raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
What if Chiang Kai-shek was killed in his last flight out of China, in December 1949?
He took several long-distance flights that year, including one in July and August to and from South Korea to meet with Syngman Rhee and Elpidio Quirino to discuss and Asian security pact, and his final flight out of China, from his last capital on the mainland, Chengdu in Sichuan province, across hundreds of miles of Communist occupied territory and the Taiwan strait, to Taiwan, in December 1949.
If his flight had stalled out and lost at sea in the straits, or brought down by coastal defense fighters, which the PRC had started to import from the USSR, and he had been killed, he would not exactly have been missed by the Truman Administration, with whom his relations were poor, even though he would be a martyr to many American admirers.
The Truman Administration had given up on his personal regime, but it was not enamored of the Communists either. Some in the administration saw signs of and reasons for tension between the USSR and the Communist Chinese, and hoped they could encourage those tensions to grow. Secretary of State Dean Acheson internalized this view the most, and made occasional public comments discussing incompatble Russian and Chinese national interests, such as remarking on Soviet designs to control Manchuria and Xinjiang. But his unsubtle words in late 1949 and the first half of 1950 were not gaining any substantive positive results, and Mao's public actions were playing to a different script of "leaning to one side", visiting the USSR, celebrating Stalin's birthday with him, and, by March 1950, negotiating a Sino-Soviet alliance.
Truman, and Acheson, were also not hastening to recognize the PRC because of PRC mistreatment and detentions of US diplomats and likely an understanding it would be highly criticized and unpopular at home. They were also obstructing the seating of the PRC's representatives in the place of the Republic of China's at the UN.
The Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, the Joint Chiefs, and USAFFE, General MacArthur placed importance on denying Taiwan, which they archaically still called Formosa, to Communist control, with several of them, especially MacArthur being pretty agnostic about the political means to do it, whether to do it under the continud Chiang regime, or to claim it was still under US control as part of the occupation of Japan as a Japanese territory pending a peace treaty.
Some Truman Administration figures, including some in DoD and CIA, while being anti-Chiang, wanted to persist in impeding and harassing the Chinese Communists in Taiwan, and the provinces of the mainland, with whatever local resistance forces were available, for as long as possible. For Taiwan, as an island, it might be possible to make that denial and resistance more or less permanent.
General Sun Liren, a VMI graduate who had fought with the Americans in Burma and now based in Taiwan, was thought by many Americans to be a competent, honest leader who would be a good replacement for Chiang.
In OTL, with Chiang alive and in charge, the Truman Administration stuck with a policy of "letting the dust settle" and waiting on events. Essentially this amounted to not aiding Chiang or his regime on Taiwan and waiting for it to get conquered by the Communists, possibly, however unlikely, survive on its own, or possibly get coup'ed by someone "better". If it were conquered by the Communists, by default the US would have no alternative but to allow the Communist regime to be seated at the UN and have some form of diplomatic talks with it. If Chiang were coup'ed the Administration could reconsider the aid question. If the new leadership looked viable, it could provide aid. Or if not, Washington could keep its distance.
With mechanically or ordnance induced aircraft failure eliminating Chiang from the equation, what do you think happens with Taiwan and the Nationalist movement, and what decision(s) does the Truman Administration make between December 1949 and June 1950?
a) The Nationalist generals in Taiwan go into depression and panic and fall all over themselves trying to defect to the Communists first for maximum personal advantage, leading to Communist takeover
b) General Sun Liren takes charge on Taiwan, in process that may or may not be heavily influenced by the USA, or may be shaped to acquire US aid
c) An alternate Nationalist leader seizes power for themselves and fights for it tooth & nail (possibly Chiang's son or his widow)
d) The Truman administration stops waiting and announces support and protection (via 7th fleet) for new regime if it likes the new leader
[it probably would find Chiang family too same/same, but consider someone outside the family, without a negative record, "fresh"]
e) The Truman administration would continue to steer clear to work on European defense, see if Commies win, if new guy can hold
If polled on this choices, anybody should legitimately get two choices - 1 of a,b, or c, and one of d or e
If compelled to put a bet on it now, I would place my bets on b) Sun Liren and d) the Truman Administration starts intervening in the straits.
I would note that I think if that was the succession outcome, and that was the Truman policy, a knock-on consequence would be that the Korean War would probably be avoided, at least that year. A US intervention, open support mission to the ChiNats on Taiwan, and intermittent patrolling of the Taiwan straits, does not literally promise or put US troops or aircraft into South Korea, but it is a strong reminder of the possibility. It implies a willingness to do it. Therefore, I think the probability is significantly raised that if Kim Il-Sung goes to Stalin seeking support and approval for an open invasion of South Korea in summer 1950, Stalin will tell him he cannot allow him to take such a bold risk, the chances of American intervention, retaliation, and a broader war are too high - we will keep fortifying your defenses.
Of course, that *might* not be the case, and Stalin and Kim and Mao might reason America is fearless on the water but frightened on land, so it its puppet should be attacked on land while it is weak and before it can be strengthened. But I think that is the less likely case. If Stalin, Kim and Mao did reach that consensus, Mao *might* offer to help Kim with troops from the get-go, although Mao and Stalin might think the international political "optics" of Koreans doing it alone would look better. It would be a tough call, weighing between political propaganda value verus military surety. For his part, based on Cold War archival stuff, Kim would prefer to do it alone, based out of national and personal pride and desire for control.
He took several long-distance flights that year, including one in July and August to and from South Korea to meet with Syngman Rhee and Elpidio Quirino to discuss and Asian security pact, and his final flight out of China, from his last capital on the mainland, Chengdu in Sichuan province, across hundreds of miles of Communist occupied territory and the Taiwan strait, to Taiwan, in December 1949.
If his flight had stalled out and lost at sea in the straits, or brought down by coastal defense fighters, which the PRC had started to import from the USSR, and he had been killed, he would not exactly have been missed by the Truman Administration, with whom his relations were poor, even though he would be a martyr to many American admirers.
The Truman Administration had given up on his personal regime, but it was not enamored of the Communists either. Some in the administration saw signs of and reasons for tension between the USSR and the Communist Chinese, and hoped they could encourage those tensions to grow. Secretary of State Dean Acheson internalized this view the most, and made occasional public comments discussing incompatble Russian and Chinese national interests, such as remarking on Soviet designs to control Manchuria and Xinjiang. But his unsubtle words in late 1949 and the first half of 1950 were not gaining any substantive positive results, and Mao's public actions were playing to a different script of "leaning to one side", visiting the USSR, celebrating Stalin's birthday with him, and, by March 1950, negotiating a Sino-Soviet alliance.
Truman, and Acheson, were also not hastening to recognize the PRC because of PRC mistreatment and detentions of US diplomats and likely an understanding it would be highly criticized and unpopular at home. They were also obstructing the seating of the PRC's representatives in the place of the Republic of China's at the UN.
The Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, the Joint Chiefs, and USAFFE, General MacArthur placed importance on denying Taiwan, which they archaically still called Formosa, to Communist control, with several of them, especially MacArthur being pretty agnostic about the political means to do it, whether to do it under the continud Chiang regime, or to claim it was still under US control as part of the occupation of Japan as a Japanese territory pending a peace treaty.
Some Truman Administration figures, including some in DoD and CIA, while being anti-Chiang, wanted to persist in impeding and harassing the Chinese Communists in Taiwan, and the provinces of the mainland, with whatever local resistance forces were available, for as long as possible. For Taiwan, as an island, it might be possible to make that denial and resistance more or less permanent.
General Sun Liren, a VMI graduate who had fought with the Americans in Burma and now based in Taiwan, was thought by many Americans to be a competent, honest leader who would be a good replacement for Chiang.
In OTL, with Chiang alive and in charge, the Truman Administration stuck with a policy of "letting the dust settle" and waiting on events. Essentially this amounted to not aiding Chiang or his regime on Taiwan and waiting for it to get conquered by the Communists, possibly, however unlikely, survive on its own, or possibly get coup'ed by someone "better". If it were conquered by the Communists, by default the US would have no alternative but to allow the Communist regime to be seated at the UN and have some form of diplomatic talks with it. If Chiang were coup'ed the Administration could reconsider the aid question. If the new leadership looked viable, it could provide aid. Or if not, Washington could keep its distance.
With mechanically or ordnance induced aircraft failure eliminating Chiang from the equation, what do you think happens with Taiwan and the Nationalist movement, and what decision(s) does the Truman Administration make between December 1949 and June 1950?
a) The Nationalist generals in Taiwan go into depression and panic and fall all over themselves trying to defect to the Communists first for maximum personal advantage, leading to Communist takeover
b) General Sun Liren takes charge on Taiwan, in process that may or may not be heavily influenced by the USA, or may be shaped to acquire US aid
c) An alternate Nationalist leader seizes power for themselves and fights for it tooth & nail (possibly Chiang's son or his widow)
d) The Truman administration stops waiting and announces support and protection (via 7th fleet) for new regime if it likes the new leader
[it probably would find Chiang family too same/same, but consider someone outside the family, without a negative record, "fresh"]
e) The Truman administration would continue to steer clear to work on European defense, see if Commies win, if new guy can hold
If polled on this choices, anybody should legitimately get two choices - 1 of a,b, or c, and one of d or e
If compelled to put a bet on it now, I would place my bets on b) Sun Liren and d) the Truman Administration starts intervening in the straits.
I would note that I think if that was the succession outcome, and that was the Truman policy, a knock-on consequence would be that the Korean War would probably be avoided, at least that year. A US intervention, open support mission to the ChiNats on Taiwan, and intermittent patrolling of the Taiwan straits, does not literally promise or put US troops or aircraft into South Korea, but it is a strong reminder of the possibility. It implies a willingness to do it. Therefore, I think the probability is significantly raised that if Kim Il-Sung goes to Stalin seeking support and approval for an open invasion of South Korea in summer 1950, Stalin will tell him he cannot allow him to take such a bold risk, the chances of American intervention, retaliation, and a broader war are too high - we will keep fortifying your defenses.
Of course, that *might* not be the case, and Stalin and Kim and Mao might reason America is fearless on the water but frightened on land, so it its puppet should be attacked on land while it is weak and before it can be strengthened. But I think that is the less likely case. If Stalin, Kim and Mao did reach that consensus, Mao *might* offer to help Kim with troops from the get-go, although Mao and Stalin might think the international political "optics" of Koreans doing it alone would look better. It would be a tough call, weighing between political propaganda value verus military surety. For his part, based on Cold War archival stuff, Kim would prefer to do it alone, based out of national and personal pride and desire for control.