Britain Backs up Czechoslovakia

Also, don't underestimate the importance of Czechoslovakian gear for the 1940 Norway and France campaigns.
And the 1939 Polish campaign.

I think the loss of (most of) this material is the big one. Czechoslavakia will most likely fall in a few months, butthe fighting means most of their material is wrecked, there will be losses on the German aide as well. And possibly the factories are damaged too. This takes their toll. On the other hand lessons the Germans in OTL learned in Poland will now be learned in Czecholovakia.

Obviously there won't be a Polish campaign, but an attack on France in 1939. Which will be harder than OTL with less Czech gear. And it's the questions if the sickle cut will be done (in OTL it was decided on pretty late). And if there is a Mechelen incident which convinces the French to do the Breda plan. With the original plan the French defence is better.

France can still fall, but it's an even riskier undertaking than OTL for the Germans.

Are there any good timelines with the allies doing better when the Germans do this? I can't remember any.
 
Ah yes, this will be a longer one.

First of, we actually have a rather excellent POD for this to happen, the August 38 travel of certain Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, a prussian arristocrat, long-term opponent of the Nazi regime, send by general Beck ad Carl Goerdeler to find out the British possition (the travel was financed by Admiral Canaris himself). He met with Churchill, and actually mananged to get both him and lord Halifax on the good side of the German opposition. When they later tried to get Chamberlein's support, he made unfavourable comparisons between the German opposition and the Jacobites of old. Aside from a few inconclusive meetings between Halifax and other members of the opposition, this was mostly it. Chamberlein deciding to take this opposition seriously, as a dagger aimed at Reich's heart, and hold a firm line against the Nazi's, would be the change needed.

Now, even a British declaration of support is unlikely to change Hitler's timetable too much, the 28. of September likely remains the invasion date, with diplomatic plays, the Sudeten uprising, the seizure of Aš by the SS and other such happenings still occuring, though with the major change that Britain would not push for Czechoslovak declarations of being willing to sacrifice territory (no Godesberg and such). Indeed, there will likely be an earlier push for Czechoslovak mobillization, with Prague happy to oblige. In the end there are two main variants here, starting on the 28.:

The Coup:
The fact that a conspiracy was ready to go is clear without any doubts. At least officially the plan was rather simple. Upon a declaration of war, a unit of 50 would seize Hitler, drive him to a well known psychiatrist who would then declare him insane. Leading nazi members would be arrested, while loyal army units under Höpner would fully secure the city. With the pro-nazi generals on the CS border (such as Reichenau), they would have little chance to actively join on either side,especially with coup-sympathizers present in their armies. SS and party officials would be arrested over the country, with the aid of pro-coup forces all over it. They would put together a somewhat broad government, give a crown to Willhelm II's grandson to have a uniting figure, and all would live happily ever after.

Alright, now to the issues. For one, the Hitler part. Several of those that were supposed to arrest Hitler, hhad already decided beforehand that killing the screeching bastard would be much more effective. Which might well have the effect of galvanizing the NSDAP loyalists. The plans to arrest many of the leading party members, especially outside Berlin, were often iffy, and there was even a large group that wished to cooperate with Göring and others. While coup loyal units were near Berlin, so was the 1. SS division under Sepp Dietrich, who would be quite certain to make a move against the coup. The support of Abwehr would be essential here (which considering the involvement of Canaris and Hans Oster was quite probable).

All in all, it is quite possible that a swift coup could easily devolve into a full civil war. Local Gaulaiters, army units, SS members, and who knows how the armies stationed against CS would react. Still, any threat against Prague, Paris or London would be neutralized for the moment, in either outcome. Germany would be weakened, and even if the pro-Nezi side won, it would likely be under somewhat pragmatic people like Göring. So still evil, but hopefully not world-domination/kill all non-Aryans evil. How long such a regime would last is unknowable.

But, best laid plans of Mice and Morons. All can fail, the conspirators might chicken out, or get purged. So option 2:

The War
All right, imagine if you will running into a wall. After a few tries, you manage to break through, only to find another wall. And then another. And so-on. Untill suddenly you get hit by a fist that breaks your nose. That would be the likeliest state of the German-CS war. Wehrmacht slowly grinding itself against a series of deffensive lines, mostly manned by 2. rate mobillzed troops, while the main part of CS army is waiting to start a general battle, and jump the Germans with several hundred tanks and large amount of fresh and trained men.
Even if the Germans do manage to take Prague in a month or two, they now have to continue fighting all the way to Slovak borders, and hope that at this point the CS army finally gives up. If they don't, welcome to Slovakia! Even more mountains and possitions to deffend, while the gold and sources you were looking to seize have already crossed to Romania. Oh, and its winter.

Meanwhile, Germany can't even use its full stregth, with one army on Sigfried, pissing its pants in fear of French army actually moving, another one in East Prussia against either Poland or USSR, all the while the German trade gets blockaded by the British fleet, and half the airforce has to be kept in reserve against French or British strike. At the same time, Mussolini is smiling at Hitler, saying that he will certainly help, in a few years, while Horthy has the whole Romanian army at his borders, waiting to be given an excuse to take Budapest again. The Poles meanwhile are considering if taking a few bits of Germany wouldn't be better then the relatively small rewards they get in Czechoslovakia, and the German people are beginning to loose all the enthusiasm, angered by getting dragged into another long, bloody and seemingly pointless conflict.

Any war in Czechoslovakia would not be comparable to the invasion of Poland. The geography, the army strength and doctrine, and other factors, would mean at least 3 months of brutall fighting, with an uncertain victor. 48 to 42 divissions was the strength divide. The German tanks and artillery might e more numerous, but are inferior in quality, and likely to face problems with ammunition. The airforce is Germany's main advantage, and a large part of it will have to be stationed in the West, if only as detterence. And even if the September conspiracy doesn't act, a few months of barely advancing will likely materialize a new one.
 
The czech defenses wre not called the Eastrn Maginot line for nothing. They were by and large finished (i have seen places quoted as '80% finished or 90% etc). These missing pieces could be like 'padlock missing on back door, etc. Apparently Hitler got a schock when he saw the defenses later.

Czech equipment was top drawer.

It would not have been an easy fight at all.

So what went wrong? Czech threw in the towel, mainly because of lack of support from UK/France.

Maybe Czech could not 'win' a war, but it is a good bet they could have achieved a stalemate.

Poland might have decided to align with Germany. That would have made a big difference in the German war on Poland. Hitler was still keen on whiping out Poland.

Stalin was an unkown at this stage, I believe.
 
One thing I've wondered about in such a scenario is how troublesome the Sudeten Germans would be for the Czechoslovak army in defending CS from a German invasion.
 
France was willing to go to war but only with British support. Nazi Germany was even less prepared for war than Britain.

“Willing to go to war” has wiggle room. France might declare war on Germany, but that doesn’t mean they’ll actually do anything meaningful other than harsh words.
 
“Willing to go to war” has wiggle room. France might declare war on Germany, but that doesn’t mean they’ll actually do anything meaningful other than harsh words.
Even during the phoney war, they did more than spout harsh words. In 1938, Germany was in no position to fight both Britain and France. What's more, the bulk of Czechoslovakian military fortifications were in the Sudetenland. If war broke out over the Sudetenland, it would go very badly for Germany.
 
Even during the phoney war, they did more than spout harsh words. In 1938, Germany was in no position to fight both Britain and France. What's more, the bulk of Czechoslovakian military fortifications were in the Sudetenland. If war broke out over the Sudetenland, it would go very badly for Germany.

Pray tell, what actions did France take during the Phoney War that actually affected the German ability to wage war?
 
The more interesting part is if Czech stands up to Germany. Telling Hitler (and France and UK) that they will fight if Germany starts a war.

And basically saying to UK and France: You can support us if yu want, but Germany cannot win.

Somehow, a Germany knocking on the Czech fortifications in 1938 might not have gone anywhere. Anschluss proved that German powers had deficiencies. The panzers broke down, etc etc.

Would UK/France have joined if they saw how well the Czech repulses German attacks?

Stalin being an 'unknown' in 1938 - yes, on the bigger stage, but I stand to be corrected.
 
The Czechoslovakian's can't win but they don't need to - all they have to do is cause a stalemate and do so much damage to the German Army that Poland, France and Britain can launch a successful offensive. They may not have wanted a war but once it is actually happening its unlikely they stay out of it.

It's likely that large parts (maybe all) of Czechoslovakia is occupied by Germany before the war ends, but there won't be a sudden shock fall of Poland, France and Scandinavia and the Entente slowly grinds over the German army. Stalin will almost certainly take the chance to seize the Baltic States and pick on his other neighbours but there is no global war - Japan, Italy and the USA stay out of it - and its all probably over by 1941. Poland and Czechoslovakia will grow a bit with favourable border changes and population transfers and a French Army will occupy Berlin for the foreseeable future.
 
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Any war in Czechoslovakia would not be comparable to the invasion of Poland. The geography, the army strength and doctrine, and other factors, would mean at least 3 months of brutall fighting, with an uncertain victor. 48 to 42 divissions was the strength divide. The German tanks and artillery might e more numerous, but are inferior in quality, and likely to face problems with ammunition. The airforce is Germany's main advantage, and a large part of it will have to be stationed in the West, if only as detterence. And even if the September conspiracy doesn't act, a few months of barely advancing will likely materialize a new one.
Even better, if Poland is on the side of CS, this should prevent or limit potential German offensive from at least upper Silesia, as the forces here would risk being attacked from behind. And anyway, Germans would need some forces to cover for that front.
 
Even better, if Poland is on the side of CS, this should prevent or limit potential German offensive from at least upper Silesia, as the forces here would risk being attacked from behind. And anyway, Germans would need some forces to cover for that front.
Conversely, it might actually weaken the "coup Hitler" camp. While a lot of German officers were skeptical about invading Czechoslovakia, a lot of the same officers were also of Prussian background and had a personal interest in war with Poland and regaining Posen/Poznan, etc. At the same time, their self-preservation instinct might balk at war with Czechoslovakia, the Entente, and the Little Entente and Poland at the same time.

But that all rests on the assumption that Jozef Beck was serious when he said that the French alliance with Poland would have led to Polish mobilization against Germany. I don't see Poland fighting alongside Germany when Germany is at war with France, but a Polish DoW is also not certain. Just that an outright Polish-German alliance is unlikely. At worst, for Czechoslovakia, that still means they can move troops off the Polish border to fight Germany.
 
It's likely that large parts (maybe all) of Czechoslovakia is occupied by Germany before the war ends

it's possible, but I think the odds are high they won't even get that far after a purge of the Heer's ranks. I know a British attempt to link up with Czechoslovakia will fail without French support (they might not even try since they know this), but Hitler will need to purge any possible coup elements in their ranks. Edward N. Luttwak (not a miltiary guy, he's more of a historian) once claimed officiers are surprisingly replaceable showing Stalin's purges didn't stop the Soviet Union from winning the war, so his conclusion is that a purge is neutral on military effectiveness, but I disagree with that.

They prepared a faulty war plan that allowed Germans to encircle the best part of their army in Belgum?

People critized the original Dyle plan, but it made some degree of sense. Plan D shortened the frontage by advancing to the Dyle river. It also kept 7 elite French divisions in reserve ready to do a counterattack just like in WW1. Then they decided to send the reserves to Breda in the Breda variant since they figured they already knew where the Germans were attacking they might as well try to link up with the Dutch army. If they followed the original Dyle plan, their best part of the army would be in northern France instead of being stuck in Belgium. If you've read about the battle of Arras where a British brigade threw Rommel's forces into chaos, imagine what 7 divisions would do.

Czechoslovakia, the Entente, and the Little Entente and Poland at the same time.

If Hungary decides to not get involved out of a sense of self preservation, wouldn't Yugoslavia likely not officially join Czechoslovakia? That said, I still think plenty of German generals would have thought Hitler would be nuts to do all that. If they can pull off their coup, they can save Germany from too much punishment from the West. Of course, Hitler is the guy in power and incumbents often have an edge in coups, given how the list of coup attempts tend to be longer than the list of succesful ones.
 
Germany would struggle due to weak mechanised forces and roughly a year less preparation than for Poland.
In Poland, the bulk of German tanks were Panzer 1 and 2, with hardly any Panzer 3 and 4 plus a few hundred Czech 35 and 38 models.
Against the Czech forces, they'd outnumber the Czech armour, but be largely outclassed as they'd have almost no mediums. They coped with a similar mismatch in tank quality in France due to concentration of forces, radios and air superiority. Here, they haven't perfected doctrine in Poland and are also facing decent 37mm and very good 47mm AT guns. It won't be easy learning as they go.
I'd see them winning but the price would be very high, especially in armour and vehicles which they were always short of OTL. Unlike OTL, they wouldn't get many running Czech tanks and would have lost probably several hundred, so about 400 tanks down, including most of the mediums they had OTL That's a big deal for Poland, and a bigger deal for France and Belgium, since fewer tanks and vehicles increases their casualties and slows down the tempo of attacks which was a key factor in France in particular..

If Poland backs the Czechs with a serious effort it could end up in a stalemate, although if historical prejudice overrules realism, they might do a Saar-type token incursion to show willing and little more, although it would surely be tempting to resolve the Polish corridor issue by taling over the bits of Germany to the east of the corridor.
The real problem for the Czechs is the near impossibility of getting military supplies in quantity from Britain, France or the US. Even from Italy it's difficult. As for the Soviets, who knows? There will be a high price, politically, and their demands might be excessive and maybe wanting things the Czechs can't offer eg full transit rights across Poland.

From here, it does look very much like calling Hitler's bluff would have been the better call.
 
I think this just becomes World War 2 Lite. No one, not even Germany, is ready for a war. It kinda just becomes a stalemate for a while. Both sides will be using old doctrines that don't work anymore. Yeah... that's what would happen at first. But once Germany is fully ready, it'd go just like IRL.
 
I think this just becomes World War 2 Lite. No one, not even Germany, is ready for a war. It kinda just becomes a stalemate for a while. Both sides will be using old doctrines that don't work anymore. Yeah... that's what would happen at first. But once Germany is fully ready, it'd go just like IRL.
It's hard to see how a German army with next to no combat experience (the condor legion is still in Spain) and almost nothing better than a Panzer 2 will get the chance to develop tactics that OTL weren't developed until after victory in Poland had shown limitations in the previous approach
Shorn of winning tactics, any fight will reveal that in 1938/early 1939 French equipment is very good in comparison to most German equipment. While the long-standing commitment to fast-paced actions and local initiative will help against sedate and unimaginative French tactics in the Saar, whether still fighting or worn down by recent fighting, the German forces will have all sorts of problems they didn't have in late 1939.
 
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