Can it Carry Bombs?

http://uboat.net/types/xxiii.htm

hummm according to this site


the XXIII sank 4 merchant ships in 210 days of patroling , which is about 7 Uboat months. That averages out to 0.57 ships sunk per Uboat per month. With 4 : 0 kill ratio for the Type XXIII Uboats

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsMineWarfare2.htm

At that time the average 62 Uboats were lost around UK waters, while sinking about 32 merchants . The kill ratio was 0.5:1 against these Uboats. The number of boat months deployed during this period was ~130-140, for a rate of about 0.23-0.24 merchant sunk per Uboat , per month.

That means these measely 234 ton Type XXIII [each with only 2 torpedos] were more than 8 times as effective as the much larger 700-1100 ton VII & IX uboats [with 14-22 torpedoes each] .

Historically it took the allies about 6 months to develope a counter to a German technology and another year to learn how to use it to full effectiveness.

BTW at this point in the war the allies were leaning on about 50 million tons of shipping to achieve their war aims. Assuming Zero losses, at best 20-25 million tons was new Liberty type boats.

How could the Victory ships be faster since their cruise speed was 11 knots and this would be the speed that the convoy would be doing when attacked. The XXI could cruise at 12 knts and dash at 15-17knts underwater , which is the speed it would be making as the approach the convoy to position itself for an attack.

I don't fully believe some of these 'Criticisms are made in good faith', I fear that WW-II is religion to too many people and not history. But failing that I have come to realise that the more you read and know , the more you really don't know. Put another way & to explain a phrase.... 'the man who has one watch can always be secure in knowing the time, but a man who has two watches can never be completely sure of the time'. So the History people accept becomes the History we believe in. When confronting WI most people are out of their depth since they can't stray too much away from what actually did happen...thus when in doubt, the ASB routine surfaces. All they are really admitting is they can't handle it.

You're making a classic mistake whic is to extrapolate the results of one U-boat to a fleet of U-boats.
A small number of u-boats were responsible for the majority of U-bot sinking.s In fact, IIRC, around 70% of U-boats sank nothing!
Now if you are sending out a new boat for a trial, you arent going to choose a brand new captain, you are going to select an experienced one.
So the figures should assume he's one of the ones who actualy sink ships. The average rate for a fleet of U-boats will be much lower.

BTW, you do realise that these wonderful new U-boats couldnt use their periscope above 12 knots as it tended to vibrate like crazy, dont you..
And as for the allies taking 6-12 months to work out a counter, your assuming a lack of urgency they never showed. |They dont have to build ships, which is the time-consuming thing, just modify some tactics.

One other point. You seem to be completely misunderstanding the reason the RN didnt bother to hurry building a HTP submarine. It wasnt because they didnt know how to. There were a few reasons they dithered. First, they were never convinced the technology was safe and reliable (they were correct!). The designs went through a number if redesigns trying to make it acceptably safe. They finally got one which was considered sorta safe. But even so, there wasnt any great impetus to build some.
The important reason they were build when they were (1956-7) was that the specs for the first generetaion of nuclear boats was then known. And while the Russian sub fleet didnt have any yet, it would. The two E's were built as target subs to mimic the upcoming nuclear boats - when built, they were the fastest submarines in the world. But until that need arose, there wasnt any need to build one, and given that HTP tends to go up if you cough near it, they very probably wouldnt have been built at all.
Nothing to do with the foolish British designers being unable to comprehend the majesty of the German design brillance...
 
How could the Victory ships be faster since their cruise speed was 11 knots and this would be the speed that the convoy would be doing when attacked. The XXI could cruise at 12 knts and dash at 15-17knts underwater , which is the speed it would be making as the approach the convoy to position itself for an attack.

XXI's cruise speed would be around 3-5kts to maximize both detection range (by using silent machinery at slow speeds self-noise is minimized) and underwater endurance. XXI's max snort speed was 10kts and a dash of 15kts would carry it about 30 nautical miles. While using snort it could not use passive sonar at all. I would assume that captain would like to have a significant portion of his battery capacity for escape and evasion.

Don't get me wrong, XXI's would have been great subs after their numerous technical glitches got worked out, but they were not sea sweepers capable of sinking everything that floated by just virtue of being cool. To really effect the mass of ships available for Allies in summer of 1945 there would have to have been a few hundreds of them. Even a few XXI's would have been panacea, true, but not war winners and I seriously doubt that they would even have a serious effect of slowing down the war effort.

Now, Type XXI did not have anything truly revolutionary in itself, so one might well ask that if the Great Donut had not been fixated with medium-sized subs attacking in surface (already in 1938 young officers aboard ships in which radars were tested were asking difficult questions) I think one might have seen Type XXI-like subs already coming out of the shipyards in 1942 and this would change the war completely.
 
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There are lots and lots of numbers being thrown about to explain production figures and operational performance. I keep thinking of the phrase, "there are lies, damn lies and statistics!"
 
There are lots and lots of numbers being thrown about to explain production figures and operational performance. I keep thinking of the phrase, "there are lies, damn lies and statistics!"

That argument only works if you have already decided ahead of time what the conclusion should be ;)

Stats are one of the only ways you can even begin to remove personal bias from your military analysis.

Jukra, The Germans were already training their electric boats in dash and drift tactics that best exploited their ultra long range passive sonar and the new low intercept active sonar. That was in early 1945 and was one of the reasons the training took extremely long time compared to previous boats....that and constant allied bombing of the yards ports etc.

Unfortunately I have to agree about admiral donunts and his fixations. One of these days I will get round to showing how the sudden expansion of the UBoat programme at the beinging of the war robbed Germany of a decent surface fleet and a decent uboat fleet.

Astrodragon , try reading Eberhard Rosslers "The UBoat; The evolution and technical history of German Submarines", most historical sources agree its the bible on German Uboats technology & development. The translated work is not cheap, but well worth the price for the likes of me ....I don't see your sources anywhere???? .

BTW the 6 months + 12 months is from the 1942/43 period ,when the UBoat war was reaching crisis point, so it IS indicative of the problems they would face with a sudden sea change in German Uboat technology. Thinking of the allies as all powerfull able to adjust to anything instantly sounds as much ABS as Germans just instantly changing fortunes in the war without, some major change happening.

Just so we understand , the grand allied plan for the 1944/45 invasion of France/Germany was just the old WW-I 1918 offensive plan dusted off and updated with modern armaments... According to Martin Van Creveld, "Supplying war logistics from Wallenstein to Patton", it was geared to the lowest common performance denomenator and rate of advance....and the allied troops tended to live down to that level of expectation. There was no finess or anything to indicate any kind of operational mauevuer boldness or brilliance as exhibited in early war German operational maneuvers....with the exception of Patton and Wood.
 
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That argument only works if you have already decided ahead of time what the conclusion should be ;)

Stats are one of the only ways you can even begin to remove personal bias from your military analysis.

Jukra, The Germans were already training their electric boats in dash and drift tactics that best exploited their ultra long range passive sonar and the new low intercept active sonar. That was in early 1945 and was one of the reasons the training took extremely long time compared to previous boats....that and constant allied bombing of the yards ports etc.

Unfortunately I have to agree about admiral donunts and his fixations. One of these days I will get round to showing how the sudden expansion of the UBoat programme at the beinging of the war robbed Germany of a decent surface fleet and a decent uboat fleet.

Astrodragon , try reading Bresslors "The UBoat", most historical sources agree its the bible on German Uboats technology & development. The translated work is not cheap, but well worth the price for the likes of me ....I don't see your sources anywhere???? . BTW the 6 months + 12 months is from the 1942/43 period ,when the UBoat war was reaching crisis point, so it is indicative of the problems they would face with a sudden sea change in German Uboat technology.

Hi esl,

I agree with what your saying.
You have some very good sources of information.
 
You're making a classic mistake whic is to extrapolate the results of one U-boat to a fleet of U-boats.
A small number of u-boats were responsible for the majority of U-bot sinking.s In fact, IIRC, around 70% of U-boats sank nothing!
Now if you are sending out a new boat for a trial, you arent going to choose a brand new captain, you are going to select an experienced one.
So the figures should assume he's one of the ones who actualy sink ships. The average rate for a fleet of U-boats will be much lower.
...



http://uboat.net/types/xxiii.htm

If you take the time to examine the source , you will see all 6 operational Type XXIII Uboats listed and along with it the skippers. All were late war Uboat skippers that did pretty much all their war patrols on these 6 Uboats....sorry no experten Uboat skippers here! These were just average rank and file Uboat crew & skippers.
 
Hello whatisinaname,

a few gripes

In late June 1945 French ace, Pierre Clostermann claims the first Allied combat encounter with a Pfeil. Leading a flight of four Hawker Tempests from No. 3 Squadron RAF over northern France, he intercepted by chance a lone Do-335A1 from the JG 26 (probably on a familiarisation flight) flying at maximum speed at treetop level. On detecting the British aircraft, the German pilot reversed course to evade. In spite of the Tempest’s considerable speed advantage and altitude, the allied fighters were not able to catch up or even get into firing position on the Dornier.

Please stop plagiarizing someone elses work in his case from Wikipedia's 'Do-335' page(Colored Red), if you must, include a appendix of sentences, paragraphs, etc were you have copied from and this is the second time I have noticed it also makes me think how much of each update is plagiarized.:)mad:)

UHU is a large 60 cm 6 kW infrared searchlight mounted in a Sd.Kfz. 251 halftrack (conversions are now available from Verlinden and MB Models).

Hmm, sounds like that came from a Model Website? (plagiarism..Again!! :mad:)

See Ya

Mark
 
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Hendryk

Banned
Please stop plagiarizing someone elses work in his case from Wikipedia's 'Do-335' page(Colored Red), if you must, include a appendix of sentences, paragraphs, etc were you have copied from and this is the second time I have noticed it also makes me think how much of each update is plagiarized.:)
A cursory Google search shows that other passages were also copied-and-pasted verbatim from other websites, without proper acknowledgement. For example, several paragraphs of the first chapter come straight out of this page.
 
A normal way to put links and books etc used for a TL is at the end of a TL, not at the beginning?

As this TL is not finish I have not done this yet.

In addition based on other TL on this board I have read it is usual to send a PM, to ask such questions, unless that poster is just being rude, as you are both being.

If you had sent a PM, you would both have found out why I have not posted my sources yet or who I have been quoting.

As this is the case I will not be posting the remaining parts of this TL, as all I keep getting rude and disparaging remarks from certain members of this board.
 

Hendryk

Banned
As this is the case I will not be posting the remaining parts of this TL, as all I keep getting rude and disparaging remarks from certain members of this board.
I note that you waited until you were called out on your plagiarizing at AH.com before belatedly admitting over at CF.net that you copied parts of your TL from unacknowledged sources.
 
I note that you waited until you were called out on your plagiarizing at AH.com before belatedly admitting over at CF.net that you copied parts of your TL from unacknowledged sources.

I would not call it belatedly.

As I said in my previous post if you had read it, I was going to post those comments in this thread as soon as I had finish this TL.

I have done so in CF.net informing them this I will be posting my sources, after I had finished posting the last parts.

If you cannot accept that, then that is your problem.

I do note that you have not answered my question about sending me a PM, asking your question in private, rather than being publicy rude about it.
 
In 1945 Doenitz hoped that his new "electro-U-boats" of Types XXI and XXIII could return to the offensive. One Type XXI reportedly conducted dummy attacks on a British cruiser without being detected. She could probably have survived in the open ocean. However, without effective ocean surveillance, it is not clear how effective small numbers would have been. The Germans still had to signal their defensive forces to help the U-boats get to sea, and decrypts would have cued using long-range aircraft armed with homing torpedoes. Wolf pack tactics, still essential to contact convoys, required more communications which the Allies were well placed to exploit. The new U-boats would probably have been forced into local areas and the approaches to ports. Allied ASW would probably have shifted towards tactics that had been secondary during earlier phases, such as mining and attacks on bases.

Network-Centric Warfare by Norman Friedman, page 37
 
Network-Centric Warfare by Norman Friedman, page 37


Since these Subs spent all their time under water and the long range aircraft could not locate these submerged subs with any degree of accuracy, even via their snorkeling, they could only have had a suppressive effect. So the only real option would have been attacking these fleets in their home ports etc. However that would not have happened in this ATL, since Germans would have controlled their own airspace.
 
Since these Subs spent all their time under water and the long range aircraft could not locate these submerged subs with any degree of accuracy, even via their snorkeling, they could only have had a suppressive effect. So the only real option would have been attacking these fleets in their home ports etc. However that would not have happened in this ATL, since Germans would have controlled their own airspace.

So let me get this straight:
1) Despite major commitments on three different fronts, being outproduced by absurd numbers, and not having the capability to defend in depth, the Luftwaffe is capable of complete air supremacy over even its ports, despite the potential for Allied low level raids or electronic attack preventing the Luftwaffe from even realizing an attack is in progress until it is too late to sortie
2) Despite major Allied success with it up to this time, the Type XXI is completely immune to Allied code breaking and traffic analysis leading to intercepts based on such things as minesweepers being ordered to clear particular lanes at particular times
3) Despite a complete lack of knowledge as to where the Allied convoys are, the Type XXI will be able to find and engage them, causing severe losses
4) Despite the fact that the German U-boat command and control net is laughably open to the Allies, any groups of Type XXIs will be able to form wolfpacks that the Allies cannot conduct evasive routings against nor send in HK teams in the now convoyless ocean.
 
Why in God's name would the US use the A-Bomb on Japan, when they had not yet achieved a breakthrough in Europe?

This is purely madness.

this-is-sparta-7.jpg


Japan did not tie up many resources, the Allies could cease heavy bombing and simply let the Japanese starve to death during the embargo they could impose with their Fleet.
A whole bunch of B29s could be transferred to Germany and make the attack with the A-Bomb feasible.
Perhaps a huge air raid with 1000 bombers of the USAAF and another 500 British bomber with every fighter available and both nuclear bombs flying, one for Berlin the other for Hamburg.


Let me guess what the next twist in this ATL is:
The third A-Bomb is shipped to Britain and the ship carrying it sunk by a German uboat.
 
Since these Subs spent all their time under water and the long range aircraft could not locate these submerged subs with any degree of accuracy, even via their snorkeling, they could only have had a suppressive effect. So the only real option would have been attacking these fleets in their home ports etc. However that would not have happened in this ATL, since Germans would have controlled their own airspace.

No, German Luftwaffe would have to deploy their jets not only to Germany proper but also to Norway. There is also the political option, if the fear of renewed U-boat campaign becomes too significant there's the risk of Allied (and coincidentally Swedish) invasion of Norway to finish the U-boat threat for good. But anyway, the XXI's will be too few to present a true difference to maritime campaign.
 
Since these Subs spent all their time under water and the long range aircraft could not locate these submerged subs with any degree of accuracy, even via their snorkeling, they could only have had a suppressive effect. So the only real option would have been attacking these fleets in their home ports etc. However that would not have happened in this ATL, since Germans would have controlled their own airspace.

Oh dear... a snorkelling sub is quite easy to spot from the air -indeed, at 10-12 knots you can spot them at 5k in good weather. Not as easy in bad weather, of course.
And the 3cm radar the allies had by 1944-5 can spot them at night, too.
The slower you go, the less of a plume, of course. But if the subs are spending so long getting out and back, their time on patrol actually trying to sink ships is reduced proportionally.

Given how far the subs had to go underwater just to get near allied shipping, they are going to lose quite a few.

Assuming the allies stay really stupid and dont put a line of hydrophones in the way - a snorkelling sub on diesels is a very noisy beast underwater...
 
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