The Battle of Midway goes according to plan for the IJN

[Brother Stormhammer]

I love how any time there's a Midway WI thread, someone always links to that excellent article. We should sticky it and make it mandatory reading for good measure

I'm a lazy hillbilly at heart...since somebody else already did all the hard research, I'll jest be borrowin' it fer a bit, y'all!

 

[GarethC]

The best POD for a Japanese victory is to write a declaration of war short enough that the embassy crypto team can get it decoded and delivered to the State Department before any bombs fall on US targets.

 

[MattII]

If the Japanese had been able to successfully hit and sink say two of the three US carriers, and Midway perhaps not taken but bombed into the ground, you'd probably throw the US back maybe three months or so.

OTOH, you might soak that victory up in another round of unsustainable advances elsewhere. Of course you can probably kiss Port Moresby good-bye.

 

[Richter von Manthofen]

If the Jps mange to sink the US Carriers AND keep theirs (with experienced Aircrews) they still will be outproduced in the mid term.

The US 3 months delayed - good guess, but that means the Japanese can consolidate their hold on Guadalcanal (assuming the US landings are conducted somewhat later)

Overall the japanese are better off - but the US Steamroller will succeed eventually

 

[SergeantHeretic]

If the Jps mange to sink the US Carriers AND keep theirs (with experienced Aircrews) they still will be outproduced in the mid term.

The US 3 months delayed - good guess, but that means the Japanese can consolidate their hold on Guadalcanal (assuming the US landings are conducted somewhat later)

Overall the japanese are better off - but the US Steamroller will succeed eventually

Yes, the Japanese war effort was based on a badly flawed understanding of the AMerican psyche. They were proceeding from the start o nthe assumption that Americans were weak lazy decadent wastrels who had no stomach for long costly wars.

They were wrong.

If they had been correct, their strategy would have been sound, but even a cursory examination of our nation's history would have given the lie to their assumpion.

Even in 1944 there were members of the Mempei Tai desperatly clinging to their flawed assumption even i nthe fact of the three years the U.S. had spent bleeding for the victories we won from Midway to Saipan.

Even as they stood on the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri some of them wondered how a nation of "Playboys and farmer and stockbrokers" defeated their "Samurai Spirit".

 

[Pangur]

So, the worse they hurt us at the beginning, the harder we would come back at them in the long run.

That makes the Japanese strategy incredibly naivee and childishly foollish.

That's not a bad summary of the situation. I get the impression that Yamamoto knew the whole plan was doomed however did any of the other senior Japanese commanders know that? Surely some of them must have known

 

[SergeantHeretic]

That's not a bad summary of the situation. I get the impression that Yamamoto knew the whole plan was doomed however did any of the other senior Japanese commanders know that? Surely some of them must have known

SOme of them probably did know, but those who spoke up were shouted down or called cowards and defeatists.

They weren't telling the militarists and industrialist what they wanted to hear.

 

[CalBear]

Virtually no difference in the long run. Somewhere in mid 1944 the massively out gunned IJN dies in a major naval action in the Central Pacific, probably in the Philippine Sea. The U.S. invades the Marianas and establishes a series of air bases there. On or about August 1, 1945, following a horrific series of firebombing raids that have burned down several hundred square MILES of urban Japan, a city that has been specifically saved to serve as a test site, disappears in the fire use of a nuclear weapon. Within a week of the initial use a second weapon, of a different design, destroys another Japanese city. On August 9th or 10th, the Soviet Union declares war on Japan and drives into Manchuria with upwards of 500,000 men obliterating the vastly over matched IJA units arrayed against the Red Army's advance as it rolls across Manchuria.

Within 10 days the Japanese, starving, irradiated, and standing in a utterly devastated nation, receive quiet assurances that the Emperor will not be tried as a war criminal and surrender without conditions.

World War Two ends with the U.S. occupation of the Japanese Home Islands.

 

[SergeantHeretic]

Virtually no difference in the long run. Somewhere in mid 1944 the massively out gunned IJN dies in a major naval action in the Central Pacific, probably in the Philippine Sea. The U.S. invades the Marianas and establishes a series of air bases there. On or about August 1, 1945, following a horrific series of firebombing raids that have burned down several hundred square MILES of urban Japan, a city that has been specifically saved to serve as a test site, disappears in the fire use of a nuclear weapon. Within a week of the initial use a second weapon, of a different design, destroys another Japanese city. On August 9th or 10th, the Soviet Union declares war on Japan and drives into Manchuria with upwards of 500,000 men obliterating the vastly over matched IJA units arrayed against the Red Army's advance as it rolls across Manchuria.

Within 10 days the Japanese, starving, irradiated, and standing in a utterly devastated nation, receive quiet assurances that the Emperor will not be tried as a war criminal and surrender without conditions.

World War Two ends with the U.S. occupation of the Japanese Home Islands.

Yeah, that seems to be about the size of it.

The only difference is the amount of causalties the Americans take and the level of dreaming the Japanese are allowed unti lthe happer falls.

 

[Hyperion]

Virtually no difference in the long run. Somewhere in mid 1944 the massively out gunned IJN dies in a major naval action in the Central Pacific, probably in the Philippine Sea. The U.S. invades the Marianas and establishes a series of air bases there. On or about August 1, 1945, following a horrific series of firebombing raids that have burned down several hundred square MILES of urban Japan, a city that has been specifically saved to serve as a test site, disappears in the fire use of a nuclear weapon. Within a week of the initial use a second weapon, of a different design, destroys another Japanese city. On August 9th or 10th, the Soviet Union declares war on Japan and drives into Manchuria with upwards of 500,000 men obliterating the vastly over matched IJA units arrayed against the Red Army's advance as it rolls across Manchuria.

Within 10 days the Japanese, starving, irradiated, and standing in a utterly devastated nation, receive quiet assurances that the Emperor will not be tried as a war criminal and surrender without conditions.

World War Two ends with the U.S. occupation of the Japanese Home Islands.

Depends.

If Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet all three are lost at Midway, with fewer Japanese losses than OTL, you probably either delay or cancel the Guadalcanal operation by about six months or so. Yorktown didn't matter, but Enterprise and Hornet where heavily involved. This leaves only Saratoga and Wasp, which against a more intact Kido Butai aren't going to be enough to support the Marines.

No offense Calbear, but you really are obsessed with sticking to the same doctrine, no matter what happens. Your either really ignorant, or a really huge troll.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

OTL fact is by Leyte the USN had more destroyers than the IJN had carrier planes, so the IJN has twice the number of carrier planes, three times, big deal, bigger target. They get crushed.

I think it was Frank Knox asking King when King explained what the IJN was doing at Midway that said ‘the Japanese really have no business fighting a modern war do they?’

Oh and the initial IJN response to the Guadalcanal landing is butterflied away - the same troops are now mostly dead in shallow water around Midway if they try to take the place.

 

[Hyperion]

OTL fact is by Leyte the USN had more destroyers than the IJN had carrier planes, so the IJN has twice the number of carrier planes, three times, big deal, bigger target. They get crushed.

I think it was Frank Knox asking King when King explained what the IJN was doing at Midway that said ‘the Japanese really have no business fighting a modern war do they?’

Oh and the initial IJN response to the Guadalcanal landing is butterflied away - the same troops are now mostly dead in shallow water around Midway if they try to take the place.

This of course assumes they even try to land after sinking the US carriers.

Wipe out Fletcher and Spruances three carriers, do a second bombing of Midway, and then run for home.

 

[CalBear]

Depends.

If Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet all three are lost at Midway, with fewer Japanese losses than OTL, you probably either delay or cancel the Guadalcanal operation by about six months or so. Yorktown didn't matter, but Enterprise and Hornet where heavily involved. This leaves only Saratoga and Wasp, which against a more intact Kido Butai aren't going to be enough to support the Marines.

No offense Calbear, but you really are obsessed with sticking to the same doctrine, no matter what happens. Your either really ignorant, or a really huge troll.

Rather than being insulted, which would not be an unreasonable reaction to your ending statement, lets just look at the actual facts.

The Navy ALWAYS had a Central Pacific strategy (Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Iwo Jima/Volcano Islands, Ryukyus). This was the direct path to Japan, the fastest way to win the war. Even a disaster at Midway, perhaps especially a disaster at Midway, would have altered this reality.

The Southwest Pacific were always a secondary campaign for the Navy, a way to keep the pressure on the Japanese on the cheap while the fleet was built up to allow the main thrust through the Central Pacific. The Army always wanted a Southwest Pacific Campaign, mainly because without one the Army really didn't have a dog in the fight against the Japanese, but the main strategy was straight through the Central Pacific.

The U.S. needed a reliable, easier to supply place to stage the strategic air war against Japan. China was simply too hard to keep supplied with munitions, fuel and parts for the bomber offensive to have any sort of bite. That means the Marianas have to be taken even if the Southwest Pacific strategy was somehow adopted as the main thrust (something that would have certainly have happened only at the cost of King's very public resignation, with all that would have entailed). That means a major offensive strike to grab the Islands as soon as the carrier forse is of sufficient size to make it possible. The earliest that is possible in spring of 1944, the latest is late summer of 1944, hence the mid 1944 time that is consistently mentioned.

The United States was going to use the Bomb as soon as it was available, that was a given, all the hand wringing notwithstanding, unless the Japanese surrendered before that time. The earliest date the Bomb can be used is late July/early August, unless something happens that can advance the date for the Trinity test detonation. Nothing in the current POD would allow for that.

The Soviets were going to go after the Japanese three months after Germany surrendered (like him or hate him, Uncle Joe was pretty much a stickler for treaties, especially when they were in his favor). As is the case with Manhattan, nothing in the POD is going to substantially change when Germany is defeated (unless someone is ready to argue that a Japanese victory at Midway would cause the U.S. to abandon the Europe First strategy AND cut off Lend-Lease to the USSR). That again puts the date on or around August 1 for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. The fact that both the Bomb's availability and the Soviet invasion date fall in the same timeframe is coincidence, but it is historically accurate and there is no POD that would alter that in the scenario under discussion.

If something retains the basic strategic thrust know from OTL, is strategically sound, and is also, without question, the way that the senior commanders in place wanted to run the war, keeping it as the logical result of a scenario is anything but ignorance. I will leave it to others to determine what arging against it may or may not indicate.

 

[Hyperion]

Well if you want to disagree, fine.

The overall US strategy will likely still be the same, the key is when it can be implemeneted if Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet are on the bottom of the Pacific off Midway.

That and the very real issue that the Japanese naval air power will not be ground up in the attrition battles fought over the Solomons in 1942 and 1943. US firepower will overcome them eventually, but it will buy them time, and the US will take losses above OTL.

Edit: Come to think if it, if the US lost all three carriers and maybe an odd cruiser at Midway, even if the island remained in US hands, how would this effect the careers of Nimitz, Fletcher, and Spruance, assuming of course also that one or both of the latter two aren't killed in action.

OTL Fletcher was somewhat removed from later major operations after Eastern Solomons, partly due to Lexington and later Yorktown being lost while under his command, and the Enterprise being damaged at Eastern Solomons.

If Enterprise and Hornet are sunk at Midway, how would loosing his two carriers effect Spruances later career, if he survives. Might he have one or more chances later on to redeem himself, or would some other rising star eventually take his place.

 

[CalBear]

Well if you want to disagree, fine.

The overall US strategy will likely still be the same, the key is when it can be implemeneted if Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet are on the bottom of the Pacific off Midway.

That and the very real issue that the Japanese naval air power will not be ground up in the attrition battles fought over the Solomons in 1942 and 1943. US firepower will overcome them eventually, but it will buy them time, and the US will take losses above OTL.

Since the U.S. did the Central Pacific strategy with Yorktown, Hornet, and Wasp all sitting on the ocean floor, and since the USN would still have outnumbered the IJN 2-1 in decks and 3-1 in aircraft even if none of the IJN decks were lost at Midway (also more than slightly unlikely) by the time of Philippine Sea, it seems likely that the strategy would be identical. Since the Japanese would still be operating the same A6M, B5N and D3A as IOTL against the same, far more capable U.S. designs by Philippine Sea, it would seem logical to to expect the outcome to be similar, especially since the IJN never did learn, even after the Midway debacle, how to conduct damage control.

Would the U.S. suffer more losses? Probably, although far from certainly (my guess would be one, maybe two decks, probably the less robust CVLs) given the vast improvement in AAA performance by mid 1944 thanks to issuance of the Mk 32 VT fuse.

 

[Hyperion]

Since the U.S. did the Central Pacific strategy with Yorktown, Hornet, and Wasp all sitting on the ocean floor, and since the USN would still have outnumbered the IJN 2-1 in decks and 3-1 in aircraft even if none of the IJN decks were lost at Midway (also more than slightly unlikely) by the time of Philippine Sea, it seems likely that the strategy would be identical. Since the Japanese would still be operating the same A6M, B5N and D3A as IOTL against the same, far more capable U.S. designs by Philippine Sea, it would seem logical to to expect the outcome to be similar, especially since the IJN never did learn, even after the Midway debacle, how to conduct damage control.

Would the U.S. suffer more losses? Probably, although far from certainly (my guess would be one, maybe two decks, probably the less robust CVLs) given the vast improvement in AAA performance by mid 1944 thanks to issuance of the Mk 32 VT fuse.

This of course assumes they don't develop any new aircraft at all if given a repreave and no drawn out Guadalcanal campaign.

This also doesn't take into account the vastly more dangerous than OTL japanese land based air which will not have gutted itself in the Solomons meatgrinder.

 

[SergeantHeretic]

CalBear, in my practical experience, when the U.S. suffers losses in a defensive war, the practical level headed folk get more determined and more resolute to GET THOSE GUYS causing the losses by hook or by crook.

Build more carriers, build more ships, build more planes and hit em hit em HIT EM!

This means that in the short term ,the IJN gets to have a party, in he long term they get stomped, possibly worse than in our OLT and the Bombs are dropped at the end of July 45 with slightly less hand wringing as the enemy has proven himself vicisious cold blooded and more than capable. and not even close to deversing of pity, not even from revisionists decades later.

 

[Flying Sorcerer]

Battle of Midway, revisited

From the Japanese perspective, Midway made no sense. It was too small to be a fleet base (East and Sand Islands were really just big sandbars). At most, the IJN could've based some seaplanes or submarines there. It was too exposed and too far from Japan to adequately support. A case could be made that the Americans could have simply evacuated Midway and let the Japanese take it - and then bleed them as they tried to defend or supply it. Midway was not worth the resources the Japanese committed to its capture.

In the best realistic outcome for the IJN, the Japanese might have sunk 2 or 3 U.S. carriers but they would still have sustained heavy losses themselves. The fragility of their carriers is really remarkable - apparently Japanese aviators were astonished at how much damage Yorktown absorbed without sinking while their own flattops succumbed to fewer hits. Chances are a "victorious" carrier striking force would still have lost one or two carriers and a lot of aircrew.

 

[SergeantHeretic]

From the Japanese perspective, Midway made no sense. It was too small to be a fleet base (East and Sand Islands were really just big sandbars). At most, the IJN could've based some seaplanes or submarines there. It was too exposed and too far from Japan to adequately support. A case could be made that the Americans could have simply evacuated Midway and let the Japanese take it - and then bleed them as they tried to defend or supply it. Midway was not worth the resources the Japanese committed to its capture.

In the best realistic outcome for the IJN, the Japanese might have sunk 2 or 3 U.S. carriers but they would still have sustained heavy losses themselves. The fragility of their carriers is really remarkable - apparently Japanese aviators were astonished at how much damage Yorktown absorbed without sinking while their own flattops succumbed to fewer hits. Chances are a "victorious" carrier striking force would still have lost one or two carriers and a lot of aircrew.

The objective of Midway was not the capture of the island, it was luring the American carriers into a trap and wiping them out as well as sinking as much more American sea tonnage as they could in order to bloody the AMericans int osuing for peace with Tokyo.

 

[Geon]

Midway

Many who study alternate history think that if Midway had gone according to the IJN plan that the Japanese would be:

• Invading Hawaii
• Raiding the West U.S. Coast
• Attacking the Panama Canal
• All of the Above

I think the posts on this thread point pretty conclusively to the fact that while Midway in OTL sealed the Japanese Navy's fate, a victory for the Japanese Navy at Midway would not have done anything but delay at most by a few months (maybe a year) the inevitable. Calbear nailed it with the supply problems. The Japanese could not have supported their troops on Midway even assuming they made a successful invasion. An invasion of Hawaii would have been sheer suicide given the number of U.S. troops and the airpower stationed there. Finally raiding the West Coast and/or the Panama Canal (a tactic which was attempted by the Japanese in the excellent AH book The Moscow Option) would have ended with the annihilation of the entire fleet.

At best there is a delay or postponement to Guadalcanal. The Japanese may actually succeed in taking all of New Guineau and be able to bomb Austrailian ports. But I don't think they had any plans for after Midway other then to reinforce their island ring.

Bottom line they were looking for the U.S. to fold after a decisive naval battle and that was just not going to happen.

Geon