D-Day in 1943: Plausibility and operations in France

[Finbarr the Fair]

Just answer the question. What was the Bolero schedule and which American units fell behind their deployment dates?

It's not just a question of the army units but the air force, logistics and other necessary elements.

FWIW I think you have demonstrated with hindsight that the Allies could indeed have amassed the forces necessary to launch an invasion of France in mid-1943. IF they had ignored the needs of other theatres or at least gave them far less resources than OTL. Althouhh this doesn't allow for the possible problems of port capacity and infrastructure in Britain.

Fine: that makes it feasible. Is it plausible?
IMHO, Probably not very as the Allied JCS did not have perfect foresight. And couldn't know at the time whether the Battle of the Atlantic would be won by mid-1943, that the Japanese had reached the limits of their expansion or that the Soviets could make do with a bit less Lend-Lease. So they chose NOT to gamble everything on a strategy that if it failed would leave them in a bad position. Understandable

So, again IMHO, to make a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 plausible you need a better performance of WAllied and Soviet forces in Q2 1942. In particular avoid the shambolic collapse of British forces at Gazala which made Torch both more urgent and meant it would take longer to clear North Africa.

Leaving that aside, how would the operation proceed? Well, getting ashore might be easier than in 1944 with less defensive works. But against that the follow up forces might be slower to come ashore with supply depending on quick capture of ports

Also, the naval and air support would be less and the ability of the Germans to move reinforcements from Germany or the Eastern Front greater than OTL. As would German armaments production in 1944 with a weaker Bombing Offensive.

I suspect that while the Allies would get a lodgement, it would not be a war winning move. Or even shorten the war significantly.

Worth gaming out but i think you might be unpleasantly surprised by what could happen with a moderately competent Axis player(s)

 

[marathag]

ould take longer to clear North Africa.

Leaving that aside, how would the operation proceed? Well, getting ashore might be easier than in 1944 with less defensive works. But against that the follow up forces might be slower to come ashore with supply depending on quick capture of ports

Those are the issue I wish the thread could have dealt with, as that's right in the title, not 'what would it take for the British to be accepting of Roundup or 'Do the Allies have enough shipping to do Roundup, and please list every vessel involved larger than a rowboat'

Deal with the effect of the War AFTER Roundup landings have occurred, not the
NO. Allies wouldn't do that. Not enough Men, bullets and beans
YES, here is what the Allies had, list follows
NOPE,they were busy in the States,, doing...something
For the past thousand posts.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Those are the issue I wish the thread could have dealt with, as that's right in the title, not 'what would it take for the British to be accepting of Roundup or 'Do the Allies have enough shipping to do Roundup, and please list every vessel involved larger than a rowboat'

Deal with the effect of the War AFTER Roundup landings have occurred, not the
NO. Allies wouldn't do that. Not enough Men, bullets and beans
YES, here is what the Allies had, list follows
NOPE,they were busy in the States,, doing...something
For the past thousand posts.

Yes. My points precisely.

As i said, Roundup may have been marginally feasible but without various PODs in 1942 implausible. Which is the first half of the Thread question after all.

An interesting WI and certainly what FDR Stalin and Churchill might have desired. But left non-viable due to Allied problems up to late 1942.

Could it have worked with a POD as late as Q3 1942? I am doubtful but it IS worth gaming.

Any ideas as to how?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

It's not just a question of the army units but the air force, logistics and other necessary elements.

FWIW I think you have demonstrated with hindsight that the Allies could indeed have amassed the forces necessary to launch an invasion of France in mid-1943. IF they had ignored the needs of other theatres or at least gave them far less resources than OTL. Althouhh this doesn't allow for the possible problems of port capacity and infrastructure in Britain.

The question is were those true needs, or part of the confusion in strategic direction that developed in mid 1942. The confusion & divergent strategic directions was discussed earlier, & produced some perspectives of the 1941& 1942 conferences I'd not considered.

IMHO, Probably not very as the Allied JCS did not have perfect foresight. And couldn't know at the time whether the Battle of the Atlantic would be won by mid-1943,

I addressed this one early in the thread. The information available in late 1942 showed the Battle of the Atlantic was effectively won. I ought to write up a proper essay on that with the references and charts to paste into these discussions, since the question comes up so often. But not today. Precisely why the British leaders acted otherwise I don't know. Lack of self confidence? Internal politics and squabbles? Whatever

that the Japanese had reached the limits of their expansion or that the Soviets could make do with a bit less Lend-Lease. So they chose NOT to gamble everything on a strategy that if it failed would leave them in a bad position. Understandable

So, again IMHO, to make a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 plausible you need a better performance of WAllied and Soviet forces in Q2 1942.

Alternately a clearer understanding of where they were mid 1942. So much of the PoV seems to be perception vs the reality. Not in hindsight but in the information they actually held.

Worth gaming out but i think you might be unpleasantly surprised by what could happen with a moderately competent Axis player(s)

My experience gaming this is the German side has the same experience as OTL. The gain some impressive tactical victories, some limited operational success, but lose most of the time operationally and solidly at the strategic level. The main difference on the game board is that with more forces engaged the Axis are attrited at a larger rate vs their ability to replace losses than OTL. The Allies also sustain larger losses at least initially, but their larger ability to replace the same puts them ahead in several ways over the long haul of 18-24 months. In the few games I ran as the Allied player I neglected strategic bombing and was not achieving remotely the losses inflicted on Axis industry of OTL Not sure if that means anything.

As the German player the insoluble problem was dealing with that high attrition rate & trying to balance growing emergencies on two major fronts. Dealing with the relative small front of a single Army Group in Tunisia, and Italy is difficult enough. As the Allied enclave in NW Europe doubles, & eventually triples that of the Mediterranean front of OTL the higher losses accelerates things for the Axis as 1944 arrives.

Wargames, models, and simulations have their uses. My experience with them is influenced by close to 20 years experience with them in the military. From that I know something of their limits as analytic tools.

 

[Belisarius II]

Just answer the question. What was the Bolero schedule and which American units fell behind their deployment dates?

They were behind schedule in delivering millions of tons of cargo, the delivery of landing craft, the building of logistical infrastructure, and basing facilities. It's not enough to just ship X number of divisions to Britain, and then drop them off on the French Coast.

 

[Belisarius II]

Those are the issue I wish the thread could have dealt with, as that's right in the title, not 'what would it take for the British to be accepting of Roundup or 'Do the Allies have enough shipping to do Roundup, and please list every vessel involved larger than a rowboat'

Deal with the effect of the War AFTER Roundup landings have occurred, not the
NO. Allies wouldn't do that. Not enough Men, bullets and beans
YES, here is what the Allies had, list follows
NOPE,they were busy in the States,, doing...something
For the past thousand posts.

How can anyone answer the questions about the effects on the war after Roundup, without first answering the question was Roundup practical?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Those are the issue I wish the thread could have dealt with, as that's right in the title, not 'what would it take for the British to be accepting of Roundup or 'Do the Allies have enough shipping to do Roundup, and please list every vessel involved larger than a rowboat'

Deal with the effect of the War AFTER Roundup landings have occurred,

My current take is a large attritional battle in France during the winters mud.

The Germans are on the losing side of this attrition. Similar to OTL in 1943 at the start, the increasing as the Allied production, support, and combat force expand into 1944.

The battle in France may draw German supply and combat forces away from other fronts, particularly the east.

If the Allies do not expand shipments to the USSR the Red Army is less capable in 1944-45. Particularly in mobility from fewer vehicles. Or they adapt and field a different army.

If the Germans draw off combat power from the east they are more vulnerable to the Red Army.

Once the Allied lodgment is set the Amphib fleet is available for use elsewhere. The Allies may even slow down production of Amphib ships & boats after this.

As the Allies liberate French population military age males are available to fill out Allied ground forces.

The French become entirely unreasonable (Rommels term), and fail to see the true advantages of a united Europe against the various barbarous invaders. (Again Rommels general idea of the French position.)

The Italians continue to consider with increasing clarity their economic prospects, and strategic military position. If the Gemans have denuded the Mediterranean to reinforce the battle in France its easier for the Italians to seek a armistice.

Allied deception operations, aided by Bletchley Park decrypts of OKW messages continue to have Hitler and company leaping after shadows.

The US Army is forced to solve its infantry replacement problem.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

It is a bit off topic, but if there was no Watchtower the Japanese advance toward Fiji, and Samoa could be very dangerous. With the airfield on Guadalcanal in Japanese hands medium bombers, and Zero fighters could attack the New Hebrides, and shipping in the Corral Sea. The Australians, and Americans would reinforce the Islands, with more troops, and aircraft, which would need more shipping. The 43rd ID may have to go to the South Pacific after all, or did you already assume they were sent there?

One way of seeking the answer to this is to look at the Guadacanal battle. There the Japanese were unable to muster the air strength to interdict the ships transport supplies to a relatively exposed enemy forward base. They seldom could muster 100 bombers for a single days worth of attacks. Often the operational availability fell below 30 bombers. During the same months the US Fifth Air Force was attacking Rabaul with similar numbers of B17s & failing to suppress the airfields there, or sink significant numbers of ships. Eventually the Fifth AF acquired the numbers and improved techniques to execute effective interdiction of sea lanes. But not until 1943. The Japanese were unable to muster the numbers, & while their skill in 1942 was good their techniques and weapons were not sufficient.

A second way to examine this is get a map out and measure the distances. The air range from Rabaul to Guadalcanal is a bit over 600 statute miles. Measuring that same range from Guadalcanal covers the northern third of the Coral Sea, and the northern half of the New Hebrides. From Santa Cruz to Espiritu Santo. Those are islands the US had been working up airfields & other defenses since March. So, the defenses are bette established than the scratch airbase of Henderson field. There established bases such as Efate sit at the edge of Japanese range or beyond to provide support.

Once you mark out the range with your compass on the map it becomes really obvious how easy it is to adjust the shipping route a few days further east & avoid the 90 Japanese bombers entirely. Shortly after taking over as CNO Adm King drew a line on the map from San Francisco to the eastern coast of Australia. Probably Brisbane. The line does pass through the Solomons. However the actual routes of the cargo ships ran further west reducing the problems of protection and escort.

Directly related to all this was the insistence of the senior Japanese leaders in prosecuting two simultaneous campaigns. 17th Army was charged with both securing all of New Guinea, and the Solomons. That & all its support and eventual reinforcements proved inadequate to contest the twin objectives with the Allied forces. Adding another 1000 km or 600 miles to the overreach is not going to work well.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

A question of diverting heavy bombers from attacks on Germany is usually raised in discussions of this subject. Here is a perspective on it. The chart is from Ellis 'Brute Force' and the numbers are drawn from the USSBS. At the nominal target date for Op ROUNDUP of 1 May the total tons of bombs dropped on Germany were averaging barely 15,000 tons per month. Less than 25% of the weigh dropped in May 1944. Perhaps 15% of the average per month from June 1944. Ellis does not summarize German production in a single neat chart, scattering segments about his book. What he does illustrate with all that is German industry was annoyed by the Allied bombing through to mid 1944, but not severely damaged. The numbers Ellis presents show the critical industries had their retraction of production from bombing start in the second quarter of 1944 & become critical in June/July 1944. So, yes German industry gets a break in the spring of 1943 if strategic bombing is halted to hammer operational targets in France. But its not much in the way of altering production or critical military items.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

They were behind schedule in delivering millions of tons of cargo, the delivery of landing craft, the building of logistical infrastructure, and basing facilities. It's not enough to just ship X number of divisions to Britain, and then drop them off on the French Coast.

Please just answer the question. What was the Bolero schedule and which American units fell behind their deployment dates? It is a given that units, regardless of size will be accompanied by sufficient logistical support - either organic, assigned, attached or under the operational control of those units through their chain of command.
Secondly, is this a statement of fact, or just a guess.

 

[Belisarius II]

The question is were those true needs, or part of the confusion in strategic direction that developed in mid 1942. The confusion & divergent strategic directions was discussed earlier, & produced some perspectives of the 1941& 1942 conferences I'd not considered.

Interesting. The conception of Roundup was to establish a permanent lodgment in France, in order to draw German forces off the Eastern Front. It wasn't the liberation of France, the Allies didn't think they were strong enough to do that. No I'm not confusing Roundup with Sledgehammer, which wasn't a permanent lodgment. Overlord was about the liberation of France. So to increase attrition on Germany it would have been worth cutting off most aid to Russia, cutting China loose, leaving India at risk, and running greater risks in the Pacific?

So Stalin will understand, China is worthless, Assam is unimportant, Japanese attacks on U.S. Pacific possessions would be indecisive, Australia will be fine, and any islands lost in the Pacific won't make any difference after Germany is defeated. I'm glad your now considering these issues, that the Allies were confronting. At this stage of the war Marshall was taking a very narrow view of global strategy. His logic was only the direct approach could get results. Once you have a Germany First Strategy, only a ground invasion can defeat Germany, then the only thing that really matters is coming to grips with the German Army, as fast as possible, and everything else is a diversion. Everything else isn't a diversion, it's setting the conditions for the ultimate victory.

I addressed this one early in the thread. The information available in late 1942 showed the Battle of the Atlantic was effectively won. I ought to write up a proper essay on that with the references and charts to paste into these discussions, since the question comes up so often. But not today. Precisely why the British leaders acted otherwise I don't know. Lack of self confidence? Internal politics and squabbles? Whatever

The information may have been available in late 1942, but only in retrospect. Besides by late 42 Roundup had already lost out to Torch.

Alternately a clearer understanding of where they were mid 1942. So much of the PoV seems to be perception vs the reality. Not in hindsight but in the information they actually held.



My experience gaming this is the German side has the same experience as OTL. The gain some impressive tactical victories, some limited operational success, but lose most of the time operationally and solidly at the strategic level. The main difference on the game board is that with more forces engaged the Axis are attrited at a larger rate vs their ability to replace losses than OTL. The Allies also sustain larger losses at least initially, but their larger ability to replace the same puts them ahead in several ways over the long haul of 18-24 months. In the few games I ran as the Allied player I neglected strategic bombing and was not achieving remotely the losses inflicted on Axis industry of OTL Not sure if that means anything.

I haven't played games with the same level of sophistication that you apparently have, but what I find is players tell me loses are only chits, or miniatures. 40K games have 100% loses for the loser, and 90-95% loses for the winner. Great, sign me up for that army. The British were near the end of their manpower reserves in 1943. The big miscalculation of the American Army was the number of replacements they'd need to keep units up to strength. D Day till VE Day was 11 months, and loses were hard to replace. Higher attrition rates over 18-24 months are hard to imagine being able to sustain.

The number of British divisions would dwindle, as they consolidated them. The Americans would need to write off the 90 Division Gamble as a lost bet, and reassess all their manpower policies. More men would be drafted from industry, and agriculture, the draft age raised, and categories of men excluded made eligible. Intergradation of Blacks into combat units would be an option hard say no to. Those changes would have major political, and social consequences in both America, and Britain. You can't just assume the Allies will literally fight to the finish, no matter the losses, or how long it takes.

As the German player the insoluble problem was dealing with that high attrition rate & trying to balance growing emergencies on two major fronts. Dealing with the relative small front of a single Army Group in Tunisia, and Italy is difficult enough. As the Allied enclave in NW Europe doubles, & eventually triples that of the Mediterranean front of OTL the higher losses accelerates things for the Axis as 1944 arrives.

Wargames, models, and simulations have their uses. My experience with them is influenced by close to 20 years experience with them in the military. From that I know something of their limits as analytic tools.

If your game had a Mediterranean Front, and Roundup, plus the Eastern Front the preconditions are false. There is no Mediterranean Front, other then the Libya/Egypt area. The Red Army is less powerful, and active, because of the loss of vital aid from the West. May 1943 found the Eastern Front fairly stable, except in part of the south, where the Germans held the initiative. The Germans can shift their strategic focus to France, with limited risks from the Red Army.

 

[Belisarius II]

Please just answer the question. What was the Bolero schedule and which American units fell behind their deployment dates? It is a given that units, regardless of size will be accompanied by sufficient logistical support - either organic, assigned, attached or under the operational control of those units through their chain of command.
Secondly, is this a statement of fact, or just a guess.

No logistical support is not organic to combat units. Yes they have transportation companies, not a whole supply chain, going back to a factory in the United States. Armies are supplied by a logistical command separate from combat units. The U.S. Army in WWII was divided into 3 parts. Army Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Service Forces. This is pretty basic stuff, but you should read the Wiki entry to give you some basic background. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Service_Forces

I found this directly relevant section.

Action was desirable to relieve the pressure on Britain and the Soviet Union. Bolero was to be followed by an emergency assault across the English Channel in the event of indications of a sudden German or Soviet collapse in 1942, codenamed Operation Sledgehammer, and a major one in 1943, codenamed Operation Roundup. Roundup required a million American troops to be moved to the UK by the 1 April 1943 target date. The ASF staff determined that the major constraints were the availability of shipping in the United States, and the capacity of British ports to handle the volume of cargo. The War Shipping Administration agreed to provide 70 to 100 sailings in June, July and August 1942 to take advantage of the long Summer daylight hours in the UK.[60]

Somervell also approached Lord Leathers, the British Minister of War Transport, for a loan of fifty British ships. Often the equipment most needed in the UK was not available, but ASF shipped what was. To maximize the usilization of shipping space, ships were loaded "full and down", using up all cargo space and weighing them down to the Plimsoll line.[60] By July, British setbacks in the Middle East caused shipping and supplies to be sent there instead.[60] That month, ASF shipped 38,000 long tons (39,000 t) of equipment to the British forces in Egypt.[61] Sinkings by German U-boats reduced the ships available for Bolero still further, and by the end of August only a fraction of the required cargo had been shipped.[60]

The ability of the United States to conduct Sledgehammer and Roundup was hampered by a shortage of landing craft and crews.[62] In May 1942, the SOS was directed to train Army landing craft crews, and the Engineer Amphibian Command was established for this purpose on 10 June. The Navy agreed to provide the crews for the larger ocean-going landing ships.[63] By July, it was apparent that there would not be sufficient landing craft to conduct Sledgehammer.[62] Sledgehammer had been abandoned in favor of an invasion of French Northwest Africa (Operation Torch), a ship-to-shore operation, and plans for the 1943 cross-Channel invasion operation were scaled back. The Navy then announced that it would take over the operation of all landing craft. Given the additional time, the Navy now believed that it could train all boat crews. Training was restricted to the three engineer special brigades that had already been created, which were sent to the Southwest Pacific Area.[64]

Bolero[edit]​

Chaos had resulted during World War I because the organization of the SOS in France was different from that of the War Department, and an important lesson of that war was the need for the theater SOS organization to parallel the one the United States.[65] Marshall and Somervell wanted it led by someone familiar with the SOS organization, and selected Major General John C. H. Lee, who had previously commanded the Pacific Ports of Embarkation in the United States. Each branch head in SOS headquarters was asked to nominate his best two men, one of whom was selected by Somervell and Lee for SOS headquarters, while the other remained in Washington.[66]

Somervell was disturbed by the proposed troop basis of the European Theater of Operations (ETO), which provided for just 277,000 personnel. This represented about 26 percent of the proposed theater strength, which Somervell felt was insufficient to unload, transport and store the flow of Bolero supplies. He was overruled by the Operations Division (OPD) of the WDGS, which prioritized combat and air units for deployment to the UK. Its 1942 troop basis for the Army as a whole provided for only 11.8 percent of the Army's strength to be service troops. USASOS was unable to raise units without personnel, but by June 1942 every theater commander was calling for more. They then accepted partially trained units with the idea that they could learn on the job, but this did not work out well. In September, OPD slowed the activation of ground units and raised the proportion of service troops to 35 percent.[67]

A little further down.

The increase in service troops in ETOUSA came too late. The flow of Bolero supplies overwhelmed the service units in the UK, and were stored in depots without proper markings, and without records being kept of what was in each depot. The result was that equipment required for Torch could not be located in time, and on 8 September Lee had to ask for it to be shipped from the United States. USASOS was unable to ship the requested 260,000 measurement tons (290,000 m3) of supplies in time, but with frantic efforts the technical services were able to ship 132,000 measurement tons (150,000 m3); another eight shiploads followed that would join convoys en route from the UK to North Africa.[69] The Western Task Force was loaded in the United States, at Norfolk and Newport News. By 27 September it was clear that the ports of Morrocco could not handle the required stores, and the Navy could not provide escorts for multiple convoys. Given a choice between reducing the number of personnel or the number of vehicles, the latter option was chosen.[70]

So no a division isn't automatically feed, and supplied, the army has to plan long in advance what it's logistical needs will be, and make the strategic arrangements to meet them. If they can't meet their logistical goals the plans have to be changed, or a whole new plan that they can supply will be substituted. In this case Torch was the substitute for Roundup.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

FWIW I think you have demonstrated with hindsight that the Allies could indeed have amassed the forces necessary to launch an invasion of France in mid-1943. IF they had ignored the needs of other theatres or at least gave them far less resources than OTL. Althouhh this doesn't allow for the possible problems of port capacity and infrastructure in Britain.

I have been quite open about the use of hindsight. It is essential to identifying a starting point for any ATL. Thereafter, it is unethical to use unless clearly stipulated as such, and reason given. I have adhered faithfully to those principles.
Your argument is closely related to Belisarius II complains about when he claims I want my cake and to eat it too. For the enlightenment of both of you, I wish demonstrate what both really look at.

First, Roundup is not executed on 12 May 1943, but on 7 July 1943. This has several effects derived from hindsight, and upgrades the cake from a boxload of stale Hostess Twinkies to the first level of a real gourmet baker’s cake.
a) Operation Citadel is now well underway, and 441 of Germany’s most powerful armored vehicles are being incinerated at Kursk. They cannot be transferred to Paris in time to hold off Marshall’s first attempt to capture Paris as I postulated in my thesis.
b) Hitler transferred 1st Panzer Division to Greece in May 1943, followed by 1st Parachute Division a month later. 16th Panzer, 3rd and 29th PanzerGrenadier Divisions have been transferred to Italy in June 1943. (Note – all four of these divisions have received their full complement of equipment and vehicles.) The 26th Panzer Division is midway through its transfer to Italy on D-Day – and is not equipped. The compensation for the loss of these panzer units is meager. No doubt, 9th SS “Hohentaufen” Panzer, 10th SS “Karl der Grosse” PanzerGrenadier and 14th Panzer Divisions have received cast off tanks for training at the company, battalion, and for the 10th SS probably regimental level as well. The only new panzer unit in France is the 60th PanzerGrenadier Division, which was reconstituted in mid-June 1943, and is still at cadre and basic intake strength level. The 12th SS “Hitler Jugend” Panzer Division was formed in Belgium in mid-June with an unusually high number of initial trainees (approx. 10,000), but did not receive its training and leadership cadres from 1st SS “Leibstandarte” PanzerGrenadier Division until the end of July. 21st Panzer Division was scheduled to be reconstituted in France in the second week of July 1943.
c) Hitler transferred the 282nd Infantry and 161st Infantry Divisions to Russia in May 1943. This reduces the number of combat ready infantry divisions in the West from four to one. The 65th Infantry Division is located at Eindhoven, Holland. The 2nd Parachute Division is the closest to combat readiness, it was sent to Rome, Italy in September 1943, and transferred to Russia a month later. None of the other infantry divisions in France were committed to combat until well into November 1943. Only two new infantry divisions have appeared in OWK-West Order of Battle, the 266th Static Division formed in Germany in June 1943 and enroute to France, and the 264th Infantry Division still at cadre strength in Belgium.

Second application of 20-20 hindsight. This two-month delay brings considerable improvement to the USAAF and RAF strength in Great Britain. For the Fifteenth US Air Force (activated in Great Britain vice Tunisia), the 80th Fighter (P-38/P-40) and 86th Fighter (A-36/P-40/P-47) Groups arrive. For the Eighth US Air Force the 94th, 95th, 96th, 100th (B-17) and 308th (B-24) Bombardment Groups arrive, with a concurrent transfer of remaining B-25/B-26 equipped Groups to the Fifteenth Air Force. (Note these Groups arrived during this OTL time frame.) There is also the upgrade of two fighter Groups, one with Spitfires and one with P-40s to P-47 fighters. For the RAF the upgrade is primarily quantitative. The last Blenheim IV Squadrons are converted to B-25/B-26/A-20 aircraft, two squadrons are re-equipped with Mustang IIIa/b (P-51B/C) aircraft, and a couple of Spitfire Squadrons re-equipped with Mk VII/VIII and IX models. Add a second layer to my gourmet cake please.

Third application. The amphibious vessels (APA, AKA, LST, first LSM, etc) completed/converted in US shipyards between 1 March and 31 May 1943 are available, thus increasing the amphibious lift for the first waves ashore. Add another layer of cake.

Fourth application. Marshall believes his intelligence reports regarding the lack of German combat power and realizes that once ashore, his forces are free to launch a “Dash across France” and logistical planning to support that advance is made. In a complete reversal of my thesis, intelligence success IS translated into operational success. Add a fourth layer of cake.

Fifth Application. The landing beaches are completely revamped and expanded to include Band Beach. As I noted in Post #944: “Respectfully, as long as you are accusing me of 20-20 hindsight, the five invasion beaches - Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword are well known. Without looking it up, where was the sixth beach, Band, located in the Overlord operation planning and for what purpose? If 20-20 hindsight is in play here, why isn't Band Beach selected?”
And in Post #954: “Back to the 20-20 Hindsight issue. Marathag is correct as to the location of Band Beach east of the Orne River. As far as tidal, soil, and beach gradient conditions, it is the best of the Normandy beaches. It is 24 air miles and 35 road miles away from the first Seine River bridge, and 28 road miles from there to Le Havre. Band Beach was one of the first beaches considered for an invasion of France, as far back as 1941, when the British assumed they would have to invade and liberate France on their own without any help from the Americans. During Overlord, it was the fall-back beach. If the Allies were absolutely slaughtered in the first wave assault at any of the five other beaches, the second waves at that beach would be diverted to Band Beach. Once it was secured by troops from Sword, it became the primary casualty evacuation beach for British Second Army because wheeled and half-track ambulances could negotiate it without great difficulty.”
Instead of the scenario I constructed, the following modifications to Post #46 are put in place. Second British Army under LTG Bernard Paget would cover the right flank (instead of the left flank) of the Americans. MG Percy Hobart’s Armored (AD) with its “funnies” is spread between Utah and Gold Beaches. Utah is the target of VIII British Corps with 5 Division, followed by 52 (Lowland) Division and finally 9 AD. The other two beaches are the responsibility of I British Corps, the most heavily armoured tactical formation. 3 Division, a mixed formation composed of 33 Tank, 8 and 9 Infantry Brigades, followed by 11 AD will land at Omaha. The remainder of I British Corps at Gold Beach consists of 53 (Welsh) Mixed Divisions followed by Guards AD in the second echelon.
Juno Beach is assigned to Third US Army – LTG Walter Kruger: V US Corps with 7th, 29th and 40th US Infantry Divisions (ID). Seventh US Army – LTG George S Patton: I Armored Corps’ 2nd and 4th US AD, 3rd and 9th US ID are allocated to Sword Beach.
Band Beach landings are conducted by First Canadian Army’s I Canadian Corps: 1 Canadian Army Tank and 1 Canadian Division. The initial assault wave was followed by 2 Canadian Division and 5 Canadian AD.
82nd US Airborne Division and 503rd US Parachute Infantry Regiment are assigned the Seine River Bridges from the Estuary to St Etienne du Rouvray; and 1 Airborne Division bridges from Elbeuf to Mantes.
The German opposition to the airborne troops consists of static infantry of 711th Occupation Division headquartered at Rouen – 33% of which is non-German, mostly Polish conscripts who quite willingly surrender in order to rejoin the fight for the liberation of their country. The remaining German troops were considered unfit for the Russian front. To the west of the Seine at Evreux is the two regimental 191st Training Division which begins retreating towards Paris.
I Canadian Corps is opposed by two battalions of the 716th Occupation Division, the best trained units of its type, and equal to the average German infantry battalion, but devoid of any antitank or artillery support. While an infantry brigade and a regiment of tanks are tasked with destroying them, the main body of the first echelon ashore covers the 35 road miles to the Seine by D+1 and reaches Le Havre by D+2. The 17th Luftwaffe Field Division garrisoning the area and spread as far away as Dieppe are among the better Luftwaffe troops, but no match for the Canadians. Le Havre is captured by D+4, D+ 5 at the latest with its 11,000 ton port capacity intact. There are no other German troops until the boundary line with the 348th Occupation Division at Dieppe is reached. Dieppe is isolated and bypassed, the Canadians moving up the coast to the 18th Luftwaffe Field Division spread between Boulogne and Dunkirk and the 156th Training Division at Calais. Eventually the Canadians will be forced to halt for ten to 14 days until resupplied.
Patton’s troops encountered the rest of 716th Occupation Division split between the areas around Caen and Lisieux with the four battalions reinforced by the artillery and antitank battalions equipped with captured Russian weapons. The Lisieux group is no match for the 3rd and 9th US ID, and the Caen force cannot withstand the 7th and 29th US ID. The 346th Occupation Division is withdrawn from Chartres to Paris, to join the 325th Occupation Division – in existence only two months. There are no other German units in the path of Seventh and Third U.S. Armies, the former is able to cross the Seine bridges relieving the British airborne and envelop Paris from the north and east, while the latter approaches from the west. It remains probable that LTG Dieter von Choltitz’ predecessor as commandant in Paris wil take a different course of action with the paltry number of troops available. Paris falls by D+7. The Americans continue eastward until they too are halted by lack of fuel.
I British Corps has the toughest fight in Normandy. 2nd Parachute Division bitterly contests every yard they hold around St Lo. Even after being surrounded, they do not slacken.
Although they have had 60-90 days to become familiar with their assigned area of responsibility encompassing the entire Cotentin Peninsula, it is doubtful the 709th Occupation Division will do any better against the VIII British Corps than against I US Armored Corps as outlined. From the Cotentin, the British have the responsibility of opening the French Atlantic ports to allied logistics.
The Allies broadcast a call for the French populace to sabotage the movement of German forces throughout the country, and instantly every collaborator and bystander is converted into a Resistance member. German troops in western and southern France are unable to escape except by leather personnel carriers. They are rounded up in penny packets with the exception of 10th SS “Karl der Grosse” PanzerGrenadier Division, whose baptism of fire and destruction was marked by tremendous brutality.
The only German panzer forces available before the Rhine is the 100th Panzer Training Regiment at St Dizier. The Germans however will transfer the 16th Panzer, 3rd and 29th PanzerGrenadier Divisions from Italy between D+10 and D+15, but are aware the panzergrenadier divisions are no match for Allied armored divisions, and the 16th Panzer Division, although fully equipped is at about 85% strength and has not completed a single divisional level field exercise. It has been in existence only four months. Therefore, the German panzers will be kept out of combat with the Allies for some weeks, allowing further training and increase in strength. By D+20, the 1st Parachute “Herman Goering Panzer Division will have arrived, followed a few days later by the 15th PanzerGrenadier Division from Sicily. The latter is also understrength. The 90th PanzerGrenadier Division on Sardinia, reformed two weeks earlier will transfer to Germany to complete its reconstitution.
Instead of another layer of cake, I would like a gallon of Berkeley Farms thin mint ice cream, vintage mid-1970s.

Sixth application. The capture of Paris, and the panicked abandonment of Italy by German forces convinces the Italian Fascist Council the war is lost, even without the loss of Sicily. Mussolini is deposed, and the Italians open armistice negotiations with the Allies. The Italian position is far weaker than in my thesis – Germany is clearly doomed, and the Italians know their fate once Germany surrenders. The terms are as in the OTL – the surrender of the Italian Fleet, and Italy declares war on Germany. The Germans are now faced with another front on the Austrian border and throughout the Balkans. Although the Italians will not fight vigorously, the Germans are forced to pay attention to the south as well. First British Army begins arriving from North Africa in northern Italian ports. Eighth and Ninth British Armies are transported to Greece as outlined in my thesis.
A full stock of vintage black cherry and cream soda please.

Seventh application. In August the buildup of Allied ground and air power is well underway, with the initial emphasis on II Canadian Corps rather than IX British Corps, but otherwise as in Post #46. As the Canadians push into Belgium, and Seventh and Third US Armies into eastern France, the Germans are forced to commit their panzers by the end of the month. The Germans do administer a nasty setback to newly arrived 3rd US AD and east of Nancy when an unexpected meeting engagement occurs with the 130th “Panzer Lehr” Panzer and 15th PanzerGrenadier Divisions in the first week of September. But this is outweighed by the trapping of 29th PanzerGrenadier Division by I Canadian Corps near Oudenaarde in Belgium. Once destroyed, the unit cannot be reconstituted. Similarly, the inexperienced 16th Panzer Division is destroyed by 4th US AD and 3rd US ID while trying to channel Patton’s troops into kill zones near Metz. The fortress is left by Patton to infantry divisions of VII US Corps while his tanks continue eastward.
By the end of September, the arrival of Second and Fourth British Armies in Alsace, allows Third US Army to shift north into Lorraine, and Seventh US Army into the Ardennes and Belgium with II US Corps of Fifth US Army on Patton’s left flank. The Canadians are able to advance into the Netherlands. The Siegfried Line is now manned by hastily assembled VolksGrenadier Divisions, with little training.
A fifth layer of cake please.

Eighth application of hindsight. In August 1943, the Soviets begin their OTL post-Kursk offensive and maul the German forces all the way to Kiev. The 1st, 14th and 24th Panzer Divisions are not available to be rushed east to stem the tide, and the Russians advance until their supplies are exhausted in December 1943. Destroyed German units cannot be rebuilt, the German Wehrkreis system is barely able to provide replacements to existing units.
Another layer of cake.

Ninth application. In mid-October, Marshall renews his offensive in the west. Although the Germans have blown every bridge over the Rhine, the four airborne divisions of I Allied Airborne Corps make parachute assaults at Karlsruhe and Kehl (near Strassburg) with American and British units. The British are airborne are given a nasty counterattack by I SS Panzer Korps, (9th SS “Hohentaufen” Panzer, 12th SS “Hitler Jugend” Panzer, and 1st SS “Leibstandarte” PanzerGrenadier Division), but the two inexperienced panzer divisions are short equipment and weapons, and fight with more zeal than skill. Once over the Rhine, German morale collapses. Hitler commits suicide on 2 December 1943, and Herman Goering unconditionally surrenders a week later.
Another layer … oh hell, just surprise me.

This is the outcome of Roundup with 20-20 hindsight. This is having my cake and eating it too. This is taking full advantage of the poor German strategic planning in the Second World War. My thesis looked nothing like this.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

No logistical support is not organic to combat units.

This is not true. Corps (the largest tactical unit), numbered Armies, and Army Groups are all combat units. At Corps level and above, quartermaster, transportation, ordinance maintenance signal, engineer construction battalions and group/regiments were assigned as dictated by mission requirements. You will note in Post #46 I included Third, Fifth and Seventh US Armies; I and II Armored, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XII US Corps in the deployment to France. They come with their logistical units. In addition there are Theater level logistical units. I have covered these.
Now, Please just answer the question. What was the Bolero schedule and which American units fell behind their deployment dates?

 

[Eric C Johnson]

No logistical support is not organic to combat units. Yes they have transportation companies, not a whole supply chain, going back to a factory in the United States. Armies are supplied by a logistical command separate from combat units. The U.S. Army in WWII was divided into 3 parts. Army Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Service Forces. This is pretty basic stuff, but you should read the Wiki entry to give you some basic background. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Service_Forces

I found this directly relevant section.

Action was desirable to relieve the pressure on Britain and the Soviet Union. Bolero was to be followed by an emergency assault across the English Channel in the event of indications of a sudden German or Soviet collapse in 1942, codenamed Operation Sledgehammer, and a major one in 1943, codenamed Operation Roundup. Roundup required a million American troops to be moved to the UK by the 1 April 1943 target date. The ASF staff determined that the major constraints were the availability of shipping in the United States, and the capacity of British ports to handle the volume of cargo. The War Shipping Administration agreed to provide 70 to 100 sailings in June, July and August 1942 to take advantage of the long Summer daylight hours in the UK.[60]

Somervell also approached Lord Leathers, the British Minister of War Transport, for a loan of fifty British ships. Often the equipment most needed in the UK was not available, but ASF shipped what was. To maximize the usilization of shipping space, ships were loaded "full and down", using up all cargo space and weighing them down to the Plimsoll line.[60] By July, British setbacks in the Middle East caused shipping and supplies to be sent there instead.[60] That month, ASF shipped 38,000 long tons (39,000 t) of equipment to the British forces in Egypt.[61] Sinkings by German U-boats reduced the ships available for Bolero still further, and by the end of August only a fraction of the required cargo had been shipped.[60]

The ability of the United States to conduct Sledgehammer and Roundup was hampered by a shortage of landing craft and crews.[62] In May 1942, the SOS was directed to train Army landing craft crews, and the Engineer Amphibian Command was established for this purpose on 10 June. The Navy agreed to provide the crews for the larger ocean-going landing ships.[63] By July, it was apparent that there would not be sufficient landing craft to conduct Sledgehammer.[62] Sledgehammer had been abandoned in favor of an invasion of French Northwest Africa (Operation Torch), a ship-to-shore operation, and plans for the 1943 cross-Channel invasion operation were scaled back. The Navy then announced that it would take over the operation of all landing craft. Given the additional time, the Navy now believed that it could train all boat crews. Training was restricted to the three engineer special brigades that had already been created, which were sent to the Southwest Pacific Area.[64]

Bolero[edit]​

Chaos had resulted during World War I because the organization of the SOS in France was different from that of the War Department, and an important lesson of that war was the need for the theater SOS organization to parallel the one the United States.[65] Marshall and Somervell wanted it led by someone familiar with the SOS organization, and selected Major General John C. H. Lee, who had previously commanded the Pacific Ports of Embarkation in the United States. Each branch head in SOS headquarters was asked to nominate his best two men, one of whom was selected by Somervell and Lee for SOS headquarters, while the other remained in Washington.[66]

Somervell was disturbed by the proposed troop basis of the European Theater of Operations (ETO), which provided for just 277,000 personnel. This represented about 26 percent of the proposed theater strength, which Somervell felt was insufficient to unload, transport and store the flow of Bolero supplies. He was overruled by the Operations Division (OPD) of the WDGS, which prioritized combat and air units for deployment to the UK. Its 1942 troop basis for the Army as a whole provided for only 11.8 percent of the Army's strength to be service troops. USASOS was unable to raise units without personnel, but by June 1942 every theater commander was calling for more. They then accepted partially trained units with the idea that they could learn on the job, but this did not work out well. In September, OPD slowed the activation of ground units and raised the proportion of service troops to 35 percent.[67]

A little further down.

The increase in service troops in ETOUSA came too late. The flow of Bolero supplies overwhelmed the service units in the UK, and were stored in depots without proper markings, and without records being kept of what was in each depot. The result was that equipment required for Torch could not be located in time, and on 8 September Lee had to ask for it to be shipped from the United States. USASOS was unable to ship the requested 260,000 measurement tons (290,000 m3) of supplies in time, but with frantic efforts the technical services were able to ship 132,000 measurement tons (150,000 m3); another eight shiploads followed that would join convoys en route from the UK to North Africa.[69] The Western Task Force was loaded in the United States, at Norfolk and Newport News. By 27 September it was clear that the ports of Morrocco could not handle the required stores, and the Navy could not provide escorts for multiple convoys. Given a choice between reducing the number of personnel or the number of vehicles, the latter option was chosen.[70]

So no a division isn't automatically feed, and supplied, the army has to plan long in advance what it's logistical needs will be, and make the strategic arrangements to meet them. If they can't meet their logistical goals the plans have to be changed, or a whole new plan that they can supply will be substituted. In this case Torch was the substitute for Roundup.

Hmm. I note that "By 27 September it was clear that the ports of Morrocco could not handle the required stores, and the Navy could not provide escorts for multiple convoys." So port facilities in Morocco were inadequate.

I found the best figures I can on the British port capacity. In 1928, the largest year of British trade, British ports handled 105.6 million tons of exported cargo originating in the United Kingdom, and imported 104.7 million tons of cargo, of which 58.6 million tons of cargo was re-exported. This is a total of 310.3 million tons of cargo, which I assume is near the upper level of British capacity since it is only about 5.8 million tons less than 1913, the next highest year. I also have doubts that in both 1913 and 1928 that all cargo imported was offloaded prior to re-export, so the lower level of port capacity is above 251.6 million tons of cargo.
Source: Commerce Reports Volume I, Issue 8, Page 540; Department of Commerce, US Government, 24 February 1930.

I looked for 1928, because it was the last year prior to the Great Depression which, naturally, depressed trade tonnage totals. For example, in 1939, British ports handled only 55.1 million tons of exports and 37.5 million tons of imports. In 1945 the figures were 56.644 million tons of exports and 54.692 million tons of imports. I cannot find figures for other years. I did find that British ports handled 27.011 million tons of Lend-Lease exports to the USSR between 1941 and 1945.

To me, this thoroughly explains why no US Army Port Construction and Repair Groups were needed in Great Britain during the entire war.

As I rescanned chapters of Hyperwar, I could not find any reference to where inadequate port facilities were located. You were the one who found Morocco. Based on the percentage of world trade, I did not believe it was either the United States or Great Britain. I assumed that it was the lack of ports in Normandy, given that the British did no begin construction of mulberries until forced to agree to at the Trident Conference in May 1943. Can you find any definitive quote from Hyperwar that explicitly identies where these inadequate ports were located?

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Interesting points.

I suppose a better way of looking at it is:

What ground, naval and air forces were actually present in the UK in mid-1943? Including amphibious capability. Could they have launched a successful invasion of France?

If not, what extras have to be sent there over the previous year? What has to be NOT sent to the UK or NOT sent somewhere else? What changes to US and UK production are needed.

How do these changes affect the course of the war between mid 1942 and TTL D-Day? And German preparedness.

Then we could look at how the invasion might have gone.

 

[Post]

Interesting points.

I suppose a better way of looking at it is:

What ground, naval and air forces were actually present in the UK in mid-1943? Including amphibious capability. Could they have launched a successful invasion of France?

If not, what extras have to be sent there over the previous year? What has to be NOT sent to the UK or NOT sent somewhere else? What changes to US and UK production are needed.

How do these changes affect the course of the war between mid 1942 and TTL D-Day? And German preparedness.

Actually the last 1000 posts have been discussing this. And still it hasn't come much farther then "Yes, it can, see..."; "No, it can't, because of..." .

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Actually the last 1000 posts have been discussing this. And still it hasn't come much farther then "Yes, it can, see..."; "No, it can't, because of..." .

There's also a difference in what is viewed as "plausible" . Something can be "feasible" but Not "plausible". Because the decision takers didn't have the hindsight the OP used to create the scenario.

So maybe the Question should be:

'Assume that with a divergence point of 1 July 1942 FDR, Churchill and the JCS decide to stick to the build up for the July 1943 invasion of France. Regardless of what is happening in other theatres. '

1) What differences to OTL would develop in the next 12 months?
2) How would the invasion and subsequent War have gone?

 

[Belisarius II]

This is not true. Corps (the largest tactical unit), numbered Armies, and Army Groups are all combat units. At Corps level and above, quartermaster, transportation, ordinance maintenance signal, engineer construction battalions and group/regiments were assigned as dictated by mission requirements. You will note in Post #46 I included Third, Fifth and Seventh US Armies; I and II Armored, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XII US Corps in the deployment to France. They come with their logistical units. In addition there are Theater level logistical units. I have covered these.
Now, Please just answer the question. What was the Bolero schedule and which American units fell behind their deployment dates?

You have left me just shaking my head. Where do you think the Armies, and Corps you listed got their supplies from? Not from themselves, but from Army Service Forces. If you read what I posted it explained how ASF drew equipment, food, and fuel out of the U.S. Economy, and shipped it overseas for U.S. Army Ground, and Air Forces needs. From what I post above, and earlier they lacked the means to meet the demands of Roundup. By the time the Allies shifted strategy from Roundup to Torch the Buildup for Roundup was so behind schedule the operation seemed unlikely. It also explained they were so undermanned at the receiving end the cargo wasn't even stored properly, and cataloged for future use.

 

[Post]

There's also a difference in what is viewed as "plausible" . Something can be "feasible" but Not "plausible". Because the decision takers didn't have the hindsight the OP used to create the scenario.

So maybe the Question should be:

'Assume that with a divergence point of 1 July 1942 FDR, Churchill and the JCS decide to stick to the build up for the July 1943 invasion of France. Regardless of what is happening in other theatres. '

1) What differences to OTL would develop in the next 12 months?
2) How would the invasion and subsequent War have gone?

As far as I remember, that was the premise of the thread when it was started.