Serbia was a slippery operator with a history of making excuses for delaying agreed upon actions.
What does that have to do with what I said about Clark's observation?
Your response utilized Clark's book which framed the Serbian response as something bad when in fact it's merely a statement of fact. In essence Clark (and a number of persons quoting his book) pre-judge the outcome of the statement of fact without actually
knowing that the Serbian government was not going to fulfil the actions demanded in point 1. Maybe Clark was privy to the minds of every Serb politician in the National Assembly at the time to tell that they would vote against the constitutional amendment. Or maybe he had access to a conversation that Pasic had suggesting that he was never intending to introduce such an amendment. Would sure be nice if that could be quoted instead what he wrote about point 1 being conditionally accepted (which a detailed reading of the response shows is only true for
part of point 1, not all of it).
Had Serbia also agreed to the Habsburg investigative presence this may have been over looked, but the response to points 5 and 6 colour the rest of the Serbian response and make it clear that the goal of the reply is to test for wiggle room. Every condition and every request for clarification therefore are also more attempts to secure wiggle room.
Again this is presenting standard diplomatic behaviour at the time and even now as if it were something
inherently bad and proof that Serbia was simply never going to comply with at least some of the demands.
Just so everyone else reading can be clear here are the English translations of demands referred to in the
Austrian ultimatum and the
Serbian reply
Austria-Hungary said:
"......................The Royal Serbian Government will furthermore pledge itself:
1. to suppress every publication which shall incite to hatred and contempt of the Monarchy, and the general tendency of which shall be directed against the territorial integrity of the latter;
2. to proceed at once to the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana to confiscate all of its means of propaganda, and in the same manner to proceed against the other unions and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal Government will take such measures as are necessary to make sure that the dissolved associations may not continue their activities under other names or in other forms;
3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, everything, whether connected with the teaching corps or with the methods of teaching, that serves or may serve to nourish the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
4. to remove from the military and administrative service in general all officers and officials who have been guilty of carrying on the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to make known to the Royal Government when communicating the material evidence now in its possession;
5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;
6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take part in the proceedings held for this purpose;
7. to undertake with all haste the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic and of one Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian official, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry;
8. by efficient measures to prevent the participation of Serbian authorities in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss from the service and to punish severely those members of the Frontier Service at Schabats and Losnitza who assisted the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to cross the frontier;
9. to make explanations to the Imperial and Royal Government concerning the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad, who, without regard for their official position, have not hesitated to express themselves in a manner hostile toward Austria-Hungary since the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June;
10. to inform the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised in the foregoing points."
Serbia said:
.....................The Royal Government binds itself further:
1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and contempt for, the Monarchy is to be most severely punished, as well as every publication whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.
It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such publications as is at present impossible according to the clear definition of Art. 12 of the constitution.
2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the society _Narodna_ _Odbrana_ and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this manner through any one of their members. Notwithstanding this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society _Narodna_ _Odbrana_, as well as every society which should set against Austria-Hungary.
3. The Royal Serbian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia anything which might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs of this propaganda.
4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy; it expects that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged.
5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Serbian Government to permit the cooperation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Serbian territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every cooperation which does not run counter to international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and neighbourly relations.
6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the cooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.
7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which the note was received the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciganovitch is concerned, who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, wherefore a warrant has been issued against him.
The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation at Sarajevo.
8. The Serbian Government will amplify and render more severe the existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms and explosives.
It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.
9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the expressions which its officials in Serbia and abroad have made in interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were made and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected.
10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put into execution.
So A-H demanded that Serbia:
"5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;
6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take part in the proceedings held for this purpose;"
Serbia responded:
"5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Serbian Government to permit the cooperation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Serbian territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every cooperation which does not run counter to international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and neighbourly relations.
6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the cooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials."
So Serbia agrees to cooperation which "doesn't run counter to international law and criminal law". So what exactly is wrong with that? Is Clark suggesting that Serbia should accept cooperation
within Serbia by A-H officials according to Austro-Hungarian law? On what basis (if A-H was actually serious about the ultimatum being accepted, which as direct quotes by officials involved in drafting it showed they had no intention of doing) was A-H expecting A-H officials to actually operate in Serbia?
With regards to point 6 as you had rightly said before this was clearly intended to infringe on Serbian sovereignty. So Serbia rejects this but does offer something else (instead of just being silent on the matter of point 6 after rejecting it). Of course its testing for wiggle room - that's called
diplomacy. Diplomacy is what you do to
avoid a war and to avoid (as best as possible) other states limiting your sovereignty or infringing on your interests (which generally includes maintaining one's sovereignty).
I'm aware of the quote from the Austrian diplomat. That said I'm quite dubious that they'd be able to come up with an acceptable reason to go to war if Serbia gives them everything they want.
No need to be uncertain at all. We have sources in which Franz Conrad (Chief of the General Staff), Leopold Berchtold (the common Foreign Minister of Austria & Hungary) are directly quoted as saying firstly that the intention was to draw up a set of demands that Serbia couldn't accept and that if Serbia actually accepted it, then the intention was to invade anyway.
There is of course the more usual names that might be thrown about on AH.com - Fritz Fischer (
Germany's Aims in the First World War. (1967)) and David Fromkin (
Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914. (2004)) who both detailed that only Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza on the Crown Council/Council of Ministers (which was basically the Common Ministerial Council or Council of Ministers for Austria-Hungary and officially called the Crown Council when the monarch was present) opposed war and who both also detailed that everyone on the Council save for Tisza debated between just launching a direct attack or drafting an ultimatum that was designed to be rejected and lead to an attack.
We also have
Luigi Albertini and his monumental 3 volume work,
The Origins of the War of 1914 which was originally published in Italian in 1942-1943 (shortly after he died in 1941) and then translated to English and published by the Oxford University Press in the 1950s.
In Volume 3, on pages 170-175 Albertini notes that Foreign Minister Berchtold told Heinrich von Tschirschky (Germany's ambassador to Vienna) that even if Emperor Franz Josef were to eventually favour Tisza's stance for definite demands to be made on Serbia, he "would advise his Sovereign so to formulate these demands that their acceptance appears impossible". This quote by the way Albertini sources from "
Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, Volume 1, Number 19" which also happens to be
online (the link should show the exact page with the telegram in question which Albertini used as a reference).
A little further on (on page 171), Albertini goes on to note a conversation that was had between Foreign Minister Berchtold and Chief of the General Staff Conrad discussing the demands which were to be set out in the ultimatum and a short time limit of 24-48 hours and the presumption of Serbian rejection followed by Austro-Hungarian mobilization and war (said conversation he referenced from Conrad's own memoirs,
Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906–1918 (5 vols., Vienna: Rikola, 1921-1925)). Professor John H. Maurer in his book,
The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure (1995), also references the conversation (with quotes) from Conrad's memoirs and notes that the meeting was also attended by Baron Stephen Burian (Hungarian minister to Vienna), Baron Karl von Macchio (a foreign ministry official), Count Forgach, and Count Hoyos (who were both section chiefs in the foreign ministry). It goes on to say (on
page 63 if the preview is still available on google books) that Conrad's determination to crush Serbia came across most clearly when Berchtold asked him what should Austria-Hungary do if Serbia capitulated to the demands of the ultimatum and offered no resistance. Conrad responded "Then we invade. Then Serbia remains occupied until the cost of the war is paid."
EDIT: Now if we want to give the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers the benefit of the doubt and suppose that the various ministers changed their stance between early July and late July about (i) wanting to draw up a set of demands that they figured it would be impossible for Serbia to accept, (ii) invading the country anyway if Serbia did accept the ultimatum (and lest it be forgotten here, invading the country is going to result in hundreds, if not thousands of Serbian civilians who had nothing to do with any crime committed against Austria-Hungary's monarchy being killed
even if Serbia's government totally accepted the ultimatum*) then that's an argument that could be made. However I have never seen that argument ever presented in any discussion about the beginning of the war (not even in any of the often mentions of Clark's book) on this forum or elsewhere. Perhaps you can find evidence of this in Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch which is freely available as mentioned above. It certainly doesn't seem like any historian from Albertini, Fischer, Maurer, Fromke or Clark ever came across any original document that even faintly hinted as such. Indeed, the fact Austria-Hungary refused to consider even any extensions to the deadline (requested by Grey and Sazanov) is a very strong indication that they didn't change their minds at all (and rather oddly, just a day before the ultimatum was delivered they supposedly requested that Germany's government deliver
Austria-Hungary's declaration of war upon the expiry of the deadline (Germany declined that of course) - really charming set of actions they did wasn't it?). They also stood resolutely on that path even when their own investigators into the killing suggested 10 days before they issued the ultimatum that the Serbian government was unlikely to have actively aided in the Archduke's murder.
* and that's the troubling thing about many of the arguments in this thread (not yours though) that Austria was somehow "right" in principle to invade that "haven of terrorists" called Serbia because in essence it boils down to folks in freaking
2020 thinking that one state blasting hundreds of non-involved civilians of another state to death is okay once the first state is characterized as the epitome of civilization and the other state can be referred to as a den of terrorists, brigands and liars. It strongly suggests a lack of any kind of critical thinking as to options other than carrying out a collective punishment that includes killing large numbers of people. The use of deadly force by any government that wants to characterize itself as halfway civilized should always be the last resort. For Austria-Hungary in 1914 it was the
only resort and any other options were ignored. What differentiates Austria-Hungary from Serbia at that point in July 1914 wasn't that A-H was somehow a decent civilized state and Serbia a terrorist-run one. It was that A-H's key government and military officials were quite willing to kill innocent people on a much larger scale than Serbia's government and military officials had by that point (and that's generously assuming that the plot to kill the Archduke originated and was directed by Serbia's government, which even Austria-Hungary's
own investigators lead by Friedrich von Wiesner told Berchtold on
July 13 was unlikely to be the case,
leaving Berchtold depressed about the prospects of using the Archduke's murder as a pretext for military action) . /EDIT
All that aside, what does this have to do with my response to the specific claim that Serbia accepted all but one point and that one point requiring Serbia to sign away its sovereignty? After all, that's what I was replying to. In the thread where I pulled that quote of me from we had much the same debate and it seems that you still assume that my understanding of the Austrian ultimatum and the Serbian reply is some sort of moral endorsement of WWI.
Your response to the specific claim is based on the need (including by Clark) to read a lot of intent (and require extremely odd and unrealistic expectations) into the Serbian reply to characterize it is being mainly deferrals, partial compliance and conditional commitments with the intention to wriggle out later. For instance, maybe Clark thinks that it was going to be super easy for Serbia's government to simply do things like fire military officers and civil servants who Austria simply names and declares as being guilty, but I'm not sure why anyone else (including yourself) would follow this line of reasoning since its pretty hard to fathom a scenario where at least a few of those officials don't take their dismissal to court
and win. After all we only have something like hundreds of years of the development of court systems (up to 1914) around the world to hint that this would be a possibility. So Serbia's response (willing to dismiss those whom A-H accuses after A-H provides their names and what they should be charged with and doing so after....you know...an actual trial or investigation) far from being (as you characterized it) a "point 4: partial commitment, and an entirely toothless commitment so long as Serbia alone is enforcing it. " is just Serbia reminding the Austro-Hungarians of the cold, hard reality of things like law and the fact that aggrieved civil servants can use it to full effect if the government didn't go about it the right way (now if A-H was sincere in wanting to realize the outcomes of the demands, what is the better result....(1) the officials get fired after A-H presents evidence and they are found guilty upon judicial investigation (and have no recourse) or (2) the officials get fired after A-H just presents the names and charges and then the courts remind Serbia's government that legally they can't do that and need to stop?). Also unsaid is the fact that dismissing at least certain wildcard military officers (for example Dragutin Dimitrijević) might well result not in a court case but an assassin's bullet for persons in the Serbian government.
Actually no, the ultimatum would have been insincere if the threat of action was insincere. Failing to follow through on its own word would have immensely weakened its negotiating position, and not just with Serbia.
Umm.... no. The Austrians wanted war. They drafted an ultimatum that was never intended to be accepted (unless you are trying to argue that they did intend for the ultimatum to have been accepted, if so it would be nice to see which author ever claimed that and what on Earth they were basing it on). Unlike say.... threats of force during the Fashoda or Morocco crises, the Austrians didn't intend to step back from war if certain conditions were met providing a basis for them to work with (that's the essence of diplomacy). As noted above it was insincere because they intended to start war against Serbia no matter what Serbia's response was.
