Operation Typhoon: September 1941

[Deleted member 1487]

Yes indeed. At least OTL strength in 1942 would be the assumptions for my ramblings. Would it not be possible to link rails up with Moscow by spring 1942?

Link up, sure, but there was the issue of capacity and loss of rolling stock over the winter...which might not be as bad if Moscow falls.

 

[History Learner]

Sure, but it can be juked. For example the Germans didn't count assault guns as AFVs, but as SP artillery, so it is possible that numbers leave that out of AFV totals. Does it count APCs in that? Germany produced tens of thousands of those, including some with AT guns or mortars, but the Soviets produced none. Do those count? Of course to quality isn't accounted for there or weight of units produced, as in 1942 the Soviets produced a huge number of light tanks as well. Also does that count LL units?

All fair points, and the only one I can give an answer for is on the LL, which is no, it does not count it given it was concerning production.

Do we? I know they had some left over Czarist wood powered electric plants because the Soviets never threw anything away, but I haven't seen anything that said it was a major source of electricity in the 1940s. If you have a source about that I'm willing to listen though.

Will do.

Wood accounted for 14.3% of the energy supply in 1940 and this increased to 15.4% "during the war"; a claim I saw on AHF stated it got as high as about 50% by 1945, but I'm rather doubtful of that. Acute coal shortages were being reported throughout 1942, to the point it was impairing Soviet production as a steel shortage had been engendered. Shortages of Nickel, Tin, Copper, Lead, Zinc and Aluminum were also in effect, but Lend Lease was able to make up for everything but the Aluminum and Nickel; the aluminum was pretty serious and brought up by Stalin in a meeting with Churchill. Of note is the fact that a lot of the Soviet supply of Bauxite is located in the areas of the Ukraine that got overrun IOTL.

Well sure, especially given that from 1942 on (arguably in 1941 too depending on who's numbers you believe) over 50% of the German budget was spent on equipment for fronts other than the Eastern Front. The Soviets specialized to produce a bunch of low quality equipment specifically tailors for the war on the Eastern Front, while the Germans had to produce for war on multiple fronts against multiple enemies in multiple conditions that the Soviets simply never experienced.

Nor did the Germans get LL (though they did pillage occupied Europe, but that is a poor substitute for US and UK tailored aid) which was a huge economic multiplier for the battered Soviet economy; Soviet production was massively enhanced by being able to ask for specific items missing in their production, like machinery, completed weapons, food, fuel, equipment, and raw materials and get it free of charge (beyond the blood price they paid so the Wallies didn't have to). And factor in the fact that Soviet losses were ridiculously high too; in 1943 more than their entire year's production of 23,000 AFVs was lost in combat and that feat was nearly repeated in 1944.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equipment_losses_in_World_War_II

Fair enough.

Sure, but then he never lost Moscow IOTL; according the Zhukov Stalin told him if Moscow were lost he'd have to make peace (not that that was an option with Hitler). Likely that would mean he'd do anything to get back Moscow. Also just because Stalin's says not one step back and refuses to authorize a retreat in Ukraine doesn't mean Southwest Front doesn't get defeated and driven back or encircled. AG-South had bridged the Dniepr without AG-Center's help and was in the process of breaking out in September. Starved on reinforcements it is very possible that Southwest Front collapses in September-October and has to pull back, with forces being encircled because they obeyed orders not to retreat.

If it unfolds as you are predicting here, then I'm in agreement although I retain my doubts.

Agreed, especially if said Panzers aren't road bound due to the mud, so could flank defenses/defenders. A big reason for the defensive success in October, besides the USSR being able to form new armies that won't exist in September, was that advancing German forces were stuck to the roads due to the fields on either side being impassible, which allowed the concentration of limited Soviet reserves on hotspots (they could also move by rail to those hotspots unlike the Germans).

Going off what you outlined in your thread on the matter, the Panzers breaking through seems fairly obvious since the Soviets had yet to constitute a solid defense. Once that is completed, IIRC there is nothing to stop them from there on and only some NKVD troops in Moscow itself; Stalin also had yet to decide whether to abandon the city or not. Also, isn't the road to Moscow from Volokolamsk all weather?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Wood accounted for 14.3% of the energy supply in 1940 and this increased to 15.4% "during the war"; a claim I saw on AHF stated it got as high as about 50% by 1945, but I'm rather doubtful of that.

So it still remained a relatively low part of production and marginally increased during the war.

Acute coal shortages were being reported throughout 1942, to the point it was impairing Soviet production as a steel shortage had been engendered. Shortages of Nickel, Tin, Copper, Lead, Zinc and Aluminum were also in effect, but Lend Lease was able to make up for everything but the Aluminum and Nickel; the aluminum was pretty serious and brought up by Stalin in a meeting with Churchill. Of note is the fact that a lot of the Soviet supply of Bauxite is located in the areas of the Ukraine that got overrun IOTL.

After the 1942 losses; like agriculture the coal situation became critical after the loss of so much of the Caucasus region. Aluminum production was not centered in Ukraine AFAIK, but in other occupied areas, including around Leningrad (the Volkov area). Perhaps things have changed since WW2, but Aluminum production is very low in modern Ukraine. Jamaica makes more than Ukraine!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_bauxite_production

I also haven't seen that Russia had a shortage of nickel. Do you have source on that?

Going off what you outlined in your thread on the matter, the Panzers breaking through seems fairly obvious since the Soviets had yet to constitute a solid defense. Once that is completed, IIRC there is nothing to stop them from there on and only some NKVD troops in Moscow itself; Stalin also had yet to decide whether to abandon the city or not. Also, isn't the road to Moscow from Volokolamsk all weather?

I'm not sure about the weather, but in October it was defended and had field fortifications built along it. I mean technically the road to Moscow via Vyazma is the best one in the country, but it didn't hold up to the strain in the weather conditions and field use of October, while also creating issues due to German forces being limited to the roads for the most part, which meant defenses could be concentrated on holding the roads alone, as they didn't have to worry about flanking maneuvers.

 

[History Learner]

So it still remained a relatively low part of production and marginally increased during the war.

Wood was a bigger slice of energy production (1/6th) than Moscow was of Soviet industrial production.

After the 1942 losses; like agriculture the coal situation became critical after the loss of so much of the Caucasus region. Aluminum production was not centered in Ukraine AFAIK, but in other occupied areas, including around Leningrad (the Volkov area). Perhaps things have changed since WW2, but Aluminum production is very low in modern Ukraine. Jamaica makes more than Ukraine!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_bauxite_production

My source directly states it was the loss of Ukraine, which had led to that situation by 1942. It also caused the following:

I also haven't seen that Russia had a shortage of nickel. Do you have source on that?

I'm not sure about the weather, but in October it was defended and had field fortifications built along it. I mean technically the road to Moscow via Vyazma is the best one in the country, but it didn't hold up to the strain in the weather conditions and field use of October, while also creating issues due to German forces being limited to the roads for the most part, which meant defenses could be concentrated on holding the roads alone, as they didn't have to worry about flanking maneuvers.

If the Soviet forces that IOTL constituted the defense had yet to arrive at Volokolamsk, that would mean they'd likely get caught out in the open as they were doing so in a meeting engagement, which would favor the Panzers I think. Further, the loss of the aforementioned place would also, I think, cause the Mozhaisk Line which should engender a general panic in Moscow among other effects.

 

[per70]

Aluminum production was not centered in Ukraine AFAIK, but in other occupied areas, including around Leningrad (the Volkov area). Perhaps things have changed since WW2, but Aluminum production is very low in modern Ukraine.

Here's a link that provides some info on the Soviet aluminum industry at the time.

http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/jom/9608/smirnov-9608.html

"In 1941, there were four alumina plants in the Soviet Union. With the German invasion of Russia, however, this situation changed drastically:
Operations in the European part of the country were shut down. Equipment from the Dnepr and Volkhov complexes as well as the Tikhvin alumina plant were dismantled and sent to the Ural"

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Wood was a bigger slice of energy production (1/6th) than Moscow was of Soviet industrial production.

Also check and see how much electricity was produced in and around Moscow....
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eisenhammer

My source directly states it was the loss of Ukraine, which had led to that situation by 1942. It also caused the following:

Though mentioned adjacent to the loss of Ukraine, the sentence reads as though it was referring to total national losses.

Anyway this link is pretty decisive about the source of Soviet bauxite (precursor mineral to make aluminum):
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/9608/Smirnov-9608.html

On the basis of the Tikhvin deposit's potential, 1929's Decree of Government Structures by the Soviet of Labor and Defense approved the construction of two aluminum complexes—one in Volkhov and one in Dnepr. Combined, these sites, with their alumina production lines and hydroelectric power, would have an annual aluminum production capacity of 20,000 tonnes. As a result, full development of the Tikhvin bauxite mine began in 1929; in 1930, construction of the Volkhov and Dnepr aluminum smelters began. The construction proved challenging owing to a general lack of engineering and design experience with aluminum smelters and the need to incorporate the new alumina production technology. Thus, the French company Ale Forge Comarg was commissioned to assist with developing the production facilities. On September 14, 1932, the first alumina was produced at Volkhov using Tikhvin bauxite. In April 1934, alumina production from Tikhvin bauxite began at Dnepr.

During the construction of the Volkhov and Dnepr smelters, it was decided to increase the country's total aluminum production capacity to 70,000 t/y. The decision was based, in part, on the 1931-1932 discoveries of additional bauxite deposits in the Ural Mountains. Hence, two new alumina production facilities were planned—a 40,000 t/y plant near the Tikhvin mines and a 60,000 t/y plant in the Urals. The Tikhvin plant used a wet-mix variation of the alumina production technology employed at the Volkhov complex.

In 1933, development of the bauxite mines near Nadejdinsk (currently known as the Northern Ural bauxite mines) was initiated, as was construction of the Ural aluminum complex. This complex was built near Kamensk-Ural because of the nearby bauxite and coal reserves. The project stipulated construction of an accompanying 70,000 t/y alumina facility that would employ the Bayer method to treat the local hydrorhillite bauxite. However, after reassessing the quality of the diaspore Northern Ural bauxite deposits, it was decided to instead employ a novel autoclave method of bauxite digestion. In some stages of the construction, design concepts from Pechiney were employed. In 1939, the first alumina was produced at the Ural complex.

In 1941, there were four alumina plants in the Soviet Union. With the German invasion of Russia, however, this situation changed drastically:

• Operations in the European part of the country were shut down. Equipment from the Dnepr and Volkhov complexes as well as the Tikhvin alumina plant were dismantled and sent to the Urals.
  
• The construction of a new alumina plant in Northern Ural as part of the aluminum smelter in Bogoslovsk (today known as Krasnoturjinsk) was changed considerably—incorporation of a Bayer processing plant was abandoned in favor of the sintering method because of the availability of the dismantled equipment from the Tikhvin plant.

If the Soviet forces that IOTL constituted the defense had yet to arrive at Volokolamsk, that would mean they'd likely get caught out in the open as they were doing so in a meeting engagement, which would favor the Panzers I think. Further, the loss of the aforementioned place would also, I think, cause the Mozhaisk Line which should engender a general panic in Moscow among other effects.

Are we talking about in October? They were already there as of early October IIRC, so in place before the Panzer could have possibly got there. Yeah the loss of the Mozhiask defense line would be a huge problem for the Soviets, if it happened.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Here's a link that provides some info on the Soviet aluminum industry at the time.

http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/jom/9608/smirnov-9608.html

"In 1941, there were four alumina plants in the Soviet Union. With the German invasion of Russia, however, this situation changed drastically:
Operations in the European part of the country were shut down. Equipment from the Dnepr and Volkhov complexes as well as the Tikhvin alumina plant were dismantled and sent to the Ural"

Ha, I was composing a post with the same link and info when you posted.

 

[per70]

Thats awesome - especially since I was 5 minutes faster and therefore can claim victory

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Thats awesome - especially since I was 5 minutes faster and therefore can claim victory

 

[History Learner]

Also check and see how much electricity was produced in and around Moscow....
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eisenhammer

Indeed, and ironically enough I was just reading the AHF thread on it. By the way, thanks for suggesting that site to me last year. Still, I'm not sure what this fact has to do with the point.

Though mentioned adjacent to the loss of Ukraine, the sentence reads as though it was referring to total national losses.

Total national losses due to the occupation of the Ukraine.

Anyway this link is pretty decisive about the source of Soviet bauxite (precursor mineral to make aluminum):
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/9608/Smirnov-9608.html

I'm a bit confused as to how its decisive on this point; aluminum production is different from where the bauxite comes from, and even that link mentions the Dnieper. @ObssesedNuker might be able to shed some more light on this subject.

Are we talking about in October? They were already there as of early October IIRC, so in place before the Panzer could have possibly got there. Yeah the loss of the Mozhiask defense line would be a huge problem for the Soviets, if it happened.

Referring to this portion from your thread on the subject:

What if it had not gone to Kalinin and instead advanced on Moscow from the 9th of October onward? The Soviet 16th army wasn't fully concentrated until the 15th/16th on the road to Moscow at Volokolamsk (it didn't fall until October 27th IOTL), having only 2 Soviet depleted rifle divisions and a couple armored battalions in place by the 12th, which was when the Panzer corps could have contacted them (the distance from their position on October 9th is a bit less to the Soviet 16th army than to their OTL position on the road to Kalinin on October 12th). Effectively the Soviet forces in place wouldn't be able to face a Panzer corps and hold their ground, because defenses weren't set up, there were no reserves in place, and the units in place were survivors of the defeat at Vyazma (i.e. not really combat effective).

Point I was trying to get across is that sufficient Soviet forces had yet to arrive on scene and thus could be caught in the open later on after the Panzers blast through the initial defenses.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Indeed, and ironically enough I was just reading the AHF thread on it. By the way, thanks for suggesting that site to me last year. Still, I'm not sure what this fact has to do with the point.

The Moscow electrical generating capacity was huge and critical to the entire region; it's capture removes the major source of power to the entire Moscow-Upper Volga region and puts Gorki and Yaroslavl in bomber range.

Total national losses due to the occupation of the Ukraine.

I'm a bit confused as to how its decisive on this point; aluminum production is different from where the bauxite comes from, and even that link mentions the Dnieper. @ObssesedNuker might be able to shed some more light on this subject.

No it is not. Without Bauxite production facilities can't run. As it was the Dnepr facility was evacuated to the Urals IOTL and would have been overrun by September anyway, as it was on the Dnepr river, not in the Donets. So...not sure what that has to do with not going after Kiev.

Referring to this portion from your thread on the subject:

Point I was trying to get across is that sufficient Soviet forces had yet to arrive on scene and thus could be caught in the open later on after the Panzers blast through the initial defenses.

Perhaps

 

[History Learner]

The Moscow electrical generating capacity was huge and critical to the entire region; it's capture removes the major source of power to the entire Moscow-Upper Volga region and puts Gorki and Yaroslavl in bomber range.

Agreed, but I'm not sure what this point has to do with Wood energy production.

No it is not. Without Bauxite production facilities can't run. As it was the Dnepr facility was evacuated to the Urals IOTL and would have been overrun by September anyway, as it was on the Dnepr river, not in the Donets. So...not sure what that has to do with not going after Kiev.

I think you missed the point with regards to the Bauxite, as I wasn't claiming it was separate from Aluminum; I meant that the areas of Ukraine that got overrun were a major source of it, but not necessarily the sight of production of the finished product. Also, if the Ukrainian production is/was located just in the general area of the Dnieper, then indeed this point will be redundant but the issue of Nickel and the coal shortage will remain.

Perhaps

I take it you're no longer as convinced as you were about the validity of such an operation when you made that thread?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Agreed, but I'm not sure what this point has to do with Wood energy production.

What is the point of wood energy production or coal for that matter if the facilities to use them are gone?

I meant that the areas of Ukraine that got overrun were a major source of it, but not necessarily the sight of production of the finished product. Also, if the Ukrainian production is/was located just in the general area of the Dnieper, then indeed this point will be redundant but the issue of Nickel and the coal shortage will remain.

No. No they were not. The Dnepr facility processed the bauxite from Volkhov (along with the facility at Volkhov, both use using hydroelectric power).

How much German nickel came from the Donbas? AFAIK most if not all came from Finland. How much coal came from the Donbas? Germany sourced theirs from all over Europe; the Soviets thoroughly sabotaged the Donbas before leaving.

I take it you're no longer as convinced as you were about the validity of such an operation when you made that thread?

Just saying nothing is guaranteed.

 

[History Learner]

What is the point of wood energy production or coal for that matter if the facilities to use them are gone?

Because the Germans had overrun around 60% of their Pre-War production, there was a shortage of coal even for surviving facilities. Having access to this will allow for increased production of war material as well as maintaining the needs of the civilian population to a better extent; coal is also, obviously, far more efficient than using wood.

No. No they were not. The Dnepr facility processed the bauxite from Volkhov (along with the facility at Volkhov, both use using hydroelectric power).

Ukraine was a source of bauxite in of itself:

How much German nickel came from the Donbas? AFAIK most if not all came from Finland. How much coal came from the Donbas? Germany sourced theirs from all over Europe; the Soviets thoroughly sabotaged the Donbas before leaving.

German gains from the occupation are a bit different than what was denied to the Soviets via the operation, which is what I've been talking about.

Just saying nothing is guaranteed.

I understand, it just seems you are a lot more doubtful on it now and I'm not sure why.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Because the Germans had overrun around 60% of their Pre-War production, there was a shortage of coal even for surviving facilities. Having access to this will allow for increased production of war material as well as maintaining the needs of the civilian population to a better extent; coal is also, obviously, far more efficient than using wood.

And the loss of Moscow means all the coal in the world doesn't matter when their aren't facilities to burn it and turn it into electricity.

Ukraine was a source of bauxite in of itself:

I haven't found any confirmation of that anywhere else. Bauxite was processed in Ukraine, but I haven't found anything saying it was mined there.

German gains from the occupation are a bit different than what was denied to the Soviets via the operation, which is what I've been talking about.

Ok, then we've had a misunderstanding on that. Of course there is no guarantee that the Soviets would actually hold the Donbass except for say a couple months more than IOTL ITTL.

I understand, it just seems you are a lot more doubtful on it now and I'm not sure why.

I'm not making a positive argument in support of a thread idea about it here, so I can discuss it from other angles.

 

[History Learner]

And the loss of Moscow means all the coal in the world doesn't matter when their aren't facilities to burn it and turn it into electricity.

How much of the electrical generation was coal based around Moscow; I was under the impression that most of it was hydro-electric? Further, Moscow supplied the energy for the Ural industry? Given the distance and thus associated loss rates, I found such doubtful.

I haven't found any confirmation of that anywhere else. Bauxite was processed in Ukraine, but I haven't found anything saying it was mined there.

News article which talks about declining Ukrainian imports due to increased domestic production. Regardless of that, I'm conceding on this point because the location of the Aluminum facility was indeed along the Dnieper and thus was to be removed whether or not the Kiev operation took place.

Ok, then we've had a misunderstanding on that. Of course there is no guarantee that the Soviets would actually hold the Donbass except for say a couple months more than IOTL ITTL.

Taking Kiev, without AGC's support, at least seems possible given the facts you've previously laid out. Pushing all the way to secure the Donbass, however, seems rather unlikely at least for 1941 given it's going to take far longer to finish operations around Kiev and then have a rest to rebuild the forces and marshal the logistics, especially given Moscow is going to be hogging them for awhile.

I'm not making a positive argument in support of a thread idea about it here, so I can discuss it from other angles.

Fair enough.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

How much of the electrical generation was coal based around Moscow; I was under the impression that most of it was hydro-electric? Further, Moscow supplied the energy for the Ural industry? Given the distance and thus associated loss rates, I found such doubtful.

The majority was energy other than hydro, only 1 turbine at the Rybinsk Reservoir was operational in 1941:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rybinsk_Hydroelectric_Station

Taking Kiev, without AGC's support, at least seems possible given the facts you've previously laid out. Pushing all the way to secure the Donbass, however, seems rather unlikely at least for 1941 given it's going to take far longer to finish operations around Kiev and then have a rest to rebuild the forces and marshal the logistics, especially given Moscow is going to be hogging them for awhile.

Depends on the damage inflicted on Soviet forces after the breakout from the Dniepr bridgehead. IOTL they didn't have to rest and rebuild or work on logistics (other than take some trucks from AG-Center, which was more a push to Rostov) and Moscow was the focus IOTL from October onward.

 

[History Learner]

The majority was energy other than hydro, only 1 turbine at the Rybinsk Reservoir was operational in 1941:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rybinsk_Hydroelectric_Station

Question thus becomes how much had changed from 1941 to late 1943 when the operational planning first began; mobilization of resources for war likely had greatly changed this picture. If not, then the question really becomes one of why didn't the Germans just disregard the mine issues, if only one of the generators was hydro-powered.

Depends on the damage inflicted on Soviet forces after the breakout from the Dniepr bridgehead. IOTL they didn't have to rest and rebuild or work on logistics (other than take some trucks from AG-Center, which was more a push to Rostov) and Moscow was the focus IOTL from October onward.

This is the fundamental question then; I would point out wear and tear will be greater on AGS, however, given it will be doing this alone.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Question thus becomes how much had changed from 1941 to late 1943 when the operational planning first began; mobilization of resources for war likely had greatly changed this picture. If not, then the question really becomes one of why didn't the Germans just disregard the mine issues, if only one of the generators was hydro-powered.

More were installed from 1942 on. Just prior to the start of the war it was all coal and some wood.

This is the fundamental question then; I would point out wear and tear will be greater on AGS, however, given it will be doing this alone.

How? They were on their own IOTL during their wild advance east from late September on.

 

[History Learner]

More were installed from 1942 on. Just prior to the start of the war it was all coal and some wood.

Question thus becomes how important was Moscow in terms of this factor in '41? Coal power plants are more local in effect than hydro-electric. Further, this does nothing for the coal shortage affecting the Urals industry.

How? They were on their own IOTL during their wild advance east from late September on.

Yes but they previously had help from AGC is destroying the Soviet forces around Kiev. ATL, they have to deal with them all on their own and then do the advance.