Can the whole turret idea, stick guns in wings and the resulting fighter should be at least as good as Hurricane.
Just build a Hurricane!
Can the whole turret idea, stick guns in wings and the resulting fighter should be at least as good as Hurricane.
The A-10. By the time it entered service in the late 70s it was already much too vulnerable to Warsaw Pact grade AA being slow and having no pgms other than short-range Mavericks gave it no stand-off attack capability to keep it out of enemy threat rings. The Air Force realized this relatively quickly and were already moving away from low-altitude tactics as well as looking for a replacement but then the Gulf War restored it's reputation. We should have kept the A-7 as our main cas platform and upgraded to the YA-7F when it became available; much faster, greater range, all weather precision attack capabilities, and a larger payload to boot. And if the gau-8 means that much to people Vought had proposals for mounting it on the A-7 too.
Wait, what? But the GAU-8 is huge! The A-10 was literally designed around the cannon! How on God's green Earth could you mount it on the A-7?!?
How did LTV plan to mount the gun on the A-7, pray tell? The Hog was built around the gun, and for survivability: there's several A-10 drivers in both ODS and OIF who brought back Hogs with major battle damage that would've sent them skydiving if they'd been in an A-7 or F-16. Not to mention that the gun pod with a 30-mm for the F-16 failed in its only combat use in ODS. That, and the Hog's combat performance in ODS, ensured the aircraft stayed in service.
The Brabazon was built around the idea that only a few rich people and companies would pay for long distance air flight but the Brabazon was capacious and the large wing area made it a potential good weight lifter. Possibly with modern high density seating it could have made it's market with low price high volume transport. Not unlike the Loftleidair Candair Cl44.
It's fantastic that she was able to RTB (and given the DFC not the expectation) but, quite frankly, so what? The airframe was only suitable for spare parts afterwards and that certainly would've been all that it was used for had it taken similar damage in a Cold War gone hot scenario. Might as well cite that Israeli F-15 that landed with only a single wing. All that shows is that going low and slow is going to hurt severely against even the most modest AA capability. You don't design around surviving the hits, you design around not getting hit in the first place. The Warthog is mythologized, but it didn't provide a meaningful capability above the A-7 and has long been obsolete.
The Hog of today has been refitted with more modern weapons, targeting pods, new avionics, and is not the same that went to war in 1991. I'd rather have a Hog driver who lives and breathes the CAS mission than an F-16 driver who doesn't train for CAS as a specialty. And if I'm a driver? I'd take the Hog over the A-10 because I know that if I'm hit, I have a decent chance of bringing the bird back, unlike an F-16, where if I'm hit, I go skydiving.
Finally somebody said it. This aircraft has a great reputation for its performance in certain asymmetric wars but its actual survivability in the face of moderately sophisticated air defenses is dubious unless total air superiority is already attained.
The A-10. By the time it entered service in the late 70s it was already much too vulnerable to Warsaw Pact grade AA being slow and having no pgms other than short-range Mavericks gave it no stand-off attack capability to keep it out of enemy threat rings. The Air Force realized this relatively quickly and were already moving away from low-altitude tactics as well as looking for a replacement but then the Gulf War restored it's reputation. We should have kept the A-7 as our main cas platform and upgraded to the YA-7F when it became available; much faster, greater range, all weather precision attack capabilities, and a larger payload to boot. And if the gau-8 means that much to people Vought had proposals for mounting it on the A-7 too.
This is amazingly wrong.Er, no? The A-10 was purpose built (as was the YA-9 prototype) with all the conditions you mention in mind. You're also getting Air Force policy/desires mixed up with actual capability which the AF wanting to 'get-rid' of the A-10 was the former not the latter. (The "plan" was in fact to give them gun and all to the Army in exchange for more F-15s/F-16s and FINALLY allowing them to do their own CAS... No Mavricks though and they had to change it to OV-10 which was not at all going to cause some confusion )
The Air Force was 'moving away from low-altitude tactics' not because the A-10 couldn't do it's job but because it could and the Air Force didn't want to do that job. (Not that we every DID want to do it mind you) The A-7 didn't stand a chance and was on the way out when I joined up in 1979 and everyone knew it because it not only couldn't do a decent job of CAS, (too fast and to limited weapons load) it wasn't able to be a 'fighter/bomber' like the Air Force wanted.
The Air Force was never happy about being forced to field a dedicated CAS aircraft, (and they still aren't) and were still trying to get rid of the A-10 from the day it arrived to today. It's all never been about the actual capabilty but the doctrinal issues with CAS itself versus "air superiority" which is far more important to the Air Force.
Randy
This situation only came about because of the comprehensive destruction of Iraq's high- and medium-altitude air defense systems early in the war. The Iraqis still had a huge amount of low altitude flak and missiles, so low altitude strike aircraft like the F-111 and Tornado were forced to operate at medium altitudes with PGMs rather than in the mission profiles they were designed for. This situation absolutely would not have arisen in a war against the Soviets in Europe; the Soviet integrated air defense system was far more resilient than the Iraqi derivative.No, the Air Force did move away from low-altitude tactics precisely because the A-10 couldn't do it's job at acceptable loss rates. See again Desert Storm, where the A-10 fleet got sufficiently chewed up that F-16s with guided bombs replaced them in the CAS role.
Here's the thing: the revelation about the A-10 was not that it was vulnerable to SHORAD, that had been known from day one. The revelation was that with precision munitions in quantity normal fast movers could do the same job with far less risk and only having to hang a targeting pod on one of the pylons. The F-111 was the best tankhunter aircraft in that war, for Chrissakes.
This situation only came about because of the comprehensive destruction of Iraq's high- and medium-altitude air defense systems early in the war. The Iraqis still had a huge amount of low altitude flak and missiles, so low altitude strike aircraft like the F-111 and Tornado were forced to operate at medium altitudes with PGMs rather than in the mission profiles they were designed for. This situation absolutely would not have arisen in a war against the Soviets in Europe; the Soviet integrated air defense system was far more resilient than the Iraqi derivative.