said so."

 

[Snake Featherston]

If you stopped bringing up topics irrelevant to the thread, it would be easier to figure out what position you are trying to defend. I have no idea how SS execution units or the SS death camps impact operational orders ITTL compared to OTL. Exactly what in the Ost plan prevents German from not accelerating the attack to the South? Or prevents German GHQ from attaching some extra units to the 6th Army for a full week? The Germans reassigned units all the time.

I don't see how long discussions of various minorities classifications in the USSR help on this thread.

I don't see how any reprisals against a losing Germany in 1945 or later changes the German GHQ decisions in 1942/43. Hitler did not worry about consequences of losing.

Now to a relevant point. I am not assuming Hitler is running a rational plan. I am assuming he stops at his stated goal of the AA line, which also matches his orders IOTL in 1942.

On the the attack to the south, I thought I made if very clear. If German GHQ achieves the full Volga line, the attack to the South is delay or cancelled depending on how one writes the TL and the butterflies. The harder the Soviets counter attack, the more likely the attack to the South is cancel.

So you have no idea that IOTL the Germans' explicit orders in the event of capturing Stalingrad were the wholesale slaughter of the city, as per the more modern books on this by both Glantz and Beevor? In that case I'm going to ask if you've read anything on this campaign not written since the 1970s, and until we're willing to admit that the German operational plans for this campaign are exactly on topic, we're going to keep going in circles. Hitler issued this kind of order IOTL on September 2nd when it looked like the fall of the city was imminent. Would ATL Hitler be less murderous or less prone to wage Vernichtungskrieg together than OTL?

The OP explicitly says Stalingrad and then stop, it says nothing about a general attack down the Volga or anything directed at the Caucasus, and as the OP hasn't cleared up what he meant, I would prefer we stick to what he actually said as opposed to what you think he meant.

 

[Orry]

Strictly speaking when they're facing Hitler and the Nazis, there's no way for them to lose. There are ways where their winning amounts purely to clearing their territory and there are a few ways to avert their participation altogether, but otherwise, you're guaranteed to see some form of the Eastern Bloc because the Nazis were just strong enough to be menaces but nowhere near strong enough to win.

If you add with the western allies involved as well I agree.

No allied bomber offensive has knock on effects - increased German production, more German aircraft and Guns available....

No fear of a Allied invasion in the west has knock on effects - Many of the German units in the west are not suitable for the east but still a lot of German divisions available to go to the east if there is no fear of D-day

No lend lease has knock on effects - Massively reduced Soviet mobility due to shortage of trucks etc reduced Soviet air-power, less tanks etc...

How you Get the UK out of the War after the fall of France is a problem....

 

[BlairWitch749]

Blair, if you're unaware of the degree to which OTL Case Blue was launched on a shoestring, I have to seriously question if you've actually read a thing about the campaign written since say, the height of the Cold War. Both David Glantz *and* more modern German-POV histories note this. You're continuing to ignore the issue and repeat yourself, and I'm not interested in that as I've already told you. Logistics very much was the problem, especially in terms of the bigger offensive, but it would also apply to a more limited one where this is a build-up much too vast for a simple drive to the Volga. Endlessly repeating the OTL German strategy isn't going to alter the OTL result of that strategy, especially because all your view allows for in Soviet action is "because I said so."

it wasn't launched on a shoe string; army group south had been reinforced at the expense of AGC and AGN and had nearly all of the available new armor and airpower for the front. the 4th panzer army had been rebuilt to a strength of over 800 tanks and assault guns. the only way you could describe blue as shoe string is in the sense of the entire eastern front; not the blue forces themselves which due to hitler's prioritizing of them were the strongest in the German army... Tsouras pegged them at being at 85 percent of authorized strength on average in AGS's divisions; much higher than the 50 for AGC and AGN; their "logistical failures" in the early stages of the campaign were objectively huge traffic jams as the 4th panzer was sent north, then south then north again which burned a lot of fuel and wasted time and slowed the advance of the 1st PAA and the 6th army whilst accomplishing nothing

you didn't see actual logistic problems until army group A was more than 300 miles past Rostov; and I was never talking about army group A; the POD's discussed were only in the operations of Army Group B which showed no material supply shortages until they were engaged in mega combat in stalingrad itself

 

[Snake Featherston]

If you add with the western allies involved as well I agree.

No allied bomber offensive has knock on effects - increased German production, more German aircraft and Guns available....

No fear of a Allied invasion in the west has knock on effects - Many of the German units in the west are not suitable for the east but still a lot of German divisions available to go to the east if there is no fear of D-day

No lend lease has knock on effects - Massively reduced Soviet mobility due to shortage of trucks etc reduced Soviet air-power, less tanks etc...

How you Get the UK out of the War after the fall of France is a problem....

Especially because Hitler doesn't want to defeat the UK, he wants Tommy Atikins to butcher women and children with machine guns like the average Gefreiter and his SS counterparts did.

 

[Snake Featherston]

it wasn't launched on a shoe string; army group south had been reinforced at the expense of AGC and AGN and had nearly all of the available new armor and airpower for the front. the 4th panzer army had been rebuilt to a strength of over 800 tanks and assault guns. the only way you could describe blue as shoe string is in the sense of the entire eastern front; not the blue forces themselves which due to hitler's prioritizing of them were the strongest in the German army... Tsouras pegged them at being at 85 percent of authorized strength on average in AGS's divisions; much higher than the 50 for AGC and AGN; their "logistical failures" in the early stages of the campaign were objectively huge traffic jams as the 4th panzer was sent north, then south then north again which burned a lot of fuel and wasted time and slowed the advance of the 1st PAA and the 6th army whilst accomplishing nothing

you didn't see actual logistic problems until army group A was more than 300 miles past Rostov; and I was never talking about army group A; the POD's discussed were only in the operations of Army Group B which showed no material supply shortages until they were engaged in mega combat in stalingrad itself

Again, books written since 1991 by people like Fritz and Glantz disagree entirely with this assertion, as does Beevor's book on Stalingrad. The entire offensive was launched with the aim of defeating the USSR, but did not have either the manpower or the logistical support to do that with a drive to the Volga and the Caucasus simultaneously. Oversaturating Stalingrad with Axis troops doesn't fix this problem, it creates all new ones.

 

[LordIreland]

Well, looking at the OPs original statement, I would say a lot would depend on Hitler, if he gets his I want the city head on then hey presto one instant Wehrmacht meat grinder That being said, I suspect that the Germans would want the city, because quite frankly it beats the crap out of sitting on the Steppe during a russian winter.

Interdiction of the Volga will cause serious problems for the Russians. That being said in OTL the Germans reached the Volga at several points and AFAIK were unable to significantly interdict the existing shipping. So presumably they would need to control both banks of the Volga or a significantly long enough stretch so as to make it impossible for the Russians to use it.

The main issue here is Hitler, I simply can't see him being satisfied with such a limited objective and if he is removed from the picture the aims and objectives would radically change.

Just my two pennies worth.

Lord I

 

[colleen1227]

There have been many studies that point to the fact that the Axis could not transport or refine the oil in the caucus during the war. The offensive should have been to cutoff the Volga from use as a transport line for the USSR and move airbases close enough to effectively deny the use of the oil fields to the USSR through bombings. Only after the war could the Axis exploit the fields. So stopping around Stalingrad and denying the use of the fields should have been the aim.Instead of driving to Baku after Stalingrad they could have tried to take Saratov completely cutting off the Caucus.

 

[Orry]

There have been many studies that point to the fact that the Axis could not transport or refine the oil in the caucus during the war. The offensive should have been to cutoff the Volga from use as a transport line for the USSR and move airbases close enough to effectively deny the use of the oil fields to the USSR through bombings. Only after the war could the Axis exploit the fields. So stopping around Stalingrad and denying the use of the fields should have been the aim.Instead of driving to Baku after Stalingrad they could have tried to take Saratov completely cutting off the Caucus.

Given how well the Russians managed to move or destroy production plants in 1941 only Hitler could have expected to capture the oil fields in a usable condition.

Seeking to deny their use to the Russians by blocking the Volga and possibly reaching the Caspian sea is one thing - expecting to get through the mountains to the fields themselves is another

 

[Gannt the chartist]

The quick answer to the OP is a different 1942 with the Germans facing an offensive at the time and place of the Russian’s choosing with an overextended front. Unless there is a belief (even a deluded one) that the offensive can win the war its a fundamentally stupid thing to do.

The Soviet reaction could be anything from an earlier destruction of Army Group Centre to a renewed attack on Kharkov. Arguably the Soviet target in 42 is wherever they can destroy conveniently vulnerable German formations - OTL 6th army and Army Group B are the best targets with this OP well it wont be impaling themselves on the strongest portion of the German front.

The idea of stripping out the logistics organisation from 6th army to support 4th Pz is hmm, interesting,. How does 6th army feed itself? And given that the majority of German transport was horse drawn I am not sure that speeds up 4th Pz rate of advance. Actually given that 2 2/3 divs of the 7 2/3 available to 4th Pz are leg infantry anyway I am not sure how the army rate of advance can be speeded up at all. In any event with no loggies or engineers that leaves 11 inf div and three mobile of 6th army sitting playing cards for the summer, mostly in the open.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Given how well the Russians managed to move or destroy production plants in 1941 only Hitler could have expected to capture the oil fields in a usable condition.

Seeking to deny their use to the Russians by blocking the Volga and possibly reaching the Caspian sea is one thing - expecting to get through the mountains to the fields themselves is another

That's not exactly a fair comparison, because the Soviets started moving their factories months before the Axis invaded. Though it was pretty obvious that the Soviets would be able to sabotage anything before the Germans got there and logistics would be a huge problem, Hitler's generals didn't object when he headed into the Caucasus:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue#Splitting_of_Army_Group_South

Believing that the main Russian threat had been eliminated, desperately short of oil and needing to meet all the ambitious objectives of Case Blue, Hitler made a series of changes to the plan in Führer Directive No. 45:

reorganized Army Group South into two smaller Army Groups, A and B;

tasked Army Group A with advancing to the Caucasus and capturing the oil fields (Operation Edelweiß);

tasked Army Group B with the offensive towards the Volga and Stalingrad (Operation Fischreiher).[26]

There is no evidence Hitler was opposed by, or received complaints from Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, or anyone else, about the directive until August 1942.

 

[BlondieBC]

So you have no idea that IOTL the Germans' explicit orders in the event of capturing Stalingrad were the wholesale slaughter of the city, as per the more modern books on this by both Glantz and Beevor? In that case I'm going to ask if you've read anything on this campaign not written since the 1970s, and until we're willing to admit that the German operational plans for this campaign are exactly on topic, we're going to keep going in circles. Hitler issued this kind of order IOTL on September 2nd when it looked like the fall of the city was imminent. Would ATL Hitler be less murderous or less prone to wage Vernichtungskrieg together than OTL?

The OP explicitly says Stalingrad and then stop, it says nothing about a general attack down the Volga or anything directed at the Caucasus, and as the OP hasn't cleared up what he meant, I would prefer we stick to what he actually said as opposed to what you think he meant.

Again, you miss the point. How does orders for the Eisengruppen or SS extermination units related to the orders of bridging units or anti-tank units? Germans are capable on any given day of issuing orders to massacre XXX people, send YYY to the death camps, bridge a river, and dig in with anti-tank units. It happened often IOTL.

In my responses, I discuss the possible military implications of taking Stalingrad and holding the Volga line while delaying the attack towards the South. I also gave a brief overview of what happens in a Hitler hold more land longer ATL, which is simply more Slavs, Jews and other minorities die.

Yes, eventually, Hitler decided to take Stalingrad, but it was either too late or with too little forces depending on ones perspective. The type of POD discussed in this thread allow for either to be different. Either the Nazi could follow the original plan and take Stalingrad earlier and then push back on the flanks or they could allocated the additional resources to taking Stalingrad. Or they could do both. Discussing in the level of detail you want about a specific order on a specific day months after the summer campaign is launched is not possible in a thread like this, it would take a full timeline.

Why don't we let the thread author speak to his original intent?

 

[Snake Featherston]

Again, you miss the point. How does orders for the Eisengruppen or SS extermination units related to the orders of bridging units or anti-tank units? Germans are capable on any given day of issuing orders to massacre XXX people, send YYY to the death camps, bridge a river, and dig in with anti-tank units. It happened often IOTL.

In my responses, I discuss the possible military implications of taking Stalingrad and holding the Volga line while delaying the attack towards the South. I also gave a brief overview of what happens in a Hitler hold more land longer ATL, which is simply more Slavs, Jews and other minorities die.

Yes, eventually, Hitler decided to take Stalingrad, but it was either too late or with too little forces depending on ones perspective. The type of POD discussed in this thread allow for either to be different. Either the Nazi could follow the original plan and take Stalingrad earlier and then push back on the flanks or they could allocated the additional resources to taking Stalingrad. Or they could do both. Discussing in the level of detail you want about a specific order on a specific day months after the summer campaign is launched is not possible in a thread like this, it would take a full timeline.

Why don't we let the thread author speak to his original intent?

Why don't we assume that stopping at Stalingrad and no Caucasus offensive means exactly what it says and what is said is exactly what's meant? As opposed to discussing a rapid capture of Stalingrad and *then* an offensive in the exact opposite scenario to that specified in the OP? What you're describing might be plausible if that were what we're talking about, but it's not.

 

[Tongera]

If the Germans took Stalingrad, wouldn't it have cut of the oil of the Causcuses from the rest of the Soviet Union? Or could it have been delivered through Astrakhan, on the Caspian?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

If the Germans took Stalingrad, wouldn't it have cut of the oil of the Causcuses from the rest of the Soviet Union? Or could it have been delivered through Astrakhan, on the Caspian?

It was mostly delivered via the Caspian Sea, but not to Astrakhan. There was a port further east, whose name escapes me ATM. The question is whether Baku could be supplied via the Caspian, as most of the infrastructure AFAIK was only set up for oil, not military supply.

 

[Tongera]

It was mostly delivered via the Caspian Sea, but not to Astrakhan. There was a port further east, whose name escapes me ATM. The question is whether Baku could be supplied via the Caspian, as most of the infrastructure AFAIK was only set up for oil, not military supply.

I think troops and supplies could be delivered by the Caspian. Might be a problem with transporting said men and supplies in the Caucuses and local infastructure might not be up to scratch.

 

[Ian the Admin]

Oh and I do not care how heroic the common Soviet soldier was - it still does not justify what they did to the civilian populations of eastern europe - and the fact the Germans committed atrocities does not justify the 'revenge'. Give the accused a trial and imprison or shoot the guilty if you want - do not rape their mothers, wives and daughters

So in other words you don't care about Germans raping Soviet mothers, wives, and daughters, and evidently invading and occupying Eastern Europe in totalitarian blocs for a half-century is worse than an invasion intent on slaughtering almost everyone in the USSR and whatever survivors are left being reduced to perpetual slavery? Evidently when Germans are the raping, shooting, butchering barbarians it doesn't count.

Someone says mass rape as revenge isn't just and they'd rather have seen the western allies occupy eastern Europe, and you accuse them of supporting German atrocities and wanting the Nazis to win WW2.

That's just batshit insane. It's viciously attacking someone because you somehow got the crazy idea that they believe the opposite of what they do. Or worse, because you just wanted shit to hurl at someone you disagreed with.

You've been kicked way too many times for this and never changed your behavior a whit.

Banned.