Gorbachev botched Soviet reform - but how?

GI Jim

Banned
If you are concerned only for the power for the sake of power, then yes, I believe that North Korean model should work in the USSR. North Korean model of course includes economy forever at 1950' levels and famines.

This would be basically new stalinism, but with worse economy. No reason why this shouldn't "work".

North Korea's economy only falters when it is internationall sanctioned. The USSR had the eastern bloc and other nations that wanted what it produced, at least pre 1980. Moderate reforms within economic communist orthodoxy could have been implemented and the Soviet economic model could have chugged steadily along. The USSR was a superpower, not a small asian nation.
 
Actually even pre-Gorbachev a significant number (something like 20 million) people worked in black market/semi-legal enterprises, and as I already mentioned itt, by 1990-91 before the collapse already something like 5-7% of the GNP was privately produced. Yes it wasn't very large relative to total economy: but the whole point is that it was possible.

OTOH it's called a black market for a reason. It's not like, for example, North Korea where that's basically how the economy functions at all because everything else stopped functioning. No - the state sector was still the main sector in the Soviet Union and AFAICT most who could avoided the black market. The black market doesn't count as a private sector at all to my way of understanding how the Soviet Union worked.

Yes of course the state sector would be involved in private sector production, this is no different than the US or UK where government agencies are involved in the private sector allt he time.

Not necessarily in the model of the US and UK - not to the level of state control that would be needed in the Soviet Union to ensure everything was on "plan".
 
'Keep the peace' suggests keep public order. In Armenia's case it is more to avoid invasion

The issue is not only the troops but economic exchange. Economy of the former Soviet republics was built as a part of the whole and it is less painful to continue the mutually beneficial cooperation then to completely break all ties. Unless, of course, you have a nice sponsor (like the EU) capable of putting the huge amounts of money into a complete revamping of your economy (even this scenario is seemingly not without the problems).

From the Armenian view, it is because of the fear of Muslims, in the closing stages of the USSR, it was the Christain-Muslim conflict that went hot. It is for this reason the Armenians want the Russian troops to stay.


I wonder how many times should I explain that the SU was not a carbon copy of China and that parallels are not applicable. Just as the parallels between China and North Korea (why bother with the reforms if in NK the commies are still in a complete control?). The cultural differences do matter.


Indeed, no significant section of the Chinese has a desire to split. The other issue is that China started from a lower economic base, had cheaper labor then Russia, central power was retained by the leaders and most importantly their economy reforms worked.


North Korea's economy only falters when it is internationall sanctioned. .

It faulted before that.
 
If you are concerned only for the power for the sake of power, then yes, I believe that North Korean model should work in the USSR. North Korean model of course includes economy forever at 1950' levels and famines.

This would be basically new stalinism, but with worse economy. No reason why this shouldn't "work".

Here we go again. Just as China is not the SU, the SU was not NK and unless you understand the differences your "beliefs" are not based upon reality.

The main problem with your "theory" is that in the SU circa 1980's majority of the people did not want to get back to the Stalinism and it was so obvious that even Politburo figured this out. Andropov's attempt to "fix" the system by force was a clear failure showing that these methods are not working anymore. As a result they chose Gorby over hardliner candidate in expectation that he'll manage to maneuver out of the situation without changing the system.
 

RousseauX

Donor
OTOH it's called a black market for a reason. It's not like, for example, North Korea where that's basically how the economy functions at all because everything else stopped functioning. No - the state sector was still the main sector in the Soviet Union and AFAICT most who could avoided the black market. The black market doesn't count as a private sector at all to my way of understanding how the Soviet Union worked.
So yes, in 1985 of course the economy was ran by the state

that doesn't mean a private sector couldn't have being created, Gorbachev started it otl and one of the easiest ways to start is by legalizing previously illegal black/grey market trades

it would take at least a generation, but there's no reason to think it was impossible
 

RousseauX

Donor
Indeed, no significant section of the Chinese has a desire to split.
Except for Xinjiang and Tibet, in the USSR the only places with popular desire to split before the August coup at least were Georgia, Moldova and the Baltics Republics, the two are actually pretty analogous there as percentage of population. China's separatist supporters would actually compose a larger share of the country's total territory.
 

RousseauX

Donor
North Korea's economy only falters when it is internationall sanctioned. The USSR had the eastern bloc and other nations that wanted what it produced, at least pre 1980. Moderate reforms within economic communist orthodoxy could have been implemented and the Soviet economic model could have chugged steadily along. The USSR was a superpower, not a small asian nation.
Ok that's going a bit too far, the DPRK economy fell apart because the USSR stopped existing to subsidize it

but yeah the soviet economy could have chugged along even as it were in 1985, it would still be shitty, but it would have kept going
 
This is getting silly, countries including Russia and Eastern Europe otl copied other country's model of capitalism, politics and economics (where do you think the idea for a parliament come from?) You are just asserting that some vague concept of "culture" which prevents adoption of other country's models. Despite the fact that in real life countries with completely different culture and history copy each other all the time. I'm not saying the Chinese model would have worked out in the USSR: only that the reasoning you are providing is bad.

It is not my reasoning that is bad it is your persistence on making conclusions based upon inadequate knowledge. For the last time, the SU (as a country with the OTL political system and economy) could not successfully go Chinese way or NK way. Modification required fundamental changes and resulted in modern Russian Federation with all its specifics (attempts to "go West" of the 1990's failed economically and politically). I have nothing else to add to the subject.
 
1) The Soviet nomenklatura hadn't recently purged the living crap out of itself to survive internal revolution by workers and peasants, the Chinese had.
2) The Soviet nomenklatura didn't view the establishment of any economy to be a matter of individual or class survival, the Chinese did.
3) The Soviet nomenklatura's economic network was deeply rooted in the firm structure: eliminating nomenklatura control of the firm meant eliminating existing nomenklatura. The Chinese suffered a similar crisis in the "old firms," this was in part preempted by attempted revolutionary activity by old firm workers in 1989 which failed. However, most Chinese industry was "new," meaning that new class relations could be developed. The Chinese nomenklatura could cream newly created capitalist industries.
4) The Soviet economy lacked the capacity for new proletarianisation, this meant that any transformation in firms or replacement with new firms would involve massive structural dislocation in the Soviet working class, which would be politically fraught (1956, 1968) potentially threatening great nomenklatura control of the commanding heights of the economy. The Chinese nomenklatura's control of the commanding heights was not threatened, and a new proletariat was brought into being: this was massive structural dislocation, but not amongst collectively organised urban workers. And the recent cycles of blood letting in the 1960s and 1970s disciplined potential revolutionary activity by workers until, 1989.
5) For the Soviet nomenklatura rather than facing potential revolution, and purging a large body of its corpus, in order to capitalise small portions of the economy that it would not control; it was simpler to face potential revolution, not purge its corpus, and capitalise the entire economy under its control as new capitalists. The Chinese did not have an economy to sell to itself: it had to create one it would own.

Now this doesn't mean that by choosing the other option they'd be out of power as a class, but the die hard fish canning plant factory nomenklatura will have to be sent to camps, and there's a risk of working class uprising.

yours,
Sam R.

I'd just add that the Soviet working class by the 1980's was not afraid of the nomenklatura and that suppression apparatus was not, anymore, adequate to the task of keeping things under control: most of them had been suffering from the same issues as the rest of the population and did not have any reason to defend people who lived better than they did.
 
China did it though

It was a different situation. China had a lot of potential for extensive growth even under a heavily controlled economy that the Soviets didn't. It also had a lot less troubles with regional nationalism (Xinjiang and Tibet have a lot less people than Ukraine and Kazakhstan). And even before Deng's reforms the average peasant was a lot better off in 1976 than in 1949 (they had to go through a horiffic famine and Cultural Revolution to get there, but there was a clear memory of the time before the Communist takeover being worse rhsn it was now for the average peasant. Unlike in Russia where only the oldest remembered the Czar and the Civil War by the '80s).
 

RousseauX

Donor
It was a different situation. China had a lot of potential for extensive growth even under a heavily controlled economy that the Soviets didn't. It also had a lot less troubles with regional nationalism (Xinjiang and Tibet have a lot less people than Ukraine and Kazakhstan). And even before Deng's reforms the average peasant was a lot better off in 1976 than in 1949 (they had to go through a horiffic famine and Cultural Revolution to get there, but there was a clear memory of the time before the Communist takeover being worse rhsn it was now for the average peasant. Unlike in Russia where only the oldest remembered the Czar and the Civil War by the '80s).
But the argument I was responding to has nothing to do with extensive vs intensive growth, it was an argument that the Soviet Communist ideology was inflexible and hence was not capable of reform

(Xinjiang and Tibet have a lot less people than Ukraine and Kazakhstan).
I think this got posted at least like 10 times itt

separatism wasn't that big a problem in Ukraine until at least the August Coup in 1991, separatism was literally never a problem in Kazakhstan. The Central Asian Republics wanted to stay all the way til the end. The idea of the USSR as a prisonhouse of nations was only true for the Baltic states, Georgia and Moldova, not for 90% of the union's population.
 
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RousseauX

Donor
It is not my reasoning that is bad it is your persistence on making conclusions based upon inadequate knowledge. For the last time, the SU (as a country with the OTL political system and economy) could not successfully go Chinese way or NK way. Modification required fundamental changes and resulted in modern Russian Federation with all its specifics (attempts to "go West" of the 1990's failed economically and politically). I have nothing else to add to the subject.
I'm not saying it had to look exactly like China, but would you agree there is a path forward towards market reform?

Actually let's propose a few alternatives:

Yeltsin after signing Belavezha, announced OTL that the USSR would be succeeded by the CIS, at the time a lot of people thought the CIS would look like a New Union Treaty style USSR, with a common armed forces and other institution retained for all member states. This fell apart largely because Yeltsin didn't actually care about it, If Yeltsin went for it do you think reform was possible under the CIS.

Yeltsin otl also considered grabbing the Presidency of the USSR after the August coup, if he went for it do you think the USSR could have being reformed and distangled from the Communist party.
 
But the argument I was responding to has nothing to do with extensive vs intensive growth, it was an argument that the Soviet Communist ideology was inflexible and hence was not capable of reform.

That is a good point and was part of it too. The Chinese leadership could change doctrine more freely due to not being the "leader of global Socalism" (though they sometimes claimed to be the leader of the Third World) and because they just hadn't been in power as long.

China when Mao died was a lot like the USSR when Stalin died (probably would make a good movie too). The USSR by the '80s was just more ossified with a public less willing to give the regime a chance to change.
 

RousseauX

Donor
That is a good point and was part of it too. The Chinese leadership could change doctrine more freely due to not being the "leader of global Socalism" (though they sometimes claimed to be the leader of the Third World) and because they just hadn't been in power as long.

China when Mao died was a lot like the USSR when Stalin died (probably would make a good movie too).
But the Soviet leadership otl -did- change ideology, Gorbachev himself is evidence of that, he went from being a Communist to being a social democrat, and plenty of people went with him.

The USSR by the '80s was just more ossified with a public less willing to give the regime a chance to change.
What's the proof for this?
 
Further, the only way to get an NEP into the 1930s is basically to subvert the 5YP / Ural-Siberian method that required urban control over the economy. Which means shooting the urban workers / party members when they revolt in 1929-1933 over lack of food. The scissors crisis means you have to choose between fucking the workers or fucking the peasants.

yours,
Sam R.

I think there was a middle path possible, where the USSR increases taxation on the peasantry but doesn't go for a forced collectivization, and simultaneously "bribes" them to send food to the cities by promoting consumer and agricultural goods production (stuff the peasants will want to buy with their food surpluses, even if the exchange rate isn't great. Whether that was politically tenable in the USSR at the time is debatable, of course.
 
But the Soviet leadership otl -did- change ideology, Gorbachev himself is evidence of that, he went from being a Communist to being a social democrat, and plenty of people went with him.

What's the proof for this?

Oh, I thought you were saying the Soviet leadership was more ideologically entrenched than the Chinese. I misunderstood, sorry.

I would argue the Soviet bureaucracy had more ability to resist change than the Chinese one, which was still pretty much in shock from ten years of angry students shouting at them, beating them and sending them to Inner Mongolia.

I think TBH we agree, I agree that the USSR could have survived, it just isn't as simple as "do what China did OTL".
 
I think part of the problem is that when some people propose that the USSR could have done what China did, others are taking that mean that USSR would have attempted to replicate Chinese moves (probably even down to copy-pasting the relevant regulations and substituting "USSR" for "PRC") whereas those who made the suggestion then have to go at pains and in length to explain that this is most certainly not what was meant but rather that different choices by Soviet leaders in 1960-1980s could have lead to a range of different outcomes involving the continued survival of the eastern European regimes (or at least some of them) and that these choices would have some similarities (but clearly not be exact copies) of the choices made by those communist dictatorships that actually survived (North Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba). Despite differing wildly in culture, history, economics and living standards one broad similarity of all 5 is that they never allowed space for political competition to develop outside of the communist party.
 
I think there was a middle path possible, where the USSR increases taxation on the peasantry but doesn't go for a forced collectivization, and simultaneously "bribes" them to send food to the cities by promoting consumer and agricultural goods production (stuff the peasants will want to buy with their food surpluses, even if the exchange rate isn't great. Whether that was politically tenable in the USSR at the time is debatable, of course.

You're describing the NEP. It did not work.
 
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