Uh… could we keep the debate of current politics and events in the Political Chat forum, maybe, to save CalBear time?
D-Day in 1943: Plausibility and operations in France
- Thread starter Bougnas
- Start date
The point that Aber invites discussion of is how many AUS divisions does my Round-up scenario employ, how long after activation, and by what rationale. If you look at post #46, only the following divisions were activated after Pearl Harbor:
6th US AD – Although activated 15 February 1942, the 6th US AD had a strong RA core in the 68th and 69th US Armored Regiments, activated in July 1940 and assigned to 2nd and 1st US AD respectively. When the number of armored regiments in an armored division was trimmed from three to two in January 1942, these two regiments were inactivated. Their personnel were reshuffled, some officers and NCOs exchanged with others in the Armored Center training establishment. The two armored regiments were reactivated with the division about 35 days later. This was designed for the “new unit” to have better cohesion than two orphan regiments divided into “old dogs and “newbies”. The infantry and artillery branches were much larger than the Armored Force (technically still a part of the Cavalry Branch) and were much better able to provide strong cadre for 50th US Armored Infantry Regiment and the three artillery battalions. 6th US AD will arrive in France in my scenario in the last half of July 1943 – 17 months after activation.
7th US AD – Activated 1 March 1942 from 40th and 81st US Armored Regiments shed from 3rd and 5th US AD respectively. It arrives in France in November 1943 – 19 months after activation.
9th US AD – Activated from conversion of 2nd and 14th Mechanized Cavalry Regiments 15 July 1942 – again a very strong pre-war RA cadre. Its divisional HQ personnel were also much more experienced than 6th or 7th US AD because the most of 2nd US Cavalry Division HQ and HQ of 3rd Cavalry Brigade were redesignated en-masse on activation day. It arrives in France in late September 1943, 14 months after its conversion to armor.
10th US AD – Also activated 15 July 1942, from conversion of 3rd and 11th Mechanized Cavalry Regiments, its divisional cadre was not as strong as the 9th US AD. It arrives in France in November 1943 – 16 months after activation.
11th US AD – Activated 15 August 1942 from cadre provided by 8th US AD. A new formation, in early December 1943, 16 months after activation.
12th US AD – Activated 15 September 1942, also from cadre poached from 8th US AD. Arrives in France in February 1944, 17 months after activation.
Armored divisions not sent: 8th US AD, as noted not only providing cadre for five other AD but also hit for combat replacements for 1st US AD in North Africa. It will not be ready for overseas movement before the end of the war. 13th US AD – Activated 15 October 1942, 14th US AD – Activated 15 November 1942, and 20th US AD activated 15 March 1943 were all cadred from the hapless 8th US AD, and will surely end up being stripped for replacements for combat losses in France. 16th US AD was cadred from the Armor Center on 15 July 1943, and I have my doubts that would happen, the Armor Center sending 16th AD troops to France as straight replacements.
OTL – the 8th US AD arrived in France in January 1945, third from last, only a month before 16th and 20th US AD.
Of US ID, only 88th, 90th, 92nd and 104th US ID were not active when the United States entered the war. In the OTL, 88th US ID arrived in North Africa in December 1943, the same month in my scenario that it arrives in France. This is 17 months after its activation. The 90th US ID was activated 25 March 1942 and certified for overseas movement in September 1943. I have it arrive in France in February 1944, one month before it arrived in the UK for Overlord in OTL. The 93rd US ID (Correction to text in Post #46) activated 15 May 1942, but one of its regiments, the 25th US Infantry was an RA unit,, the 368th US Infantry (AUS) activated 1 March 1941, and only the 369th US Infantry activated in May 1942. It left San Francisco for Guadalcanal in January 1944, I have it sent to France in December 1943.
I noted the 104th US ID in Post #270. This requires further explanation. MG Allen commanded the 1st US ID in North Africa, and MG Omar Bradley wanted to fire Allen after the “Second Liberation of Oran”, when 1st US ID troops fought MPs over restricted access to the city where the division landed in November 1942 OTL. Patton refused to relieve Allen, who continued in command during Operation Husky. At the close of the campaign, Bradley did fire Allen, and Patton and Eisenhower did not intercede. In my scenario, Bradley gets his way in April 1943, and Allen becomes one of only a handful of US Army generals to command two separate divisions in World War II three months earlier. Allen’s training of the 104th US ID included specialized in routine night attacks and in May 1945, Bradley commended Allen for doing so. I am comfortable sending the 104th to France in February 1944.
Please relook Post #46. Only four divisions from North Africa are used in my Round-up Scenario. They are the 2nd US AD, 3rd and 9th US ID and 1 British Airborne Division, none of which saw combat in Tunisia. There is no other connection to any other ground troops used in the Mediterranean. 7th and 43rd US ID are not diverted to the Pacific, and 5 Division and 45th US ID not used in Sicily and 36th US ID is not used at Salerno. All other divisions I cited were idle - completely unempolyed during all of 1943. It is my thesis that Great Britain would have been better served if these units were used in combat in 1943.
In short, the British First, Eighth and Ninth Armies remain available for use in the Mediterranean once the amphibious requirements of Round-up are fully satisfied.
I briefly returned to Zhukov and Shtemenko's memoirs as well as a few Kursk books to reestablish the timeline for Soviet strategy. Sometime in early 1943 Stalin will be informed that a Second Front is a sure thing in Summer 1943, May-June, and it will be requested that the USSR launch an offensive to support the invasion within a month of its start.
IOTL from April 8-12 the Genshtab visited the Voronezh and Central Fronts, established the situation, and formulated recommendations for the Summer campaign. They also solicited recommendations from the Front commanders, Vatutin and Rokossovsky. At the strategy meeting on April 12 it was decided - on the universal recommendations of Zhukov, Antonov, etc. - that the RKKA would stay on the defensive until Germany attacked first.
ITTL this obviously is not possible, because Stalin has already committed to launch a supporting offensive for Roundup. Yet they are also aware that Germany intends to resume the offensive against the Kursk sometime in the next month - defensive preparations are necessary, and a half-cocked attack with no defensive preparations will end the same way as 1942.
For a solution, we can return to the recommendations of Vatutin and Rokossovsky for their respective Fronts. Vatutin only described the strong enemy forces in front of him and recommended a strategic defense - only in late May did he begin suggesting a preemptive offensive. Rokossovsky, however, clearly recommended a preemptive offensive against the Orel salient by the Central, Bryansk, and Western Fronts to destroy the German ability to launch a concentric attack against Kursk and defeat 9th Army before it could be properly reinforced. As I noted above, 9th Army only had some 314 operational AFVs in May, which tripled in strength by June, and had severe ammunition shortages until the end of June. Rokossovsky was aware of this temporary weakness, and wanted to strike first with the 700 AFVs he had ready in early May.
So sometime in early-mid May, the USSR will begin the summer campaign against the Orel salient with a preemptive offensive from all sides. Voronezh Front will remain on the defensive for the moment, with a transition to the offensive in late May if German reserves are attracted. Probably secondary/diversionary offensives against Izium/Mius and Smolensk as well.
So roughly coinciding with the Allied landings, you would have an escalating series of Soviet offensives against still-unprepared German forces.
IOTL from April 8-12 the Genshtab visited the Voronezh and Central Fronts, established the situation, and formulated recommendations for the Summer campaign. They also solicited recommendations from the Front commanders, Vatutin and Rokossovsky. At the strategy meeting on April 12 it was decided - on the universal recommendations of Zhukov, Antonov, etc. - that the RKKA would stay on the defensive until Germany attacked first.
ITTL this obviously is not possible, because Stalin has already committed to launch a supporting offensive for Roundup. Yet they are also aware that Germany intends to resume the offensive against the Kursk sometime in the next month - defensive preparations are necessary, and a half-cocked attack with no defensive preparations will end the same way as 1942.
For a solution, we can return to the recommendations of Vatutin and Rokossovsky for their respective Fronts. Vatutin only described the strong enemy forces in front of him and recommended a strategic defense - only in late May did he begin suggesting a preemptive offensive. Rokossovsky, however, clearly recommended a preemptive offensive against the Orel salient by the Central, Bryansk, and Western Fronts to destroy the German ability to launch a concentric attack against Kursk and defeat 9th Army before it could be properly reinforced. As I noted above, 9th Army only had some 314 operational AFVs in May, which tripled in strength by June, and had severe ammunition shortages until the end of June. Rokossovsky was aware of this temporary weakness, and wanted to strike first with the 700 AFVs he had ready in early May.
So sometime in early-mid May, the USSR will begin the summer campaign against the Orel salient with a preemptive offensive from all sides. Voronezh Front will remain on the defensive for the moment, with a transition to the offensive in late May if German reserves are attracted. Probably secondary/diversionary offensives against Izium/Mius and Smolensk as well.
So roughly coinciding with the Allied landings, you would have an escalating series of Soviet offensives against still-unprepared German forces.
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Once Roosevelt and Churchill decide to follow Marshall's recommendation for Round-up in 1943, Stalin will be informed of that strategic decision immediately. This gives Stalin much more advanced notice, but that is not as helpful as it may seem. The landings in Normandy were weather and tidal dependent, While Stalin will know the tidal dates, weather was a last minute decision. Marshall will give the final go-ahead perhaps as late as 10 May 1943. This makes coordination of a simultaneous Russian offensive much more difficult.
Other factors make a chance simultaneous Russian offensive as opposed to a deliberate one possible. Thanks to the Red Orchestra, Stalin had Operation Order 6 dated 15 April 1943 ordering execution of Citadel about 24 hours before Army Group South did. Stalin also had Hitler's order on 4 May 1943 delaying Citadel until heavy tank reinforcements arrived before Von Manstein did. In the OTL, Stalin chose the heavy build-up of defensive minefields and anti-tank positions with concentrations of air support and armour for a counteroffensive.
If STAVKA knows for certain Allied landings will take place in 1943 - if not May then June, etc; Stalin may order a spoiling attack on the Germans, with head-on meeting engagements. That outcome is very difficult for me to predict. Julian had introduced a wild card here.
Other factors make a chance simultaneous Russian offensive as opposed to a deliberate one possible. Thanks to the Red Orchestra, Stalin had Operation Order 6 dated 15 April 1943 ordering execution of Citadel about 24 hours before Army Group South did. Stalin also had Hitler's order on 4 May 1943 delaying Citadel until heavy tank reinforcements arrived before Von Manstein did. In the OTL, Stalin chose the heavy build-up of defensive minefields and anti-tank positions with concentrations of air support and armour for a counteroffensive.
If STAVKA knows for certain Allied landings will take place in 1943 - if not May then June, etc; Stalin may order a spoiling attack on the Germans, with head-on meeting engagements. That outcome is very difficult for me to predict. Julian had introduced a wild card here.
The correlation of forces strongly favors the Red Army for a preemptive attack at Orel in early May, perhaps even more so than OTL. Infantry/artillery strength is 80% of July 1943, while Model's forces are much weaker in tanks (The equivalent of 2 full strength panzer divisions), replacements, and ammunition - they haven't even begun constructing rearward fortifications that he had them dig IOTL. Central Front alone possesses a 2:1 advantage in tanks over Model, not to mention Bryansk/Western Front and any additional reinforcements Rokossovsky receives compared to OTL. You'll probably have an immediate crisis in the Orel salient which leads to the diversion of German divisions from AGS, as happened IOTL. A follow-on offensive by Western/Kalinin Front against the Smolensk region as IOTL would cause additional diversions.
No proposals were made for an offensive by Vatutin's Voronezh Front until late May/early June, as there was good awareness that AGS was the strongest German formation. As it was recognized early on that Kharkov-Poltava was the most important axis of advance, the offensive there will occur last after all of Germany's reserves are diverted. I'd imagine that by July you get a situation similar to September 1943, with the front in freefall and a rushed withdrawal to the Panther Line.
Soviet proposals for a preemptive attack were all grounded in reality (Attack where the Germans were weak, defend where they were strong) and written by qualified commanders, not harebrained Stalinist schemes.
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Indiana Beach Crow
Monthly Donor
It came from him seeing the Marine Corps actions on the Western Front in WWI (Battle of Belleau Wood mostly) as stealing the glory that should have rightfully gone to the US Army, and making sure that wasn't going to happen again.
True, the did not know the location of every company or battalion.
500? The Axis had near 3000 operational aircraft in the Mediterranean theatre when Op TORCH was launched. Better than half that were soon operating over Tunsia, flying from Sicily, S Italy, and Sardinia as well as the airfields around Bizet & Tunis. That was November. At the end of March, four months later they could no longer operate over Tunisia, nor defend the Italian cargo ships trying to supplythe Axis lodgment in Tunisia. The last attempts to fly supplies in were massacred. Unlike the southern UK the Allies had no robust infrastructure or well established system of air bases. Yet they shot the Axis air forces out of the sky over Tunisia.
To use another example the Luftwaffe built up over 1500 operational aircraft in range of the Normandy battle during June-July 1944. At the peak they made 1300+ sorties in a single 24 hours against the Allied 21st Army Group. The results? A lost ground battle & severe unsustainable losses for the Luftwaffe
Hughes & Costellos 'Battle of the Atlantic' has a different set of numbers. Drawing from RN records their summary for the entire German submarine campaign is:
...........................Total Tons Sunk.....Total Ships Sunk......Subs Operational.........Subs Sunk
Jul-Sept 1942.......2,750,000..............290........................................95.............................32
Oct-Dec 1942.......2,000,000..............260.....................................100............................34
Jan-Mar 1943.....1,500,000................200.....................................100............................40
Apr-Jun 1943........900,000................120........................................90.............................73
John Ellis drawing from the same record focuses on the the North Atlantic battle & describes a similar arc in 'Brute Force'. The German effort peaking in 1942 & rapidly fading out from the latter months of 1942. One of the points he examines in the annual gross delivery to the UK. Of the total material embarked for delivery to the UK in 1942 slightly over 10% was lost enroute to submarines. In 1943 the loss to submarines fell to near 4% of the total embarked. Tonnage lost per submarine sortie starts going south earlier in 1942. & the losses of submarines in the latter half of 1942 are unsustainable, exceeding the ability to build replacement boats and properly train crews.
Bottom line is the German effort peaked in 1942 & BoA was headed the Allies way before 1942 expired.
I believe it's more than that. The Allies encountered several fortifications in Dieppe that they were not aware of.
I think you are missing the point. If the Luftwaffe shows up with 500 bombers over the beachheads within the first week of the invasion, it may get ugly for the Allies.
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If the Luftwaffe did show up in force, that is exactly what Marshall would want. Marshall understood fully that Total War was ultimately a war of attrition. Normandy is geographically closer than any other Theater to a concentration of Allied air bases, and those air bases have the highest concentration of fighter aircraft in the entire world in 1943. The numbers ratio will make the difference. Allied losses can be replaced, German losses cannot. The sooner the Luftwaffe is bled out, the better as far as Marshall and his USAAF and RAF subordinates are concerned.
I do not think that is correct. The best bet would be the Luftwaffe to try to attack South England, just as it happened in OTL, with disastrous results.
Saturation of the landing grounds by hundreds of Luftwaffe aircraft will cause losses among Allied shipping. The Luftwaffe is not broken yet. It will suffer losses, catasthrophic ones, but it also stands a good chance to inflict heavy losses among allied shipping.
The Luftwaffe tried to do the same thing at Salerno IOTL. It sank some vessels and struck 85 total. They launched 450 sorties over a period of 36 hours against Hewitt's flagship alone. But its losses were catastrophic and its efforts weren't even close to stopping the invasion. Luftwaffe air offensives got buried under Allied airpower long before they were able to produce substantial results.
This is not about how we view this today, knowing what happened in OTL in other operations. This is about how the Allies viewed it back then. The Luftwaffe still was dangerous in the eyes of the Allies in 1943.
Ans this is precisely one of the reasons why they chose not to go for France in 1943, among others.
MUC has a point in that the Allies decided IOTL in June 1942 against making an unshakable commitment to Roundup, and in January 1943 cancelled it altogether in January 1943 at Casablanca because they took counsel from their fears. This is especially true of the British High Command.
I doubt however, if any fear of the Luftwaffe was factored in. If it had, then the Allies would not have assaulted Sicily or Salerno at all, because in both cases the Allied air power advantage over the Luftwaffe was vastly smaller than with the available combat air power in Great Britain.
Going back to my thesis, regardless of 20-20 hindsight, the known advantages of a 1943 invasion should have been given greater weight than Churchill and company gave it. These include: 1) earlier employment of the massive manpower and industrial resources of the United States against Germany with the potential of an earlier end to the war; 2) the employment of the British Army while it is at peak manpower strength; 3) the potential of returning French resources to the war; 4) elimination of U-Boat bases in France with a corresponding reduction of Allied (especially British) merchant shipping; 5) elimination of Luftwaffe air bases in France, with a corresponding reduction of the threat to British cities and civilian population; 6) with an earlier end of the war in Europe, the potential of strong 1944-45 offensives against Japan in Southeast Asia to restore the prestige of the Empire; and 7) a better postwar position overall for Great Britain.
It remains the great missed opportunity.
I doubt however, if any fear of the Luftwaffe was factored in. If it had, then the Allies would not have assaulted Sicily or Salerno at all, because in both cases the Allied air power advantage over the Luftwaffe was vastly smaller than with the available combat air power in Great Britain.
Going back to my thesis, regardless of 20-20 hindsight, the known advantages of a 1943 invasion should have been given greater weight than Churchill and company gave it. These include: 1) earlier employment of the massive manpower and industrial resources of the United States against Germany with the potential of an earlier end to the war; 2) the employment of the British Army while it is at peak manpower strength; 3) the potential of returning French resources to the war; 4) elimination of U-Boat bases in France with a corresponding reduction of Allied (especially British) merchant shipping; 5) elimination of Luftwaffe air bases in France, with a corresponding reduction of the threat to British cities and civilian population; 6) with an earlier end of the war in Europe, the potential of strong 1944-45 offensives against Japan in Southeast Asia to restore the prestige of the Empire; and 7) a better postwar position overall for Great Britain.
It remains the great missed opportunity.
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The Allied air leaders had some concern, but they went at it full force anyway, and yes the decision to execute Op HUSKY & BRIMSTONE/FIREBRAND were taken anyway. A significant part of of this was the results of the air battle over Tunisia. The Allie air commanders had a fairly accurate understanding of why they won & were confident the same factors and methods would carry them through the next campaign/s. Similary the senior command & staff @ SACMED & the Joint Chiefs saw no reason to hold back on their priority operations in the Mediterranean. Specifically Op HUSKY. That the German air force had withdrawn under pressure from western France in 1942 reinforced the idea the Allies were gaining the upper hand.
In simple terms, wherever the Allies could put up a viable fighter plane force the Axis or Germans had lost the air campaigns. They could hold back and pick favorable circumstances, they won some notable tactical victories, but campaigns & long running operations are not won by a few isolated tactical victories.
Re: German bomber forces vs invasion fleets & bases.
The 'Baby Blitz' was executed with night attacks. The German air leaders understood their bomber would be massacred in daylight attacks. This ran directly against the fact the air crews were badly undertrained in night navigation. The rookie pilots, who were the majority had insufficient training in the schools, and there was too little time or fuel to make up the deficiency. The result was a extremely low number on bombs on target. The probable weight of bombs hitting invasion base targets looks insignificant.
Attacking a invasion fleet proved equally problematic. After TORCH was executed the Axis had the ability to strike the essential sea lane east from Algeria, that supported the advance into Tunisia. Despite a air strength of 2000+ operational aircraft in the Mediterranean a few cargo ships & warships were sunk or damaged in the harbor at Bone. Little else was accomplished beyond harassment. For the invasion of Sicilly the Allied plan allowed for the loss of up to 200 ships out of a invasion fleet of 2500+. The actual loss was 22 ships sunk. That from a remaining Axis air fleet of 1500 operational combat aircraft.
There nothing magical, or any operational factors that make the Luftwaffe any more effective in a 1943 invasion of NW Europe. The Allied invasion of Sicilly was supported by some 3500 operational aircraft. Any 1943 attack into NW Europe would be supported by at least that number or likely more. & they have a better base structure in southern England. Conversely the Germans have the same limits, and would not be able to drawn on significant number of Italian squadrons to assist. The charts displayed here would have different numbers in each theatre, but the overall results would be similar.
Wow. Again Wow! I owe I huge debt to those who added superb detail to aspects I had only general knowlwdge of when I first examined this topic at USA C&GSC and then again a few years later in response to Fenzel's argument. Both a salute and a tip of the cap are well-deserved.
Petains government was not allowed combat aircraft in Metropolitan France. Their overseas air force ceased to exist when Darlan flipped the North African colonies to the Allies in November 1942. So the number of 'Vichy' combat aircraft in 1943 was effectively zero.
May-July. A quick look at my shelves shows Blumenson 'Sicily, Who's Victory' placing the Axis operational air strength at 1,000 on 1st May 1943. WGF Jackson provides a more detailed take on the German aircraft, but nothing for the Italians. The numbers are drawn from the 'Rise and Fall of the German Air Force' A Brit Air Ministry publication of 1948.
On Forward Airfields
.............................................At the Fall of Tunis....................1 July
Sardinia......................................80.............................................175
Sicily...........................................415...........................................290
Greece & Crete....................125............................................305 -Result of Allied deception op aimed at encouraging fear o a Allied invasion there.
Totals........................................620...........................................770
In Central Reserve
S France N Italy.......................0.............................................165
Central & S Italy..................200............................................345
Totals.......................................200...........................................510 Available for X Fligerkorps use
Grand Totals.........................820.........................................1,280
The Italians are slippery & I don't have any definitive sources here. The lower numbers tossed out are in the neighborhood of 200 fighters 1 July, or 200 total depending on the source. The high end is up around 1,000 but those may not be differentiating between squadrons of obsolete aircraft that were not counted as 'operational' by the Italians, which were deadlined to save fuel and pilots for the better equipped air groups. Maybe some useful numbers will turn up from some other participant here.
The difference in numbers 1 May & 1 July reflects first the replacement aircraft/aircrew sent in May & June, & second the continuing attrition from Allied air attacks and operating losses. For both the Allies & Germans non combat losses fluctuated from 30 to 35 % of total losses. The difference being for the Germans the rate was slowly rising and Allied slowly declining. Without the May/June total losses the German total available would have been 50% or more higher. As it was the Italians withdrew their bombers and most fighter groups from Sicilly in late May, & the Germans withdrew the bomber groups from late May to mid June.
More recent sources place fewer aircraft on Sicilly & more in Southern Italy, but I don't have those in reach of my comfy chair.
Initially the anti invasion bomber strikes on the fleet off Sicilly took advantage of the Sicilian mountains to mask their approach from Allied radar. By the time they were detected it was too late to vector a effective fighter strike. This got the Ju88s onto their attack runs with fewer losses & disruption. I don't have data for the sortie vs attack ratio. On 6th June 310 German aircraft took off for the invasion fleet. About 15 were unable to actually take off but I'm not sure if that number is separate or part of the 310. In any case after aborts for mechanical problems, aborts to escape Allied fighters, shootdowns, and navigation errors less than 100 actually attempted attack runs on the beach or ships. Lest this seem like I'm down playing German ability consider the US 5th Air Force in the spring of 1942. Of the 80 to 90 B17s on hand in Australia Generals Brett, Berton, & Kenny were successively hard pressed to get 10% to the bomb release point over Rabaul harbor on any particular day. Worn aircraft, shortages of parts, undertrained crews, and a capable air defense of the enemy anticipated the problems the German bombers were facing in 1943.
I don't have anything comparable for the Salerno or AVALANCHE operation. assorted sources suggest the German air strength had fallen off 30 or 40 % pf the July number. The Germans did have a advantage of operating from the excellent all weather airfields around Foggia & Rome while the Allies were still trying to deal with the dust, bomb craters, and other inconveniences of the Sicilian airfields, or fly from Malta & Tunisian air bases.
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