Prince gong becomes emperor and initiates meiji style reforms in 1853

[Avrorrange]

Tongzhi was 18 when he died. Cixi was the real power behind the throne, and she actively promoted people who would support her and keep her in power while Tongzhi was kept busy eating glue. She did this deliberately in order to draw on a source of power outside the bureaucracy, which she knew generally loathed her.

That is true, but the whole Xiang/Huai and the descending Beiyang faction was very much their own political force as well.

The Huai and Xiang Army factions were generally not.

By that point, all the senior leaders who'd made their reputations in the war were long dead. (ex. Zeng Guofan - 1872, Zuo Zongtang - 1885).

The main players were either junior officers or were too young to have fought at all. The younger ones grew up in Cixi's system and had been promoted to their ranks by her toadies. For example, Yuan Shikai was first promoted by Ronglu, one of Cixi's earliest allies.

Ronglu had been a division commander and Yuan Shikai was born during the war.

Li Hongzhang was definitely a corrupt official and he was one of the main leaders that suppressed the Taiping Rebellion(he was a high ranking member of the Xiang army and later went on to become the founder of the Huai army in fact). He and his subordinates(also veterans of the Taiping Rebellion) lost the Sino-Japanese War through a combination of nepotism, ineptitude and outright corruption. Even during the suppression of the Taiping rebellion itself, European observers often commented on the corrupt nature of the two armies’ officers.At any rate, he was still a leading figure in the regime during the coup, with figures like Yuan Shikai being his proteges. His reaction to it was to do nothing.

I'd say that when Daoguang died, things were still salvageable.
Had there not been some fuckery with the succession, Prince Gong would have been emperor in 1851.
It certainly beats ten years of inaction with Cixi waiting in the wings to take control.

The question is how does he suppress the Taiping rebellion with that degenerative army of his.Devolving power to local governors was the beginning of the end for the Qing Dynasty.

Which was completely relegated to the sidelines in 1850-1853, when various governors were ordered to raise local militias and given complete control over their drill, regulation and arms (ex. Zeng Guofan's Xiang Army). From then on, these were the new army, and they did a much better job than the old one.

And that eventually led to the demise of the Qing Dynasty.The Qing court always had less control over these armies and their officers compared to the old Banner-Green Standard army system. These armies and the regional governors that led them refused to obey orders to fight the Europeans in the Boxer Rebellion, and eventually they spearheaded the movement to overthrow the whole system in 1911.

 

[Pio2013]

Theres a TL about prince Gong taking under his wing former ACW western generals like Longstreet, and becoming the big boss in China.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

Li Hongzhang was definitely a corrupt official

Still among the least corrupt in the imperial court.

his subordinates(also veterans of the Taiping Rebellion) lost the Sino-Japanese War through a combination of nepotism, ineptitude and outright corruption.

His subordinates from the Taiping days were mostly shunted into provincial governor roles and left to their own devices. They had no effect on policy being developed at the capital.

Even during the suppression of the Taiping rebellion itself, European observers often commented on the corrupt nature of the two armies’ officers.

They made such commentary about basically every official in China, with little or no discernment of who was worse than whom.

There is also a difference between corruption for self-enrichment and corruption for doing your job.
For example, Zeng Guofan took bribes in order to fill his budget because, as I already said, the budgets that provincial governors were given were far too small to service their province's population effectively. We also know he did it for the latter reason and not the former, because he was never wealthy and died relatively poor, and he was widely remembered as a good administrator.

Compare that to Cixi embezzling money from the navy budget to fund a new Summer Palace, and you see the difference.

At any rate, he was still a leading figure in the regime during the coup, with figures like Yuan Shikai being his proteges. His reaction to it was to do nothing.

Li Hongzhang had no connection with Yuan Shikai. Yuan Shikai was Ronglu's protege, and he controlled the New Army.
That last fact also explains why Li Hongzhang did nothing during the coup. Since, you know, this happened.

As Mao said, power comes from the end of a gun, and Li Hongzhang didn't have a gun at the time. Yuan Shikai did.

The question is how does he suppress the Taiping rebellion with that degenerative army of his. Devolving power to local governors was the beginning of the end for the Qing Dynasty.

Devolving power and then not picking it back up was the beginning of the end.
Devolving power, having the local governors do reforms on their own, and then having no national plan to integrate those efforts into was the beginning of the end.

These armies and the regional governors that led them refused to obey orders to fight the Europeans in the Boxer Rebellion, and eventually they spearheaded the movement to overthrow the whole system in 1911.

Because they rightly viewed Cixi as insane and suicidal for trying to start a war against literally all of Europe at this point.
By 1851, everybody wanted change and most believed the Qing could be reformed to provide it.
By 1911, everybody had been thoroughly disillusioned with that idea, so they figured that a clean slate was needed. Cixi's 40 year reign had ensured that. Unfortunately, the new government was built on Yuan Shikai and the system Cixi had built, so it was doomed from the start.

 

[Avrorrange]

Still among the least corrupt in the imperial court.

His subordinates from the Taiping days were mostly shunted into provincial governor roles and left to their own devices. They had no effect on policy being developed at the capital.

I would call that an understatement to be completely honest.They had immense power over the provinces and they often dismissed court orders when they saw fit. The imperial court often turned a blind eye on it as they had to tread carefully when dealing with these warlords.Nevertheless, the forces Li Hongzhang and co. developed were meant to represent the martial pride of China—the best of the best so to speak. Regardless of how ‘little’ corruption they had, it was corruption in a vital area where corruption should not be tolerated. That they lost the war against Japan was the straw that broke the camel’s back, as it’s now evident to anyone that they were so corrupt that they cannot beat even fellow Asians.

They made such commentary about basically every official in China, with little or no discernment of who was worse than whom.

And it was kinda true. The Xiang/Huai army was notorious be being extremely greedy and was widely hated in the areas they ‘liberated’ from the Taiping rebels.

Li Hongzhang had no connection with Yuan Shikai. Yuan Shikai was Ronglu's protege, and he controlled the New Army.

He was considered a protege in the sense that his family served in the Huai army and was thus part of Li Hongzhang’s clique. Yuan certainly benefitted from his family’s connections to Li Hongzhang and the Huai/Xiang army clique during his rise. He wouldn’t even be admitted to government without his connection to them. In Chinese society, you have an obligation to look after the family of your friends and subordinates(not to mention the pals of your own family members). In turn they have an obligation to assist you.

That last fact also explains why Li Hongzhang did nothing during the coup. Since, you know, this happened.

He didn’t act because Guangxu‘s reforms damaged the interests of the entire Confucian land owning elite. He couldn’t care less about the death of the six gentlemen.Hardly any of the officials did.

As Mao said, power comes from the end of a gun, and Li Hongzhang didn't have a gun at the time. Yuan Shikai did.

He was still serving as Viceroy in the provinces and retained influence amongst many army officers and provincial governors. If he actually declared a rebellion, many likely would have answered the call.

Devolving power and then not picking it back up was the beginning of the end.

No dynasty successfully picked up power once it devolved power to the provinces, no matter it was the Eastern Han Dynasty, the Tang Dynasty, or the Ming Dynasty. For Prince Gong to succeed where others failed very much is against the trend.

Because they rightly viewed Cixi as insane for trying to start a war against literally all of Europe at this point.
By 1851, everybody wanted changed and most believed the Qing could be reformed to provide it.
By 1911, everybody had been thoroughly disillusioned with that idea, so they figured that a clean slate was needed. Cixi's 40 year reign had ensured that.

They did it much earlier actually. When Li Hongzhang’s forces struggled against the Japanese, most of the other provincial forces refused to be redeployed in support of them—giving one excuse after the other.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

I would call that an understatement to be completely honest. They had immense power over the provinces and they often dismissed court orders when they saw fit.

Zero support and nothing but shit from the top doesn't engender loyalty from subordinates.
Especially when they built the arsenals, railroads, dockyards, et al on their own and found their funds being slashed by the central government due to a personal dispute or fear that they were threatening Cixi's power. Hence why the Beiyang Fleet got the lion's share of funding while the other fleets mostly had to make do with what their provinces could muster.

They did it much earlier actually. When Li Hongzhang’s forces struggled against the Japanese, most of the other provincial forces refused to be redeployed in support of them—giving one excuse after the other.

Yeah, that was a chronic problem. Recall the Sino-French War, when the Fujian Fleet was attacked and the other three fleets just sat and watched. Because lack of coordination is the inevitable result of factional politics like this.

The problem was the lack of an adult emperor interested in reform. Instead of that, the imperial court was dominated by a coalition of several cliques, including one around Prince Gong and another around Cixi. Cixi wanted to secure her power, so she placed her toadies in vital positions around the Zhili government and began purging anyone outside her clique. Which was a problem because most of the major reformists were outside her faction, with the exception of Li Hongzhang, so all the provincial reformists' support in the imperial government vanished.

Had there been a sober reformist on the throne, Cixi and her allies wouldn't have gotten into power in the first place, the government would not have had to balance the needs of Cixi against the needs of modernization, and the government would be dominated by reformists who could provide effective support and coordination to the provinces.

That they lost the war against Japan was the straw that broke the camel’s back, as it’s now evident to anyone that they were so corrupt that they cannot beat even fellow Asians.

That they lost the war against Japan hinges a lot on events after the suppression of Taiping.

Events such as Guangxu defunding the New Army on the advice of Weng Tonghe because Weng Tonghe didn't think Japan was likely to invade, Cixi embezzling funds from the Beiyang Fleet to rebuild the Summer Palace, and the lack of coordination between the central government's forces and the outlying provincial forces.

And it was kinda true. The Xiang/Huai army was notorious be being extremely greedy and was widely hated in the areas they ‘liberated’ from the Taiping rebels.

I think the hate had rather more to do with them massacring rebels and anyone in the same post code as them, by the tens of thousands.
That was standard procedure in imperial China, unfortunately. Plunder, arson and rape was purely optional.

He was considered a protege in the sense that his family served in the Huai army and was thus part of Li Hongzhang’s clique. Yuan certainly benefitted from his family’s connections to Li Hongzhang and the Huai/Xiang army clique during his rise. He wouldn’t even be admitted to government without his connection to them. In Chinese society, you have an obligation to look after the family of your friends and subordinates(not to mention the pals of your own family members). In turn they have an obligation to assist you.

And yet he was a protege of Ronglu in the sense that Ronglu promoted him to his position and entrusted him with an important military force in Zhili. Ronglu had much more to do with Yuan Shikai's career than Li Hongzhang did.

He didn’t act because Guangxu‘s reforms damaged the interests of the entire Confucian land owning elite. He couldn’t care less about the death of the six gentlemen. Hardly any of the officials did.

What I meant is that he didn't want to get executed along with them and anybody else who stood against Cixi.
People who went against her generally got purged from the government, but this time they also got executed.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

I've already mentioned in another thread the problems that beset the Qing before the Europeans arrived.
To recap:

Spoiler: The problems.

1. A silver crisis, caused by total reliance on Spanish silver since the Ming era, and a lack of native production at a time when silver outflow had dramatically increased. According to Qing officials' estimates, around half of China's silver supply was drained away by this in the first half of the 19th century; modern estimates place this at closer to 20%.

2. A tax crisis, caused by Kangxi-era tax reforms which fixed provincial tax rates in order to curb corruption by officials inflating the census numbers and asking the central government for money which they'd actually spend on themselves.

3. Due to the above law, provincial governors' budgets stayed fixed while the population they needed to service with them tripled in size. The same happened to their salaries. Thus, corruption slowly became not just the purview of evil men, but a necessity for even basic governance to be carried out.

4. Due to a Ming dynasty government reform designed to curb corruption, the provincial governors had basically no staff and most of the duties carried out by modern governments were actually carried out by wealthy families who cooperated with the governors. This meant that the provincial governors were, to a large extent, dependent on the goodwill of local families in order to carry out their duties. If the governor needed to do something like, say, repair local roads, he turned to them to provide the necessary workers.

5. The entrance exam that lets you get into government is very draconian. Around 1% of students passed the first-level exam, and could only expect to do so in their mid-30s, if not later. Hong Xiuquan failed his exam 4 times. Ordinarily, the 99% that fail go back to their provinces and act in auxiliary positions (teachers, tax collectors, etc), but even so there is a shortage of positions and many failed students are left bitter and with nothing to show for their lifetime of study. Perfect rebel material.

6. An opium crisis, caused mostly by native opium production in Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. In fact, opium was so ubiquitous that in the inner provinces, opium was often used as currency in place of silver.

This was not news to the Qing by the Opium Wars. In fact, all of these issues had lively discussion around them as different factions proposed different solutions. Take opium, for example. Some people wanted it completely banned. Others wanted to make it legal and tax it. A few even wanted to not only make it legal, but use opium overdoses as population control. I'm not kidding! This is just one facet of the vast ideological brew going on China.

And what about the imperial exam, that most cherished of Confucian institutions? As early as the 1830s, officials were proposing that the imperial exam be reformed to include a section on Western technology, to no avail. In the early 1860s, high officials like Feng Guifen, Ding Richang and Li Hongzhang took this one step further by proposing that the Western technology section would be the main part of the exam, with an emphasis on engineering and mathematics, but they were ignored. Others proposed replacing the archery portion of the exam with a gunnery test. In 1874, Li Hongzhang proposed the creation of schools of Western learning, and that all graduates of these would be accorded the same status as someone who passed the imperial exam. But the imperial academy, headed by Weng Tonghe (one of Cixi's closest allies), shot all these ideas down.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

Of these six problems which all demanded answers, only one was ever addressed: domestic opium production was legalized in 1870 and the Qing government actually made a lot of tax revenue on it. This was due to a combination of things:

a. Distraction by the Taiping Rebellion, various other rebellions and the 2nd Opium War. By the time these wars are over, the remaining formal government structure at the low level has already been bypassed in favor of local cliques and family networks. By the 1880s, when the chaos of the rebellions had largely been dealt with, the government was fixated more on buying weapons from abroad as fast as possible to counter Japan and the West, rather than focusing on administrative reforms.​

b. Between 1850 and 1861, reform was resisted by the Xianfeng Emperor, because he was a doctrinaire Confucian like his father and insisted on keeping the old structure of government intact.​

c. After 1861, reform was resisted by Cixi and other members of her clique (ex. Wang Tonghe) who were threatened by them because they required them to give up their power over the institutions Cixi had placed them in.​

So what if they got fixed? It's not that hard to imagine, actually! Here are six broad solutions that should be worked toward.

1. Legalize opium. The faster, the better. More opium = more money to tax = more money in the government's pocket.​

2. Fix the silver problem by starting native production back up again, so people can actually pay their taxes properly without being forced to choose between scarce Spanish/Mexican dollars and fucking opium.​

3. Fix the tax rate to the actual population of the provinces again, and institute a system of inspectors to check if governors are reporting their numbers correctly. Once the silver problem is resolved, this at least triples the government's tax revenue.​

4. Use some of that new revenue to add necessary departments to the local bureaucracy (ex. road inspectors, legal staff) in order to make it easier for governors to do their jobs without bowing to local landowners. Remember that giant pool of resentful failed students? This is a useful jobs program for them! This will also help with corruption because the more sharply you define an official's jurisdiction, the less room he has for corruption. And the more you delegate the governor's specific duties into his increasing pool of subordinates, the more you make it difficult for him to get away with too much. Basically, the Qing need to abandon their commitment to small government. Fuck libertarianism!​

5. Reform the imperial exam system to include Western subjects, and eventually make them the majority of the exam. Also, lower the grading standards a little so there are more passing students. They'll be needed to fill out the new government structure. Even a 5% passing rate would be nice!​

6. Create special institutes of Western learning like Li Hongzhang wanted. Imperial Russia actually did this and they ended up creating a class of technology-minded civil servants that were vital to Imperial Russia's industrialization efforts, and would later be vital to the Soviets' industrialization efforts as well.​

This creates a large corps of decently-paid and dedicated officials, it boosts government power massively, and it allows for more shit to get done. This is how you fix corruption, integrate the provinces into the central government, and speed up the adoption of Western technology. Combine this with a no!Taiping scenario where Hong Xiuquan passes his fucking exam, or the Taiping rebellion is less utterly devastating, and I feel certain that China can modernize just like Japan did.

That's my summary. I'm sure some details require more complicated solutions than what I just laid out, but not by much.

 

[John Gault]

The communist party at least initially was far less corrupt than what came later. The KMT whom they defeated was a direct descendant of the landowning class elite which backed the Qing Dynasty. Even now the PRC has reached a spot where corruption is preventing further gains.

Imperial Russia was somewhat successful in modernizing despite corruption. Imperial Russia was more economically developed than Japan before falling to the Reds. One of the problems with modernizing China is the late start. Japan began modernizing in the bakamatsu period, even before the Meiji restoration.

Another potential POD, that could push back a Chinese modernization effort to be on par with Russia is having Mianxin instead of Mianning become emperor in 1820. Although Mianxin is unknown quantity anybody would be an improvement over the Daoguang Empeor. The Daoguang Emperor was an opium addict who didn't even know where England was. Mianxin could spark an opium war with BEIC in 1827, lose Hong Kong to the BEIC, and then modernize China starting in 1830 once Mianxin realizes England can kick Chinese ass from the opposite side of Eurasia.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

Although Mianxin is unknown quantity anybody would be an improvement over the Daoguang Empeor. The Daoguang Emperor was an opium addict who didn't even know where England was. Mianxin could spark an opium war with BEIC in 1827, lose Hong Kong to the BEIC, and then modernize China starting in 1830 once Mianxin realizes England can kick Chinese ass from the opposite side of Eurasia.

I wouldn't rely on another prince to solve the issue without knowing what his political stances were. We at least know what Gong's leanings were because his association with the Self-Strengthening Movement shows them. But Mianxin doesn't seem to have had much of a career at all. Whatever his faults, the Daoguang Emperor was staunchly anti-opium, and he'd been trying hard to eradicate it since the start of his reign in 1820. He'd appointed Lin Zexu to the role of Liangguang Viceroy because he knew he was of like mind and had a reputation for incorruptibility.

If you want an earlier opium war and/or earlier reforms, it would be better to have outside forces arrange themselves differently beforehand.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

For example, take @ahmedali's suggestion of the British seizing the Philippines. They actually almost did so in the Seven Years' War.(1)
This would have a lot of knock-on effects.

1. It would cut the Chinese off from the Spanish silver galleons, which were flooding the Chinese market with cheap Spanish silver that made silver mining in China less lucrative since the late Ming dynasty. This would force the Chinese to reform the silver system, which takes one problem off their plate and potentially sets them on the track to reforming the tax system as well.

2. It would give the British a forward base for the China trade. They could send multiple McCartney-style embassies over the years, which means they have multiple chances of provoking a war or impressing the Chinese with gifts of the latest Western weapons.

3. There was a number of officials from southern China who came from naval backgrounds, were aware of Western naval power, and advocated building a Western-style navy since the 1730s.(2,3) IOTL they themselves didn't gain any traction, but their works gained public attention in the immediate aftermath of the 1st Opium War.

3a. More British naval presence in the South China Sea would lead to more people being exposed to them in peacetime and advocating naval reform.​

3b. Once a war does happen, these people would be there to tell everyone "I told you so!" and promote naval reform. Even if it takes as much time for the government to start reforms as IOTL, they could still get started on naval reforms before the gap with the West grows insurmountable.​

3c. Repeated defeats are likely to result in opium being legalized, which will give the Qing a decent boost in tax revenue.​

If the British take the Philippines in 1764, perhaps the 1st Anglo-Chinese War starts in the 1780s or 1790s?
Assuming an optimistic outlook, the Qing get started on reforms in the 1810s.
Assuming a pessimistic outlook, the Qing get started on reforms in the 1840s.

In this scenario, we've made early fixes to 2 of the 6 crises affecting the Qing and gotten started on technical reforms before China is hopelessly behind the West. This also makes it much easier for the Qing to face the rash of rebellions that started in the 1850s IOTL because they aren't burdened with as many institutional problems and they'll have modernized the army before the rebellions started.

(1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_occupation_of_Manila
(2) https://www.jstor.org/stable/44289104
(3) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-Strengthening_Movement#Beginnings

 

[John Gault]

Whatever his faults, the Daoguang Emperor was staunchly anti-opium, and he'd been trying hard to eradicate it since the start of his reign in 1820.

How about the Qing intervene in the First Anglo Burman war and spark a war with Britain that way. The Qing lose the war but only have to cede Hong Kong and then start modernizing. The Qing should have felt threatened by Britain in the 1820s because the Brits were infringing the territory of traditional Qing tributaries like Nepal and Burma.

 

[ahmedali]

For example, take @ahmedali's suggestion of the British seizing the Philippines. They actually almost did so in the Seven Years' War.(1)
This would have a lot of knock-on effects.

1. It would cut the Chinese off from the Spanish silver galleons, which were flooding the Chinese market with cheap Spanish silver that made silver mining in China less lucrative since the late Ming dynasty. This would force the Chinese to reform the silver system, which takes one problem off their plate and potentially sets them on the track to reforming the tax system as well.

2. It would give the British a forward base for the China trade. They could send multiple McCartney-style embassies over the years, which means they have multiple chances of provoking a war or impressing the Chinese with gifts of the latest Western weapons.

3. There was a number of officials from southern China who came from naval backgrounds, were aware of Western naval power, and advocated building a Western-style navy since the 1730s.(2,3) IOTL they themselves didn't gain any traction, but their works gained public attention in the immediate aftermath of the 1st Opium War.

3a. More British naval presence in the South China Sea would lead to more people being exposed to them in peacetime and advocating naval reform.​

3b. Once a war does happen, these people would be there to tell everyone "I told you so!" and promote naval reform. Even if it takes as much time for the government to start reforms as IOTL, they could still get started on naval reforms before the gap with the West grows insurmountable.​

3c. Repeated defeats are likely to result in opium being legalized, which will give the Qing a decent boost in tax revenue.​

If the British take the Philippines in 1764, perhaps the 1st Anglo-Chinese War starts in the 1780s or 1790s?
Assuming an optimistic outlook, the Qing get started on reforms in the 1810s.
Assuming a pessimistic outlook, the Qing get started on reforms in the 1840s.

In this scenario, we've made early fixes to 2 of the 6 crises affecting the Qing and gotten started on technical reforms before China is hopelessly behind the West. This also makes it much easier for the Qing to face the rash of rebellions that started in the 1850s IOTL because they aren't burdened with as many institutional problems and they'll have modernized the army before the rebellions started.

(1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_occupation_of_Manila
(2) https://www.jstor.org/stable/44289104
(3) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-Strengthening_Movement#Beginnings

Totally agree

He also got rid of the reactionaries at court, such as the Empress Dowager