What does Nazi Germany do next?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amerika_Bomber
Though it largely didn't advance to a functional production version, this was the result of war conditions in 1944 and the canceling of anything bomber related for the Emergency Fighter Program.

I get your point about the A-10 as it existed in our timeline, but ITTL without the pressures of the war being lost, Germany would have more time to refine the design, because until Japan is defeated at some point (in 1944 or 45 depending on the scenario), that doesn't mean the US and Germany are immediately coming to blows. If anything there will be a Cold War situation.

Also Germany IOTL worked out the Jumo 222 engine, which was their 3000hp engine, but couldn't build it due to the raw material costs; without a war in the East or even full peace they could afford to build it for their Amerika Bomber program, which gave it the same power as the B-36 when it was introduced in 1949.

Its also not like their wouldn't be jet engine versions either, as several strategic bombers (not Amerika bomber ranged though) were to be ready in 1946-47.

The A-10 is essentially a ICBM. The first ICBM was the Soviet R-7 in 1957. How much faster would have the Germans being able to develop something similiar? Realistically I don't see how the a plane like the JU-390 compares very favorably to even the B-36B let alone the later B-36 featherweigh models that had jet engines and ceilings of over 50,000 feet.
 

Deleted member 1487

The A-10 is essentially a ICBM. The first ICBM was the Soviet R-7 in 1957. How much faster would have the Germans being able to develop something similiar?
Several years, because they were working on it tens years before the Soviets started on the R-7. I'm not saying it would be ready before the late 1940s or even early 1950s, but the Soviets were too busy working on the V-2 derived R-1 for years first to catch up to wear the Germans were in 1944; once they had mastered what the Germans had in 1944 by November 1950, they could start working on more advanced versions; in 1940 the work on the A-10 began and though not with a viable guidance system by 1943 when it was cancelled IOTL, it was a start and well ahead of the rest of the world. Testing was supposed to have begun in 1946 without cancellation, which probably would have left 1949 as the earliest it would have been ready. The real question is not whether the missile would reach the target, that it could do for sure, its more a matter of the guidance system. The Germans were the farthest ahead in that department thanks to the experience working with the V-1 and V-2s. Further developments with years of peace would probably have yielded something that could hit New York by the early 1950s, though possibly by 1949.


The Amerika Bomber would have been ready sooner of course.
The Ta400 was also a bomber in this category, which with 6 engine and the Jumo 222, could have performed the necessary task, though probably with a lower bomb load than the B-36.
 
Armageddon and Pantheocide.

Since both of those works really don't deal with past alternative timelines why do you think his view point of history is narrow and slanted? If you have never read any of his books from his "The Big One" alternative timeline I don't see how you could make a solid informed opinion. What where your issues with Armageddon and Pantheocide if you don't mind me asking?
 
Several years, because they were working on it tens years before the Soviets started on the R-7. I'm not saying it would be ready before the late 1940s or even early 1950s, but the Soviets were too busy working on the V-2 derived R-1 for years first to catch up to wear the Germans were in 1944; once they had mastered what the Germans had in 1944 by November 1950, they could start working on more advanced versions; in 1940 the work on the A-10 began and though not with a viable guidance system by 1943 when it was cancelled IOTL, it was a start and well ahead of the rest of the world. Testing was supposed to have begun in 1946 without cancellation, which probably would have left 1949 as the earliest it would have been ready. The real question is not whether the missile would reach the target, that it could do for sure, its more a matter of the guidance system. The Germans were the farthest ahead in that department thanks to the experience working with the V-1 and V-2s. Further developments with years of peace would probably have yielded something that could hit New York by the early 1950s, though possibly by 1949.


The Amerika Bomber would have been ready sooner of course.
The Ta400 was also a bomber in this category, which with 6 engine and the Jumo 222, could have performed the necessary task, though probably with a lower bomb load than the B-36.

I get where your going with the ICBM's. However I think with the current tech of the time trying to develop a full scale ICBM would have been really difficult. Of course without a nuclear bomb to put on the ICBM it isn't much use.

Looking t the Ta400. The B-36 used 3500HP Wasp Major engines the Ta400 used 1700 hp engines, the Ta400 2,000lb thrust engines and two of them. The B-36D was using 4x 5,000lb thrust engines. Payload of 22,000lb versus over 80,000lb for the B-36. To me while it could perform the task of intercontinental bomber it wasn't in the same league as performance as the B-36.
 

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Since both of those works really don't deal with past alternative timelines why do you think his view point of history is narrow and slanted? If you have never read any of his books from his "The Big One" alternative timeline I don't see how you could make a solid informed opinion. What where your issues with Armageddon and Pantheocide if you don't mind me asking?

Both Armaggedon and Pantheocide deals with deceased historical characters and therefore gives quite insightful concepts on Slades historical knowledge and his view upon how history is formed.

I can actually make an informed opinion about an author based upon his prior works, if those are shite, odds are his later works are also shite.

You may ask, but my 'issues' with Armaggedon and Pantheocide are mine. I only give reasons of why I dislike (or like) something to the creator of any works as I believe readers ought to make up their own minds and I do not wish to influence their opinions with mine. I will only say that I didn't like them.
 
I would really be interested in a source that supports this point. I have a hard time reconciling this with German/Nazi tendency to document everything. Documentation is generally a function of bureaucracy as it is the primary reason for such documentation. Hitler might have been the lynchpin of the Nazi party but I think the German state would have been a little more resiliant. This is particularly since, as of this TL, it would not have suffered under strategic bombing, which destroyed so much infrastructure. But, I suspect you are more knowledgeable on the subject than I, so I am interested in your sources.

Ian Kershaw writes a lot about the structure of Nazi Germany, and I draw most of my conclusions from his works, along with various information about how its government functioned. Biographies on Stalin also offer insights into the important differences between the two systems of rule. Essentially the German government was divided into numerous competing factions, all of which vied for power and were led by a Plenipotentiary; by 1944 these were Speer, Bormann, Himmler, and Goebbels, but ITTL such centralization is unlikely without the pressures of war. These factions were filled with their own subfactions, ambitious subordinates, etc all looking to seize power. This constant competition and jockeying for control was kept in a delicate balance only by their mutual loyalty to Hitler and adherence to his leadership. Despite this, as time went on Nazi Germany became an increasingly confused mess with the opinions of Gauleiters, Party officials, factory managers, etc replacing bureaucratic rule by law. Remove Hitler from this picture and there's nothing to control the competition and chaos in the Nazi system; no one has the means or power to take and hold the position of Fuhrer, because they lack the system of control that Hitler had built.

This isn't to portray Hitler as a skilled manager or heavily involved in government; just the opposite, he mostly left things to his subordinates. But his personality and the general idea of what he wanted, along with the loyalty towards him (All of his inner circle owed everything they had to his personal support and favor), created a powerful system of control which IOTL was only broken by his suicide.

Nobody argues that hypothetical replacement German leaders could not try that in a victory scenario - without the Führer. The point is whether they would.
Note that by 1942 already - with war going on - the chances of surviving one of the worst possible situations, probably the worst after that of being a Jew, i.e. being a Soviet POW, greatly increased, not because the Germans had had a change of heart, but because they realized they needed HiWis. In that victory scenario, they would need serfs. Dismantling the conquered cities would also mean losing the manpower for their industries. In words of General Leykauf, certainly a great killer within the Ostplan, and yet a pragmatic man, if they killed millions, "who is actually supposed to produce economic values?"
At the end of 1941, German officers tasked with policing the rear areas voiced grave concerns about the chances of maintaining order, when the populace was starving.
An all-out Hungerplan, leaving aside all ethics, did not come without serious very practical drawbacks.
I don't expect the German decision makers to suddenly grow a heart. But I wouldn't be surprised if they saw those.

The reason for the declined rate of death among foreign laborers and POWs was due to the worsening situation of the war in the east. As the war had gone on much longer than expected there was a massive shortage of labor which needed to be filled. Thus at the same time as mass starvation of laborers was temporarily halted, large number of new ones were brought in, reducing total percentages of deaths. However, at the same time as this rational use of labor, genocidal practices continued unabated. The very concept of "performance feeding" (Denying food to under-performing workers, resulting in their deaths) was designed to continue killing off those too work to weak, resembling the program of separating those unable to work to be sent to the gas chambers immediately while those able to were kept as slave labor for a while longer.

With the war ended there will no longer be a pressing demand for labor (Especially as armaments production slows down and millions of soldiers return to the workforce) and mass slaughter will resume. Slavs will continue to be employed as slave labor; Generalplan Ost specifically set aside percentages (35% on Ukraine, 25-35% in Russia, etc) to be kept alive. However, they will be performing tasks of a different sort than workers did in Germany. While killing a worker in a factory would not be beneficial as it would take time for a new worker to become acclimated to the job, a worker building roads and digging ditches could be replaced easily. The tearing down and building of infrastructure in the East was a central component of the Generalplan. With labor readily available no need to keep workers alive, millions will be worked to death without slowing the projects. Those that survive will either be shot or kept as slaves for SS-run factories or plantations, perhaps eventually Germanized.

The major concerns in implementing the Hunger Plan were always related to not having the resources to do so effectively. Sealing off a city and destroying the food market is next to impossible without serious force, especially when the population has no reason to accept its death. With the Heer no longer involved in fighting elsewhere this problem will be resolved. As Nazi treatment of the General Government shows, delays and setbacks did not result in a halt to the killing; instead they simply looked for more efficient means to do so.

The economic concerns about the mass killing of tens of millions, which a rational mind would of course note, played very little part in Nazi policy or the Heer's cooperation with it. As I noted before, the goal was a restructuring of the East to benefit Germany with a food surplus and open land for settlement. Generalplan Ost involved not only agricultural but industrial colonization as well; while farmland played an extensive role, new "Germanized" cities were to be industrial centers as well. Thus any economic damage in the short term was, theoretically, to be replaced by an immediate benefit in food for Germany and economic growth in the long run as the East was settled.
 
Middle Eastern oil didn't really develop until after WW2. Prior Iraq and Iran were the primary sources, but were pretty minor compared to the US, as it was the #1 producer of oil until the 1970s. Saudi Arabia didn't even start producing oil until the late 1940s and prior the US had very little involvement in the Middle East. It was only after and with the Saudis giving US oil companies concessions on their newly discovered fields that the Middle East took on strategic importance; even then it was mostly Britain's problem until Operation Ajax in the '50s.

Don't forget that Germany too was well ahead in the development of intercontinental ballistic missile and had the technology to make a 'dirty' radiation bomb; they were close to a proximity fuze, which would have make the A10 missile with a uranium/HE tip capable of irradiating New York and D.C. The Germans were also slightly ahead of the B36 in terms of intercontinental bombers, so could hit the US if need be with chemical and/or bioweapons (the Germans were weaponizing Anthrax and a host of other nasty things, but were behind the USSR in terms of technology...have the Japanese share samples of their weapons and they can have a formidable program ready very quickly). So using nukes is not the end-all/be-all of potential warfare between Germany and the US.

http://www.russianspaceweb.com/a9a10.html
Without the need to abandon development due to the failing war effort in 1944, Germany could have had something ready by the late 1940s.


Oil was discovered in both in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia prior to WWII. In Saudi Arabia's case, they didnt become the powerhouse until the Ghawar oil field was discovered in the late 40s. However, given exploration had only begun in the 30s, most observers expected reasonable amounts of oil to be found in the region. While it certainly did not match the US's production, it certainly would have been in the best interests of the West to keep it out of the hands of the Germans. And in fact, I am pretty sure I recall Roosevelt guaranteeing the Saudi king's national defense in exchange for agreements regarding energy supplies - my memory might be somewhat on inaccurate on this though.

All that aside, I fully expect the US would have beefed up its presence in the mideast if the the OP scenario had played out, regardless as to whether there would have been a follow up conflict between the US and Germany.
 
Ian Kershaw writes a lot about the structure of Nazi Germany, and I draw most of my conclusions from his works, along with various information about how its government functioned. Biographies on Stalin also offer insights into the important differences between the two systems of rule. Essentially the German government was divided into numerous competing factions, all of which vied for power and were led by a Plenipotentiary; by 1944 these were Speer, Bormann, Himmler, and Goebbels, but ITTL such centralization is unlikely without the pressures of war. These factions were filled with their own subfactions, ambitious subordinates, etc all looking to seize power. This constant competition and jockeying for control was kept in a delicate balance only by their mutual loyalty to Hitler and adherence to his leadership. Despite this, as time went on Nazi Germany became an increasingly confused mess with the opinions of Gauleiters, Party officials, factory managers, etc replacing bureaucratic rule by law. Remove Hitler from this picture and there's nothing to control the competition and chaos in the Nazi system; no one has the means or power to take and hold the position of Fuhrer, because they lack the system of control that Hitler had built.

This isn't to portray Hitler as a skilled manager or heavily involved in government; just the opposite, he mostly left things to his subordinates. But his personality and the general idea of what he wanted, along with the loyalty towards him (All of his inner circle owed everything they had to his personal support and favor), created a powerful system of control which IOTL was only broken by his suicide.

Thanks for the source.
 

Deleted member 1487

I get where your going with the ICBM's. However I think with the current tech of the time trying to develop a full scale ICBM would have been really difficult.
No doubt it would have been difficult, but not impossible with the right resources and uninterrupted development from 1940. By 1952 it should be ready IMHO provided it gets uninterrupted development from 1940.

Of course without a nuclear bomb to put on the ICBM it isn't much use.
Agreed, it would have been a much more expensive V-2 unless pared with a dirty bomb.


Looking t the Ta400. The B-36 used 3500HP Wasp Major engines the Ta400 used 1700 hp engines, the Ta400 2,000lb thrust engines and two of them. The B-36D was using 4x 5,000lb thrust engines. Payload of 22,000lb versus over 80,000lb for the B-36. To me while it could perform the task of intercontinental bomber it wasn't in the same league as performance as the B-36.

Without the war in the East the Jumo 222 could be built, which had 3000hp. IOTL it wasn't produced, as by the time it was ready in mid-1943 there was no need for it and every need for extra fighters. So while not as big or with as heavy a payload, it could still do the job with the Jumo engine. With development it was expected to be able to reach 3500hp, which the Wasp Major got by 1949; the Jumo could have reached that with an extra 5 year development too.

We are agreed that it wasn't in the same league, but by 1949 the Germans would likely have the next generation intercontinental bomber ready based on jet engines, though of course IOTL by 1944 these were still Napkinwaffe, so its hard to say what their capabilites would end up being.
 
I think there is exaggeration as to how far the Nazis could have gone in their designs without invoking the continued ire of the WAllies (read: USA and Manhattan project). If you assume that the Reich can last twenty or even just 10 years after the war (to 1953 or 63), this necessarily means that they became less insane. The thing that really freaks people out about Nazis specifically is because of their fanatical devotion to killing large of people for zero practical reason, and this would be inimical to their continued existence in the face of a powerful, rational American enemy.

Total subjugation of even Western Russia is absolutely ASB, especially if you are doing your damnedest to slaughter all the locals without nuclear weapons (which the Reich would not have). Look at Japan vs. China; the attackers simply got bogged down even though they won nearly every engagement that mattered until 1940. The same would happened to the Nazis even supposing they had taken Moscow and Stalingrad. Between Moscow and the Ural mountains would be a neverending war between grossly overstretched German punitive forces and the relocated industrial and demographic resources of the Soviet Union. The Russians would be incapable of victory perhaps, but not incapable of putting up obstinate organized resistance.

Compare this to the actions of the KMT in WW2, which tried and failed to drive out the Japanese in 1938-39 and was forced to the hinterland. It wasn't like they gave up. It is true that China also had a 2.5:1 population advantage compared to the USSR, but much of its densely-populated areas (Manchuria, the central Chinese plain, the eastern Yangtze delta) were nonetheless under occupation. But Russia has a geographical, climate, political, and technological edge over the Chinese that can augment their admittedly less impressive raw human numbers. They don't ahve to produce lots of tanks and planes, they can turn out rifles and ammo by the thousands and millions to be passed along to partisans, something China couldn't do since it had little industry in Sichuan. The border will be too big for the Germans to control.

You would have repeated attacks, many of them involving largish numbers of partisan troops, against industrial centers and labor camps. You would have large numbers of young people escaping the occupation to become refugees closer to the Urals or in Central Asia. Millions of them would be willing to go back and fight for anyone left behind, or simply for revenge if there is no one left to bring back. It would be like the US northern states openly arming freed slaves to return to the antebellum South to destroy their former owners. Except in this case there would be no "antebellum" to speak of, the USSR very much being "in bellum" with the Reich.

Now, how the Germans attempt to mitigate this? As explained above, they can't just stick to the original plan, i.e. kill farming to the max. That would require the same mentality that got them in a war with every major power IOTL and defeated in 1945. So their mentality has to change. This may well be ASB given the way the Nazi regime was set up to maximize death and destruction, but if they do somehow tone things down a bit, you can expect a lot more people being considered Aryans or honorary Aryans as the occupiers increasing play the "if you can't beat us, join us" card. Gather up all the opportunists and national sellouts possible and give them power over their own people. Let their children become "Volksdeutsche," or, if you will, take it one step further and declare that such-and-such Slavic area has "Aryan roots" and has found its "long-lost royal linage" (you can take any suitable family of turncoats and give them such titles) freed from Judeo-Bolshevik influence. Not saying it will work out in the long run, but it's smarter than trying to kill the 100 million originally called for which simply isn't possible given the necessary mentality needed for the Nazi state to eke out survival as a collective.
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb
The effects would be pretty quick for people most exposed, resulting in some pretty ugly deaths and sickness for those less exposed that sets soon thereafter. Once the effects are known, which would be in a matter of days then the public would panic over these weapons and evacuate major cities that are in range of these weapons.

So then, the resulting war looks like this:

United States: A few hundred (at best) deaths, with some resulting panic.
Nazi Germany: Totally Annihilated.

Yeah... not seeing a credible deterrence from the Germans here.

Without the war in the East the Jumo 222 could be built, which had 3000hp. IOTL it wasn't produced, as by the time it was ready in mid-1943 there was no need for it and every need for extra fighters.

Of course the reason the Jumo 222 was abandoned was because the engine proved to be a horrendous failure in testing. I'm not seeing the Germans managing to make a bomber with it.
 
The economic concerns about the mass killing of tens of millions, which a rational mind would of course note, played very little part in Nazi policy or the Heer's cooperation with it.

Undoubtedly. That was actual OTL Nazi policy, and the Heer carried out its orders. Now the issue is that what we are talking about here is no longer the kind of Nazi Germany, and Nazi Germany at war, that we know with positive certainty from actual history.

Thus any economic damage in the short term was, theoretically, to be replaced by an immediate benefit in food for Germany and economic growth in the long run as the East was settled.

Where the key word is "theoretically", and the theory was Hitler's, Rosenberg's, Himmler's. If the ATL implies that these players, and others entertaining the same theories, disappear, the question is whether those who remain at the helm of Germany won't question the theory, and assuming they do question it, whether they'll find that it is indeed, objectively, sound - or not.
 

Deleted member 1487

So then, the resulting war looks like this:

United States: A few hundred (at best) deaths, with some resulting panic.
Nazi Germany: Totally Annihilated.

Yeah... not seeing a credible deterrence from the Germans here.
More like thousands dead per missile with tens of thousands sickened or more in densely settled cities. We are talking about 1 ton air bursts over densely populated urban centers on the East Coast of the US, rather than a small dirty bomb at ground level as was tested for a terrorist weapon in the link I posted. Especially if they launch a few thousand of uninterceptable missiles at cities on the East Coast, which kills even 100,000 people, it would sicken millions in the short term and cause mass panic that would badly disrupt the US economy; its certainly not the power of a nuclear tipped ICBM, but its not a firecracker either.

Of course the reason the Jumo 222 was abandoned was because the engine proved to be a horrendous failure in testing. I'm not seeing the Germans managing to make a bomber with it.
They worked out the bugs by mid-1943 IOTL, but the production version required more high heat metals than Germany was able to spare for large scale production and the factory that was to produce it was virtually leveled by US bombers, so they opted out of producing the ready model and instead focused on fighter engines:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_222
Junkers still did not give up. Using the original 46.4 litre displacement A/B design, they added a new two-stage supercharger including a trio of aftercoolers, one per pair of neighboring cylinder banks for high-altitude use, producing the 222E and F-series. Although sea-level performance was unchanged, the engine was able to produce 1,439 kW (1,930 hp) at 9,000 m (29,530 ft). By this point it appeared that the problems were finally being worked out, but bombing of the Junkers Motorenwerke's headquarters factories in Dessau made production almost impossible. A final attempt for even higher altitude performance resulted in the turbocharged 222G and H, built only to the extent of a few testbed prototypes.

In peacetime the resources that would/could be poured into making the project production ready without the distractions of the allied bombing wrecking the research and production facilities of Dessau would produce a vastly different outcome for the project; as it was other pressing needs caused the project to be cancelled, because allied bombing required an immediate response, while jet engines had leapfrogged the high powered piston engines in terms of propulsion.
 
More like thousands dead per missile with tens of thousands sickened or more in densely settled cities. We are talking about 1 ton air bursts over densely populated urban centers on the East Coast of the US, rather than a small dirty bomb at ground level as was tested for a terrorist weapon in the link I posted. Especially if they launch a few thousand of uninterceptable missiles at cities on the East Coast, which kills even 100,000 people, it would sicken millions in the short term and cause mass panic that would badly disrupt the US economy; its certainly not the power of a nuclear tipped ICBM, but its not a firecracker either.

The only way Germany can produce that much highly radioactive material is in a nuclear reactor. If they have a nuclear reactor they have plutonium, and that means that, in a year or two, they have an actual nuclear weapon.

Edit to Add: Also, I'd like a source on "sickens millions of people". Not saying it's impossible, but I'm not convinced it is, either.
 
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Deleted member 1487

The only way Germany can produce that much highly radioactive material is in a nuclear reactor. If they have a nuclear reactor they have plutonium, and that means that, in a year or two, they have an actual nuclear weapon.
Not necessarily, as they had an experimental reactor, but were nowhere close to a workable bomb. Apparently they were talking about building a dirty bomb in 1944.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranprojekt#Uran
 
Not necessarily, as they had an experimental reactor, but were nowhere close to a workable bomb. Apparently they were talking about building a dirty bomb in 1944.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranprojekt#Uran

This is not an area I am deeply familiar with, but my understanding is the German reactor was essentially the equivalent of the American CP-1. It was a research tool, not a production machine. To produce enough radioactive material for thousands of missiles, they'll need to scale up to something at least on the same plane as the Hanford complex.

Moreover, while I haven't done the math on this yet, I am increasingly skeptical that the Germans could produce enough radioactive material to "sicken millions" without a nuclear industry capable of producing actual bombs.
 
If you haven't read it then how would you know his understanding of history and how it is shaped is incorrect?

Well i dwelled his site for a while, read much of the comment and snippet of the various books and i can say that while his technical knowledge is excellent...regarding proper history it lack greatly and what he wrote is vastly biased towards actual neo-con talking point, so no i will not take The Big One as a credible version of what it can happen.
 
Undoubtedly. That was actual OTL Nazi policy, and the Heer carried out its orders. Now the issue is that what we are talking about here is no longer the kind of Nazi Germany, and Nazi Germany at war, that we know with positive certainty from actual history.

Where the key word is "theoretically", and the theory was Hitler's, Rosenberg's, Himmler's. If the ATL implies that these players, and others entertaining the same theories, disappear, the question is whether those who remain at the helm of Germany won't question the theory, and assuming they do question it, whether they'll find that it is indeed, objectively, sound - or not.

There is no reason that Germany's attitudes would be fundamentally moderated by peacetime. Indeed, just the opposite, wartime necessities were what contributed to the limiting of its more genocidal tendencies. With peace there's no longer any reason to avoid directing all resources to the extermination of undesirables.

I think it's absurd to assume such a radical change in government would occur immediately post war; it would take years for Hitler himself to succumb to parkinsons, plenty of time for the genocidal phase of Generalplan Ost to be implemented (Again, recall that in 2-3 years Germany killed 14 million people out of 68 million under occupation in the Soviet Union).
 
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