Building Jerusalem Mk2.0
- Thread starter V-J
- Start date
Oh, that. You're involved in electoral... things, in some way, aren't you?
Thanks.
I've done a little support work for the Tories, aye. Not much though.
Thanks, hope you keep on reading.
Hopefully another update will arrive by next week. No promises though.
A suitable time, I think, for an update update.
I am still fiddling about with the next update because I am not quite happy with it. It has some 'big' things in it, and I want to get them right before posting. It will also take on more of an international tilt, which will continue as things move towards the millenium.
No promises on an ETA as of yet.
Some of the things the next update will deal with:
I am still fiddling about with the next update because I am not quite happy with it. It has some 'big' things in it, and I want to get them right before posting. It will also take on more of an international tilt, which will continue as things move towards the millenium.
No promises on an ETA as of yet.
Some of the things the next update will deal with:
- the Euro
- Housing + Local Government
- Tory politics (again)
- Devolution (again)
- Labour's economic policy
- the Lib Dems
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1998
Taken from John Smith - A Life by Mark Stuart (Politicos, 2005)
Probably the most debated aspect of Smith’s legacy - although it is a well-contested arena - is his approach to the Euro. His approach - not his attitude. Smith’s attitude to Europe had hardly changed for decades, stretching back to him going through the government lobbies with his fellow Labour pro-Europeans to vote in favour of European entry back in the early seventies. As other politicians bended and stretched their attitude to Europe, Smith was notable for his consistency. The issue is not one of argument about belief but about strategy. And the issue boils down to one question: was Smith right not to press ahead with Euro entry immediately after 1997? Some believe that Smith was overly-cautious, conservative, and missed an historic opportunity; others believe that Smith, in his principled stand on the issue, brought the pro-European position to greater respectability than it had possessed since entry to the Community; that his consistent advocacy laid the ground for Labour’s fulfilment of that advocacy in 2004.
The answer to his decision lies in a range of factors which had sway over Smith’s political thinking and judgement. Smith certainly made his public position abundantly clear, stating in an interview with Jeremy Paxman early in 1998: “I want Britain in the Euro and that is what I shall argue for … I want to see the issue resolved within my political lifetime.” But Smith’s desire to see Britain enter was in competition with other principles which he held equally dear. Principally among these was Smith’s famed consensual attitude in handling Labour and it’s competing elements. Smith, and Labour, had rode to power on a programme of reversing what were perceived to be the under-funding of public services under the Conservatives, and increasing public spending. The tight fiscal criteria involved in EMU membership did not sit easily with such a programme, nor with Labour backbenchers, many of whom already had, as we have seen, a pre-existing level of scepticism about some aspects of integration; Smith would therefore have faced, in the words of Chris Smith, “a very hard sell” on the issue with the party. Labour itself was in many respects as divided on the issue as the public, and pursuing entry would have polarised opinion within Labour, and likely soured Smith’s relations with the left of the party…
… Perhaps Smith could have overcame these factors with a more united Cabinet. But here too, the ground was uneven. Principally, Smith faced a challenge in the face of his Chancellor, who was never more than lukewarm about the prospect of membership. [149] Brown and Smith’s relationship, as we have seen, was already beginning to enter stormy waters and their once close association was growing weaker. Formulation of economic policy had been a give-and-take affair, and both men were beginning to suspect the other was attempting to ‘take’ too much. The situation was not eased by the fact that Brown’s longstanding rival and critic, Robin Cook, was also now the most passionately pro-European member of the Cabinet. Any attempt to press the issue therefore risked exacerbating a strong personal tension between the two men. Siding with Cook over Brown, which is what a forward policy on EMU would have been, would have been a very direct challenge to Brown’s status as Chancellor. One well-placed source believes that any attempt by Smith to overrule Brown on Euro entry, “would have finished off the relationship with Gordon. It would have been the final nail in the coffin. Gordon might even have resigned if John had pushed it. Less than a year into a Labour government, can you imagine the headlines? There would have been a riot.” Some nevertheless have listed this as a failure on Smith’s part, believing that Smith was more interested in keeping his likely successor ‘on side’ than he was in pressing forward with a pitched battle on a contentious issue. Perhaps, ultimately, the damage from the issue rebounded on Brown - he would later be attacked for putting the breaks on one of Smith’s most cherished policies. In the words of one former minister, it “alienated Gordon from John’s legacy”…
… Smith also did not subscribe to the arguments laid down by many of those who argue that an opportunity was missed. The notion of an opportunity being missed rests on the belief that a referendum would have been won in Labour’s honeymoon period on the automatic popularity of the new government. That is a very shaky proposition to say the least. Although Smith had formidable public authority during his premiership, that authority, for any government, is not absolute. Although Smith would have had the public endorsement of the electorate from the election behind him, he would have also had the opposition and the accumulated strength of the Murdoch press set against him, which would have passionately opposed a Labour government which it already distrusted, and would in all likelihood have relished an opportunity to take on Labour on this key issue, in a way which the Tories had proved unable to do at the ballot box - it would have been, in the words of one commentator, “a titanic all or nothing battle”. Nor was Smith a presumptuous man in respect of public opinion. He believed that public respect, particularly on economic issues, was earned rather than bestowed, and he believed that once Labour had built up it’s record for economic competence in government, then it would be in a far stronger position to argue for entry. He believed that a swift entry into a referendum would be seen by the public as opportunistic rather than bold. The ‘lost opportunity’ analysis also fails to take into account the unpredictable nature of democratic choice. If Smith had ran a Euro referendum and lost - it would likely have taken place in the Autumn of 1997 or the Spring of 1998 - the effect could have been disastrous. Not only would it have seriously clipped Labour’s room for manoeuvre in Europe, but it would also have domestically invigorated Labour’s critics only months after Labour had won power. A failed referendum would not have looked bold, but on the contrary, it would have appeared monumentally stupid and foolhardy. Few in Labour or outside would have praised Smith for it.
Smith also feared what he called “overload“; that it was better for Labour to do it‘s core manifesto commitments extremely well, rather than try to do everything possible, but badly. Frank Dobson outlines the case: “Look, you have to bear in mind that in the first term, we had devolution, the New Deal, freedom of information, the minimum wage, reforming the Commons, reforming the Lords, shaking up the tax system, equality laws, and Christ knows what else going through. The legislation was absorbing our time and John wanted to get it through, because a lot of it was very close to the party’s heart and it needed to be done. The idea that you could have done all that and ran a serous campaign for the euro when half the country, half the party, and half the cabinet weren’t convinced of it, it’s just total bananas. People can say that it would have been won but these are the tunnel vision people. John took the common sense road and he laid the ground for it later on, and really that was the best you could ask for.” This well illustrates the occasionally conservative nature of Smith’s approach, at the same time as proceeding with a programme which was sometimes radical…
Some believe that Smith would come very close to pressing for an immediate referendum on the Euro, but that he was beaten, ultimately, by what were limits too great on his freedom of action. Perhaps if Gordon Brown had not been Chancellor, so goes the argument, the referendum would have been brought about. But the avoidance of that referendum would itself have concrete political effects. Smith’s policy on Europe would leave an enduring later sense of unfulfillment within Labour, but it would also shape and sanctify the issue for many within Labour. This would be regarded as Smith’s great ‘unfinished business’, and that feeling would greatly impel policy in the near future….
Taken from the Times, 10th of April 1998, ‘Low Pay Commission recommends £4.22’
The government could be facing confrontation with business after its Low Pay Commission recommended an hourly minimum wage rate of £4.22 an hour. [150] Although that figure is likely to satisfy unions, business and the Conservatives are already warning that a minimum wage could create job loses.
In a move likely to anger unions, however, the commission recommended a lower rate of £3.80 for workers aged between 16 and 18. Rodney Bickerstaff of Unison has described the £4.22 figure as “positive” but has described the lower rate for younger workers as “grossly unfair”.
The CBI has said that it is “deeply concerned” about the £4.22 figure, warning that it could price smaller businesses out of the market and lead to redundancies. Unions say there is evidence a generous minimum wage could create jobs.
Taken from Devolution in Perspective - Regional and National Government in the United Kingdom ed. Paul and Singh, (Oxford University Press, 2007)
… London’s vote in favour of devolution on a low turnout was mostly explicable by the fact that Londoners already believed that devolution was a ‘done deal’ - the proposals had been endorsed by all three main parties, and there was therefore a lack of overall controversy or contention on the issue. Devolution in the North East would not have such an easy birth. Of all the four ‘initial’ areas given the opportunity to vote for devolved government, the North East was easily the one with the weakest inherent pro-devolution sentiment. Unlike Scotland or Wales, the issue did not combine with obvious cultural factors, and unlike London it did not have a history of government as a fixed unit. There were also divisions within the region itself, with Teesside distrustful of what it had occasionally perceived as Tyneside’s cultural dominance; there was widespread concern over the possibility of increased council tax to fund a new Assembly, and whether the Assembly would simply be a ‘talking shop’. Although there was no specific indication of what result the government would consider binding - the government was not going to gamble as it had in Wales - most believed that a majority vote was necessary on a relatively comfortable turnout.
Labour’s handling of the campaign was adept. Although Mo Mowlam was in any case the relevant minister in charge of the issue, she was also extremely well-placed to lead the campaign for the Assembly. Popular with the public at large, Mowlam also had strong roots in the North East, and crucially she represented a Teesside constituency, which she characteristically referred to as “my patch”. Mowlam was therefore ideal to act as the chief persuader for the government’s plans. Labour proposed the abolition of two-tier councils, and the Assembly government itself would be given relatively broad powers over economic development, housing, planning and the environment, cultural promotion and development of the region, and transport and infrastructure. A forty-two member Assembly would be headed by a small executive, headed by a First Minister. In this respect, Labour's proposals were relatively similar to those that had been endorsed in Wales.
The 'yes' campaign conveyed it's message through a much-praised, serious, detailed media campaign, popularised in pamphlet form, addressing voter’s fears regarding council tax and the possibility of financial unaccountability, which was delivered to voters directly by the ‘Yes’ campaign. Mowlam campaigned hard throughout the region for the proposals in what some described as a ‘barnstorming’ campaign, with the personal intervention of the Prime Minister in it’s later stages. Held shortly after the referendum in London in May, the North East would vote in favour of an Assembly by a slim majority. (53.6%, on a 58.9% turnout) [151] The government’s handling of the issue once again seemed vindicated, but there were now serious concerns about how acceptable devolution would be within regions of England which were less predisposed towards Labour.
Taken from The New Encyclopaedia of British Politics, 1945-2006, ed. Jones and Langdon (Longman, 2006)
Arms to Africa - Minor scandal during John Smith’s premiership, touching on the civil service, the British company Sandline International, and Tony Blair’s stewardship of the Foreign Office. The affair raised serious questions about the behaviour of Foreign Office civil servants and confirmed the longstanding caricature of the institution as being a law unto itself. Although no blame was apportioned to Blair directly, the affair damaged him politically by giving the impression he was not in full control of his department’s decision-making or it’s behaviour.
In May 1997 President Kabbah of Sierra Leone had been ousted in a coup which brought in a military junta. The Arms to Africa affair centred on the extent to which Sandline had been given official sanction by the Foreign Office to supply Kabbah’s government-in-exile with logistical support and thirty-five tons of Bulgarian-made AK-47s, in violation of a UN resolution against such action, which ironically had been partially drafted by Britain. Sandline believed it had received tacit Foreign Office endorsement of this and that the understanding given was that the embargo applied only to the junta, not the government-in-exile.
Virtually no-one came from the official Legg Report into the affair untarnished; the report found that the High Commissioner in Freetown, Peter Penfold, had been ‘incautious’ in his dealings with Kabbah and Sandline, that Foreign Office officials had failed in their duty to ministers, and had unintentionally contributed to ministers misleading MPs over the nature of the sanctions regime. The affair also indirectly fed into some already existing questions from political opponents about Blair’s staying-power and attention to detail as a minister, and left him politically wounded and vulnerable. [152]
Taken from Menzies Campbell - My Autobiography, (Hodder and Stoughton, 2004)
… Although there had been whispers over the New Year that Paddy was about to resign, becoming dogged and more pronounced as the year progressed, I was still immensely uncertain politically when the event finally arrived in July. [153] I was stunned by the manner of Paddy’s resignation, and felt that I had been caught off guard. I had conflicting emotions and instincts. Part of me wanted to stand, part of me was concerned about the burdens on family life and emotional wellbeing that I had observed in operation at close quarters in David Steel and Paddy. Paddy had resigned at the height of his success and popularity, and the mood of the party was entirely supportive of Paddy’s positioning of the party in opposition to the Conservatives, but still retaining our distance from Labour. Would my election be seen as a continuation of that success? Many assured me that it would. I was not so sure. One of my other main concerns was more personal. My longstanding friendship with the Prime Minister was well-known around Westminster and I was genuinely concerned that it might bar me from being an effective leader of my party. Would our friendship, indeed, be able to sustain such direct political polarisation? …
… By pure chance I would have a meeting with John three days after Paddy announced his resignation, at a function at the South African High Commission at which I was representing my party. John saw me and came over to speak, and we soon fell into our usual warm conversation, with John asking about my family and prospects. John then coyly told me there was a lot of speculation regarding the possibility of me standing for leader of my party.
“So I hear.” I said. I wanted to try to gauge John’s reaction without having to prompt him.
“Well, what’s the plan?” John enquired. I said that there was no plan as such and I was still undecided whether to put my name forward or not. John seemed surprised by that. He said that I would deeply regret not standing if I didn’t go through with it. [154] John joked that I had excellent qualifications to be leader, being a Scot, an alumnus of Glasgow University and an Advocate!
“I think you’d be a mug if you didn’t stand.” John said. “You’re at the height of your career. You won’t get a second chance. Nobody ever does in politics.”
I asked John directly whether or not my being leader would have an effect on our friendship. John brushed it off and said that it would be no different to debates back at the Glasgow Union. I was not so sure. We parted amicably, and John reiterated that I should put up for the leadership: “Talk it over with Elspeth but don’t leave it too long.” The positive advice of a close friend like John was very encouraging but I was still not entirely convinced on whether I should put my name forward.
As soon as Paddy had announced his resignation, much of the speculation fell immediately on Charles Kennedy. Charles was then the thirty-eight year-old agriculture spokesman and he almost immediately became the bookies’ favourite. Although I was unconvinced as to whether or not I should stand it seemed almost certain that Charles would, as there was a good deal of pressure and expectation on him to do so. As it happened I and Charles had discussed the possibility of Paddy resigning the year before. [155] Charles and I had agreed that if Paddy should stand in the first half of the parliament, he would support me, and if Paddy stood down in the second half, I would support him. As it happened, Paddy had resigned in the first half of the Parliament, but I knew that Charles would still stand, as the pressure on him was huge. The following weekend, I would meet Charles and he would confirm that he was facing immense pressure to stand, and that it would be difficult to keep the speculation in check. I said that I understood, and that Charles should not feel compelled to comply with an informal agreement which had been made many months before under very different circumstances. I found Charles’ reneging on our prior agreement entirely understandable, but it still somewhat irritated me, as it made my choice all the harder. [156]
… I began to take soundings from colleagues and supporters, and they all agreed that I stood a good chance of being competitive with Charles. I was less sure of this, although as speculation mounted, I began to receive favourable notices in the press. The Times described me, somewhat to my surprise, as “serious potential Prime Minister … a leader for a party that has come of age.” People assured me that my chances were excellent, and that I was likely to receive significant support from among parliamentary colleagues. I talked with Elspeth, who said that if I wanted to take it on, then I should not hold back, because I would regret it later.…
… My campaign gathered increasing momentum as it went along. Nick Harvey withdrew from the race and declared that he would be supporting me for leader, and soon after Nick’s withdrawal, Don Foster also withdrew and endorsed me. I began to pick up more and more support and more and endorsements. I began to feel increasingly confident as time went on, although in my mind I never rated my chances higher than fifty-fifty or so…
… The result in the first round shocked me. Not because I had not come first; I was not expecting that. [157] It shocked me because Simon came in first, albeit narrowly. [158] I had expected Charles to come in first, and likely stay there for the duration. Clearly I - and the media as well - had misread the mood of the party. This was going to be a much more competitive contest than we had been lead to believe. The result in the first round was 16,279 votes for me, 17,124 for Simon, and Charles a close third with 15,592. Liz Lynne, [159] Jackie Ballard, Malcolm Bruce and David Rendel were much farther back than the top three candidates and therefore the next four rounds would be a process of the redistribution of their supporter’s choices under the alternative vote. David Rendel was eliminated first, then Jackie Ballard, then Malcolm Bruce in the third round, and then Liz Lynne - nevertheless Liz and Jackie’s bold and serious candidacies were a milestone for women in our party. By the time of the fifth round, Simon had 21,408 votes, I had 19,262 votes, and Charles had 18,919. No candidate yet had over fifty percent of the vote, and Charles was therefore eliminated under the rules in what was by any standard a shocking upset. [160] Even I had always assumed that it would be me who would be eliminated by this stage, and to find myself still in the running caught me off guard.
Although Simon had lead in every round up to this point, many assumed that Charles‘ supporters would swing behind me, or vice-versa had I been eliminated - The policy differences between myself and Charles were minimal compared to those between ourselves and Simon. I was less sure. The media had done much to paint the contest between myself and Charles as a personal one despite it never becoming so and my relations with Charles remaining warm. I worried, however, that some of that negative attitude may have filtered through to the party members. Perhaps, even as the final results were being read, I was trying to ready myself mentally for what I still mostly expected to be a defeat. In the end, I need not have worried or doubted so. The vast majority of Charles’ supporters’ votes were redistributed towards me, and I was elected leader of the party with 31,826 votes to Simon’s 27,623...
Taken from The New Encyclopaedia of British Politics, 1945-2006, ed. Jones and Langdon (Longman, 2006)
‘98 Group - Parliamentary grouping of Conservative MPs founded in 1998 and dedicated to the cause of modernisation of the Conservative Party. The group was founded on the back of Michael Portillo’s leadership changes of that year, and was designed to act as a forum for both leadership-friendly frontbenchers and ‘young turks’ who had been first elected in the 1997 general election. Bypassing traditional groupings such as the Tory Reform Group, Conservative Way Forward and the No Turning Back Group, the ‘98 Group would act as an aid to the organisation of Conservative modernisers within parliament.
Notes and Clarifications
[149] That is rather putting it mildly.
[150] Rather more than OTL - this will cause some problems for the government a little along the line.
[151] Why does the North East devolution referendum of TTL succeed? Well for one, it's much better handled and run by Mowlam and the rest of the government than it was in OTL by John Prescott; the government is also riding on it's honeymoon bounce as well, instead of mired in the midterm unpopularity of 2003 in OTL. There's not much reason for Labour supporters in the North East to be mad at this government, in fact they're pretty pleased at the moment. I suspect there may also be a 'don't miss the bus' factor at work in Labour's favour here with the devolution referendums being quite close together. There's also the fact that the Assembly has more powers than the proposal of OTL - it's about one rung lower down the ladder, although relatively close to the Welsh Assembly in terms of powers.
[152] More or less all of this happened in OTL under Robin Cook - due to the rather ‘autonomous’ behaviour of the Foreign Office in this instance and the relatively recent POD, very much the same thing is likely to happen ITTL.
[153] Labour and the Lib Dems do not have anywhere near as close a relationship as in OTL at this point ITTL - there is certainly no OTL-style Joint Consultative Cabinet Committee here. Smith was a Labour man of the tribal, old mould - his thinking was quite different from Blair’s in OTL, who is/was basically an SDP man at heart, and who thought during this period in terms of a ‘progressive coalition’ and ‘re-making British politics’. (Blair actually said in an interview with Robert Harris in 2000 that not inviting Ashdown into the cabinet had been his biggest regret in office up to that point.) In Smith’s mind, Labour is pretty much all Britain needs in terms of progressive politics. In this sense, he’s more dedicated to the party as an institution and Labour’s spirit than he is to grand, sweeping, Roy Jenkins-style ideas. (Smith, incidentally, had no time for Roy Jenkins at all - he was once mildly horrified at being unknowingly seated next to him at a function.)
There are still the kind of back-scenes manoeuvring as in OTL in terms of how both parties approach the media in order to facilitate tactical voting at the election, soundings-out in the immediate pre-election stage about a coalition should there be a minority Labour government, etc, but that’s strictly ‘it‘.
This isn’t to say that the two parties don’t increasingly agree on many issues as they did historically - they do, just not with anywhere near as much personal and institutional cosiness as in OTL.
So if there is little prospect of Ashdown et al entering the cabinet of a Labour government before the election, then there is absolutely none after it. In OTL, Blair continued to muse on this issue even after the election - even into 1998, apparently - which held Ashdown’s attention for some time. Of course, that doesn’t happen here, hence with little prospect of anything significant changing in the short-term, Ashdown decides to retire just under a year earlier than in OTL, after almost ten years at the top. (This provides plenty of time for his successor to be installed for both the ‘98 conference season and the anticipated elections to the new devolved institutions. Indeed, if the party elects Charles Kennedy or Ming Campbell, that might boost the Lib Dems in any election to the new Scottish Parliament.)
[154] Campbell later said that he regretted not standing in OTL’s 1999 leadership contest “for about ten minutes every day” but concluding the remark with “until common sense kicks in.” A lot of his reticence was to do with the simple fact that Kennedy looked unbeatable. He also had a health scare at the same time which didn't help, and Ashdown strung his resignation out over six months (doubtless hoping something might 'come up' with respect to Blair) which likewise was not helpful in stopping Kennedy's momentum.
Although there is a strong movement for Kennedy here, it is much less than it was in OTL; there is no grassroots anger against Ashdown and the party establishment over Ashdown’s OTL ‘love-in’ with Blair, nor is there such a great desire to put in a young, Blair-style leader, for obvious reasons. The movement for Kennedy here is therefore a mild clamour rather than OTL’s media-backed avalanche.
All combined with the positive advice he receives here it’s just enough to push Campbell in a different direction from OTL.
[155] As they did in OTL.
[156] Campbell is being tactful here - in fact it irritates him a great deal.
[157] Well, this is autobiography of course, so Campbell is rather downplaying his determination and self-confidence.
[158] I’m sure someone will question this aspect at some point, so I may as well state here that Hughes was returned at Bermondsey at the general election with a relatively comfortable majority. Southwark/Bermondsey is a very difficult constituency to analyse, as Hughes’ majority has gone up and down like a yo-yo, often with absolutely no relation to how well the Lib Dems are doing nationally, but I think by 1997 he was comfortably ensconced with a sufficiently large personal vote that the possibility of the voters removing him is extremely unlikely.
Certainly, Hughes’ 1992 majority was near 10,000, compared to about 3,500 in 1997 in OTL, so the idea that a more left-wing Labour would have knocked him off his perch doesn’t really seem to wash. In this sense, Hughes’ result looks a bit more like OTL’s 1992, 2001 and 2005 Bermondsey results than the OTL 1997 result.
[159] Lynne lost her Rochdale seat in OTL; ITTL she has ran as a grassroots outrider candidate. The main effect of this is in damping down Jackie Ballard's candidacy a bit.
[160] At the end of the day, Kennedy is rather caught between two stools in this contest; Ming Campbell offers a highly plausible continuity, establishment candidacy, while Simon Hughes is a more obvious champion of the Social Liberal side of the party here than in OTL, where Kennedy was able to draw off much of Hughes’ appeal with his scepticism over Lib-Lab relations and the direction of the party in that respect under Ashdown.
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Capital work as always V-J, I particularly liked the way in which you dealt with the North East Devolution Referendum, getting it passed in such a way seems very plausible, it almost makes one think why Blair didn't go for it back then in OTL.
It will also be interesting to see how things between Smith and Brown deteriorate over the course of the administration, Blair could have ditched Gordon several times but didn't, somehow, I can see Smith being rather more cut-throat in his dealings with subordinates when pushed enough.
Sir Ming as LibDem leader as well? Excellent, perhaps he'll be able to show himself as the capable and personable figure that he really is, rather than the unfair caricature of him that we see in the media today.
Good-oh.
It will also be interesting to see how things between Smith and Brown deteriorate over the course of the administration, Blair could have ditched Gordon several times but didn't, somehow, I can see Smith being rather more cut-throat in his dealings with subordinates when pushed enough.
Sir Ming as LibDem leader as well? Excellent, perhaps he'll be able to show himself as the capable and personable figure that he really is, rather than the unfair caricature of him that we see in the media today.
Good-oh.
I assume that's a yay for me finally pulling my finger out and updating.
I was going to put the above update in with another 1998 update I'm working on with atm and then go on straight to 1999. But that didn't work out because the second half still needed work doing on it. So I split 'em.
Ta very much, always nice to have more commentators.
Well Blair wasn't very enthusiastic about devolution. In fact he didn't really like the idea. What he went with in OTL were simply all the stuff that any Labour government would have done anyway out of obligation - Scotland, Wales, London. There wasn't any follow-up because there was no interest in it. Prescott was given regional assemblies as his pet project in the second term once he'd had all his other ministerial responsiblities stripped and it was always a sort of weird policy side-concern; being interested in the North was sort of old fashioned in New Labour. IIRC, Blair even once denied that there was a North-South divide, which is a rather bizzare, reality-denying statement which any Tory would be politically lynched for.
Here the Smith is very pro-devolution, and he's listening to people like Prescott, so the agenda takes a step up from what happened in OTL.
Smith certainly won't take too much crap, but he's in a difficult position with Brown because he's not only Chancellor, but the expectation from a lot of people is that he will be the successor. So Smith is broadly in the position that Blair was in OTL in that he can't really push him too far.
Brown is probably a lot less frustrated overall than OTL - Smith after all will be 62 in 2000 and is probably going to retire sooner rather than later - which makes things a little bit easier ITTL, and economic policy is very much a partnership (or fight) between Number 10 and Number 11. So Brown is not getting his own way. But that itself is a cause of frustration.
I don't want to give too much away but there will be an awful lot of shit flying as things go on.
Well he's certainly in a better position than he was in OTL - obviously he's younger, he's not a 'Sir' either for that matter, (He only got his knighthood in, what, 2004 in OTL?) there's less media pressure on leaders ITTL to be in that telegenic Blair-Cameron mould. But I think people are going to get annoyed with Ming at some point. There won't be the constant rumour mill there was during his leadership in OTL, and I'm sure he can make it to the next election without major incident, but a lot will depend on how the Lib Dems perform at the next election.
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Agree with the above comments about Ming- one of the things that really interests me about TTL is how the public perception of politics will turn out without Blair at the helm. Will there be less pressure for young, telegenic Blair/Cameron/Clegg figures at the helm?
Certainly there is at the moment. I think the ultimate answer to this question probably depends an awful lot on how Portillio's leadership turns out. If it's a success then there is obviously going to be a lot of pressure on the other parties to follow suit with that kind of careful image-crafting. If it isn't a success, then it would probably partially discredit that kind of politics in a lot of people's minds, certainly within the Tories.
Good work as per usual V-J.
I do rather like where you are going with the sucessful NE devolution.
Do you know of any good histories of the devolution reforms?
I do rather like where you are going with the sucessful NE devolution.
Do you know of any good histories of the devolution reforms?
Thanks, always appreciate it.
Well it's actually going to cause a few problems within Labour in the short-term as they will have to pick who will be Labour's leader there. Considering how sharply the NE was divided between modernisers (ultra-modernisers at that) and traditionalists (some ultra-traditionalists at that) this is not going to be an easy task.
None specifically, I write all the devolution stuff broadly from memory with help from a few odds and sods of sources in respect of a few things. I think Bogdanor's book is considered the top text on the subject, others can correct me if they know of better stuff.
Very interesting update, I'm really enjoying this tl. I was just wondering what the factional break-down of the Tory party is at this stage. As I'm sure you know this was the time when Dan Hannan and Conservative Way Forward were roaming the country fighting to get "their" people selected to stand for all the empty candidacies. I'm guessing similar fights are going on here but how are they turning out?
Thanks for the author name, he seems to be well represented at the local library, so I may pay a visit.