"Russia First" German strategy in ww1?

Riain

Banned
Going east would preserve all the well trained austrian military lost in the defeat of the austrian offensive and subsequent russian counterattack, with major butterflies for the austrian war effort. (Diverting the westmost flank of the russian front vs austria alone would do the trick, that was where things really fell apart).

I don't think so, the Russian mobilisation plan had no flexibility in it until the '3rd wave' of armies coming up from deep in Russia to deploy in week 6. The 2nd wave will still deploy against AH in week 4 of mobilisation and if OTL is any guide will smash them.

Due to French intelligence the Russians believed there would be 15-25 divisions in East Prussia, and they planned to invade with about 25 divisions expecting equality of numbers or a 5:3 numerical advantage. If the German went east the most they could deploy is 42 divisions in 4 armies in East Prussia: 1 locally raised, 1 bought in by train, 1 marching in from west of the Vistula and the 4th coming later once the railways were clear again. Initial intelligence of troop movements in East Prussia would likely conform more or less to Russia's expectations of up to 25 divisions and it will take several weeks before they realise that they will be facing maybe 34-36 divisions. However by then the troop trains carrying 4 armies to the AH border will be well and truly on the move and not able to be changed easily if at all.

So basically Russia will get flogged in the north and win a big victory in the south.
 
OTL if the Germans were convinced of a long war, they could gone west first still, and have just stopped and held the line Abbeville to Amiens to Verdun and secured most of the mines and much French industry. Amiens was lightly held by the Germans in September 1914. Instead of swinging south to the Marne secure the channel there on a (relatively to OTL) short front then transfer forces to go east .
This is a point that I feel is often neglected - the French industrial regions being occupied was a disaster for them.

I do understand the temptation of defending a short front line and focusing on the isolated power, but leaving France undiminished is a huge threat to your flank.
 

Riain

Banned
This is a point that I feel is often neglected - the French industrial regions being occupied was a disaster for them.

Governments and General Staffs didn't think this way in 1914, it took the experience of WW1 to illustrate the need for what we today call 'War Planning' .

In 1914 General Staffs universally undertook 'Campaign Planning', they tried to defeat the enemy's army and didn't look to capture things that would be of value in a long war. In Germany's case the best example would be capturing forward bases from which to fight Britain, they didn't even think to look until Antwerp was under seige!
 
This is a point that I feel is often neglected - the French industrial regions being occupied was a disaster for them.

Sure. 24% of French steel manufacturing alone, for example.

OTOH, the ore deposits of Briey-Longwy were abandoned immediately on Joffre's orders. No matter what the Germans do, you have to write those off.

But these strategic choices are always about tradeoffs. In this case, the question for Wilhelm II and his ministers is - if they are right in concluding that Britain will not come in as an Entente belligerent if Germany stays on defense in the West (as many of us here think) - whether keeping the economic assets of NE France in France's column is more than offset by the gain of continued (more or less) access to global trade and not having the British Empire's warmaking power in the Entente column?

I do understand the temptation of defending a short front line and focusing on the isolated power, but leaving France undiminished is a huge threat to your flank.

Now, this is no longer an economic argument, but a strategic one, if by "flank" you mean the unfought region north of Metz-Thionville?

But for France to attack on that flank, it would have to go through Belgium. And it was a strict requirement of French policy in 1914 not to do that.

As the war dragged on, of course, that might change. A more risk-taking government might come to power. But the longer they wait, the more extensive German mobilization will be, and the more prepared the Germans will be for any attack through Belgium.
 

Riain

Banned
But these strategic choices are always about tradeoffs. In this case, the question for Wilhelm II and his ministers is - if they are right in concluding that Britain will not come in as an Entente belligerent if Germany stays on defense in the West (as many of us here think) - whether keeping the economic assets of NE France in France's column is more than offset by the gain of continued (more or less) access to global trade and not having the British Empire's warmaking power in the Entente column?

This is a chicken and egg thing.

The German Government told Military leaders in December 1912 that Britain would be a combatant in the next war, so they prepared plans accordingly.

Prior to that there were 4 plans, because between 1908 and December 1912 the German Government was unsure if Britain wold join the Double Entente or not.
 
With the exception of Poland and perhaps the Baltics, pushing deep into Russia will rapidly become a logistical nightmare beyond Central Power capabilities in 1914-15. Russia may have the advantage just by Germany's increasing inability to make or capitalize on breakthroughs the further east the front moves.
 

Riain

Banned
Well, that tends to happen when you invade Belgium.

Yeah but so what?

If Germany thinks Britain is going to enter the war anyway there is no point missing out on the military advantage against France just because it will will bring Britain in.

Chicken and egg.
 
This is a chicken and egg thing.

The German Government told Military leaders in December 1912 that Britain would be a combatant in the next war, so they prepared plans accordingly.

Prior to that there were 4 plans, because between 1908 and December 1912 the German Government was unsure if Britain wold join the Double Entente or not.

Even in that case, staying on defence in West could have been worth it, just to prevent A-H from getting pummeled by Russia and making the war more unpopular in Britain.

After all, against predictions of the time, attacker did not have advantage in the narrow Western front.
 
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Sure. 24% of French steel manufacturing alone, for example.

OTOH, the ore deposits of Briey-Longwy were abandoned immediately on Joffre's orders. No matter what the Germans do, you have to write those off.

But these strategic choices are always about tradeoffs. In this case, the question for Wilhelm II and his ministers is - if they are right in concluding that Britain will not come in as an Entente belligerent if Germany stays on defense in the West (as many of us here think) - whether keeping the economic assets of NE France in France's column is more than offset by the gain of continued (more or less) access to global trade and not having the British Empire's warmaking power in the Entente column?



Now, this is no longer an economic argument, but a strategic one, if by "flank" you mean the unfought region north of Metz-Thionville?

But for France to attack on that flank, it would have to go through Belgium. And it was a strict requirement of French policy in 1914 not to do that.

As the war dragged on, of course, that might change. A more risk-taking government might come to power. But the longer they wait, the more extensive German mobilization will be, and the more prepared the Germans will be for any attack through Belgium.
Joffre abandoned the Briey longwy area because the Germans were advancing though the Ardennes, and Belgium to the north, and he feared they'd be flanked. In this timeline that wouldn't be happening.
 

Riain

Banned
Even in that case, staying on defence in West could have been worth it, just to prevent A-H from getting pummeled by Russia and making the war more unpopular in Britain.

After all, against predictions of the time, attacker did not have advantage in the narrow Western front.

The reality of mobilisation means that AH will still get a flogging.
 
The reality of mobilisation means that AH will still get a flogging.

Whose mobilization? German or Russian?

If Russia goes against A-H as in OTL, they are going to be wrecked by the German offensive. They will also have far less time to pummel A-H, before the Germans basically force them to send troops to assist that front.
 

marathag

Banned
With the exception of Poland and perhaps the Baltics, pushing deep into Russia will rapidly become a logistical nightmare beyond Central Power capabilities in 1914-15. Russia may have the advantage just by Germany's increasing inability to make or capitalize on breakthroughs the further east the front moves.
The Germans don't need to march all the way to Moscow in 1914 to get a desirable outcome
It's not 1812 or 1941
Russia doesn't have the threshold of Pain to hold out like those two conflicts.
This was shown in OTL 1917. Here, that point comes in 1915.
 

Riain

Banned
Whose mobilization? German or Russian?

If Russia goes against A-H as in OTL, they are going to be wrecked by the German offensive. They will also have far less time to pummel A-H, before the Germans basically force them to send troops to assist that front.

Russian. Sorry to quote myself.

......................... the Russian mobilisation plan had no flexibility in it until the '3rd wave' of armies coming up from deep in Russia to deploy in week 6. The 2nd wave will still deploy against AH in week 4 of mobilisation and if OTL is any guide will smash them.

Due to French intelligence the Russians believed there would be 15-25 divisions in East Prussia, and they planned to invade with about 25 divisions expecting equality of numbers or a 5:3 numerical advantage. If the German went east the most they could deploy is 42 divisions in 4 armies in East Prussia: 1 locally raised, 1 bought in by train, 1 marching in from west of the Vistula and the 4th coming later once the railways were clear again. Initial intelligence of troop movements in East Prussia would likely conform more or less to Russia's expectations of up to 25 divisions and it will take several weeks before they realise that they will be facing maybe 34-36 divisions. However by then the troop trains carrying 4 armies to the AH border will be well and truly on the move and not able to be changed easily if at all.

So basically Russia will get flogged in the north and win a big victory in the south.

No version of Russia's Plan 19 or the 1914 hybrid Plan 19/20 had more than 2 armies going against East Prussia in the 1st wave and no less than 4 armies against AH in the 2nd wave. The only flexibility, the A or G variant of Plan 19 or the changes made to Plan 19/20 IOTL, were the late arriving armies coming from Kazan, Moscow etc of the 3rd wave due to arrive at the front 6 weeks after mobilisation. The railway timetable means 4 Russian armies are going against AH in week 4 in the south no matter what.
 
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