marathag
Banned
Some wrong stuff as well: McNair increased the number of towed Anti-Tank guns over SPG for the invasion of France.
Best Date for a 1943 D-Day?
- Thread starter B-29_Bomber
- Start date
Some wrong stuff as well: McNair increased the number of towed Anti-Tank guns over SPG for the invasion of France.
the whole 'tanks are for pursuit, tank destroyers for killing tanks" was one of the big mistakes the US Army made in World War II (only the replacement situation was worse in terms of effects)
but at least the M10/M18/M36 tank destroyers were somewhat useful. The towed guns never were up to snuff for the US Army. We would have been better off producing more 105 howitzers and a lot more HEAP rounds while up armoring (and upgunning) the Sherman sooner or coming up with something like the SU100 (an American version with a 105 gun would not have been all that expensive) or producing more M7 SP 105s or buying a lot of 6 pdrs and 17 pdrs from the British.
Just about any other choice other than arming tank destroyer battalions with US towed anti tank guns. The 57 wasn't too bad (it was pretty useful in the Ardennes) when used as a battalion and regimental support weapon. But the 76 was too big (defeating the whole point of an easy to hide anti tank gun) while the 37 was obsolete even before it was deployed (although it could fire canister, useful against banzai charges)
For that matter building more Pershings sooner would have been nice
But North Africa and Sicily made it clear that the 1942 pattern Armored Division had too many tanks and not enough infantry, which resulted in the 43 version which was probably the best organized and most flexible armored division of the war. It also made it clear that permanent attachment of tank and tank destroyer battalions to infantry divisions was necessary and resulted in the removal of the tank and tank destroyer groups as intermediate headquarters.
I was actually getting ready to respond, then I realized...
TFSmith121
Banned
The 1942 AD T&O had 18 tank companies
The 1942 AD T&O had 18 tank companies; the 1943 had 12 tank companies.
Not a huge difference; and the 2nd and 3rd armored divisions kept the 1942 TO&E through to VE Day.
Infantry was the same in each - three battalions.
Best,
The 1942 AD T&O had 18 tank companies; the 1943 had 12 tank companies.
Not a huge difference; and the 2nd and 3rd armored divisions kept the 1942 TO&E through to VE Day.
Infantry was the same in each - three battalions.
Best,
to be fair we lost the Wasp and had the Saratoga knocked out of action because they spent too much time meandering about "Torpedo Junction"
(Not to mention the torpedo spread that eliminated the Wasp, knocked the North Carolina out of action and bagged a destroyer was probably the best result for a torpedo spread in the history of warfare)
If the Japanese had tried for New Caledonia or the New Hebrides or for that matter Port Moresby, we could have hit them with the Hornet, Enterprise, Saratoga and Wasp, plus there were plenty of land based US Army, Marine Corps and even some New Zealand squadrons already assigned to defend them. Not to mention the Australians. At best the Japanese have what they had at Santa Cruz (5 carriers of varying quality)
So not too worried about the Japanese moving much past Guadalcanal. As a base though I think TFSmith is underestimating its value. A large base there gives Japanese fighters 1,000 miles of escort range, which gives them a hell of a reach, especially as Japanese bombers have longer range still.
It really was a serious threat and not one to underestimate. It also means that the convoy route to Australia has to be shifted much further south, which means longer shipping times and thus aggravates the shipping shortage even further.
So at a minimum Guadalcanal has to be secured along with Tulagi.
Politically the Australians are going to be rather insistent on this, and so of course is Admiral King.
If we have a POD I am going to wish that Macarthur is sent home with malaria or some such (I don't want the PT boats sunk, I admire Buckeley) which makes it possible to marginalize his political clout that made the offensive campaign to control New Guinea possible.
As for the Central Pacific drive, the first steps aren't possible for about a year as of the Summer 1942, and just sitting on the defensive is not really politically possible in the US. There was very strong pressure to deal with Japan and that has a huge impact on American deployments. After all, Hitler didn't bomb Pearl Harbor.
So no matter what, Guadalcanal pretty much has to happen. Everything after that is potentially optional. Same for the Buna Campaign.
I have also seen good arguments that one reason for the rapid success of the US drive across the Pacific was precisely because of its duel drives. The Japanese had to spread out their air and naval power and could not focus on one particular drive without leaving the other area too weak to offer effective resistance. The Allied drives in the Solomons and New Guinea also used what the Allies had in very large numbers.. excellent combat aircraft as of early 1943 such as the Mitchell, Beaufighter, Corsair etc. Those aircraft inflicted staggering losses on Japanese Army and Naval land based air power, as well as Japanese destroyers and transports but would not have been nearly as effective in the Central Pacific were island bases were further apart.
So for all those reasons the Allies are pretty much stuck with Watchtower, and relevant operations in that area as well as around Buna/Port Moresby and eastern New Guinea.
But definitely the Aleutians was a waste of time, energy and as it happens there were some battleships used that would be far more useful shooting up the shores of France
TFSmith121
Banned
The SLOC ran from Hawaii or Panama to NZ, and from
The SLOC ran from Hawaii or Panama to NZ, and from NZ to Australia (Sydney or Melbourne), well south of New Caledonia; IJNAF units on Guadalcanal, if they could even have been deployed and sustained, would have posed pretty much zero threat.
The Australians were not in any position to insist on anything with regards to Guadalcanal; their fight was in Papua, anyway, which with two US divisions (32nd and 41st) and two Australian (6th and 7th), plus the AMF, RAAF, and the 5th Air Force, was well in hand by the summer of 1942.
EJK was completely supportive of Germany First; if the CCS had agreed to go flat out at 2nd Washington, there's no dissent. FDR had hired him, after all.
Best,
The SLOC ran from Hawaii or Panama to NZ, and from NZ to Australia (Sydney or Melbourne), well south of New Caledonia; IJNAF units on Guadalcanal, if they could even have been deployed and sustained, would have posed pretty much zero threat.
The Australians were not in any position to insist on anything with regards to Guadalcanal; their fight was in Papua, anyway, which with two US divisions (32nd and 41st) and two Australian (6th and 7th), plus the AMF, RAAF, and the 5th Air Force, was well in hand by the summer of 1942.
EJK was completely supportive of Germany First; if the CCS had agreed to go flat out at 2nd Washington, there's no dissent. FDR had hired him, after all.
Best,
Zounds!the more important point was that the 42 division had 6 tank battalions (with the attendant tail) while the 43 had only 3 of them. This also resulted in a significant reduction of manpower in divisional support units as well. It also eliminated the regimental headquarters in the 42 version while retaining the combat command structure that was the most flexible part of the American doctrine.
We kept the two heavy divisions because they were already in theater, and to hedge bets, just in case the smaller division was too small. Although the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions were regularly rated as among the best divisions in the US Army by the Germans, it had more to do with their excellent leadership more than their heavier structure.
this book does a better job explaining it than I can, but there are other works too that discuss the matter
http://www.amazon.com/Combined-Arms...6612951&sr=8-1&keywords=combined+arms+warfare
still think you are seriously underestimating the politics of this. Particularly the desire in the US to hit the Japanese hard and soon
As to the SLOCs, Fiji and Samoa are on that route too. While New Caledonia has valuable minerals (that were exploited during the war and after)
The Australians raised a hell of a stink after the British threw away the 8th Division at Singapore. Enough so that Churchill was pretty much forced to send the AIF home, with the remaining division going home after North Africa was won. Australia has more clout than Churchill liked and for that matter King had a lot of clout with FDR.
TFSmith121
Banned
The US would be involved in a corps-level offensive
The US would be involved in a corps-level offensive against the Japanese in Papua, which combined with the air war and various alarums and excursions against the Mandates, would be enough war in the Pacific, one would think...
By the summer of 1942, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa were all better defended than Midway was, and we all know what happened when the IJN tried for Midway...
As far as Australia goes, Curtin was well aware Australia was the junior partner in the Pacific, and after Coral Sea, the Australians knew the Japanese were out of luck in the Southwest Pacific.
Basically, the decision comes down to liberating France (and bringing 8-16 divisions into the Allied order of battle) in 1943, and - potentially - defeating the Germans in 1944, or forcing the surrender of Italy (or at least half of it) and bringing about 3-4 divisions into the Allied order of battle in 1943, but delaying VE Day until 1945.
Seems like a risk worth taking, especially because the troops, air forces, naval forces, merchant shipping, and yes, the LSTs were available in 1943 for ROUNDUP or some variant.
As far as air power goes, here are some numbers from Cajus Bekker's The Luftwaffe War Diaries:
In August, 1943, the German home defense forces (daylight fighters) reached their all time high in frontline aircraft: 405 single-engine (Me. 109 and Fw. 190) and 80 Me. 110/Me. 410; two full wings (JG 3 from the eastern front and JG 26 from the Channel) were brought "home" to Germany, as were separate groups from JGs 27 and 51 in the Mediterranean theater and JG 54 from the eastern front.
Interesting thing about the above is the need for daylight fighters in the hundreds as early as the spring of '43; given the above, it appears that 300-400 modern fighters is about what the Germans could consider a "reserve" in this period, and so even if those numbers are doubled or even tripled, it is still far less than what the RAF and USAAF could deploy over the UK, Channel, and northwestern France.
What we've kicked around in the previous thread was ROUNDUP in NW France as an OVERLORD analogue in July of 43 (same time as HUSKY, and the equivalent of the HUSKY assault force OOB as the assault force for ROUNDUP), following Sardinia-Corsica (BRIMSTONE-FIREBRAND) in the spring of 1943, with southern France (ANVIL) in the autumn. ANVIL opens up the French Mediterranean ports (in any scenario).
The above requires a firm commitment from all parties at 2nd Washington (summer, 1942) with a strategic defensive in the Pacific and an enlarged "SUPER" TORCH in November, 1942, using additional resources not sent to the Pacific. The enlarged TORCH shuts down the Axis in North Africa in the winter of 1942-43, this providing enough time for the assaults listed above in 1943.
Considering the "spread" of potential targets for Allied amphibious assaults in 1942-43 the Germans have to guard against, and the reality they have to try and do something in Russia, and the odds seems well within reason.
Others may differ, but the potential payoff of VE Day in the summer or autumn of 1944 seems like a risk worth running ...
Considering the historical record of where and when the Allies were campaigning in 1943, it seems pretty clear that given an early enough decision, there was an opportunity to concentrate in NW Europe and actually achieve something in 1943, rather than marking time in the Med, SEA, SW Pacific, South Pacific, etc.
Best,
The US would be involved in a corps-level offensive against the Japanese in Papua, which combined with the air war and various alarums and excursions against the Mandates, would be enough war in the Pacific, one would think...
By the summer of 1942, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa were all better defended than Midway was, and we all know what happened when the IJN tried for Midway...
As far as Australia goes, Curtin was well aware Australia was the junior partner in the Pacific, and after Coral Sea, the Australians knew the Japanese were out of luck in the Southwest Pacific.
Basically, the decision comes down to liberating France (and bringing 8-16 divisions into the Allied order of battle) in 1943, and - potentially - defeating the Germans in 1944, or forcing the surrender of Italy (or at least half of it) and bringing about 3-4 divisions into the Allied order of battle in 1943, but delaying VE Day until 1945.
Seems like a risk worth taking, especially because the troops, air forces, naval forces, merchant shipping, and yes, the LSTs were available in 1943 for ROUNDUP or some variant.
As far as air power goes, here are some numbers from Cajus Bekker's The Luftwaffe War Diaries:
In August, 1943, the German home defense forces (daylight fighters) reached their all time high in frontline aircraft: 405 single-engine (Me. 109 and Fw. 190) and 80 Me. 110/Me. 410; two full wings (JG 3 from the eastern front and JG 26 from the Channel) were brought "home" to Germany, as were separate groups from JGs 27 and 51 in the Mediterranean theater and JG 54 from the eastern front.
Interesting thing about the above is the need for daylight fighters in the hundreds as early as the spring of '43; given the above, it appears that 300-400 modern fighters is about what the Germans could consider a "reserve" in this period, and so even if those numbers are doubled or even tripled, it is still far less than what the RAF and USAAF could deploy over the UK, Channel, and northwestern France.
What we've kicked around in the previous thread was ROUNDUP in NW France as an OVERLORD analogue in July of 43 (same time as HUSKY, and the equivalent of the HUSKY assault force OOB as the assault force for ROUNDUP), following Sardinia-Corsica (BRIMSTONE-FIREBRAND) in the spring of 1943, with southern France (ANVIL) in the autumn. ANVIL opens up the French Mediterranean ports (in any scenario).
The above requires a firm commitment from all parties at 2nd Washington (summer, 1942) with a strategic defensive in the Pacific and an enlarged "SUPER" TORCH in November, 1942, using additional resources not sent to the Pacific. The enlarged TORCH shuts down the Axis in North Africa in the winter of 1942-43, this providing enough time for the assaults listed above in 1943.
Considering the "spread" of potential targets for Allied amphibious assaults in 1942-43 the Germans have to guard against, and the reality they have to try and do something in Russia, and the odds seems well within reason.
Others may differ, but the potential payoff of VE Day in the summer or autumn of 1944 seems like a risk worth running ...
Considering the historical record of where and when the Allies were campaigning in 1943, it seems pretty clear that given an early enough decision, there was an opportunity to concentrate in NW Europe and actually achieve something in 1943, rather than marking time in the Med, SEA, SW Pacific, South Pacific, etc.
Best,
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Solomons Largely Irrelevant
During several of the previous discussions on this subject I did several back of the envelope calculations on the cost in shipping & other resources. My take is the entire new Guinea/Solomons campaign could have been run as OTL & not interfered significantly with expanding the MTO/ETO campaigns in 1943. The Cartwheel & subsequent operations were different. Those drew new resources from the US during the 2d, 3rd, & 4th quarters of 1943 & into the 1st qtr of 44. Redirect the 'offensive' portion of 1943 SoPac to the ETO & it comes out to between one & two additional corps worth of ground combat power & service support. Plus a corps worth of blue water amphib lift & the lighter 'landing craft portion. (I suspect the blue water portion is way more significant than the landing craft.)
Another 4-6 divisions & a couple corps HQ may not seem like a lot, but it doubles the US Army contribution to the Tunisian & Sicillian campaigns. Or it triples the US forces in Iceland & the UK. Having the shipping to deploy 4-6 additional divisions +corps & army support to the UK during the 1st quarter of 1943 & the same in the 2d qtr Puts the Allies in a good starting position for a Op Husky size attack.
During several of the previous discussions on this subject I did several back of the envelope calculations on the cost in shipping & other resources. My take is the entire new Guinea/Solomons campaign could have been run as OTL & not interfered significantly with expanding the MTO/ETO campaigns in 1943. The Cartwheel & subsequent operations were different. Those drew new resources from the US during the 2d, 3rd, & 4th quarters of 1943 & into the 1st qtr of 44. Redirect the 'offensive' portion of 1943 SoPac to the ETO & it comes out to between one & two additional corps worth of ground combat power & service support. Plus a corps worth of blue water amphib lift & the lighter 'landing craft portion. (I suspect the blue water portion is way more significant than the landing craft.)
Another 4-6 divisions & a couple corps HQ may not seem like a lot, but it doubles the US Army contribution to the Tunisian & Sicillian campaigns. Or it triples the US forces in Iceland & the UK. Having the shipping to deploy 4-6 additional divisions +corps & army support to the UK during the 1st quarter of 1943 & the same in the 2d qtr Puts the Allies in a good starting position for a Op Husky size attack.
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TFSmith121
Banned
Dropping WATCHTOWER, however, does give the extra
Dropping WATCHTOWER, however, does give the extra sealift and escorts for a "SUPERTORCH" type of plan to have a division landing at Bone, if not Bizerte, which opens the door to end the campaign in December, 1942, rather than May, 1943...
Which opens a few doors.
Best,
Dropping WATCHTOWER, however, does give the extra sealift and escorts for a "SUPERTORCH" type of plan to have a division landing at Bone, if not Bizerte, which opens the door to end the campaign in December, 1942, rather than May, 1943...
Which opens a few doors.
Best,
In these discussions there eventually comes the point of how the German AF was somewhat better quality in mid 1943 than in mid 1944 ( the numbers were about the same). Another version is how the GAF was defeated or severely damaged in early 1944 & not sooner. All that is correct OTL . Some German AF quality and numbers were preserved though 1943. This was accomplished through a general stratigic withdrawl of the air power from active fronts.
In 1942 the air power was withdrawn from western, & parts of central, France. Despite the real and claimed outcomes of the Rodeo & Circus ops the German air power in France was reduced to between 300 & 400 operational aircraft, & those were based eastwards, out of reach of the Allied medium bombers and fighter planes.
Each time in 1943 the Axis tried to make a sustained fight of it in the air over Tunisia, Sicily or South Italy they lost. Despite tactical victories the overall result was unsustainable losses & stratigic withdrawl chosen.
If the Allies invade France in mid 1943 the Germans have the same choice as they did over Sicilly or Italy; stand and fight to destruction, or withdraw and make smaller stratigically useless raids. From the UK the Allies have the ability to sustain a operational strength of between 8,000 to 10,000 aircraft from mid 1943. In mid 1944 it was over 12,000. In the Med in 1943 the Axis AFs were repeatedly pushed back by a Allies AF of around 4,000 in the spring & over 5,000 in the summer autum 1943. OTL the German AF operational or fit for combat numbers fluctuated between 5,000 & 5,800. During 1943 & 1944. About 40% were deployed on the Eastern Front, so between 3,000 & 3,500 In the west & Mediterranean.
In 1942 the air power was withdrawn from western, & parts of central, France. Despite the real and claimed outcomes of the Rodeo & Circus ops the German air power in France was reduced to between 300 & 400 operational aircraft, & those were based eastwards, out of reach of the Allied medium bombers and fighter planes.
Each time in 1943 the Axis tried to make a sustained fight of it in the air over Tunisia, Sicily or South Italy they lost. Despite tactical victories the overall result was unsustainable losses & stratigic withdrawl chosen.
If the Allies invade France in mid 1943 the Germans have the same choice as they did over Sicilly or Italy; stand and fight to destruction, or withdraw and make smaller stratigically useless raids. From the UK the Allies have the ability to sustain a operational strength of between 8,000 to 10,000 aircraft from mid 1943. In mid 1944 it was over 12,000. In the Med in 1943 the Axis AFs were repeatedly pushed back by a Allies AF of around 4,000 in the spring & over 5,000 in the summer autum 1943. OTL the German AF operational or fit for combat numbers fluctuated between 5,000 & 5,800. During 1943 & 1944. About 40% were deployed on the Eastern Front, so between 3,000 & 3,500 In the west & Mediterranean.
Not just the US Army but Air to:
In April 1942 the US War depart. issued Field Manual FM 31-35 entitled 'Aviation in Support of Ground Forces'. This manual attempted to create a workable ground-air support system. In fact it was cumbersome, and flawed in both concept and execution, with its emphasis on Corps-level air support. Giving the Corp Commander and his staff their own mini air force to call on for their own use.
After Kasserine, with the failings of FM 31-35 exposed, the Coningham system of air-ground coordination and control system that had worked so well previously.