Other than making supportive diplomatic noises, and probably helping broker peace negotiations, no. They just don't have the resources to spare to do so.
Trent Affair Goes Hot
- Thread starter Bullmoose713
- Start date
Other than making supportive diplomatic noises, and probably helping broker peace negotiations, no. They just don't have the resources to spare to do so.
I would suspect there'll be a bit of private enterprise support as well, and considering this support in detail may help to illustrate why the Union is in a worse position than the Confederacy:
- Commerce raiders and blockade runners built in Russian ports: The Russian ability to construct modern warships has no doubt improved since the Crimean War, when they suffered the indignity of having the Royal Navy commandeer ships they were having built in British ports. However, Russia's capacity to manufacture modern ships on the lines of the Alabama will be a lot more limited than Britain's, so less choice of builders and higher prices for anything the Union orders, and much easier for British agents in Russia to identify them. There's certainly no prospect of having ironclads built, as the Confederacy attempted to do. The Russian merchant marine is much smaller than the British, so fewer sailors to recruit; as the navy is also smaller, you can expect fewer personnel to come pre-trained in gunnery. There will also be a substantial language barrier between the Union officers and their Russian men, which didn't exist in Confederate vessels.
- Illicit shipments of weapons: The fact that in the first couple of years of the war the Union was buying up pretty much anything that could go bang, yet still didn't buy any Russian weapons, doesn't bode well for this. The M1857 Russian percussion rifle is .60, so (even if they have any to spare) US .58 ammunition won't fit into them in the same way as it did into the .577 Enfield. The Russians may have some surplus percussion muskets to sell, but that means the quality of Union arms will not improve in 1863 onwards as it did historically thanks to increased deliveries from Springfield and imports from Enfield.
As such, the British have a much, much easier task to intercept these third party contributions to the conflict than the Union did.
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So what I am getting from this thread is that the Union would be at a severe disadvantage here, which why obviously they calmed things down OTL; They could win or at least push a long-term Pyrrhic victory for the British if they are quick enough with their Army but their economy is now a ticking timebomb (which is the worst result of this going hot). This increases the chances of the CSA going independent, and at the very least extends that war a few more years, years that the Northern Public might not have the stomach for.
Is this an accurate general summary of the thread?
Is this an accurate general summary of the thread?
Ficboy
Banned
Not entirely, it's just trying to debate Britain's capacities in a Trent War with America. The British already have plenty of advantages over the Americans unlike the Confederates and either way it's going to end badly for the latter.
In broad strokes yes. If the Union had a really good first strike they might have been able to push a flotilla up the St. Lawrence supported by heavy artillery and be able to wheel on Montreal and cut the Province of Canada in two. Doing that, and then holding it or building up for an offensive against Quebec, would give them a not-unrealistic chance of getting to the negotiating table in a position of strength from which they won't have terms dictated to them by the British. That's the rosy scenario for the Union.
What is, IMO, more likely to end up happening is the Americans refuse any British ultimatum, hoping for the international arbitration. This is, unacceptable for the British, So they declare war. This leads to what amounts to a first strike against the American navy and the frontier with Maine and New York, to seize important border posts. This will, without a doubt, infuriate the American public who see the British as 'sucker punching' them in order to help the Confederacy, In return, Lincoln, who simply can't not retaliate, will order the invasion of Canada in the spring when the campaign season opens. American armies will march across the border at the Niagara Frontier and Detroit, and along the Richelieu River, aiming to capture Montreal.
My own prediction is that the Americans would achieve steady success in Canada West, but in Canada East they would run into a bloodbath marching into the teeth of British prepared defences and artillery, The British meanwhile, will be attacking Portland Maine to try and secure the Atlantic terminus of the Grand Trunk Railroad. This is where the war will be by roughly June 1862. On the seas the British will have since the war opened, engaged in IMO at least one successful squadron action against the furthest south American blockading squadrons while the remainder will probably have managed to escape to safe harbor. The British will implement an ever tighter blockade, which will begin having short term effects on the American economy.
The Confederates meanwhile, having seen the Union move men and material north to attack Canada, will probably counterattack through Kentucky and north against Washington, hoping to end the war on their terms.
The outcome of all this, is in doubt. I think the British would, by economic attrition, force the Union to the negotiating table by late 1863 if not early 1864 since Lincoln cannot afford an election with the British squatting on any American territory. If the British exit the war before it's conclusion, then I give the Union a not uneven chance of turning around and defeating the Confederacy, but probably not before spring-summer 1866. If the British decide to stick the war out to the end, making Confederate independence their goal, I believe the war would end by 1864.
But none of this is set in stone. The British have unquestionable naval and economic advantages which would make the situation for the Americans untenable in the long term, and would require a total war footing from every state in the Union. The Americans though, do have the advantage that they can 'win by not losing' and try to outlast the British pressure for some sort of mild peace. It's hard to predict exactly how the chips would fall, and I personally can only speak to the opening moves up to June 1862 with any reasonable sense of 'this is probably what would happen' rather than explorations moving from a point of divergence.
Pretty much.
I also think the British would leave early as they would like to spin the conflict as a separate war, not one to help the Confederates.
The North may go along with this, and I suspect an appropriate financial apology with status quo ante gets spun as an American win domestically.
The South could go deeply anti-British - "we wuz stabbed in the back" type thing.
Canadian patriotism becomes even more "we're not USian and beat their asses when they invade".
I'm not sure of the impact on Mexico.
A Confederate stab-in-the-back myth is possible, but unlikely, IMHO -- a British-American war would help them, of course, but in the absence of any actual co-operation or co-ordination between the CSA and UK, I don't think the Confederates would think of the Brits as allies or friends, merely people whose strategic goals happened to align with theirs for a bit.
Of course, one other possibility is that the British decide that the US can't be trusted not to declare war on them every few decades and decide to support CS independence as a means of weakening/distracting the Union. How this pans out is kind of hard to say. People here seem to generally assume that the US would become obsessively revanchist and seek every opportunity to reconquer the South and get its revenge on Perfidious Albion. This is possible, but not inevitable -- plenty of countries have enjoyed good relations with former rebels or traditional enemies, after all. It probably depends on how the US develops after the war -- if living standards continue to rise, I'd expect most people to get over it pretty quickly; if the post-war period sees economic problems and/or political turmoil, revanchist and anti-British sentiments are quite likely.
Ficboy
Banned
The Confederacy would see Britain and France as allies since they courted them for foreign recognition via cotton and shipbuilding. The two nations wouldn't necessarily be aligned with them given their trade ties to America but they would have friendly relations with both.
Now I know I must have posted this at least 3 times in other threads, however that doesn't make it irrelevant!
The Navy List for 1862 gives a total Royal Navy strength of 735 ships, or about 3 times that of the Union Navy, of which 28 are Armoured.
Noticeably this is more Ironclads than the Union Commissioned in the entire Civil War. And the Arapiles mentioned is the same ship that gave the US Navy the vapours during the Virginius Affair.
There are several Brown Water vessels listed, most obviously the Aetna & Erebus Classes, such as HMS Terror, and those based on the hulls of Sloops and Corvettes ie. Research, Enterprise & Favorite etc. Arapiles had a shallower draft than CSS Virginia. Absalon and Esbern Snare were marginal in terms of combat power, but not obviously more so than the City-Class, they would however fit through the locks of the Welland Canal.
The Navy List for 1862 gives a total Royal Navy strength of 735 ships, or about 3 times that of the Union Navy, of which 28 are Armoured.
From the Navy list of 1862 http://archive.org/stream/navylist03admigoog#page/n5/mode/2up
(And ships under construction can be accelerated and rushed to completion in a crisis!?)
There were another Five Ironclads under Laid Down or Converted from 1863 Repulse, Lord Clyde, Lord Warden, Pallas and Bellerophon.
And 14 Ironclads under-construction for other Nations Navies The Laird Rams, Rolf Krake, Affondatore, Huascar, Independencia, Smerch, Pervenets, Arminius, Danmark, Arapiles, Vitoria, Absalon and Esbern Snare.
(There was always a clause in warship construction contracts allowing for their requisition by the Royal Navy in an emergency ... which they could easily have just done anyway by an Order in Council ... The foreign contracts listed only include vessels completed by 1865, there were more in existence.)
This comes to some 47 Ironclads, assuming not a single extra ship is laid down or converted. (From the hulls already in existence the RN could have added perhaps another 7 1st Rates converted ala Royal Sovereign, 2-5 Bulwark's converted to Prince Consort's, maybe 7 Jason Class Corvettes, and 6-14 more Camelion Class Sloop conversions, without any more purpose built Iron, or wooden, hulled ships, and at the time the wooden to Iron hull commissioning ratio was about one to one?)
- Achilles (building at Chatham, reserve from December 1863, Commissioned into the Channel Fleet September 1864)
- Agincourt (building at Birkenhead, reserve on 26th May 1864, Commissioned 1867)
- Black Prince (in Commission with the Channel Fleet)
- Caledonia (in reserve at Woolwich from 2nd February 1863, Commissioned into the Med. Fleet July 1865)
- Defence (in Commission with the Channel Fleet)
- Enterprise (building at Deptford, Commissioned into the Med. Fleet May 1864)
- Erebus (in deep reserve at Portsmouth)
- Favourite (building at Deptford, Commissioned into the American Fleet 1866)
- Glatton (in deep reserve at Portsmouth)
- Hector (building at Glasgow, reserve from October 1862, Commissioned into Channel Fleet 1864)
- Minotaur (building at Blackwell, reserve on 15 December 1863, Commissioned into the Channel Fleet 1867)
- Northumberland (building at Millwall, reserve in 1866, Commissioned into the Channel Fleet 1868)
- Ocean (building at Devonport, in reserve from 23rd March 1863, Commissioned into the Channel Fleet 1866)
- Prince Albert (building at Millwall, reserve from 20th May 1864, Commissioned almost immediately into the Channel Fleet to test the turrets)
- Prince Consort (building at Pembroke, reserve from 14th January 1863, Commissioned into the Channel Fleet 1864)
- Research (building at Pembroke, reserve from March 1864, and Commissioned next month into the Channel Fleet)
- Resistance (in Commission with the Channel Fleet)
- Royal Alfred (building at Portsmouth, in reserve October 1864, Commissioned into the American Fleet Jan. 1867)
- Royal Oak (building at Chatham, in reserve 13th September 1862, Commissioned into 27th April 1863 into the Channel Fleet)
- Royal Sovereign (building at Portsmouth, complete as turret ship 20th August 1864 and placed on Harbour Commission in October, but was never fully Commissioned)
- Terror (in Commission on the Bermuda station)
- Thunder (in deep reserve at Sheerness)
- Thunderbolt (in deep reserve on the River Thames)
- Trusty (in deep reserve at Woolwich)
- Valiant (building at Millwall, reserve from October 1863, Commissioned 1868)
- Warrior (in Commission with the Channel Fleet)
- Zealous (building at Glasgow, reserve from December 1864, Commissioned into the Pacific Fleet 1866)
- Aetna (tender to HMS Cumberland, River Thames)
(And ships under construction can be accelerated and rushed to completion in a crisis!?)
There were another Five Ironclads under Laid Down or Converted from 1863 Repulse, Lord Clyde, Lord Warden, Pallas and Bellerophon.
And 14 Ironclads under-construction for other Nations Navies The Laird Rams, Rolf Krake, Affondatore, Huascar, Independencia, Smerch, Pervenets, Arminius, Danmark, Arapiles, Vitoria, Absalon and Esbern Snare.
(There was always a clause in warship construction contracts allowing for their requisition by the Royal Navy in an emergency ... which they could easily have just done anyway by an Order in Council ... The foreign contracts listed only include vessels completed by 1865, there were more in existence.)
This comes to some 47 Ironclads, assuming not a single extra ship is laid down or converted. (From the hulls already in existence the RN could have added perhaps another 7 1st Rates converted ala Royal Sovereign, 2-5 Bulwark's converted to Prince Consort's, maybe 7 Jason Class Corvettes, and 6-14 more Camelion Class Sloop conversions, without any more purpose built Iron, or wooden, hulled ships, and at the time the wooden to Iron hull commissioning ratio was about one to one?)
There are several Brown Water vessels listed, most obviously the Aetna & Erebus Classes, such as HMS Terror, and those based on the hulls of Sloops and Corvettes ie. Research, Enterprise & Favorite etc. Arapiles had a shallower draft than CSS Virginia. Absalon and Esbern Snare were marginal in terms of combat power, but not obviously more so than the City-Class, they would however fit through the locks of the Welland Canal.
In this case, I think the need for small vessels for blockade and trade protection will be sufficient that you won't see many of the smaller ships converted - they'll be needed elsewhere. The same goes for Arapiles, which will probably stay as a wooden warship. If the Royal Navy needs smaller ironclads for coastal assault or just to fend off the threat of Monitors, they'd be better going for repeat editions of the iron-hulled Crimean floating batteries. These are relatively cheap (HMS Terror cost just over £90,000 - USS New Ironsides cost almost £160,000), reasonably quick to build (from order to launch in just over four months), the plans are already on file which makes them straightforward to order (though they would need amending to allow for thicker backing and armour, as identified by tests in the late 1850s), and they'd still have a role to play in future as mobile harbour defence or coastal assault against the French. They're also iron-hulled, which means you're not using precious timber needed for unarmoured wooden warships in their construction.
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I designed the River Class ironclad in Wrapped in Flames based around a cut down Aetna with 7 guns (one bow mounted and three in the broadside) as I figured they'd have the design and would just knock it down and ship it across the Atlantic to be rebuilt at Montreal or Kingston to help control Lake Ontario and the Saint Lawrence River. The only real question I had is whether the Union could build their own northern river squadron of ironclad before the British could put theirs on the river. That's the biggest up in the air factor around the war on the rivers and lakes of Canada.
marathag
Banned
Pulling those all to the Atlantic Coast to fight in US and Canadian waters means that they can't do the job that they were doing in 1861 and before.
World wide commitments need to be upheld, yes?
Here's the list for January 1 1863, and what was building
The number of line-of-battle and other steamers composing the squadron on the North American station is 29, under the orders of Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne, K.C.B.
The squadron in the Mediterranean, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir W.F. Martin, K.C.B., numbers 28 vessels of all classes.
The East India and China squadrons consist of 32 vessels, the Admiral in command of that station being Rear-Admiral A.L. Kuper, C.B.
The number of ships stationed on the West Coast of Africa assisting in the suppression of the slave trade is 21.
The Pacific squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral J. Kingcome, numbers 12 ships,
South-east coast of America, commanded by Rear-Admiral R.L. Warren, 8 ships.
There are six line-of-battle and other ships stationed at the Cape of Good Hope
Australian station, under the orders of Commodore W.F. Burnett, C.B., also has the same number
The Channel squadron consists of the Revenge, 73, 3,322 tons, 800-horse power, Capt. C. Fellowes, flagship of Rear-Admiral R. Smart, K.H.; the Warrior, 40, 6,109 tons, 1,250-horse power, Capt. the Hon. A.A. Cochrane; the Black Prince, 40, 6,109 tons, 1,250-horse power, Capt. J.F.B. Wainwright; the Defence, 16, 3,720 tons, 600-horse power, Capt. A. Phillimore; and the Resistance, 16, 3,710 tons, 600-horse power, Capt. W.C. Chamberlain.
The annual official return of the number, name, tonnage, armament, and horse-power of each vessel, both steamers and sailing ships, composing the British navy, was published yesterday under the authority of the Lords of the Admiralty. Including a numerous fleet of gunboats, the navy of England on the 1st of January numbered 1,014 ships of all classes.
Of this number there are 85 line-of-battle ships, mounting from 74 guns to 131 guns each, according to their rating;
39 of from 50 guns to 72 guns each;
69 frigates of from 24 guns to 46 guns each, most of which are of a tonnage and horse-power equal to a line-of-battle ship;
30 screw corvettes, each mounting 21 guns;
upwards of 600 frigates and vessels of all classes mounting less than 20 guns.
In addition to the above there is a fleet of 190 gunboats, each mounting two heavy Armstrong guns and of 60-horse power, besides a numerous squadron of iron and wooden mortar vessels built during the Russian war, and now laid up at Chatham.
At present there are 43 vessels under construction for the Admiralty at the various public and private dockyards, many of which will be completed and launched during the present year.
The iron vessels building are the Achilles, 50, 6,079 tons, 1,250-horse power, at Chatham; the Northumberland, 50, 6,621 tons, 1,250-horse power, at Millwall; the Minotaur, 50, 6,621 tons, 1,250 horse power, at Blackwall; the Agincourt, 50, 6,621 tons, 1,250-horse power, at Birkenhead; the Hector, 32, 4,063 tons, 800-horse power, at Glasgow; the Valiant, 32, 4,063 tons, 800-horse power, at Millwall; the Tamar, 3, 2,812 tons, 500-horse power, and the iron-cased frigate Royal Alfred, 34, 3,716 tons, 800-horse power, at Portsmouth; the Ocean, 34, 4,045 tons, 1,000-horse power, at Devonport; the Zealous, 34, 3,716 tons, 800-horse power, at Pembroke; and the Favourite, 22, 2,186 tons, 400-horse power, at Deptford. In addition to the above, the Royal Sovereign, 3,963 tons, 800-horse power, is being converted into a cupola ship, and the Enterprise, building at Deptford, for a shield-ship, on the new plan submitted to the Admiralty.
During the year 1862 the vessels launched at the several dockyards were the Caledonia, 50, 4,045 tons, 800-horse power, iron-cased frigate, at Woolwich; the Royal Oak, 34, 3,716 tons, 800-horsepower, iron-cased frigate, at Chatham; the Prince Consort, 34, 3,716 tons, 800-horse power, iron-cased frigate, at Pembroke; the Rattler, 17, 951 tons, 200-horse power, and the Columbine, 4, 669 tons, 150-horse Power, at Deptford; the Jaseur, 5, 80-horse power, at Devonport; the Orontes, 3, 2,812 tons, 500-horse power, at Blackwall; and the Enchantress, 4, 835 tons, 250-horse power, and the Psyche, 4, 835 tons, 250-horse power, at Pembroke.
The vessels now under construction at the various Royal dockyards, exclusive of the iron and ironcased ships, are the Dryad, 51, 3,027 tons, 600-horse power, the Harlequin, 6, 950 tons, 200-horse power [cancelled in 1864], and the Helicon, 4, 835 tons, 200-horse power, at Portsmouth; the Bulwark, 91, 3,716 tons, 800-horse power [already suspended in 1861 and finally cancelled in 1872]; the Belvidera, 51, 3,627 tons, 600-horse power [cancelled in 1864], the Menai, 22, 1,857 tons, 400-horse power [cancelled in 1864], the Reindeer, 17, 951 tons, 200-horse power, the Salamis, 4, 835 tons, 250-horse power, and the Myrmidon, 4, 695 tons, 200-horse power, at Chatham; the Repulse, 89, 3,716 tons, 800-horse power, the Dartmouth, 36, 2,478 tons, 500-horse power [cancelled in 1864], the Wolverene, 21, 1,623 tons, 400-horse power, and the Sylvia, 4, 695 tons, 200-horse power, at Woolwich; the Robust, 89, 3,716 tons, 800-horse power [already suspended in 1861 and finally cancelled in 1873], the Ister, 36, 3,027 tons, 500-horse power [cancelled in 1864], and the Bittern, 4, 669 tons, 150-horse power, at Devonport; the Endymion, 36, 2,478 tons, 500-horse power, the Sappho, 6, 950 tons, 200-horse power, and the Circassian, 4, 669 tons, 150-horse power [completed as Enterprise], at Deptford; the North Star, 22, 1,623 tons, 400-horse power [cancelled in 1865], at Sheerness; the Tweed, 51, 3,027 tons, 600-horse power [cancelled in 1864], the Trent, 6, 950 tons, 200-horse power, [completed as Research,] the Newport, 5, 425 tons, 80-horse power, the Nassau, 4, 695 tons, 200-horse power, the Guernsey, 4, 695 tons, 200-horse power [cancelled in 1863, not laid down] the Tartarus, 4, 695 tons, 200-horse power [cancelled in 1864], and the Research, 4, 1,253 tons, 200-horse power, at Pembroke; and the Prince Albert, 5, 2,529 tons, 500-horse power, at Millwall.
The job that most of the ships are doing is waiting in reserve until they're needed. Did you not wonder why your numbers didn't add up?
North American station is 29
squadron in the Mediterranean... numbers 28 vessels
East India and China squadrons consist of 32 vessels
West Coast of Africa... is 21.
Pacific squadron... numbers 12 ships
South-east coast of America... 8 ships.
six ... at the Cape of Good Hope
Australian station... also has the same number
The Channel squadron [5 named ships]
there are 43 vessels under construction
Total: 184
the navy of England on the 1st of January numbered 1,014 ships of all classes.
So where are the rest, if not in reserve and deployable in a crisis?
I don't think you need a new design to control Lake Ontario and the Saint Lawrence, as it's just the Welland canal onto Lake Erie that the Aetna class won't fit through. Smaller ships are needed, certainly, and being able to deploy them either on Ontario or Erie would be helpful. However, building those extra Aetna class that you can send to Halifax and then decide whether Lake Ontario or the blockading squadrons need them more just makes a lot of sense.
I've always been sceptical about the idea of having the Canadians assemble ironclads: labour will be more expensive even before taking tens of thousands of militia out of the job market, they don't have the same level of experience of working with iron as UK shipyards would, and getting the kit there right as the Lakes are about to open and finding you just can't get it to fit together (the 'Ikea scenario') would be absolutely disastrous. In the event, I think the government would probably have determined to have the ships built in the UK and caulk and tow them as they would have a gunboat. Most of Canada's shipwrights would have been busy converting Lake steamers to gunboats; if they had any time left, building shallow-draft Clown-class gunboats would have been the more appropriate use of it. If the government are going to send anything over disassembled, they'd have been better pulling the engines out of the most rotten Crimean gunboats and sending a few to Canada to form the basis of new construction.
An interesting question would be "where are these shipyards located?"
If we assume @Belisarius II scenario of the Union marching all its reserve forces off to Canada, then presumably these shipyards are practically undefended. In which case, one of my first moves as the British would be to land troops at these shipyards and destroy every facility that I could lay my hands on, imprison the American shipyard workers for the duration of the war, and ruin or capture any ship that had been laid down or was nearly finished.
We know that the British were able to land troops up and down the American coast during the War of 1812 - they burnt the White House down - so how feasible would this be in 1862?
To me, that makes much more sense than waiting for these ships to be constructed and set sail, especially if said ships are actually as amazing as some members claim.
Northstar
Possibly not, though I'm pretty certain you'd want to tweak the Aetna design a bit for better riverrine fighting (the bow mounted gun would be helpful in the more constricted Richelieu IMO). The Aetna design is pretty solid, so other than some murmurs at the Admiralty (and probably Captain Coles saying that he can make a better turret ship) I'm reasonably certain that shortly after the outbreak of war they would be appearing in Canadian waters.
All valid concerns for the Canadians. IIRC they do have some advantage with constructing larger iron ships at Montreal and Kingston, and the Allan Steamship Line was constructing a larger ocean going iron hulled steamer at Quebec. Though caulking and towing probably makes more sense if you're just tweaking the Crimean battery design slightly and sending it across the Atlantic. I suppose it's just about guessing a time table for the ironclads to show up on either side. The Americans would arguably have the local advantage since they could re-route men and material from any building for the Western Gunboat Flotilla not completed by the end of January northwards, and anything from such disasters as the Stevens Battery and use men and material to extemporize something on Lake Champlain and Lake Ontario (I think it would be roughly 4 months between ordering and commissioning based on the Western Gunboat Flotilla ironclads) then the question would just be whether the British can move everything faster or how much this comes up to the thaw. The British ironclads being a month later than their American compatriots would be irksome, but not a war ending disaster.
So I have read a lot of this thread and seen a lot of Britain but what about France? from what I have read napoleon was perfectly eager to join Britain for an attack on the union. So what kind of forces can France send, it can't be a hole lot, they only have a few ironclads and they have forces in Mexico, Indochina, and Algeria already, can't see them haveing more then a division or two to send, but they would probably be much more willing to help the confederate army directly.