Was Britain Right to Enter WWI?

[Athelstane]

In 1914 there wasn't the 'machinery' in place for alternative courses of action, it took the experience of WW1 to show that the link between politics and military action was poor. As it was Britain did take an alternative course of action; they delayed their DoW for several days and then limited their contribution to 2/3 of what they planned.

I concede that mindset of the day tended to push black-and-white approaches on decisions on this level, but in a sense, Britain had *already* carried out more limited alternatives over the previous days: Churchill's decision to keep the fleet mobilized, and the promise made (privately) to Paris that Britain would not allow the HSF to come down the Channel each constituted "measures short of war."

But beyond that, I do confess that an invasion of Belgium was going to create more pressure to go to war than to resist it, even for a Liberal government; I can understand how they got there, even while thinking it was a very grave mistake (even, to some real degree, in foresight, as Ramsay MacDonald recognized). It would be more instructive, I think, to see what a scenario that did *not* involve an invasion of Belgium - the Germans go east, or even get Belgium's permission to march through (as Geon's timeline proposed) - might have impelled in Westminster. But I recognize that this is not what the OP is asking here.

 

[matzeskatze]

Been thinking about what the Germans could have done differently, with a pinch of hindsight.

So what if they had delayed their Mobilisation from August 1st to the next day? We know that France mobilized OTL one hour before the Germans. But that time is so short no side could know about the other and adjust in a mayor way Imo.

Would that have influenced the British reaction? And what influence would it have had on the German position?

 

[Derek Pullem]

Been thinking about what the Germans could have done differently, with a pinch of hindsight.

So what if they had delayed their Mobilisation from August 1st to the next day? We know that France mobilized OTL one hour before the Germans. But that time is so short no side could know about the other and adjust in a mayor way Imo.

Would that have influenced the British reaction? And what influence would it have had on the German position?

It was probably too late then. The Germans were fixed on a war versus France and that war relied on a movement through Belgium.

If Germany could have fought this war reversed, defending against France and attacking Russia (Aufmarsch II Ost) then with hindsight its possible Uk stays out long enough for Russia to be trounced and run out of Poland whilst France bleeds against the frontier. War ends by Christmas and a treaty establishes de facto control of Serbia by AH and a "congress" Poland controlled by Germany.

 

[Riain]

Until two voters tell them that they are wrong

A single digit margin dends it's own unmistakable message to the elected member.

 

[Derek Pullem]

A single digit margin dends it's own unmistakable message to the elected member.

Usually "I won".

Four more years on the gravy train.

 

[stodge]

One of the key players was David Lloyd George - a known pacifist. His support for intervention was crucial in swaying the Liberal Cabinet to joining the conflict. Had Lloyd George not supported action, it's hard to see how Asquith, for fear of splitting the Liberal Party (ironic given actual events), could have moved ahead with the Declaration of War.

 

[AntoniousTheBro]

Reply to athelstane
While I concede that legality wise they are not obligated to join and would provide decent reason to not intervene. However I don't think the lack of direct statement that explicitly demands British intervention means that it's not implied. Now I would make the point that if a nation guarantees a nations nuetrality then it would be expected that they enforce said nuetrality. And this is the view held by belguim as it demanded British and French intervention. This leaves us in a position where with this I would say they were under no obligation to enter though there is nothing wrong morally for doing so. Which leaves only really the geopolitical realities to deem where the needle lands. However need ask with hindsight or not. Because without its a coin toss worth absolutely not.

 

[Athelstane]

It was probably too late then. The Germans were fixed on a war versus France and that war relied on a movement through Belgium.

If Germany could have fought this war reversed, defending against France and attacking Russia (Aufmarsch II Ost) then with hindsight its possible Uk stays out long enough for Russia to be trounced and run out of Poland whilst France bleeds against the frontier. War ends by Christmas and a treaty establishes de facto control of Serbia by AH and a "congress" Poland controlled by Germany.

I tend to agree. And the longer the British stay out, the harder I think it will be for them to jump in, especially with the whole situation in Ireland. Fears of the danger of German hegemony will be offset by the scale of the carnage underway, I think.

Some of this (though not all of it) is hindsight, of course, but maybe it is worth contemplating what that hegemony would amount to, in such a case. Logistics, geography, and Entente willpower dictate that it would take a good two to three campaigning seasons for the Germans to prevail, and the cost in blood and treasure to attain it would be grim, well beyond anything previously known. Whatever Mitteleuropa Berlin can cobble together out of it all may well be adverse to British economic interests, but would also be restive, managed by a great power forehead deep in debt and complicated democratic political pressures at home, and it's more than possible that the Brits would have grabbed a lot of German markets abroad during the war.

 

[Athelstane]

One of the key players was David Lloyd George - a known pacifist. His support for intervention was crucial in swaying the Liberal Cabinet to joining the conflict. Had Lloyd George not supported action, it's hard to see how Asquith, for fear of splitting the Liberal Party (ironic given actual events), could have moved ahead with the Declaration of War.

Lloyd George *could* have made it a lot harder for Asquith and Grey, no question about it.

 

[Riain]

I concede that mindset of the day tended to push black-and-white approaches on decisions on this level, but in a sense, Britain had *already* carried out more limited alternatives over the previous days: Churchill's decision to keep the fleet mobilized, and the promise made (privately) to Paris that Britain would not allow the HSF to come down the Channel each constituted "measures short of war."

But beyond that, I do confess that an invasion of Belgium was going to create more pressure to go to war than to resist it, even for a Liberal government; I can understand how they got there, even while thinking it was a very grave mistake (even, to some real degree, in foresight, as Ramsay MacDonald recognized). It would be more instructive, I think, to see what a scenario that did *not* involve an invasion of Belgium - the Germans go east, or even get Belgium's permission to march through (as Geon's timeline proposed) - might have impelled in Westminster. But I recognize that this is not what the OP is asking here.

Britain had a military campaign plan that didn't depend on Belgian neutrality being violated, they were just as inflexible as Germany, France and Russia in terms of their military options although their innate security gave them some wriggle room to enact it when the others didn't.

In fact only AH had more than one mobilisation/campaign plan, what's more they enacted both! I struggle to pin the blame on the country who could move faster than their neighbor, I'm sure Russia would have loved to invade East Prussia earlier than M+17 ad France certainly got an attack in a week before Russia was ready.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

In a democracy the voter is always right.

Unless he/she votes for the other side.

 

[Belisarius II]

It was probably too late then. The Germans were fixed on a war versus France and that war relied on a movement through Belgium.

If Germany could have fought this war reversed, defending against France and attacking Russia (Aufmarsch II Ost) then with hindsight its possible Uk stays out long enough for Russia to be trounced and run out of Poland whilst France bleeds against the frontier. War ends by Christmas and a treaty establishes de facto control of Serbia by AH and a "congress" Poland controlled by Germany.

Quite possible, except for the Serbian part. The Serbs trounced the Austrians, and forced them back, recapturing Belgrade, late in 1914. Only with large German reinforcements, and the Intervention of Bulgaria were the CP's able to overrun Serbia, and force the Serbian Army to retreat into Albania, and Greece. But that was only in late 1915. Your scenario is just a bit too logical. If the Germans are doing that well, they may just keep doubling down, and hope to win bigger. That's what they kept doing in the OTL, and that's what got Germany into so much trouble. The GGS were just compulsive gamblers, who thought they were on a winning streak.

 

[TDM]

I mean, sure, that was how Grey (and in the end, Asquith) saw it.

Well what other tactics do you think would have persuaded Germany to leave Belgium once it was fighting France in France?

Though as it turned out in the end, the best way still failed. In the end, combined Anglo-French armed strength, even after total mobilization, had not been sufficient to evict Germany from French soil, let alone Belgian soil, even after four years of war and over 6 million casualties (!). In the end it took the addition of a million American troops, and the warmaking power backing of the American economy, to force Germany to terms. The most Britain could do, it turned out, was to make Germany's overlordship of Belgium extremely expensive, and only at a truly horrific cost to itself.

OK but this is from hindsight

Now, that was not fully apparent to Grey or Asquith on August 1-3, 1914, but then, enough of their expressions at that point suggest that they appreciated that a war with Germany would be a long one. (Think of Grey's famous quote, "The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our life-time.")

But perhaps we should step back and rexamine the premises here: Belgian neutrality was a means to an end, was it not? Because what British leaders (of all parties) had really sought for over two centuries was to keep the North Sea ports out of the hands of a major hostile power. And maybe there other ways of achieving that policy end. (For example, Asquith could declare to Germany that it was closing the Channel and North Sea to the KM, and that it was putting British army units ashore in the key Belgian ports for "humanitarian reasons," basically daring Wilhelm to attack the ports. I'm just spitballing here, mind you.)

But, I might argue, lurking behind that was another concern: That France might be permanently crushed as a great power, utterly wrecking the balance of power in western Europe. And I would argue that, fundamentally, this was the even greater fear by Grey and Asquith.

I think you are pretty much right although selfish policy ends can still coincide with for the sake of brevity "the right thing to do". And at the basic level WW1 ended with neither Grammy controlling the continent nor France destroyed as a balancing power. It's just the cost of the war was higher then any one would have wanted to pay. I.e. WW1 was very much pyrrhic victory for the victors, and a bitter defeat for the losers

 

[Derek Pullem]

I tend to agree. And the longer the British stay out, the harder I think it will be for them to jump in, especially with the whole situation in Ireland. Fears of the danger of German hegemony will be offset by the scale of the carnage underway, I think.

Some of this (though not all of it) is hindsight, of course, but maybe it is worth contemplating what that hegemony would amount to, in such a case. Logistics, geography, and Entente willpower dictate that it would take a good two to three campaigning seasons for the Germans to prevail, and the cost in blood and treasure to attain it would be grim, well beyond anything previously known. Whatever Mitteleuropa Berlin can cobble together out of it all may well be adverse to British economic interests, but would also be restive, managed by a great power forehead deep in debt and complicated democratic political pressures at home, and it's more than possible that the Brits would have grabbed a lot of German markets abroad during the war.

Actually I'm not sure the war aims of any of the powers started off as a blueprint for hegemony.

• A-H wanted to secure her borders from Nationalists and their influence - they wanted to maintain the "Status Quo"
• Germany wanted to re-establish the military dominance they enjoyed in Europe after the Franco-Prussian war - they wanted to maintain the Status Quo which was threatened by rapidly improving capabilities of France and especially Russia
• France wanted to return to the position pre Franco-Prussian war - they wanted to return to what they saw as the Status Quo ante
• UK wanted Europe to remain divided and for Britain to be unchallenged at sea - they wanted to maintain the Status Quo
• Russia wanted its influence over the Balkans and by extension the Ottomans recognised. In hindsight this is the only "aggressive" political aim and it is not aimed at either Germany or A-H

As the war progressed then we had aberrations like the "September Plan" and the Allies Constantinople Agreement / Sykes-Picot. Later we had Brest-Litovsk and the even more threatening Wilson's 14 Points. All of these were aiming at tearing up the Status Quo and remaking a new Europe. The price that each combatant had paid for their victory demanded a greater reward - which led to the disaster of WW2.

I could argue Germany kicked this all off with the September Plan but that would be unhelpful. Essentially the militaries and the governments of the time on all sides were too entrenched (figuratively and literally) to seek a way out of the mess. Every power except Russia could have achieved its pre-war aims through negotiation - and even Russia could have improved its position.

 

[TDM]

Actually I'm not sure the war aims of any of the powers started off as a blueprint for hegemony.

• A-H wanted to secure her borders from Nationalists and their influence - they wanted to maintain the "Status Quo"
• Germany wanted to re-establish the military dominance they enjoyed in Europe after the Franco-Prussian war - they wanted to maintain the Status Quo which was threatened by rapidly improving capabilities of France and especially Russia
• France wanted to return to the position pre Franco-Prussian war - they wanted to return to what they saw as the Status Quo ante
• UK wanted Europe to remain divided and for Britain to be unchallenged at sea - they wanted to maintain the Status Quo
• Russia wanted its influence over the Balkans and by extension the Ottomans recognised. In hindsight this is the only "aggressive" political aim and it is not aimed at either Germany or A-H

As the war progressed then we had aberrations like the "September Plan" and the Allies Constantinople Agreement / Sykes-Picot. Later we had Brest-Litovsk and the even more threatening Wilson's 14 Points. All of these were aiming at tearing up the Status Quo and remaking a new Europe. The price that each combatant had paid for their victory demanded a greater reward - which led to the disaster of WW2.

I think the problem is Germany can't do that without defeating France / Russia. The military dominance it had enjoyed had come after the Franco Prussian war, There's a Moltke quote at the time (sorry the elder in 1871 not the younger in 1914) about the result of that needing to keep the French down for a generation, but it's been 40 odd years since then. Russia is now industrialising and modernising. Germany can't impede that directly. There's also the issue that a united German society is changing Prussia might have been "an army with a nation", but that stereotype is getting less and less true for Germany in the end of C19th / beginning of the C20th.

Similarly, AH doesn't just want to secure it's borders (although it certainly wants to do that). It wants to increase it's influence and expand into the Balkans although you could argue that partly how it also secures it borders. But that invariably brings it into conflict with Russia (and so see above). Both are looking to take advantage of a recent change in the status quo of the Ottoman empire retreating in the last half century

I.e. the two status quo's referenced have not been the status quo for long nor are they natural states of equilibrium (if such a thing ever exists)


the corollary is France is not going to stay the loser of the Franco-Prussian war for ever

I think you are right about the UK's desired status quo, but equally I think that ls the status quo that is 'least new' and least requires conflict to maintain

I could argue Germany kicked this all off with the September Plan but that would be unhelpful. Essentially the militaries and the governments of the time on all sides were too entrenched (figuratively and literally) to seek a way out of the mess. Every power except Russia could have achieved its pre-war aims through negotiation - and even Russia could have improved its position.

Thing is negotiations were offered by some parties, but it takes two to tango

 

[ranoncles]

I concede that mindset of the day tended to push black-and-white approaches on decisions on this level, but in a sense, Britain had *already* carried out more limited alternatives over the previous days: Churchill's decision to keep the fleet mobilized, and the promise made (privately) to Paris that Britain would not allow the HSF to come down the Channel each constituted "measures short of war."

But beyond that, I do confess that an invasion of Belgium was going to create more pressure to go to war than to resist it, even for a Liberal government; I can understand how they got there, even while thinking it was a very grave mistake (even, to some real degree, in foresight, as Ramsay MacDonald recognized). It would be more instructive, I think, to see what a scenario that did *not* involve an invasion of Belgium - the Germans go east, or even get Belgium's permission to march through (as Geon's timeline proposed) - might have impelled in Westminster. But I recognize that this is not what the OP is asking here.

If Germany had gone with its Ost plan and only planned maritime operations against a France that was attacking it in the Alsace region, it would have come up against the British blockade of the Channel and defence of French Atlantic ports. This would mean an alleged neutral party actively preventing a belligerent attacking another (aggressive) belligerent.

Germany really had nothing to lose by invading Belgium as Britain was clearly already in bed with France and much to win if its Schlieffen plan worked. If Britain had truly been neutral, it was arguably a bad mistake but not under the conditions prevailing in 1914.

 

[matzeskatze]

Some thougts regarding the status quo,
I'd like to point out what one side sees as military dominance for Germany can also be seen as military security or safety depending on the view point one uses. To add, I think Germany was also still trying to find a balance in the position it now held. It had a very fast and meteoric rise in power and influence and at the same time was (too) agressively seeking its place in the established order of Great Powers.
Another point is that while Wilhelm was as mercurial as he was, he also liked to be a popular monarch. So I doubt that he would have stood in the way of reform for the sake of it. Would he have liked it? No, probably not. But if he could be sold on the point it was good for his image and strenghtend the position of Germany he could Imo be willing to see certain reforms through.

Re France, it wanted the top spot of continental power back from Germany and was hurt that the shoe was on the other foot regarding AL so to say. Because for a long time it was France that was nibbling away at the HRE and I think it liked the position it had and the power to push east...

And lastly the British. Yes they liked the status quo. But at the same time 1870/71 had thrown a big German spanner in that. Because of the geographic and economic position Germany now inhabited it upset the balance of power and the old alliances. For good or bad Britian had to find a solution to this situation. Add that it was not helped by the industrialisation of other nations undermining the position of the RN. With the likes of Germany, the USA and Japan beginning to build fleets in earnest and railroads allowing continental powers to harness their resourcess without the need for maritim transport. Add that it became ever more costly to keep the RN at the size it needed for its global commitements and that global and european concerns began to intermingle more and more I think Britain had the hardest time to square the circle of its wants and needs to keep the satus quo as those various needs may run counter to each other.

 

[matzeskatze]

If Germany had gone with its Ost plan and only planned maritime operations against a France that was attacking it in the Alsace region, it would have come up against the British blockade of the Channel and defence of French Atlantic ports. This would mean an alleged neutral party actively preventing a belligerent attacking another (aggressive) belligerent.

Germany really had nothing to lose by invading Belgium as Britain was clearly already in bed with France and much to win if its Schlieffen plan worked. If Britain had truly been neutral, it was arguably a bad mistake but not under the conditions prevailing in 1914.

Sorry for the double post here.
I can see three scenarios that could entice Germany to go east. Because as you say the prospects of the war against France and Russia demanded on opponent be taken out first and France seemed to be the weeker one.

The three scenarios are first that Germany gets a realistic estimation of Russian strenght and resilience prior to the war and decides that it has chances to take it out while holding France at bay. Second there is a loosening of the Franco-Russian relations and neutrality of France becomes a real possibility. And lastely that British foreign diplomacy and or Grey slip up and realize how ensnared in continental politics they have become. Maybe aided by a reexamination of the relative strength of both sides and an realisation, that the Russians are not as strong as they appear. (One point for the British to enter into the understandings with the Franco-Russians was that they were seen as the stronger side Imo.) So in the end they take a step back from European affairs and declare Belgium a red line ala 1870 for both sides.

 

[Derek Pullem]

If Germany had gone with its Ost plan and only planned maritime operations against a France that was attacking it in the Alsace region, it would have come up against the British blockade of the Channel and defence of French Atlantic ports. This would mean an alleged neutral party actively preventing a belligerent attacking another (aggressive) belligerent.

Germany really had nothing to lose by invading Belgium as Britain was clearly already in bed with France and much to win if its Schlieffen plan worked. If Britain had truly been neutral, it was arguably a bad mistake but not under the conditions prevailing in 1914.

A British blockade of the Channel has little or no impact on the war plan for the Germans, East or West.

The Germans plans relied on achieving military success before any blockade could be effective.

Germany had to invade Belgium if it was going to attack France. I'm not sure Germany needed to attack France to achieve its main pre-war aim (neutering Russia in the long term and through it the Franco-Russian alliance). But that is also with hindsight given the abysmal performance of the Russians in 1914 - although it could be argued that German generals should have known how bad the Russians would be. If they did and still argued for a France first plan then they badly served the German government.

EDIT ninja'd to some extent by matzeskatze

 

[TDM]

Problem for the Germans is that even if the Russians are rubbish, it's not just they have to beat them it's that they have to beat them before the French really get going in the west.

And the Russians even if they're shit have two things that will make it hard for a quick German victory, large numbers and lots of space to operate in. Plus the knowledge that France will be coming along.

Leaving aside all the political why's and wherefore's of invading Belgium I can see why The Germens felt they had to get to Paris quick ala 1870-71.