Beer: I'll apologize in advance for my long response below, as I'll quote some of the earlier updates (from almost half a year ago) about Korea as well to clarify what is going on.
Take your time when responding.
(I've omitted some of the details from the updates because it would be tedious to scroll through everything, but I've retained most of the important aspects.)
From the book "Ripples in the pond - Side effects in History", Gotland Förlag, 2009
Chapter 3 - Korea
. . .
Neither Germans nor Japanese could know or guess what would happen in Korea. The end of the Joseon Empire began in Shimonoseki 1864 . . . Paris intervened in 1866 for the persecuted Catholics in Korea, the government was loath to risk a repeat in East Asia.
Most military history experts agree that this "want to win" attitude was the reason France pushed on despite stingy losses on Ganghwa and in the taking of a fortified monastery on the way to Seoul. But the forces of French Admiral Roze were too weak for a march on the Korean capital. The Regent of Korea on the side wanted peace to stabilize the nation, which had seen a number of uprisings due to corruption and poverty.
It came to the face-saving treaty of Munsusansong in late 1866. France could sail home with prestige won, even if the actual French influence in Korea had been stifled, while the isolationist Joseon dynasty could keep the opening of Korea limited to some areas. The French-Korean Trade treaty, part of the peace negotiations, is seen today as a sort of, if unsuccessful "F... you" to the Germans in nearby Japan.
Unsuccessful because the French did not endear themselves with the attack on Korea and it was limited in scope, nothing more than a less harsh unequal treaty.
Still, this treaty set a precedent and within a few years several Great Powers and Japan secured trade agreements.
It was now that Regent Daewongun earned his major place in Korean history. The years between 1866-69 had made it clear to him that Korea had only a chance if some reforms and modernisations would be executed.
Even before 1866 Daewongun had initiated some reforms and begun to combat the rampant corruption . . . in 1873 King Gowong became the ruler of Korea, the reforms had begun to stabilize Korea economically and the extreme poverty of much of the population had eased a little bit. The life expectancy was still just in the mid-twenties for most of the population, but the Chungin, the middle class, became the hope of the rulers to modernise Korea far enough to withstand the foreigners. A modernisation program was started, but it derailed . . . Overconfidence and a return to corruption . . . led not only to a rising debt but to costly and often unsuccessful special projects.
. . .
The rising debt forced the Korean government to look for moneylenders. Japan convinced the Zollverein to put up capital, to make Korea dependent on them . . .
. . .
For Korea the problems, internal and external, began to start fully. The Regent´s anti-corruption course had stabilised and in conjunction with a small economic rise brought most Koreans to back the old system again, but King Gowong´s false handling of the situation kept the resistance in Korea alive. For now, most of Korea had closed ranks against the foreigners, but the returning corruption and the overly expensive, shaky modernisation were deep, unsolved problems.
(Nitpick: "Gojong" is only mentioned once while "Gowong" repeatedly appears elsewhere, as well as in the next relevant update. Please proofread.)
Hi! again!
ATL France, due to the TL circumstances, sent around 3 times the number OTL France did. But even that was just a regiment and a bit. It was more a punishment expedition than a real campaign, so France could see it as a real win.
According to the above, France sent around 1,800 troops (600 x3), who would have been outnumbered by at least 10,000 Koreans by more than 5:1. IOTL, the French remained trapped on Ganghwa Island for a month because they had extremely limited knowledge of the topography or currents, so any attempts to break out ultimately failed. The troops were also not particularly motivated because the main objective was to "punish" Korea for executing missionaries, as well as ensuring the safety of the remaining two within the peninsula. As a result, the troops were severely demoralized when an attack by more than 300 Korean sharpshooters with muskets led to around "36" French casualties, and withdrew altogether when they were informed that the two surviving missionaries had escaped to China, in addition to adverse weather conditions as winter began to set in.
For comparison, the United States sent its own expedition (albeit with 800 troops) in 1871 in retaliation for the General Sherman incident (1866), and scored a victory over ~500 Korean troops, which was reported to the Joseon court as a major defeat. However, the Heungseon Daewongun merely made preliminary preparations to flee the capital in order to continue military resistance from elsewhere if necessary, and firmly refused to negotiate with the Americans. As a result, the regent would literally have been the
last person to arrange terms with the French (or the Americans), regardless of the circumstances, as it was imperative for him to take a hardline stance in order to retain his tenuous position.
It's also worth noting that it was not until 1876, three years
after the regent was forced to retire, that Korea finally agreed to negotiate with Japan due to gunboat diplomacy.
This map suggests that Japan still used military means to expand into the Ryukyus, Hokkaido, and the Kuril Islands, and would have still considered about militarily intervening in Taiwan, so the Japanese government would have to tread very carefully in order to avoid antagonizing China. These efforts alone would have tied up Japanese resources before 1875, so I'm not sure why Japan would have directly seized Jeju Island if it would have been well-aware of the potential repercussions, which I will cover in more detail below.
Recording from a lesson in the Audimax of the Franz-Ferdinand-University Wien 2012
"Distinction of Cultures - The industrial Take-off in East Asia"
. . .
Unlike the imperial government in Beijing, the regent in Hanseong learned the right lesson from the first real confrontation with Europeans . . .
Here now was one of the deciding differences between the two. For all the flaws, the Tokugawa Shogunate had made Japan united and internally stable. The Joseon dynasty on the other hand had several prolonged periods of massive corruption . . . Uprisings, rebellions were numerous and long-lasting . . .
For once, the Regent of Korea, under the impression of the French incursion and examples seen in Japan, pulled off a really good performance . . .
When Regent Daewongun gave over the staff . . . he had changed Korea in just 7 years. The nation had returned to a, if brittle, unity, the corruption lessened . . .
. . .
Gowong and his sycophants were too sure about the power of the old "Big Brother" China, when clear signs were present that Beijing had problems with the western nations.
In addition, the last independent government of Korea invested heavily in prestige projects to show the world East Asian, in special Korean, superiority. This was not only a hit and miss game, one of the biggest failures a flying boat with feathered wings, but thoroughly expensive.
Money was loaned from any source Hanseong could reach, even the old rival Japan. Soon the debt had risen to very high levels, but that was just the beginning . . .
In 1874, the Japanese government sent a diplomatic note to Korea . . .
Among the Kanji characters used where the ones for "imperial" and "Decree". Back then in Korea it was only the Chinese emperor who could use these characters in letters and the Korean government refused the note from Japan.
While even Beijing nudged Korea . . . Hanseong did not move, convinced that their modernisation would be enough to weather the storm.
Freshly elected Shogun Yoshinobu Tokugawa meanwhile recognised the chance the Korean stubbornness offered. Being sure of German support, in autumn 1875 a Japanese fleet landed on and occupied Jejudo, an Island between Japan and Korea. The explanation was easy: The Korean government purposely overreacted on a harmless note . . . in the light of Korean unreasonableness, the Imperial government of Japan occupied Jejudo . . . returned after Korea paid off her debts.
Most nations swallowed that explanation without trouble, the situation seemed clear. What only few nations knew, was that in the light of Korea´s ever more precarious finances paying off the debt to Edo would be long in the future, if ever. This was in essence a night and fog annexion . . .
Japan on the other side had taken the first step to become a classic Great Power with Korea now set in the sights.
(Technically, Gojong was enthroned in 1863, although he seized power in 1873 after the regent (his father) had been ousted. This distinction doesn't seem to be made here.)
Given the (entangled) developments above, I'm extremely confused as to why and how these series of events have occurred.
Specifically, the regent had taken an extremely firm stance against French and American incursions in order to consolidate his fragile position, while the treasury was depleted several times over in order to systematically reconstruct all of the 7,700 rooms of the Gyeongbok Palace from 1865-72 (seven years), which had been thoroughly destroyed and abandoned for over two centuries after the Imjin War (Japan) and the two Manchu invasions (Qing). These were the main reasons why the regent had been adamant in carrying out thorough purges of major political factions on the pretext of corruption, as his own political position was extremely unstable (he was eight generations removed from the main royal line). Additionally, his policies were more of a return to "traditional" norms (centralized rule), given that many of the "progressive" policies had been pioneered beforehand for centuries under various court factions in order to balance the monarch's undue influence, although factional conflicts became extremely detrimental to the populace over time.
In other words, even if France had somehow managed to "open up" Korea through gunboat diplomacy (which I would consider to have been virtually impossible), Gojong would not have approached either China or Japan for "loans" for other "major" projects even years after Gyeongbok Palace had been thoroughly rebuilt. If he had attempted to do so, however, it have been politically suicidal due to fierce opposition from the court, as Japan and the Qing's aggressions had caused the devastation of the main palace in the first place. The concept of "loans" would also have been extremely difficult to fit into the millennia-plus East Asian tributary system, as goods had been required to flow both ways.
Also, after butterflies have been taken into account, if Korea had been somehow been more open to European influences soon after 1866 or so, the Joseon court ITTL would also not have been as inflexible as IOTL during the "diplomatic note incident," as it would have more accurately gauged Japanese internal developments without the "hermit" policy.
As a result, Korea would have just been content with seeking advice from various Western, Chinese, and Japanese military advisors, as well as opening up trade links.
Hi!
I know Jeju-do sits "in the left corner", but taking the Island should show two things. No nation in this TL is perfect, all make sub-optimal choices or full mistakes too and the changes to OTL adding up.
ATL Japan´s government, while having many OTL faces in it, is not the same as OTL. As said in an earlier post, Japan is testing the waters how far it can go.
As the reason, they took the Korean dragging of the feet of the credits given to them for their modernisation. Tokio is rather sure that Japan is in the better position, but last doubts and advice convince the government to aim for something "less important". Busan would have been a better choice, but Jeju Island is still a logical one, even if it is a sub-optimal.
The "left corner" is particularly important because it opens up a potential route to attack China, in addition to the original one through the Ryukyus. Given that attacking the island would have been perfect for antagonizing both Korea and China, I don't see why Japan would have taken the risk without plans to intervene militarily within the peninsula.
To keep the possibility of an international reaction small, Jeju-do is good. Beijing does not really care about that Island and Japan is quite open that the occupation of Jeju is to hasten the paying off of Koreas debts and that they would give back the Island when that was accomplished. (at least in theory)
It was highly unlikely, that while a hostile reaction form Hanseong and Beijing is a given, actual operations against Japanese-held Jeju would be ordered. Even if, at that point in time, as reasoned in Tokio, Japan has some modern ships unlike China.
I never said anything about Korea and/or China attempting to retake the island. In fact, while Japan seizing the island would elicit a very strongly-worded response from Korea, the latter would have been much more focused on consolidating its military on the peninsula in preparation for future attacks by Japan, similar to what had occurred during the Imjin War. This doesn't necessarily mean that Japan will actually invade the peninsula outright, but this omnipresent fear will heavily shape both domestic and foreign policy in Korea in the short run. China would also have been more than willing to provide military advisors to Korea in order to stem Japanese "aggression," as it also had been heavily building up its army and navy along Western lines soon after its defeats in the Opium Wars, as well as potentially deterring Japan by sending a handful of warships to Busan.
