Brooke or Mashall as supreme commanders instead of Eisenhower

[Belisarius II]

Given the number people dying every day of that horrendous war - to not have attempted to shorten it with an MG type op in Sept is IMO morally reprehensible - and they were correct to have attempted it.

Success would have cut off the 15th Army - which was obliged to retreat into the remaining parts of the Netherlands anyway abandoning all of its heavy equipment but here might have been completely cut off and large parts of it trapped - and forced the 1st Parachute 'army' under Gen Student back into Germany, liberated more of the Netherlands and greatly extending the Western front -further stretching the German forces in the West and placing the Allies closer to the Ruhr and outflanking the Westwall.

Your moral argument is understandable, but M/G was still militarily unsound. How could XXX Corps do all of that? Even if they got to the bridge at Arnhem how far over the Rhine could they get? They could barely protect the flanks of the 60 mile salient they created in the German lines short of Arnhem. That doesn't take hindsight, it was obvious at the time, or at least should've been. Defending the salient tied down Allied forces for the rest of the Fall depriving the Canadians of the support they needed to clear the Scheldt, which should've been Monty's primary objective.

Instead of sending XXX Corps to the NE toward Arnhem they should've taken a shorter turn to the north from Antwerp, to cut off the German 15th Army, in Zeeland. M/G gave the Germans time to fortify the waterways north of Antwerp, and forced the Canadians to fight a time consuming battle, with high losses. Capturing Antwerp intact was the greatest stroke of luck the Allies had during the exploitation phase after Normandy, but the fruits of it were deigned by the extended battle for the Scheldt.

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[Belisarius II]

Just because Market Garden was the best option at the time to end the war in one grand swoop does not mean it was a good idea…. If someone suggests you jump out of an airplane without a parachute, jump off a cliff or jump off the roof of your home, the roof may be the best option but that does not mean it is a good idea. M.G. Was NOT a good idea. It was a gamble. And it was one that Ike was either dumb enough to take or one that he figured wouldn’t harm him. But I personally think it was not likely enough to work to justify risking the lives of the men involved. I also personally believe that from Ike’s point of view it had little downside if it work he and Monty looked like hero’s if it failed Monty was the scape goat, And either way it would tend to shut Monty up for a while. So if you ignGGore the needless deaths that would happen from it failing… it is mostly positives from Ike’s point of view,

As for the single thrust idea that is perhaps the absolute worst idea the wallies could have. In WW2 the single largest advantage the wallies had was more men and equipment, thus outnumbering and out equipping Germany But you can’t take advantage of that by limiting the area. Germany would be able to concentrate forces while the wallies radically limited its forces. This is a horrible idea when you have more forces then your enemy. If you don’t think so look at how well that worked for the Union in the ACW… If the Union had attacked consistently and everywhere at the same time from the start the war probably is over much sooner. But the played games attacking here and there at different time allowing the South to shift around to handle it as best it could. Germany could have pulled that trick…

And Ike’s biggest failure was not better managing the overall picture, he and his HQ were the folks in a position to control the overall battle but for much of the time they just sat back and chose from the options Patton, Bradley and Monty and co. put forward rather then come up with there own ideas. Very much like the chairman and not like a true general.

And the US is not letting a non US general take overall command for multiple reasons ranging from ego, to legal arguments. By having IKe in charge then ultimately it could be argued that even while under Mounties command they were still under US command as Ike was a US officer and Monty worked for Ike so ultimately authority cam from a US officer.

I agree with you on M/G, and the Single Thrust, but not that Ike sat back and let others make the plans. It was Ike who rejected the strategies suggested by his subordinates, and insisted on the Broad Front Strategy, and multiple axis of attack, like in the ACW. It's not the job of the supreme commander to direct the conduct of Corps level battles, it's the army commander involved. Patton was responsible for Metz, and Hodges for the mess at Aachen. SHAFE had to trust their army commanders to handle tactical operations, and not micromanage. It was their job to manage the logistics, and give strategic direction to air, sea, and ground forces, which they did. The ETO had to have an American commander because most of the forces in theater were American.

 

[Belisarius II]

That quote is from an unnamed British staff officer; on balance the quotes from the US side (excluding Bradley and his staff ) are positive.

It isn't what Monty did so much, as claiming he'd saved the day, which pissed the Americans off. Monty actually played a minor part in the Battle of the Bulge, but claimed credit for a battle won almost totally by American generals, and troops. The main reason Ike put Monty in command was to assure British troops would be deployed north of the Meuse, to backstop the 1st Army, in case of a German breakthrough. If Monty wasn't in command his cooperation would always be in doubt.

 

[Nytram01]

...The main reason Ike put Monty in command was to assure British troops would be deployed north of the Meuse, to backstop the 1st Army, in case of a German breakthrough. If Monty wasn't in command his cooperation would always be in doubt.

That's not true. The reason Montgomery was given command of the northern part of the Battle of the Bulge was because Bradley didn't take control of the situation himself.

If Bradley had shown any intent of getting to grips with the situation then Eisenhower would never have taken the 1st and 9th US Armies away from him, but Bradley had little-to-no contact with those Armies and left them to deal with the attack themselves. The action in the North turned into a series of individual holding actions by isolated units with no clear direction from above and no cohesive battle plan as Hodges panicked and Bradley refused to take direct control

Bardley's suggestion that he could oversee the battle remotely via telephone was the final straw for Eisenhower, and since Bradley was not going to take control in a crisis he gave command to someone who would.

 

[Belisarius II]

That's not true. The reason Montgomery was given command of the northern part of the Battle of the Bulge was because Bradley didn't take control of the situation himself.

If Bradley had shown any intent of getting to grips with the situation then Eisenhower would never have taken the 1st and 9th US Armies away from him, but Bradley had little-to-no contact with those Armies and left them to deal with the attack themselves. The action in the North turned into a series of individual holding actions by isolated units with no clear direction from above and no cohesive battle plan as Hodges panicked and Bradley refused to take direct control

Bardley's suggestion that he could oversee the battle remotely via telephone was the final straw for Eisenhower, and since Bradley was not going to take control in a crisis he gave command to someone who would.

And what did Monty change in the Allied battle plan? There were some adjustments in the line of VII Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps withdraw from St Vith, which they were going to do anyway, and a dispute about the date for launching the counter attack toward Houffalize. The quote your using about Monty's part in the battle is from 5th Panzer Army commander Von Manteuffel who wasn't fighting on the northern side of the Bulge. It was 6th Panzer Army that was facing north, and I doubt Dietrich, and his generals would've said it was Monty who stopped them. By December 20th, when Monty took over, the German offensive had already failed, and they knew their hopes of reaching the Meuse were fast fading. Still his generalship was fine, it was his taking credit for success that rubbed the American raw.

 

[Aber]

So where do you get this "enough supplies nonsense?"

Supplying War by Van Creveld 2nd Edition (2004) p225

...the main question, namely whether it was logistically possible, in September 1944, to capture the Ruhr without first opening Antwerp.

p227

On the basis of the best information available, we have calculated that, in September 1944, enough transport could have been found to carry Dempsey and Hodges to the Ruhr.

 

[Aber]

Your moral argument is understandable, but M/G was still militarily unsound. How could XXX Corps do all of that?

They were not expected to; there were 2 other Corps from British 2nd Army involved.

It was Ike who rejected the strategies suggested by his subordinates, and insisted on the Broad Front Strategy, and multiple axis of attack, like in the ACW.

Why is using Civil War strategies a good thing?

 

[McPherson]

Supplying War by Van Creveld 2nd Edition (2004) p225

p227

To stall as they DID. Sheesh. Context.

 

[McPherson]

Why is using Civil War strategies a good thing?

Because it worked. Called BULLDOZERKRIEG in WWII. And Anaconda (Scott) was the strategy (proto Mahan, use blockade and economic warfare and siege to wear the enemy down before the main blow is struck.). It was continuous fighting across all frontages to bleed the enemy down which Eisenhower directly borrowed from Ulysses Grant when the main blow fell (That was the Overland Campaign to destroy the main enemy formation accessible to attack.). That was the op-art application to finish OB West in France 1944.

A lot of gaps seem to exist as to about how and why Americans did the things they did, the way they did in WWII. Not even Creveld gets that part right. Especially Creveld.

 

[Aber]

It isn't what Monty did so much, as claiming he'd saved the day, which pissed the Americans off. Monty actually played a minor part in the Battle of the Bulge, but claimed credit for a battle won almost totally by American generals, and troops.

As Montgomery acknowledged - see below for the UP reporting of "that" press conference. It pissed off Bradley and his staff because they got no name check.

Montgomery Says Doughboy Courage, Fighting Ability Halted Nazi Drive

Twenty-first Army Group Headquarters, Jan. 7 (UP)

Field Marshall Sir Bernard L. Montgomery today declared allied teamwork, and especially the inherent “courage and good fighting quality” of American troops, had halted the German drive into Belgium.

The battle is “far from over”, he asserted, but the Germans “have been halted, then sealed off, and we are not in the process of writing them off”, wit the initiative in allied hands.

Time and again in telling how Field Marshall Karl von Rundsedt’s thrust developed, and how he moved to meet it, Montgomery stressed that above all it was the fighting ability of American Doughboys and their tenacity in battle that makes a great soldier, and that has really saved the situation by the stands at St. Vith, Bastogne and south of Monschau.

He singled out two American armored divisions, the Second and Seventh, and two United States airborne divisions, the 82nd and 101st, and the 106th Infantry as doing a fine job, and praised Gen. Eisenhower’s leadership.

“What was Von Rundstedt trying to achieve ? I don’t know,” Montgomery said. “One must admit that he has dealt a sharp blow and he has sent us reeling back, but we recovered and he has been unable to gain any great advantage. He has therefore failed in his strategic purpose.”

“When the situation began to deteriorate,” Monty said, “the whole allied teem rallied to meet the danger. “The battle has been the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake.”

Formed Offensive Army Corps

“I formed an offensive army corps—the Seventh — under the very fine American Gen. Collins (Maj. Gen. S. Lawton Collins) and had to decide where to put it. It turned out that where I put it was not a bad place, although it was a large part luck.

Although he had placed the Seventh Corps there for offensive purposes, Montgomery revealed, Von Rundstedt tried a powerful left hook up the Manse towards Liege and ran right into the power of the American Second Armored Division under Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon. In a furious battle this division nearly wiped out Von Rundstedt’s spearhead—the Second Panzer Division.

“This changed plans and I bad to reform the corps again for an offensive and this time it was good business and the Seventh Corps now is attacking. You can’t hurry these things. You must get well balanced and have a tidy show.

We have halted the Germans, sealed them off and are now writing them off. German divisions’ have suffered heavily, but I say this about a battle. It is a very great mistake, to think it is over. The worst parts are over, but a great deal more must be done.”

 

[McPherson]

Montgomery had a bad habit to not name or credit idiots. (Gatehouse at 2nd Al Alamein.). I have no heartburn about Bradley snubbed here. He deserved the blanking.

Where he, BLM, had a tin ear and what the American press played up was in the pronouns...

“When the situation began to deteriorate,” Monty said, “the whole allied teem rallied to meet the danger. “The battle has been the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake.”

Now it is factually true, that he re-established a command presence and the communications (C5I1L) on the northern shoulder to join it across the breach to the south and tie in with Hodges and Patton and that is what he tried to say when he credited the specific American formations who sealed that gap. But the press, being ninnies, thought he meant that he ran the whole battle. CONTEXT.

Montgomery would have served the allied cause and himself better if he had said "we" and let it mean "the whole allied team".

 

[Aber]

12 AG is inland and stuff from the US has a week or more transatlantic voyage with much more dependence on ADSEC and FECOMZ to move stuff forward from Cherbourg. And both of those are clearly under SHAEF.

Ruppenthal Vol 1, p225 has them under Commanding General ETO, one of Eisenhower's other hats.

Given Lee was also Deputy Commander ETO, it is not surprising that US logistics were problematic given that Bradley had no authority over Lee, unlike the set-up on the British side.

 

[McPherson]

Ruppenthal Vol 1, p225 has them under Commanding General ETO, one of Eisenhower's other hats.

Given Lee was also Deputy Commander ETO, it is not surprising that US logistics were problematic given that Bradley had no authority over Lee, unlike the set-up on the British side.

1400 trucks conked out.
Port management fiasco.
No Red Ball or RR rebuild program.

So...

 

[Aber]

As Montgomery acknowledged - see below for the UP reporting of "that" press conference. It pissed off Bradley and his staff because they got no name check.

And to placate Bradley he got a bronze star on 9 January 1945 with the citation:

...Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was paying tribute to his generalship by awarding the Bronze Star to him. The citation follows:

On Dec. 16. when the enemy launched his counter-offensive on the Ardennes front. General Bradley quickly appreciated the possible consequences and made arrangements within his army group. As the hostile attack drove forward in the center, General Bradley Instantly sensed the points at which principal defensive measures should be concentrated. Realizing that the maintenance of communications with his northern flank would be difficult, he turned over to Field ` Marshall Montgomery temporary operational control of the Ninth and that part of the First Army on the north of the penetration while he devoted himself to the southern flank. With his tactical skill, clear in-sight, decision and unfaltering , determination, he not only made rapid counter-attacks to insure the integrity of key points of his position but eventually withstood the furious attacks of the main portion of the hostile forces and seriously disrupted the hostile plan of attack

 

[Nytram01]

And what did Monty change in the Allied battle plan? There were some adjustments in the line of VII Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps withdraw from St Vith, which they were going to do anyway, and a dispute about the date for launching the counter attack toward Houffalize. The quote your using about Monty's part in the battle is from 5th Panzer Army commander Von Manteuffel who wasn't fighting on the northern side of the Bulge. It was 6th Panzer Army that was facing north, and I doubt Dietrich, and his generals would've said it was Monty who stopped them. By December 20th, when Monty took over, the German offensive had already failed, and they knew their hopes of reaching the Meuse were fast fading. Still his generalship was fine, it was his taking credit for success that rubbed the American raw.

The fact that the German offensive had already failed and been stopped by the individual actions of the units of the 1st US Army just goes to show how Bradley caused his own worst day by doing nothing to take direct control.

Eisenhower suggested Bradley move his headquarters to be closer to the Northern section of the battle but Bradley refused. All Eisenhower wanted him to do was to show some impetus in dealing with the situation, to move from his HQ and go to the front himself to deal with a crisis, and Bradley refused to do this.

It was not possible in 1944 to run a battle remotely via telephone. There could be no way to properly gage the situation at the front via a phone-line, and discussing the problem via phone was no substitute to meeting the commanders in person.

One of the first things Montgomery did when command was transfered to him was to go to the front himself and meet with Hodges, who he found in a terribly nervous state, and try to reassure him and strengthen his resolve. If Bradley had done that himself, if had visited the front even once, he wouldn't have lost control of the Northern section.

Eisenhower didn't want to give command of the 1st and 9th US Armies to Montgomery, but Bradley's stubborn negligence forced him to.

 

[DougM]

While I think that Bradley was in general overrated and promoted post war because Ike was leaving and ultimately becoming president and Patton was dead so the only person left around to be the big time war hero was Bradley. I don’t think he sucked. He was just not the best when things went in a surprisingly different direction then expected. When that hapoened he needed a stronger commander to nudge him in the right direction. When he worked for Patton that was not a problem but Ike was much more hands off in general. Ike expectEd his generals to figure things out and to run it past him. But if Ike was a bit more hands on then I think Bradley would have been more in control.
As for the fact he was surprised by the attack. Well frankly any of them would have been, they all were terrible at seeing what the enemy was doing right in front of them. I would hate to have been an intel officer for any of them. Look at the failing in M.G.
It just happened that Bradley was in position to play against the German offensive.

As for supplies yes they had issues. A closer port would have been nice. But the whole mechanized mobile warfare thing was pretty new and never conducted on this scale before so I am inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt. Still a few more trucks in Europe (maybe at the expense of those trucks everyone around here tends to say the USSR didn’t really need) would have been nice. But by the time that was obvious it was a bit to late to easily fix.

As for the broad front strategy. A single thrust is tossing out the wallies biggest strength the size of its army. When you outnumber your opponent by a LOT you don’t want to let him concentrate his troops. You can only fit so many troops in a give space. You may have a million men but if you are advancing on a narrow front most of those men will not be on the front. You ,any have 10 pins when bowling but only one at the point. And adding 90 more pins will not change that if I still form the pointed triangle. A broad front means the enemy has to try and hold everywhere and can’t concentrate his weaker forces. And most examples of a single attack vs a constant broad front are not good.
As for Ike. I am sorry but in general he did not coordinate the Broad front very well. He mostly just stopped his individual commanders from pushing out to far on there own *M.G. Being an obvious exception). But if he had coordinated them a bit better it probably would have helped. If for instance Bradley applied a steady pressure and Patton a true big offensive lead up to M.G. It may have helped. (Frankly this is a bad example as I don’t think M.G. Would be saved by this but you get my point about coordinating things better.
it seams that much of the time the three Generals were doing their thing completely independent of everyone else, This sort of worked ok because the front was so long and the numbers of Wallies so big that Germany couldn’t concentrate to well. But obviously they could concentrate enough to pull off the Bulge.
Once again nit saying Ike was bad, but he was a better Chairman then a general.

 

[ivanotter]

Good analysis!

What Monty really wanted was to haver overwhelming force at the point of contact. And keep the pressure up by using/rotating divisions into the line.

It was not a matter of dispersing, it was a matter of concentrating on the point where it would matter. That was probably also Monty's forte.

Monty did indeed provide 'grip'. Ardennes was a matter of trading space for time. It was not enough to just hold the German offensive. Monty let them run along for a while as he put something together in terms of divisions and plan of counterstroke. When he was ready he defeated the german offensive.

There was no panic after Monty 'cleansed the temple'.

... and if he had just keep the pie hole shut!

 

[marathag]

When he discusses the Normandy campaign and why Patton ran out of gas and bullets in that book. The

Though bullets&beans diverted to Monty did not help, even if the Red Ball was running ragged.
AFAIK,he was the only Allied Army leader to ordersideline and even museums raided for old French locomotives to be put back into active service

 

[marathag]

Why is using Civil War strategies a good thing?

The Anaconda Plan did work, and more importantlycould not fail. Just took 5 years.
Shave two years off if somebody other lil Mac was in charge

 

[Johnrankins]

The thing about the Battle of the Bulge is that it was inane. It had zero chance at working which is a big reason that it was unexpected. That a professional army would try something like that appeared absurd.

What happened at the end of the Bulge is what you should have expected to happen if you knew about it before hand. That the Germans would be handed a big loss. In the end it was a disaster for the Germans. The Panzer Divisions were weak after the battle and the LW a completely spent force. The long term result of the Battle of the Bulge helped the Allies greatly.