D-Day in 1943: Plausibility and operations in France

[McPherson]

One knowledgable person on this subject stated with out intending humor that Allied leaders, their staff, and clerical army did not know either. they lacked far into 1943 any accurate or consolidated accounting of their mass of cargo ships.

Turner made this comment or something like it just before Tarawa. Nobody was tracking tonnage flow too well. But from what I can assemble for my ATL efforts I can tell you that there was insufficient shipping for Roundup throughout 1943. I think the surplus shipping lift in British Isles waters was not available for Overlord until March 1944. Roundup, to have a chance at all, needed initial lift as large as Overlord.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

..l. But from what I can assemble for my ATL efforts I can tell you that there was insufficient shipping for Roundup throughout 1943. I think the surplus shipping lift in British Isles waters was not available for Overlord until March 1944. Roundup, to have a chance at all, needed initial lift as large as Overlord.

This circles around to my earlier point about what your strategic goals are for 'ROUNDUP'. If you are trying to reproduce the 1944 OVERLORD this maybe correct. If the goal is to simply place the Allies in a better strategic position for kicking off 1944 thats something else.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Probably it would have. But it does not change the problem with Tank Destroyer Doctrine.

My take is there was no TD doctrine problem. Looking at the US Army training ops in the US, particularly the large scale ops, there some strong evidence the future Army and corps commanders were seeing the problems as early as 1941 & taking their own counsel vs Gen Bruces school house pronouncements. Evidence of this is that after the Tunisian campaign the TD battalions were neither deployed or used tactically as per doctrine. Neither did Patton, Clark, Bradley, Simpson, Gerow, ect... request the mass of TD Group HQ be sent to their theaters. A hand full were, but most languished in the US until disbanded. Like the independent tank battalions the TD were not kept in reserve at corps or army level, but were usually assigned to the ground combat divisions on what amounted to a permanent basis. In battle the US Army used its TD doctrine in one campaign, where ironically it more or less worked as advertised, then the actual battlefield leaders discarded it for the remaining two years.

 

[Karelian]

The fourth problem is the Finnish request for an Armistice. Although Great Britain declared war on Finland on 6 December 1941, the United States did not. As early as 20 March 1943, Secretary of State Hull attempted to secure a separate peace for Finland, but Soviet demands were too severe and were rejected by the Finns in early May 1943. Only a week later, the Finns were having second thoughts. With the German abandonment of the Murmansk Front, the only German troops in the country were on the Karelian Peninsula facing Leningrad.

No such troops were present in the Isthmus because of the specific orders of Mannerheim, despite repeated pleas from the German side.

The Finns saw the writing on the wall, and reopened secret negotiations with the Americans, guaranteeing that Finnish troops would not replace Germans outside of pre-1939 Finnish territory. In early June, the Finns proposed the Germans turn over the Northern Leningrad Front to Finnish command, and shift German troops to elsewhere on the Russian front. As the situation in France continued to deteriorate and German intelligence had detected the impending Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, the Germans agreed on 2 July. The last German troops left Finnish soil on 9 August 1943.

There are no Finnish troops left to spare to man the front up north.
Finnish Army cannot continue the war against the Soviets if the German military evacuates entire Lapland.
Petsamo nickel was also pivotally important to the Nazi war economy, and a reason why the mines were held to the last possible moment, even after the Finnish government had signed the armistice with the Soviets in OTL.

As they left, Finnish troops never moved forward to replace them, and made contact with Russian troops only as they reached pre-war Finnish territory. The siege of Leningrad was unilaterally lifted on 29 July, and on 5 August 1943; the United States resumed diplomatic relations. The Soviets had little incentive to open large-scale movements against the Finns. It would greatly damage Soviet-American relations at a time when Moscow’s termination of diplomatic relations with the Polish Exile Government in London had relations with Churchill at low-ebb. Soviet troops were required to re-conquer the vast sections of Belorussia and Ukraine still in German control. With Allied successes in liberating France the Soviet priority was on the race to Berlin.

In OTL Stalin still opted to initiate a major strategic offensive against the Finns in 1944 in a virtually similar strategic situation. He had already made his terms known in February 1943:

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/d376: Stalin then outlined the Soviet terms, as follows:

1.The restoration of the Treaty of 1940, with the possible exchange of Petsamo for Hango. However, whereas Hango had been leased, Petsamo would be taken as a permanent possession.

2.Compensation for 50% of the damage done to the Soviet Union by the Finns, the exact amount to be discussed.

3.Break with Germany, and the expulsion of Germans from Finland.

4.Reorganization of the army.

The problem is that Finland was not a dictatorship, and no government could not get the parliament (and the public) to accept that the areas lost in the Winter War were gone forever, and the irredentist claims for Eastern Karelia would have to be abandoned as well. This was only politically possible after Mannerheim became President and the Soviet strategic offensive had only just barely been checked at Tali-Ihantala.

Consequently, from late August 1943, a de facto cease-fire emerged on the Finnish front. After negotiating through American intermediaries, Great Britain signed an armistice with Finland on 4 September, and Churchill declared that Soviet-Finnish differences should not be discussed until post-war peace conferences convened. The Soviets refused to accept this British condition, but the Finns recognized their weak negotiating position and offered to evacuate Karelia to a line only six miles from the city of Viipuri; well out of artillery range of Leningrad. This concession was enough to convince the Soviets to agree to an armistice on 19 September 1943.

See above, Stalin would not have it.

Finland declared war on Germany on 1 October 1943. The Germans could offer no incentives for the Finns not to defect.

Finland would be facing starvation by then.

https://faravid.journal.fi/article/download/91901/50710/151529

"The US Secretary of State explained that the Finnish official had stated that the US Government erred in believing that the Finnish Government was unwilling to contribute whatever it could to the liberation of Europe. He claimed that the Finnish situation was simple: the greater part of Finland’s food supply came from the Germans, who prevented Finland from building up vital stocks. Thus, Finland was dependent on shipments from the Germans, who could easily, within a few days, create almost insurmountable food difficulties in the country. The Finns were certain that the Germans would not be “slow to punish” any demonstration of political independence on the Finnish side. However, the Finns saw one chance to reshuffle sides in the Northeastern theater of World War II in Europe. This time was at hand, and therefore, the Finns approached the US Government. Also, the Swedes had appraised the situation similarly in January 1943. The major obstacle was that the flow of German supplies, especially food, would be cut if Finland was no longer aligned with Germany. Finland had made a trade agreement with Germany in March 1943 that guaranteed food supplies until the next harvest. Kennan asked the Finns a question: What food supplies would Finland need in the future? The Finnish foresaw that after the next harvest at the end of August or the beginning of September in 1943, Finland would temporarily have enough grain in its stocks to end its dependence on the Germans."

 

[Garrison]

Turner made this comment or something like it just before Tarawa. Nobody was tracking tonnage flow too well. But from what I can assemble for my ATL efforts I can tell you that there was insufficient shipping for Roundup throughout 1943. I think the surplus shipping lift in British Isles waters was not available for Overlord until March 1944. Roundup, to have a chance at all, needed initial lift as large as Overlord.

Which is the overall problem with an invasion in 43, everything is that bit harder. The BotA isn't won until well into the year, the Luftwaffe is stronger, shipping is harder to come by, landing craft, etc. Unless you are going to change things much earlier, vis a vis the Middle East and Italy.

 

[McPherson]

Source: Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943 to the Secretary of War

Here is a chart from that same source.

Notice the time elements?

Here is a deployment graphic from the same source.

One can go to the same source for training and manpower deployable stats, the airpower situation and the American army view of the naval situation. One phrase describes the entire document; "dire situation now, but with improvements immediately observable in the projected data".

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The above chart is useful but, subsequent research shows the numbers were based on 'best guesses' and incomplete data. The people making up those estimates were sincere & making a best estimate, but they were still working through the chaos created by the emergencies and policy changes of 1942. We can make estimates from it, I have, but its not based on data I'd publish from. The data for 1944 - 45 is better. What I've not found are deep analysis of Allied shipping transport comparable to whats been done for the Axis logistics. It all seems to be superficial recycling of war time estimates.

 

[marathag]

Stalin was never an ally of Hitler's.

correct, but nearly the same type of relationship between Finland and Germany between 1941 -1944 Co-Belligerents.
Similar goals, and assisted each other on a military front, like the Soviets escorting a German Raider, and Trade.

 

[marathag]

The Allies will face an intact LW fighter force that can stage into France (About 450-600 day-fighters with 70% veterans.)

Their Ground Attacks skills would not be the equal as effort spent on bomber interception. Not the same skill set

 

[marathag]

See my previous comments about how American resources were localized and distributed.

Aircraft, of course, can fly to the East Coast, anything smaller than ships will use rail transport, while the rest will use the Panama Canal

 

[marathag]

German tanks (IIIs and IVs) will be competitive in the mid 1943 timeframe

Grants in the Desert were able to handle both. Sure the Sherman did it better, but against infantry, Grant is just fine, as it's no more vulnerable to the Panzerfaust than the Shermans ended up being.

I could see Grants attached to infantry, as mobile AT defense.
Much depends if McNair gets his way with pulling the AT Platoons from Inf Regiments or not.

 

[marathag]

German tanks (IIIs and IVs) will be competitive in the mid 1943 timeframe

Grants in the Desert were able to handle both. Sure the Sherman did it better, but against infantry, Grant is just fine, as it's no more vulnerable to the Panzerfaust than the Shermans ended up being.

I could see Grants attached to infantry, as mobile AT defense.
Much depends if McNair gets his way

 

[McPherson]

The above chart is useful but, subsequent research shows the numbers were based on 'best guesses' and incomplete data. The people making up those estimates were sincere & making a best estimate, but they were still working through the chaos created by the emergencies and policy changes of 1942. We can make estimates from it, I have, but its not based on data I'd publish from. The data for 1944 - 45 is better. What I've not found are deep analysis of Allied shipping transport comparable to whats been done for the Axis logistics. It all seems to be superficial recycling of war time estimates.

Best Guesses were at the time projected for Roundup as the report was published for June 1943. IOW, those are the planning estimates they had as of June 1943. This makes the "what they thought they knew" planning definition. It does not change the inaccuracy or the fudge factors implicit one bit, but it was what they had. Nine months later, they are in a much better planning data place, but that is nine months later.

 

[McPherson]

Grants in the Desert were able to handle both. Sure the Sherman did it better, but against infantry, Grant is just fine, as it's no more vulnerable to the Panzerfaust than the Shermans ended up being.

I could see Grants attached to infantry, as mobile AT defense.
Much depends if McNair gets his way

The Grant was "the coffin for seven brothers" and a target that even a 37mm AT gun could not miss putting holes into. It also had the rotten ammunition stowage of the early Shermans... "Bonfires R' US".

Red Army soldiers did not harbor much affection for the M3, nicknaming it the “Coffin for Seven Brothers,” particularly as the paint and soft rubber lining inside the tank was known to combust and emit poisonous fumes when struck.

In one infamous incident during the Battle of Stalingrad, all but two of the 51 Lee and Stuart tanks of the 241st brigade were lost after going over a ridge on September 26—victims of mines and anti-tank guns of the German 3rd Motorized Division. The Lee-equipped 167th Brigade was sent to find them and too fell victim—with only four vehicles escaping. The 192nd brigade were less fortunate, suffering heavy losses after being mistaken for enemy tanks

However, the Lee’s performance in combat exceeded its reputation according to a detailed article by Yuri Pasholok. For example, the Lee-equipped 230th regiment claimed to destroy 17 German tanks in battle at Chepel.

Several M3 units participated in the titanic tank battle at Kursk in 1943. The 245th Tank Regiment covering the 67th Infantry Division was attacked by 200 German Panther tanks on July 5, but claimed knocking out a dozen despite incurring heavy losses.

 

[Aber]

The Grant was "the coffin for seven brothers" and a target that even a 37mm AT gun could not miss putting holes into. It also had the rotten ammunition stowage of the early Shermans... "Bonfires R' US".

On the other hand Von Luck calls them superior to Panzer IVs (presumably the short 75mm version).

 

[Garrison]

On the other hand Von Luck calls them superior to Panzer IVs (presumably the short 75mm version).

Most of the Panzer III's in North Africa were H and J models with the KwK 38 L/42 50mm(short barrel), which the Grant could bounce. The PzIII's in Russia were primarily the L model with the KwK 39 L60 50mm(long barrel), which could penetrate the Lee/Grant.

 

[marathag]

The Grant was "the coffin for seven brothers" and a target that even a 37mm AT gun could not miss putting holes into. It also had the rotten ammunition stowage of the early Shermans... "Bonfires R' US".

Most of the Panzer III's in North Africa were H and J models with the KwK 38 L/42 50mm(short barrel), which the Grant could bounce. The PzIII's in Russia were primarily the L model with the KwK 39 L60 50mm(long barrel), which could penetrate the Lee/Grant.

German KwK 39 50mm L60 with APC ammo vs Grant Hull

Turret vs 50mm APC
Now the 37mm AP vs Grant Hull

Not good for the Pak36 crews, or any AFV armed with it
Now for Grant going the other way, here with the short M2 75mm with APC vs MkIIIM Hull and turret

now with the M6 37mm APC Hull and Turret

So the Grant is still viable in 1943

In 1942, 994 Mk ivs were produced, switching to the 'F2' with long 75mm from March'42 thru July with 175 built and 3822 built in all of 1943, while 2958 Mk III in 1942 and 3379 in all of 1943
Panther production was starting, with 1849 by years end 1943, with an average of 148 a month built in 1943
842 Ausf D were made til September , when going over to the more reliable Ausf A in August 1943 that reduced the engine fires and blown head gaskets issues, in part by governing the engine down to 2500rpm from 3000

 

[McPherson]

I know this is obvious, but the charts supplied above clearly indicate the 37 mm gun was effective at 500 meters range against a Grant's flank and rear. Guess at where most WWII tank engagement ranges occurred and where the AT gunners were trained to shoot?

 

[Garrison]

I know this is obvious, but the charts supplied above clearly indicate the 37 mm gun was effective at 500 meters range against a Grant's flank and rear. Guess at where most WWII tank engagement ranges occurred and where the AT gunners were trained to shoot?

And by 43 there are an awful lot of StuG's lurking around...

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Strategically, the only effect of Kursk is to plant additional seeds of doubt in Stalin’s mind concerning the possibility of collusion between the Western Allies and Nazi Germany to ensure that Soviet losses were maximized.

IMO this is too clever by half. Stalin vociferously demanded a western front from early 1942 on. He regarded US/UK moves into Africa and Italy as deliberate evasions, and the delay of OVERLORD to 1944 as highly suspicious.

ITTL he gets what he asked for. Lots of German elite forces go west instead of east (all those Panthers, Tigers, and Elefants). In an odd pinball effect, this results in a limited German victory at Kursk. And that leads Stalin to suspect US/UK-German collusion? He's paranoid, but this is beyond paranoia.

Imagine what he'd say if the US/UK had said: "We're not going to invade France now, because then Hitler would send all the new German tanks there instead of the east. Instead of waiting for those tanks, he'd launch his summer offensive sooner when Soviet forces aren't yet prepared." Somehow, I don't think he'd buy it.