December 28th, 1941: The Day of Infamy

[Justus_II]

Subscribed! Interesting and a realistic POD.

 

[Rickshaw]

Another thing.

In the weeks following the commencement of the Pacific War John Curtin worked himself to the point of complete physical exhaustion and was recovering in Perth in the last weeks before the fall of Singapore. He was out of touch and not in Canberra when the decision was made to not evacuate forces from Singapore.

That may or may not remain the same in a delayed time frame.

Errr, where did you read that? I have Curtin quite firmly in Canberra at the time. He'd have been unable to wage "the battle of the telegrams" with Churchill isolated from "the Doc" and other members of the Cabinet and their advisors in Perth. Every history I've read makes no mention of that.

 

[Cook]

Errr, where did you read that? I have Curtin quite firmly in Canberra at the time. He'd have been unable to wage "the battle of the telegrams" with Churchill isolated from "the Doc" and other members of the Cabinet and their advisors in Perth. Every history I've read makes no mention of that.

I’ll look over the weekend for you. Several telegrams signed ‘Curtin’ were sent by Evatt.

 

[Rickshaw]

I’ll look over the weekend for you. Several telegrams signed ‘Curtin’ were sent by Evatt.

Yes, they were but that does not mean they were done without the consent or knowledge of Curtin.

According to David Horner's "Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Sheddon and the making of Australian Defence Policy," Curtin was firmly placed in Canberra on 14 February as Sturdee, CGS spoke to him, by phone (p.135). On 17 February, Curtin is placed in Sydney. (p.136) and on the same day he is admitted to St. Vincent's Hospital in Sydney with "Gastritis". On 22 February he is placed once more in Canberra, being described as "having a walk around the Majura Hills" to consider Churchill's latest telegram and before sending his reply (p.137). Canberra is a long way from Perth.

 

[Cook]

Interesting. Do you have a reference for that?

This is from Peter Thompson’s The Battle for Singapore, Chapter 7 concerning the 8th A.I.F:

On 30 October Gordon Bennett celebrated his elevation from General Officer Commanding 8th Australian Division to GOC Australian Imperial Force, Malaya. He was in a cocky mood when his old adversary General Blamey arrived at Singapore on 6 November on his way from the Middle East to Australia to confer with the War Cabinet. But Bennett’s ebullience evaporated when Blamey informed him that he wanted the 8th Division to be transferred from Malaya to the Western Desert, a posting that would nullify all Bennett’s efforts in Malaya and place him under Blamey’s command. The Military Board confirmed this intention and suggested that Bennett visit the Middle East to familiarise himself with the command. Taylor gleefully recorded, ‘GOC is going to Middle East – may be forerunner of a move.’

Bennett left Malaya by air on 18 November. After two weeks touring Australian positions in the Western Desert, he wrote scathingly that the Allied offensive against Rommel ‘lacked drive, punch and co-ordination…’

In the Middle East, Gordon Bennett noted in his diary on 3 December, ‘Indochina has been well prepared [by the Japanese] as a springboard from which to make the dive into Thailand, Malaya and Netherlands East Indies. I fear that the move may start before my return, so I have decided to push off at once.’
He would be too late.

I’ll chase up the Curtin reference later.

 

[Rickshaw]

Blamey may have wanted the 8th but that does not equate to "being warned" in military parlance. That amounts to an expression of desire but as much as Blamey believed he was the boss, he wasn't nor ever the CGS. In 1941, he was still aspiring to Commander of the 2nd AIF. Bennett was another contender (or so he believed). There may have been an intention to ship the 8th to the Middle East but I suspect events and political desires would have prevented it.

 

[Rickshaw]

Found mention in the Official History of WWII of Blamey's visit to Singapore:

On 6th November General Blamey arrived at Singapore on his way to
Australia to confer with the Ministers . In particular (as he informed
Bennett), he sought firstly to try to persuade them to reverse a decision
that would necessitate breaking up one of the divisions in the Middle
East ; secondly to press that the 8th Division be sent to the Middle East.8
Blamey was still in Australia when, on 18th November, Bennett left Malay a
by air to visit the A .I .F. in the Middle East . Bennett's subsequent comments suggest that he was not impressed by what he saw there . He wrote that the offensive in the Western Desert at the time, "lacked drive, punch and coordination", that the "elephantine" headquarters of the army in Egypt "had grown usually at the expense of the number of men availabl e
to fight" ; and that "too many officers were so far removed from th e
battles that were being fought that they lost touch with reality . Depart-
ments became watertight and out of touch with other departments . Perfect cooperation was extremely difficult . " 9
_____________________________________________
8 In view of the Far Eastern situation, however, the War Cabinet decided on 18th November tha t
no action be taken on this request .
9 H. G . Bennett, Why Singapore Fell (1944), pp . 55-6.

[p.102, Wigmore, Lionel, The Japanese thrust, Australian War Memorial, 1957]

Still does not equate to having, "received a warning order that it would be departing Malaya for North Africa." As Footnote 8 shows, political considerations over-rode Blamey's desires.

 

[Derek Jackson]

I am guessing that Had Japan postponed a bit the most vulnerable date would have been December 25th

 

[Astrodragon]

I am guessing that Had Japan postponed a bit the most vulnerable date would have been December 25th

Hmm, thats a very good point..!!

Given the level of unpreparedness the IJN could expect on Xmas day at Pearl (plus a greater chance of ships being in port), it would have been a very logical choice...

A Xmas that will live in Infamy....

 

[Lord Brisbane]

If the operations are delayed, is there a chance that the Malaya portions are detected? Also, what of force z?

 

[Gridley]

I have to wonder why they'd be unsalvagable with just torpedoes.

Pearl isn't that deep.

They capsized, and then their exposed hulls were bombed by the 2nd wave dive-bombers. This was part of the Japanese plan. Salvaging them wouldn't be completely beyond the technical capabilities of the USN, but it would require a massive effort and the ships wouldn't be ready for well over a year if not two or three... by which time the Essex class will be coming off the line. As noted, USS Oklahoma was righted and started being towed to the West Coast... to be scrapped. Carriers are also more fragile than battleships; things like the elevators will have to be rebuilt more or less from scratch.

So it isn't that the USN couldn't do it, it is that it would take so long and so many resources that it wouldn't be worth it.

Have you read At Dawn We Slept?

I've read the free section on google books IIRC. Why?

Its deep enough to capsize without prompt counterflooding. Witness the Oklahoma and Utah from OTL. Perhaps more accurate to say, so badly damaged as to not be worth the incredible expense of righting them, and towing them back to the mainland (though we did try with the Oklahoma, much latter. She sank on the way).

Yup. Take a look at USS West Virginia and USS California too; they didn't even capsize, but didn't re-enter service until 1944.

 

[Dave in St. Louis]

First off, has anyone looked at the weather for late December in the northern Pacific? Kido Butai got very lucky as far as the weather went.

Secondly, the more time goes by, the messages Kimmel and Short get fromWashington DC. The more messages they get, the more likely it is that one gets the reaction that Stark and Marshall were trying to get out of the Pacific Fleet and Hawaiian Department.

Thirdly, a lack of success in refueling has a better chance, IMO, of activating, for want of a better term, Plan B. Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiei, Kirishima, Tone and Chikuma can make it to the launch point and back using only their onboard fuel supplies. In the book At Dawn We Slept, we can see that it was contemplated sending only these vessels at various times in the planning. In fact, the IJA was in favor of that as it would free up carriers for the Southern Operations.

Too many plans are already moving. Too many Operations are set in stone - like the hoax sailing of the Tatuta Maru. The Hawaiian Operation will not be delayed.

 

[Dave in St. Louis]

Have you read At Dawn We Slept?

I've read the free section on google books IIRC. Why?

Because you are ignoring or hand-waving away a lot of reasons why this POD will likely not happen in the way you describe.

 

[Gridley]

I am guessing that Had Japan postponed a bit the most vulnerable date would have been December 25th

Hmm, thats a very good point..!!

Given the level of unpreparedness the IJN could expect on Xmas day at Pearl (plus a greater chance of ships being in port), it would have been a very logical choice...

A Xmas that will live in Infamy....

While readiness would I'm sure have been extremely low, if you follow the link in the first post you'll see that TF 2 (with USS Enterprise and BatDiv 1) was scheduled to be at sea. The Japanese wanted to nail as many capital ships as they could, which means aiming the raid at a day that both TF 1 & 2 are in port. Only 11 days in December met this criteria... one of which was the 7th.

If the operations are delayed, is there a chance that the Malaya portions are detected? Also, what of force z?

My understanding is that the Allies were aware of the preparations for the Malaya operation, so not much.

Force Z... will be showing up soon.

Wake and a few other bits will be posted later today.

 

[superkuf]

Interesting. A japanese carrier force that can do supply on the high sea would be far better. But did the japanese navy actually have enough of supply ships, oilers etc for it to work?

The US soldiers/marines that the 7th were digging in on Guam and Wake would probably be far more difficult to remove with three extra weeks of digging, mining and preparations.

Weren't a Marine regiment sent to the Philipines in early December and the Piliphine Army on a big expansion drive late 1941?

And in Europe Hitler would notice that the East Front was half frozen to death while the Soviets were attacking in large numbers. The urge to declare war on the US would be far lower, but Hitler was always bad at playing the odds.

 

[Dave in St. Louis]

Interesting. A japanese carrier force that can do supply on the high sea would be far better. But did the japanese navy actually have enough of supply ships, oilers etc for it to work?

Kido Butai took (depending on where you look) seven or eight oilers with it. Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
So, yes, they could do it and they made it work.

 

[Gridley]

First off, has anyone looked at the weather for late December in the northern Pacific? Kido Butai got very lucky as far as the weather went.

This is a good point, but having no source I just gave Kido Butai the same luck they had IOTL.

Secondly, the more time goes by, the messages Kimmel and Short get fromWashington DC. The more messages they get, the more likely it is that one gets the reaction that Stark and Marshall were trying to get out of the Pacific Fleet and Hawaiian Department.

True, but several weeks had already gone by. A few more without an optimal result may not be the most likely result, but if you want a TL where the IJN gets its butt kicked by a prepared USN read CalBear's Pacific War Redux. I'm not going to try to compete with that.

Thirdly, a lack of success in refueling has a better chance, IMO, of activating, for want of a better term, Plan B. Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiei, Kirishima, Tone and Chikuma can make it to the launch point and back using only their onboard fuel supplies. In the book At Dawn We Slept, we can see that it was contemplated sending only these vessels at various times in the planning. In fact, the IJA was in favor of that as it would free up carriers for the Southern Operations.

No, they can't. CV Shokaku and Zuikaku have ranges of 7,700nm @ 18kts. A strait-line round trip is 6,600nm or more, depending on the exact departure port. A strait-line approach runs them through the very shipping lines and patrol zones they were trying to avoid, however, thus completely blowing any chance of surprise. Also, the last bit of the approach HAD to be a speed run which burns fuel MUCH faster, again to preserve surprise. One also has to allow for high-speed ops to launch and recover aircraft, and the fact that no group of ships moving together get optimum fuel efficiency.

The IJA wanted the entire IJN to support their operations. They didn't get what they wanted IOTL, why should they ITTL?

Too many plans are already moving. Too many Operations are set in stone - like the hoax sailing of the Tatuta Maru. The Hawaiian Operation will not be delayed.

There was, in fact, a contingency plan in the event that underway fueling failed IOTL; part of the force was to make a suicide run. That, however, was a contingency plan. Knowing UnRep is harder than expected, the IJN quite reasonably says "we're not going to PLAN to throw away a bunch of our carriers and air wings."

The Dec 7th/8th date to commence operations wasn't fixed in stone until Dec 1st/2nd IOTL. Military operations, even large, complex ones, are delayed all the time.

 

[Dave in St. Louis]

First off, has anyone looked at the weather for late December in the northern Pacific? Kido Butai got very lucky as far as the weather went.

This is a good point, but having no source I just gave Kido Butai the same luck they had IOTL.

This isn't ASB. The weather is important.

Secondly, the more time goes by, the messages Kimmel and Short get from Washington DC. The more messages they get, the more likely it is that one gets the reaction that Stark and Marshall were trying to get out of the Pacific Fleet and Hawaiian Department.

True, but several weeks had already gone by. A few more without an optimal result may not be the most likely result, but if you want a TL where the IJN gets its butt kicked by a prepared USN read CalBear's Pacific War Redux. I'm not going to try to compete with that.

I'm just trying to get you to be realistic about this TL.

Thirdly, a lack of success in refueling has a better chance, IMO, of activating, for want of a better term, Plan B. Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiei, Kirishima, Tone and Chikuma can make it to the launch point and back using only their onboard fuel supplies. In the book At Dawn We Slept, we can see that it was contemplated sending only these vessels at various times in the planning. In fact, the IJA was in favor of that as it would free up carriers for the Southern Operations.

No, they can't. CV Shokaku and Zuikaku have ranges of 7,700nm @ 18kts. A strait-line round trip is 6,600nm or more, depending on the exact departure port. A strait-line approach runs them through the very shipping lines and patrol zones they were trying to avoid, however, thus completely blowing any chance of surprise. Also, the last bit of the approach HAD to be a speed run which burns fuel MUCH faster, again to preserve surprise. One also has to allow for high-speed ops to launch and recover aircraft, and the fact that no group of ships moving together get optimum fuel efficiency.

First off, I have the Cranes range at 18 knots as 9700 nm.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Zuikaku
Secondly, where is your evidence that these ships (and the submarines) cannot make it there and back? I'm giving you the definitive book on the Pearl Harbor Attack - At Dawn We Slept. Thirdly, the Task Force did not proceed at 18 knots. The speed of advance was more like 12 knots. Fourthly, all of the ships carried extra fuel in barrels and in various normally empty voided tanks on an as feasible basis - so whatever estimate you have of range will be off and low for the purposes of this Operation.

Here is what Prange says about refueling Kido Butai on page 394 (hard back) - "If planned refueling proved impossible, Nagumo would have to settle for filling up his biggest ships and proceeding on his mission with only three carriers (Kaga, Shokaku, and Zuikaku), the two battelships, the two heavy cruisers, and a few tankers..."

The IJA wanted the entire IJN to support their operations. They didn't get what they wanted IOTL, why should they ITTL?

Because you've thrown in a monkey wrench that did not occur IOTL. They bowed to Yamamoto's will before. Now you've given them an excuse to override, in a reasonable manner, that iron will.

There was, in fact, a contingency plan in the event that underway fueling failed IOTL; part of the force was to make a suicide run. That, however, was a contingency plan. Knowing UnRep is harder than expected, the IJN quite reasonably says "we're not going to PLAN to throw away a bunch of our carriers and air wings."

I'm not just talking about an after departure contingency plan. In the early stages of planning, there was talk of sending just those three carriers if practice refueling proved too difficult.

The Dec 7th/8th date to commence operations wasn't fixed in stone until Dec 1st/2nd IOTL. Military operations, even large, complex ones, are delayed all the time.

Kido Butai left Hitokappu Bay on November 26. And the Operation could have been called off anytime before the release of the midget submarines.

Prange notes, in reference to Roosevelt's personal plea to the Showa Emperor (another thing you don't account for), that, at some point, trying to stop the Operation (and various other Operations in the Southern Resource Area) "would have been rather like commanding Niagara Falls to flow uphill."

 

[Gridley]

This isn't ASB. The weather is important.

I'm just trying to get you to be realistic about this TL.

Yes, I agreed the weather is important. To repeat: I don't have a source for weather in the Pacific in 1941. Since you obviously have a source for everything (though your linked cite so far is wikipedia) would you please provide one?

I am attempting to be realistic. If you feel that I am not being realistic, you are under no obligation to read this timeline. If the moderators feel I am being unrealistic, they can move the thread to ASB. Since one of the moderators is CalBear, one of our local PacWar experts, they're quite capable of making that judgment. You are welcome to bring the issue to their attention.

Over the years I've read half a dozen books that cover Pearl Harbor in detail, from both the US and Japanese perspective. I'm constantly referring to websites far more reliable than wikipedia for details of OTL as I write this. Despite this, I am going to make mistakes, and there are going to be things I can't know. Sources often disagree about technical specs; I choose the ones that seem best. As I do not read Japanese, I am limited to English-language sources.

I am not going to change the basic premise of TTL. If that's a problem for you, please see above. If you're willing to accept that, then I welcome further comments.

 

[Dave in St. Louis]

Since you obviously have a source for everything (though your linked cite so far is wikipedia) would you please provide one?.

I don't have a source for everything. I have no idea what the weather was like in the North Pacific Ocean two weeks later from the IOTL sortie. The closest I can come is that on December 12 and 13, the Task Force experienced the worst weather of the sortie and had to cancel an attack, laid on for Midway by Admiral Yamamoto by message on December 9th (pg 574). On page 576, Nagumo cancels the Midway strike - "In the northern Pacific the wind increased steadiliy throughout December 12 and 13. Heavy seas and the worst swells experienced during the entire operation buffeted the carriers, washing overboard several of Hiryu's crew. Akagi pitched and rolled so steeply that planes could not possibly take off or land. The relentless pounding sprang numerous leaks in Nagumo's ships. Under the circumstances the admiral seized upon the qualifying phrase "as far as the situation permits" in his attack orders and called off the Midway strike." Note that the route back from Pearl is south of the route to the attack http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PearlHarborCarrierChart.jpg.

I'm so sorry that At Dawn We Slept is not online for me to link to. I have quoted directly from it. I gave the page number in one instance and can back up any quotes I pull from it (as a way of demonstrating that, here is the page number of the Prange quote concerning the Roosevelt message - pg 468 - and the ranges of the various ships can be found on a table on page 416). I realize that this is harder for you than simply linking to a web page, but there isn't much I can do about that.

I looked at Combined Fleet and saw no ranges for the Cranes ("kaku" is Crane in Japanese - Shokaku means "Flying Crane" and Zuikaku means "Fortunate Crane") - nor did you give any linked source, at all, for your range figure. Do you really believe that Prange has it wrong and that the Cranes cannot make it there and back? He only talked to most everyone who was still alive after the War who was involved in the planning of the attack - including Genda and Kusaka. If not, why would you doubt the Wikipedia numbers?

As for what I'm telling you, I'm telling you that you've glossed over several points. It is out of character for Tojo to just capitulate on the timetable - especially since there is a plan to deal with it (by sending three carriers). You don't play out Roosevelt's personal message to the Emperor (which IOTL didn't get shown to him until after the attack). You don't deal with deception measures like the sailing of Tatuta Maru. You don't deal with the messages that will surely get sent to Kimmel and Short. Delay causes a lot of boulders to come rumbling down the mountainside of history and you don't deal with any of those boulders.

Basically, you need to get down to the library and check out a copy of At Dawn We Slept and read it. THEN you can make things go the way you want without leaving all those softballs out there for critics to hit out of the park.