The Kriegsmarine's Double Whammy: Monitors and Carrier Conversions

[muskeg13]

That's cool information about the torpedoes, and about the subs especially.

What about using U-boats to land commandos/special forces and seize the coastal batteries? Is this even feasible? Brandenburgers?

It wasn't thought necessary to seize (or bombard into submission) the coastal batteries as there had been no mobilization of reserves and the forts were to be manned with re-called reserve troops. It was believed that the forts would only be inhabited by small caretaker elements that could be easily bypassed on a dark peacetime night. Once the outer harbor defenses were breeched, guns pointed out to sea were largely useless even if sufficient local reservists managed to make their way to the forts. Using U-boats to land commandos wasn't efficient or necessary. There were German troops onboard torpedo gunboats, minesweepers and destroyers whose mission it was to storm ashore and capture the seaport harbors, and this plan proved sound as most harbors were overrun and captured without much of, or even any, fight (Horten, Stavanger, Alesund, Bergen and Kristiansand to name a few).

The Germans hoped for a successful "Hearts and Minds" campaign to eventually win over active support of the Norwegians after a quick and bloodless invasion they were calling a "rescue" to protect Norwegian neutrality. As they entered the mouth of Oslofjord, Admiral Kummetz signal to his flotilla was: "Mission is the peaceful occupation of Norway. Searchlights or warning shots do not justify use of own weapons. Only fire back if fired on." Kummetz didn't believe the Norwegians would "shoot to kill" even if they knew it was a German invasion. The Germans severely overestimated Norwegian response to British violations of Norwegian sovereignty, such as the Altmark Incident and the mining of the Leads.

However, it was the inaction, total confusion and lack of leadership on the part of the Norwegian Government that doomed Norway. Hiding behind a very thin cloak of neutrality, the weak pacifist (even anti-military) Government refused to accept the reality that war was knocking on their door no matter their wish to remain neutral. Oslo air raid alarms went off shortly after midnight. Reports of multiple darkened warships, probably German, steaming up Oslofjord had been coming in for hours. The British Ambassador confirmed the ships were not British. So, the Cabinet dithered and delayed mobilization until German warships had already entered multiple harbors, and even then it was only a pitiful half-assed measure. Despite the urgent pleas of staff and even other cabinet ministers for an immediate full mobilization to be broadcast by radio, at some time past 0300 on 9 April, the Minister of Defense agreed to a partial "quiet" mobilization of the reserve forces, but only in southern Norway, and only by mail and telegram notification. The Minister knew this would take at least 3 days to accomplish, but he didn't want to alarm the people. The it took until 0530 for the orders to be drafted and given to the mail and telegraph services, and it being peacetime, none of the mobilization orders started going out until these services opened for daily business after 0800. I've spoken with several veterans, or their sons, who expressed extreme frustration at receiving mobilization orders several days after the Germans had landed and swept north past Oslo, driving the King and Government before them.

 

[HMS Warspite]

That is true. But those are mostly 15cm weapons and don't have much punch against coastal artillery. What we really want is 28cm and above.

Perhaps strip the pre-dreads of their main armament?

Coastal artillery is mostly placed in open batteries with no cover on the top in most cases, unless the Atlantic Wall heavy concrete structures of later in the war are build sooner. Any sort of artillery, even down to light AA guns, can hit open batteries if in range, so the argument of a heavy naval gun to counter coastal artillery is a non starter. The bigger the naval gun in a ship, the bigger the ship, the bigger the target for the coastal artillery. Ideally smaller vessels are better suited to engage a coastal battery, compared to larger, more expensive ones. Even better was to avoid sending ships against coastal batteries at all and bomb it out of existence with aircraft.

BTW, Norway lacked a good and powerful defense in general and the vast majority of the its defense force was voluntary and undermanned in april 1940. the coastal battery at Oslo was partially manned and it did surprisingly well, though the Germans themselves were mostly to blame here, taking not the needed precaution and planning to do the operation in the first place. Basically it was a huge gamble that in the end resulted in the conquest of Norway, mostly due to allied incompetence, rather than a good German plan, with the navy suffering badly though not as complete as was feared for by the high command.

Alternatively, the Oslo campaign could have been done with the combined Kriegsmarine force backed up by a strong Luftwaffe component of especially transport aircraft and gliders, that could have been pulled away temporarily from the upcomming attack on the West, putting troops in the aircraft, out of the warships, especially the larger units such as Blucher. Lutzow and Emden, to make these warships free for other duties, rather than an army transport. Note the invasionforce had just 2000 troops, so these could be flown in if needed. with around 18-20 fully equipped soldiers in each aircraft, suggesting a need of roughly 100 - 120 Ju-52 planes would be able to carry them all. Added to this, the forts near Oslo could be attacked by a few bombers of any type, if at least having the range to reach the target. This would have made the heavy units of the Kriegsmarine free for deployement elsewhere, so only a number of minesweepers and auxilliaries would be needed to bring in supplies and more troops with heavy equipment for the airborne troops, after they secured the various objectives.

 

[McPherson]

Alternatively, the Oslo campaign could have been done with the combined Kriegsmarine force backed up by a strong Luftwaffe component of especially transport aircraft and gliders, that could have been pulled away temporarily from the upcomming attack on the West, putting troops in the aircraft, out of the warships, especially the larger units such as Blucher. Lutzow and Emden, to make these warships free for other duties, rather than an army transport. Note the invasionforce had just 2000 troops, so these could be flown in if needed. with around 18-20 fully equipped soldiers in each aircraft, suggesting a need of roughly 100 - 120 Ju-52 planes would be able to carry them all. Added to this, the forts near Oslo could be attacked by a few bombers of any type, if at least having the range to reach the target. This would have made the heavy units of the Kriegsmarine free for deployement elsewhere, so only a number of minesweepers and auxilliaries would be needed to bring in supplies and more troops with heavy equipment for the airborne troops, after they secured the various objectives.

The LW was not trained or geared for it. To carry out what amounts to a full three battalion drop would require double the aircraft transports suggested. (Ju52s being the turkey aircraft selected.).

 

[HMS Warspite]

The LW was not trained or geared for it. To carry out what amounts to a full three battalion drop would require double the aircraft transports suggested. (Ju52s being the turkey aircraft selected.).

Not entirely correct as just a month later the Luftwaffe DID employ large numbers of the same Ju-52 fleet to transport troops into combat in both Belgium and the Netherlands. using several paratrooper units to swiftly occupy strategic points in the Netherlands and Belgium.

Quote:
To ensure a victory the Germans resorted to unconventional means. The Germans had trained two airborne/airlanding assault divisions. The first of these, the 7. Flieger-Division, consisted of paratroopers; the second, the 22nd Luftlande-Infanteriedivision, of airborne infantry. Initially the plan was that the main German assault was to take place in Flanders, and it was expected these troops would be used for a crossing attempt over the river Scheldt near Ghent. This operation was cancelled, so it was decided to use them to obtain an easy victory in the Netherlands.[103] The airborne troops would on the first day attempt to secure the airfields around the Dutch seat of government, The Hague, and then capture that government, together with the Dutch High Command and Queen Wilhelmina.[104] German officers actually took lessons on how to address royalty on such occasions. The plan, Fall Festung, had been developed by Hitler personally, embellishing an earlier idea to let an envoy offer "armed protection of the Dutch neutrality", that is, to become a German protectorate.[105] In the event this did not bring forth the desired immediate collapse, the bridges at Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Moerdijk would simultaneously be secured to allow a mechanised force to relieve the airborne troops from the south.

Note that the Germans used the German Fallschirmjäger units numbering 3000 men with equipment, meaning m ore than the actual number of troops used in the innitial Oslo operation as mentioned earlier. 2000 troops were deployed in the first wave of the attack, the same number as at Oslo.

In other words: cheque your own data before making suggestions like yours may seem reasonable.

Also of some importance is that teh Ju-52, although slow, was not threatened in Norway by any airforce as the Norwegian defense force hardly had an airforce at all, compared to the Dutch, who had the small, but relatively well trained, but ill equipped Koninklijke Luchtmacht, availabel, which did indeed seriously hit the German Ju-52 fleet, when it was cramming Dutch airfields on th ground.

Norway: see: http://www.nuav.net/norwair1940.html
Netherlands: See: http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=the-airforce

 

[McPherson]

In other words: cheque your own data before making suggestions like yours may seem reasonable.

Check geography, weather, troop loads, fuel availability for the Ju 52s and airfields suited and sited and suggested for the Norway targets.

Also...

Immediately after the bombardments, between 04:30 and 05:00 local time, paratroopers were landed near the airfields. Dutch anti-aircraft batteries shot down numerous Ju 52 transport planes of the Luftwaffe's Transportgruppen and even more were wrecked during or after landing. German Ju 52 total losses in the entire battle amounted to 224, compared to 430 Ju 52s deployed by the airborne troops.[123]

Not trained for it. Not equipped for it and a freaking operational disaster at half the DISTANCE they would have to fly in much better weather and terrain than the LW would face in Norway.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

BTW, Norway lacked a good and powerful defense in general and the vast majority of the its defense force was voluntary and undermanned in april 1940. the coastal battery at Oslo was partially manned and it did surprisingly well, though the Germans themselves were mostly to blame here, taking not the needed precaution and planning to do the operation in the first place. Basically it was a huge gamble that in the end resulted in the conquest of Norway, mostly due to allied incompetence, rather than a good German plan, with the navy suffering badly though not as complete as was feared for by the high command.

Alternatively, the Oslo campaign could have been done with the combined Kriegsmarine force backed up by a strong Luftwaffe component of especially transport aircraft and gliders, that could have been pulled away temporarily from the upcomming attack on the West, putting troops in the aircraft, out of the warships, especially the larger units such as Blucher. Lutzow and Emden, to make these warships free for other duties, rather than an army transport. Note the invasionforce had just 2000 troops, so these could be flown in if needed. with around 18-20 fully equipped soldiers in each aircraft, suggesting a need of roughly 100 - 120 Ju-52 planes would be able to carry them all. Added to this, the forts near Oslo could be attacked by a few bombers of any type, if at least having the range to reach the target. This would have made the heavy units of the Kriegsmarine free for deployement elsewhere, so only a number of minesweepers and auxilliaries would be needed to bring in supplies and more troops with heavy equipment for the airborne troops, after they secured the various objectives.

What about switching the Narvik and Oslo force ships? Both carried the same number of troops IIRC. 10 destroyers might do a better job, especially if the Germans want to look friendly to the Norweigians as @muskeg13 mentioned above. Smaller, less intimidating, and yet still good enough to force the coastal defences, as said by @HMS Warspite . Conversely, the 3 cruisers in Narvik can get out of there faster, without having to refuel, before Warburton-Lee turns up.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Check geography, weather, troop loads, fuel availability for the Ju 52s and airfields suited and sited and suggested for the Norway targets.

Also...



Not trained for it. Not equipped for it and a freaking operational disaster at half the DISTANCE they would have to fly in much better weather and terrain than the LW would face in Norway.

Question remains: What defenses??? Norway lacked an airforce to speak of, lacked seriously in AA capabilities in every branche and troops were not present in numbers to pose any serious threat even to unarmed slow aircraft trying to land on whatever sort of ground they wished to. The Netherlands were to some sort of level prepared to hostilities since the 30's, Norway, with a Pacifist government in most of the Interbellum period, was not. So still the question remains: Even with an illprepared airborne push, what sorts of dangers posed by the Norwegean armed forces could be considered a threat???

 

[HMS Warspite]

What about switching the Narvik and Oslo force ships? Both carried the same number of troops IIRC. 10 destroyers might do a better job, especially if the Germans want to look friendly to the Norweigians as @muskeg13 mentioned above. Smaller, less intimidating, and yet still good enough to force the coastal defences, as said by @HMS Warspite . Conversely, the 3 cruisers in Narvik can get out of there faster, without having to refuel, before Warburton-Lee turns up.

Not a good idea as well as DD's were not very wel suited to operate in the sort of conditions they were pulled in this operation in teh first place. The only reason tehy were used was their speed, whch was a critical thing the Germans needed to get at Narvik. Putting these roops on larger ships would have been more troublesome as these were not well suited to dash in the narrows of Narvik at the speed the more agile DD's could, besides the combining of all larger ships to Narvik would certainly have allerted the British even more than the Schanrhorst, Gneisenau and Hipper already did.

Alternatively a more logical way to land troops at Oslo would be to use civilian ships of the Merhcant Navy and perhaps some so called: "Sperrbrecher" type conversions leading them in case some opposition was offered. These very bouyand conversions could take a seriouspounding, if needed and still remain affloat, allowing following ships to adjust their course and continue the operation. Bonus would be that a Merchant ship look a like would less allert the defending Norwegian gunners than a large powerful looking warship.

 

[McPherson]

Question remains: What defenses??? Norway lacked an airforce to speak of, lacked seriously in AA capabilities in every branche and troops were not present in numbers to pose any serious threat even to unarmed slow aircraft trying to land on whatever sort of ground they wished to. The Netherlands were to some sort of level prepared to hostilities since the 30's, Norway, with a Pacifist government in most of the Interbellum period, was not. So still the question remains: Even with an illprepared airborne push, what sorts of dangers posed by the Norwegean armed forces could be considered a threat???

Not the point. The Norwegians "could" have with forces in place turned in a performance that would have similarly decimated the LW airborne by simply having infantry with Krags show up at the proposed drop zones. Fatso's "private army" were not ready at that stage of the war to execute a mission.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Not the point. The Norwegians "could" have with forces in place turned in a performance that would have similarly decimated the LW airborne by simply having infantry with Krags show up at the proposed drop zones. Fatso's "private army" were not ready at that stage of the war to execute a mission.

A token force on one airfield is possible, I agree, not at multiple landingsites and the Germans certainly would not send all transports to one place only, as is their nature of WWII operations using multiple deployement area's, so the argument still does not prove valid.

Besides that, the landingtroops were deployed just one month later in combat, so they were ready to action though in another operation (Netherlands and Belgium)

 

[Kantai Kessen]

Not a good idea as well as DD's were not very wel suited to operate in the sort of conditions they were pulled in this operation in teh first place. The only reason tehy were used was their speed, whch was a critical thing the Germans needed to get at Narvik. Putting these roops on larger ships would have been more troublesome as these were not well suited to dash in the narrows of Narvik at the speed the more agile DD's could, besides the combining of all larger ships to Narvik would certainly have allerted the British even more than the Schanrhorst, Gneisenau and Hipper already did.

Alternatively a more logical way to land troops at Oslo would be to use civilian ships of the Merhcant Navy and perhaps some so called: "Sperrbrecher" type conversions leading them in case some opposition was offered. These very bouyand conversions could take a seriouspounding, if needed and still remain affloat, allowing following ships to adjust their course and continue the operation. Bonus would be that a Merchant ship look a like would less allert the defending Norwegian gunners than a large powerful looking warship.

If the British can sail Warspite into Narvik, I think an Admiral Hipper-class CA will fit very nicely.

You mention the alert factor, so how about this? The Twins, Admiral Hipper and Blücher, along with 10 destroyers, sail north. The Twins go on their diversion as in OTL. The CAs and 2 DDs go to Narvik, while 8 DDs go under Bonte to Trondheim. Troop numbers should work out the same. The CAs refuel the DDs (they have the same type of fuel and both use high-pressure steam propulsion so this should be feasible) and dash back before the RN figures out what is up - no need to wait for tankers. The 8 DDs slaughter Glowworm and complete the landing as in OTL.

The number of ships involved is, in fact, less than that in real life - I've substituted Blücher for 4 DDs. Those could instead be used in Oslo with Lützow as the group flagship, for a potentially better result.

 

[muskeg13]

Not the point. The Norwegians "could" have with forces in place turned in a performance that would have similarly decimated the LW airborne by simply having infantry with Krags show up at the proposed drop zones. Fatso's "private army" were not ready at that stage of the war to execute a mission.

Absolutely, if Norway had mobilized sooner and had the stomach to shoot-to-kill in repelling invaders much more could have been done to at least disrupt the Nazi timeline, giving allies Britain and France time to effectively render assistance. Geirr Haarr in The German Invasion of Norway documents that the pacifist Government had gone so far as to force the army to remove the bolts of rifles and machineguns and have them stored in separate locations from the weapons, and the ammunition was stored in a third location. Elderly Norwegian friends have recounted to me that it was absolute chaos when the Germans arrived without any warning or direction from Norwegian authorities until many hours after the invaders had a strong foothold in the Oslo region. They said that many reservists reported for duty on their own initiative when they realized their country had been invaded and were told to go back home until the army could get itself better organized!

The understrength Norwegian company holding Fornebu (Oslo) Airport initially did well in holding off the LW airborne troops, but gradually were overwhelmed as they took casualties and began to run low on ammo, particularly for their few machineguns, and there was no reinforcement. The LW eventually gained the upper hand with the assistance of strafing Me-110s, and began to regularly land Ju-52s with troops.

Elsewhere, certain German sympathizing Norwegians in command of local defenses did very little or even nothing to repel the invaders (Stavanger airfield). Their treasonous actions were assisted by the lack of leadership and direction by their higher regional and national headquarters.

 

[McPherson]

A token force on one airfield is possible, I agree, not at multiple landingsites and the Germans certainly would not send all transports to one place only, as is their nature of WWII operations using multiple deployement area's, so the argument still does not prove valid.

Besides that, the landingtroops were deployed just one month later in combat, so they were ready to action though in another operation (Netherlands and Belgium)

Have already demonstrated the majority of those operations in Belgium and Holland offered as proof were actually disasters. As to multiple drop operations? Apparently the Herr was not too confident because they cancelled most of the planned ones for Norway and only executed "vital" time critical ones for which they had no other recourse and even at that. when Norwegians showed up, the fallschirmjager made slow and rough going.

 

[HMS Warspite]

If the British can sail Warspite into Narvik, I think an Admiral Hipper-class CA will fit very nicely.

You mention the alert factor, so how about this? The Twins, Admiral Hipper and Blücher, along with 10 destroyers, sail north. The Twins go on their diversion as in OTL. The CAs and 2 DDs go to Narvik, while 8 DDs go under Bonte to Trondheim. Troop numbers should work out the same. The CAs refuel the DDs (they have the same type of fuel and both use high-pressure steam propulsion so this should be feasible) and dash back before the RN figures out what is up - no need to wait for tankers. The 8 DDs slaughter Glowworm and complete the landing as in OTL.

The number of ships involved is, in fact, less than that in real life - I've substituted Blücher for 4 DDs. Those could instead be used in Oslo with Lützow as the group flagship, for a potentially better result.

One problem: Where do you get four additional DD's from? This type of warship was not available in large numbers in the Kriegsmarine to start with and they were bounc to tactical flottilla's and so far as is known in april 1940, there was just one such operational flottilla under the command of Friedrich Bonte, which included the 10 ships of the 1st, Zerstörer Flottille (Flagship of Bonte; Z-21 Wilhlem Heidkamp, Z-2), 3rd ZF (Z-17, Z-18, Z-19, Z-22) and 4th ZF (Z-9, Z-11, Z-12, Z-13) total of 10 vessels to one tactical commander and flottilla leader. It is not normal to split up such a command in seperate geographically dispersed subcommands, due to commandstructure. The group with Admiral Hipper was accompanied by elements of the 2nd ZF (Z-5, Z6, Z-8 & Z-16) as these also carried troopps for Bodö. These 14 Zerstörer at the time were all the Kriegsmarine could bring into the waras some others already had been lost prior to teh invasion of Norway (Z-1 Leberecht Maass and Z-3 Max Schultz) sunk by friendly fire and mines in februari 1940, and the last four were still running trials, being just commissioned a month or so before (Z-20 Karl Galster), or were in refit and/or repair (Z-4 Richard Beitzen, Z-7 Hermann Schumann, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-14 Friedrich Inn ). The whole Kriegsmarine at the time only had 19 Zerstörer in total, with one of them still running trials and four in refit and repair, making a grand total of operational units 14 vessels.

Another issue: The German ships were disappointingly unstable and v ery badly affected by heavy seastate, very much limmiting their combatcapabilities, so the HMS Glowworm case is not so much a push over, even with the numbers 8 vs 1. The British destroyer was only stopped by the presence of the more seaworthy large heavy ship, Admiral Hipper, which was a far better and more stable gunnery platform and proved to be decisive in the confrontation. (HMS Glowworm actually could outrun the heavily loaded German Zerstörer with ease, being less heavily build and not loaded with troops.)

So in the mentioned scenario, Only Hipper and two Zerstörer to Narvik will see all three lost, as the British would counter as they did historically, with Admiral Hipper and Blücher a far bigger targets to shoot at for HMS Warspite in confined waters where a defending side cannot operate well as well as in the proces of landing troops. The eight Zerstörer mentioned for Bodö get a slugg out with HMS Glowworm and suffer heavily in return. Perhaps the British now can get the rest of her division mates HMS Greyhound, HMS Hero & HMS Hypernion and perhaps their escorted high value ship HMS Repulse into action as well by radiocontact, historically not possible as the first shots of Admiral Hipper knocked her radiowires out of action. So a disaster in the making, even bigger than the historical outcome. Added to this, the landings at Bodö would fail as well, either by disruption, or complete destruction.

So it basically is a no go.

The alternative is to have the operation be done as historically with the omission of the Blücher, Emden and Lutzow at Oslo, replacing them by a pair of "Sperrbrecher" decoy's and a number of transportships as well as a number of troops being dropped around the landingzones by Luftwaffe transports, either by parachute, or by simply landing the aircraft wherever possible. Losses would still be serious, no matter what else was done, with the exception of not invading Norway at all.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Have already demonstrated the majority of those operations in Belgium and Holland offered as proof were actually disasters. As to multiple drop operations? Apparently the Herr was not too confident because they cancelled most of the planned ones for Norway and only executed "vital" time critical ones for which they had no other recourse and even at that. when Norwegians showed up, the fallschirmjager made slow and rough going.

Afterthought is not an option here as even German High Command had no capabilities to look into the future so the May 1940 operation is irrelevant in this discussion still. What is relevant is that the Luftwaffe had aircraft and (partly trained) troops ready fro early deployement and could lift them to any operational area in range of German controlled airfields. (Danemark surrendered in hours after the borders were violated so Danish airfields closer to Norway offered a startingpoint). Losses were expected and calculated for, mostly due to navigational and landing errors, rather than opposition of the poorly equipped token force the Norwegian armed forces could muster. Oppostion in the air was none existend as there were no fighterplanes in the Norwegian Airforce, other than a few armed trainers and biplane relics of the past. All Luftwaffe pilots were trained by experience in combat already while the Norwegian pilots were hampered by lack of training, due to the limited flyinghours allowed for due to lack of fuel and costs in the period before as a result of the Depression.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

One problem: Where do you get four additional DD's from? This type of warship was not available in large numbers in the Kriegsmarine to start with and they were bounc to tactical flottilla's and so far as is known in april 1940, there was just one such operational flottilla under the command of Friedrich Bonte, which included the 10 ships of the 1st, Zerstörer Flottille (Flagship of Bonte; Z-21 Wilhlem Heidkamp, Z-2), 3rd ZF (Z-17, Z-18, Z-19, Z-22) and 4th ZF (Z-9, Z-11, Z-12, Z-13) total of 10 vessels to one tactical commander and flottilla leader. It is not normal to split up such a command in seperate geographically dispersed subcommands, due to commandstructure. The group with Admiral Hipper was accompanied by elements of the 2nd ZF (Z-5, Z6, Z-8 & Z-16) as these also carried troopps for Bodö. These 14 Zerstörer at the time were all the Kriegsmarine could bring into the waras some others already had been lost prior to teh invasion of Norway (Z-1 Leberecht Maass and Z-3 Max Schultz) sunk by friendly fire and mines in februari 1940, and the last four were still running trials, being just commissioned a month or so before (Z-20 Karl Galster), or were in refit and/or repair (Z-4 Richard Beitzen, Z-7 Hermann Schumann, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-14 Friedrich Inn ). The whole Kriegsmarine at the time only had 19 Zerstörer in total, with one of them still running trials and four in refit and repair, making a grand total of operational units 14 vessels.

Another issue: The German ships were disappointingly unstable and v ery badly affected by heavy seastate, very much limmiting their combatcapabilities, so the HMS Glowworm case is not so much a push over, even with the numbers 8 vs 1. The British destroyer was only stopped by the presence of the more seaworthy large heavy ship, Admiral Hipper, which was a far better and more stable gunnery platform and proved to be decisive in the confrontation. (HMS Glowworm actually could outrun the heavily loaded German Zerstörer with ease, being less heavily build and not loaded with troops.)

So in the mentioned scenario, Only Hipper and two Zerstörer to Narvik will see all three lost, as the British would counter as they did historically, with Admiral Hipper and Blücher a far bigger targets to shoot at for HMS Warspite in confined waters where a defending side cannot operate well as well as in the proces of landing troops. The eight Zerstörer mentioned for Bodö get a slugg out with HMS Glowworm and suffer heavily in return. Perhaps the British now can get the rest of her division mates HMS Greyhound, HMS Hero & HMS Hypernion and perhaps their escorted high value ship HMS Repulse into action as well by radiocontact, historically not possible as the first shots of Admiral Hipper knocked her radiowires out of action. So a disaster in the making, even bigger than the historical outcome. Added to this, the landings at Bodö would fail as well, either by disruption, or complete destruction.

So it basically is a no go.

The alternative is to have the operation be done as historically with the omission of the Blücher, Emden and Lutzow at Oslo, replacing them by a pair of "Sperrbrecher" decoy's and a number of transportships as well as a number of troops being dropped around the landingzones by Luftwaffe transports, either by parachute, or by simply landing the aircraft wherever possible. Losses would still be serious, no matter what else was done, with the exception of not invading Norway at all.

There were 14 destroyers in the plan I mentioned above: 2 to Narvik with the CAs, 8 to Trondheim, 4 to Oslo. Apologies if I did not make that clear.

Considering the bold above: wasn't the reason the British could deploy forces to Narvik at all because the Germans were still there, trapped due to Warburton-Lee's actions and the destruction of their supply ships? A cruiser force isn't going to have the same problem - it carries the same number of troops with more endurance and firepower.

I accept though that the Trondheim force may get screwed over. Still, this is a net gain of 1 heavy cruiser (Blücher) and 2 destroyers (8 lost instead of 10). Worth it?

 

[HMS Warspite]

There were 14 destroyers in the plan I mentioned above: 2 to Narvik with the CAs, 8 to Trondheim, 4 to Oslo. Apologies if I did not make that clear.

Considering the bold above: wasn't the reason the British could deploy forces to Narvik at all because the Germans were still there, trapped due to Warburton-Lee's actions and the destruction of their supply ships? A cruiser force isn't going to have the same problem - it carries the same number of troops with more endurance and firepower.

I accept though that the Trondheim force may get screwed over. Still, this is a net gain of 1 heavy cruiser (Blücher) and 2 destroyers (8 lost instead of 10). Worth it?

Seriously doubtfull as the Royal navy would do what it historically did, no matter what the Kriegmarine had send to Narvik and once in the narrows, getting out was an entirely different thing as it is a large inlet with curves and rocks everywhere, making a fast movement of ships, especially large ones over 200 meters in length (Admiral Hipper class cruiser was longer than 200 meters), challenging even with no opposition whatsoever.

So the scenario is as it was in the OTL: German ships get in Narvik, to unload landforces and equipment (after tossing off the Norge and Eidsvold when entering the Loffoten). Assume the two Norwegean battelships did not offer any resistance as in the OTL was the case so no damage to the German side still. Then the ships move to Narvik at the end of the Fjord to unload and refuel there, needing several hours to do so. The Royal navy 2nd DD Flottilla still gets into Narvik as well as historically and fights a running brawl with stationary German ships, still in the refueling and unloading proces, getting serious damage ob both sides, possibly worse for the Germans as the large ships are sitting ducks and are torpedomagnets. Assume the outcome is the same as historically was the case: Both sides loose 2 warships and have one seriously damaged. This would mean the German force is halved already in numbers and for the fun assume the ships still floating are both cruisers Admiral Hipper and Blücher. Both are seriously incapacitated by eitehr direct damage, or the debris all around them, making leaving the port not possible. The British react as historically sending in HMS Warspite and a large number of Destroyers to mop up the remnants of the German Naval presence at Narvik, though too late to prevent the landforces capturing the city and surrounding area. With only two targets to shoot at the outcome is for certain, Both Admiral Hipper and Blücher are lost. Hittler will still get Norway, but the Kriegsmarine is whiped out as a fighting force of any significance, apart from the still operational large ships (Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, as well as Lutzow perhaps.)

 

[McPherson]

Afterthought is not an option here as even German High Command had no capabilities to look into the future so the May 1940 operation is irrelevant in this discussion still. What is relevant is that the Luftwaffe had aircraft and (partly trained) troops ready fro early deployement and could lift them to any operational area in range of German controlled airfields. (Danemark surrendered in hours after the borders were violated so Danish airfields closer to Norway offered a startingpoint). Losses were expected and calculated for, mostly due to navigational and landing errors, rather than opposition of the poorly equipped token force the Norwegian armed forces could muster. Oppostion in the air was none existend as there were no fighterplanes in the Norwegian Airforce, other than a few armed trainers and biplane relics of the past. All Luftwaffe pilots were trained by experience in combat already while the Norwegian pilots were hampered by lack of training, due to the limited flyinghours allowed for due to lack of fuel and costs in the period before as a result of the Depression.

Have answered that.

Apparently the Herr was not too confident because they cancelled most of the planned ones for Norway and only executed "vital" time critical ones for which they had no other recourse and even at that. when Norwegians showed up, the fallschirmjager made slow and rough going.

So they knew going in.

 

[thaddeus]

the Admiral Scheer and light cruisers Leipzig and Nurnberg were all under repair, the forces might have been reshuffled if those were available.

my suggestion thru this thread was for the WWI-era ships to be rebuilt (somewhat), they could have been used along with the suggested Sperrbrecher for Oslo, they would all be approx. same speed? (any losses or damage not as important)

 

[Kantai Kessen]

Seriously doubtfull as the Royal navy would do what it historically did, no matter what the Kriegmarine had send to Narvik and once in the narrows, getting out was an entirely different thing as it is a large inlet with curves and rocks everywhere, making a fast movement of ships, especially large ones over 200 meters in length (Admiral Hipper class cruiser was longer than 200 meters), challenging even with no opposition whatsoever.

So the scenario is as it was in the OTL: German ships get in Narvik, to unload landforces and equipment (after tossing off the Norge and Eidsvold when entering the Loffoten). Assume the two Norwegean battelships did not offer any resistance as in the OTL was the case so no damage to the German side still. Then the ships move to Narvik at the end of the Fjord to unload and refuel there, needing several hours to do so. The Royal navy 2nd DD Flottilla still gets into Narvik as well as historically and fights a running brawl with stationary German ships, still in the refueling and unloading proces, getting serious damage ob both sides, possibly worse for the Germans as the large ships are sitting ducks and are torpedomagnets. Assume the outcome is the same as historically was the case: Both sides loose 2 warships and have one seriously damaged. This would mean the German force is halved already in numbers and for the fun assume the ships still floating are both cruisers Admiral Hipper and Blücher. Both are seriously incapacitated by eitehr direct damage, or the debris all around them, making leaving the port not possible. The British react as historically sending in HMS Warspite and a large number of Destroyers to mop up the remnants of the German Naval presence at Narvik, though too late to prevent the landforces capturing the city and surrounding area. With only two targets to shoot at the outcome is for certain, Both Admiral Hipper and Blücher are lost. Hittler will still get Norway, but the Kriegsmarine is whiped out as a fighting force of any significance, apart from the still operational large ships (Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, as well as Lutzow perhaps.)

So what can the Kriegsmarine send to Narvik that isn't doomed to die a horrible death?