And they didn't. France ordered mobilization of August 1, the same day Germany declared war on Russia. Frankly I find the idea that France, a country which had war declared on it, and was subsequently invaded by the one who declared war was the aggressor to be completely absurd. The Central Powers started the war, and they did so knowing full well what they were doing.
Could Russia have refused to protect Serbia from a A-H invasion?
- Thread starter Femto
- Start date
marathag
Banned
on August 3, with intentions fully clear that they would support Russia fully.
Plan 17 was not defensive.
July 27 - France tells the Russians the French army would fully stand by Russia militarily.
July 28 - French General Staff informs Russian military attache in Paris that French Army will fully support Russia as an Ally, and French units move towards the Frontier, modified on the 30th, that other units are withdrawn in the North
July 31 - Germans send ultimatum to Paris demanding to know if France will stay neutral and if so, to hand over forts at Toul and Verdun; given 18 hours to reply, French refuse to send reply.
August 1 - on word that the French will begin full Mobilization later in the Afternoon, the German Ambassador prepares to leave Paris. Germans Soldiers fired on by Russians.
French Government declares a state of siege on August 2nd.
marathag
Banned
In response to Full Mobilization by both France and Russia, with both having Offensive plans
On to Berlin!
Russia was worried about losing more influence in the Balkans, especially since the 1909 Bosnian Crisis happened and Russia did nothing. But even if they lose influence... where are the Serbs going to go? The Germans who back Austria? The Brits won't touch them, the Turks are of very limited usefulness, the Italians won't pick a fight with Austria and Germany over Serbia. So a few Russians get mad, but at the end of the day not a whole changes.
Germany was pushing for a localized war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, hoping that Austria would crush the Serbs, causing a diplomatic realignment in the Balkans, reversing the trends of Italy and Romania being wooed into the Entente. Germany did not want a war with Russia.
France mobilized before Germany did. Russia mobilized before Germany did, even after a German ultimatum. Britain did nothing of substance until it was too late. Frankly I find the idea that the Central Powers "started" the war to be completely absurd.
This is correct. According to Sean McMeekin, Prince Alexander told the Czar that he would accept the ultimatum in full if that is what the Czar wished. He didn't.
Right, France mobilizing on the day Germany declared war on Russia, and started the invasion of Luxeburg was the thing that kicked off the war. Sure.
Let's see...Austria declared war on Serbia. Germany informed France that if Russia mobilized then France would be invaded. Germany declared war on Russia. Germany declared war on Belgium. Germany declared war on France. Germany invaded Luxemburg without declaring war. Germany rejected offers of mediation.
The French rejected the military's request to mobilize on July 31. The French got invaded. The French were willing to go along with mediation. But nope, its the French who the aggressors. Right.
Nothing ever quite surprises me as the level of apologism for the Central Powers that comes up in these threads.
Frankly speaking both the french and the german "wanted" war in the sense that if it was to come better now than later. Both sentiments were rooted in the inflated belief of Russian development - which was impressive for sure but the outsiders didnt see that the giant was as of now standing on legs of clay.
1. For the french (or at least Poincaré) the logic was that as the russians are developing so rapidly they will soon be strong enough on their own and wont need France anymore. Thus if there is to be war better now than later and it better starts in the east with Russia as thats the only way to make sure the russians are in. For this reasons France accepted the idea of going to war for Balkan entanglements - something they refused to do earlier -and even during the balkan wars at times it activly urged Russia for war - so much so that there was an occassion when the tsar had to calm Poincaré. Not to mention the fluidity of french politics and Poincaré's fear that one of the fast changing cabinets would abolish the 3 years military service.
2. For the germans this was the already mentioned Russia was growing too strong for us. If there is to be war better war now than later.
I would say neither Berlin nor Paris activly wanted a war but both came to the position that if there is to be a war its better if its now than later. This helped immensly in bringing about the war.
As for Russia: I think it could have decided not to back Serbia: playing up the asassination - as the Romanov's have plenty of bad experience with that one - could be an acceptable reason to avoid war. They could have made clear that if Austria tries anything militarily in the case of Serbia accepting the note they wil intervene or that if the Serbians refused the note even knowing Russia wont back them made clear that the war cant result in any annexations. Anything other than basically unconditionally backing a quasy terrorist state could have easily avoided WWI (at least for the moment).
Instead the Russians made it clear even before the austrian ultimatum and the result of autrian police investigations that they wont accept any findings if they point to Serbia - citing a decade old case where Austria tried a serbian nationalist on falsified evidence (which resulted in the austrian court finding the guy not guilty by the way). Both France and Britain knew of and accepted the Russian position that Serbia cant be found guilty of this - which IMO is absurd especially with the hindsight that Serbia was guilty.
1. For the french (or at least Poincaré) the logic was that as the russians are developing so rapidly they will soon be strong enough on their own and wont need France anymore. Thus if there is to be war better now than later and it better starts in the east with Russia as thats the only way to make sure the russians are in. For this reasons France accepted the idea of going to war for Balkan entanglements - something they refused to do earlier -and even during the balkan wars at times it activly urged Russia for war - so much so that there was an occassion when the tsar had to calm Poincaré. Not to mention the fluidity of french politics and Poincaré's fear that one of the fast changing cabinets would abolish the 3 years military service.
2. For the germans this was the already mentioned Russia was growing too strong for us. If there is to be war better war now than later.
I would say neither Berlin nor Paris activly wanted a war but both came to the position that if there is to be a war its better if its now than later. This helped immensly in bringing about the war.
As for Russia: I think it could have decided not to back Serbia: playing up the asassination - as the Romanov's have plenty of bad experience with that one - could be an acceptable reason to avoid war. They could have made clear that if Austria tries anything militarily in the case of Serbia accepting the note they wil intervene or that if the Serbians refused the note even knowing Russia wont back them made clear that the war cant result in any annexations. Anything other than basically unconditionally backing a quasy terrorist state could have easily avoided WWI (at least for the moment).
Instead the Russians made it clear even before the austrian ultimatum and the result of autrian police investigations that they wont accept any findings if they point to Serbia - citing a decade old case where Austria tried a serbian nationalist on falsified evidence (which resulted in the austrian court finding the guy not guilty by the way). Both France and Britain knew of and accepted the Russian position that Serbia cant be found guilty of this - which IMO is absurd especially with the hindsight that Serbia was guilty.
Last edited:
I can recommend 'thirteen days' by Ponting.
It gives a rather great insight into the diplomatic efforts.
AH was the one who felt most threatened by a Russian and Slavic move. Russia was getting into the strides of industrialization and the extensive building of railways did not bode well for AH in a military showdown.
AH could have defused the entire situation by accepting the Serbian stance on the ultimatum. Although none of the ultimatum points were just accepted (all qualified somehow), there was room for diplomatic solutions. The sticky point was the involvement of AH police in Serbia. Even that could have been sent for international arbitration.
The 'blank cheque' was stupid by the Kaizer. There was no need for it and it got interpreted as a real 'blank cheque'.
When Germany finally started to see where that was leading they tried to avoid it all. too late!
What Germany (according to Ponting) really wanted to see was AH within hours declaring war on Serbia, occupy Belgrade and then start arbitration.
Russia would not have any claims if it was done within 2-3 days.
Despite everything Germany and Britain were probably closer than France and Britain.
Did Germany feel threatened by Russia's industrialization? not to the extent of AH. And that is where the wheels came off.
Who to blame: Surely AH for spoiling for a fight with Russia and Russia for starting total mobilization well-knowing it would mean war (and not only with AH).
It gives a rather great insight into the diplomatic efforts.
AH was the one who felt most threatened by a Russian and Slavic move. Russia was getting into the strides of industrialization and the extensive building of railways did not bode well for AH in a military showdown.
AH could have defused the entire situation by accepting the Serbian stance on the ultimatum. Although none of the ultimatum points were just accepted (all qualified somehow), there was room for diplomatic solutions. The sticky point was the involvement of AH police in Serbia. Even that could have been sent for international arbitration.
The 'blank cheque' was stupid by the Kaizer. There was no need for it and it got interpreted as a real 'blank cheque'.
When Germany finally started to see where that was leading they tried to avoid it all. too late!
What Germany (according to Ponting) really wanted to see was AH within hours declaring war on Serbia, occupy Belgrade and then start arbitration.
Russia would not have any claims if it was done within 2-3 days.
Despite everything Germany and Britain were probably closer than France and Britain.
Did Germany feel threatened by Russia's industrialization? not to the extent of AH. And that is where the wheels came off.
Who to blame: Surely AH for spoiling for a fight with Russia and Russia for starting total mobilization well-knowing it would mean war (and not only with AH).
The entire catalyst to the german DoW was the russian the mobilization, which provided a conundrum to the germans: do nothing and be crushed by the fully mobilized franco-russian armies, or fight now using the little advantage you still have (faster mobilization), after the russians refused to cancel their mobilization and the french refused to commit to neutrality.
The most interesting thing is that the Schlieffen Plan is a strategically defensive plan while the french and russian plans were all strategically offensive ones. From a purely military standpoint, any delay on the german DoW would be extremely detrimental to their ability to even fight the war.
The most interesting thing is that the Schlieffen Plan is a strategically defensive plan while the french and russian plans were all strategically offensive ones. From a purely military standpoint, any delay on the german DoW would be extremely detrimental to their ability to even fight the war.
... which involves invading a neutral country.
... on someone else's territory.
German strategy was based on fast mobilisation and rapid seizure of strategic enemy territory to allow them to fight on the tactical defensive. You cannot separate military strategy and political arguments.
Russia arranged the whole thing, in turn Austria was to support Russian demands for the Turkish straits, which they did, until Russia realized that Austrias input on that question is meaningless. Then they threw a fit until Austria released the documents humiliating them even further. This whole exercise just torpedoed relations with a country you share common goals with - staying a monarchy and keeping down the Poles, in exchange for nothing.
Russias worst enemy is traditionally Russia itself.
Deleted member 94680
Come again? How does Conrad's Plan S - which devotes two of his three Army Groups (Minimalgruppe Balkan and B-Staffel) to attack Serbia, at the expense of leaving one group (A-Staffel) to defend against Russia, mean there will be no attack against Serbia if Russia doesn't mobilise?
I genuinely very much want to see the info, not too long ago on a discord server there was a large argument on whether Germany deserved what it got and as a result the causes of war were looked it.
I'd be very interested to see the points for your argument of France being at fault.
Alcsentre Calanice
Gone Fishin'
Well, there seems to be a certain consensus in historical studies that the German (military) leadership was looking for a conflict with the other Great Powers to assert Germany's position as the leading European power military (Germany at that point was already the top European economy). However, it's debatable how important the German responsibility for WWI really was.
Fritz Fischer - Wikipedia
Germany's Aims in the First World War - Wikipedia
SsgtC
Banned
The best defense is a good offense. As true in war as it is in sports... which involves invading a neutral country.
... on someone else's territory.
German strategy was based on fast mobilisation and rapid seizure of strategic enemy territory to allow them to fight on the tactical defensive. You cannot separate military strategy and political arguments.
I'm very much not an expert, I just happened to have finished a really great book on the subject. I recommend you all read it.
Anyway, here are a few of the big trends that, imo, helped cause the war, that are not being mentioned (and relate directly to the OP).
1. The fact the war broke out over Serbia was not a random chance, or bad luck. France had deliberately and knowingly included a 'Balkan Inception Plan' into it's war plans with Russia. Indeed, to Paris, a Blakan based war was the best outcome since it was assumed Austria-Hungary would have to divide its forces in such a conflict, between Serbia and Russia (which it indeed did). This led to France being very aggressive about Russia's Balkan policy despite having zero stakes there. Indeed, during Balkan warscares in 1912 and 1912 Russia actually was so alarmed at French' ambassador's belligerence, they had to be told to calm down.
2. France had poured millions of francs into Russia for years, with one purpose. To give Russia the most aggressive and fastest offensive war plans in Europe. To influence Russia to arm and mobilize fast and hard, and most importantly to view Germany as the main threat even in a conflict that started over the Balkans, where A-H would be more natural. Paris (and later St. Petersburg) was so sure Vienna was just a cog in Berlin's wheel, it was viewed that any coming war would auto include Germany so France pushed hard for any Russia war plan with A-H to consist mostly of a massive armed push into East Prussia.
When I said I blame France for the war, I was being unclear. I do not mean to lie moral culpability for the war at France's feet. I think trying to find moral fault at the national level for the start of WW1 to be folly. All the states are guilty or not guilty in various ways (I much prefer to find moral fault at the individual, human level). What I meant to say was France did the most to change Europe from a multi-polar 'Concert' of powers into a set of two gigantic blocs, one anti-German and one Pro-German. Without those blocs, you don't get a war like WW1.
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
I have no horse in this race. However would point out that the first of the giant blocs, the Triple Alliance, was formed a decade before the Franco-Russian Alliance, and it's aim was to isolate both France & Russia, who were seen as very unlikely bedfellows (the autocratic Alexander III hated republics!)
I firmly believe that Bismarck set up his system of alliances with a view to maintaining peace in Europe. It was his successors & Wilhelm II who failed to maintain it.
My own thought on the idea concurs with Captain E Blackadder. "It was bollox!"
Edit - reference to the Kaiser & Bismarck's successors is not meant to lay blame for the war. They viewed the alliance system in a different way. There are others - Serb, Russian, French & British who also carry their responsibility for failing to maintain peace rather than deliberately starting the Great War.
Last edited: