Battle of the Atlantic.....
- Thread starter dmz23
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BlairWitch749
Banned
german resources would be better put to just put more uboats into production scap the surface fleet all together figure it puts 25 more u boats on patrol during the critical times in 1940-41 will have more damaging effect
OMG the stupids are out on patrol again.
Germans had replenishment at sea with fuel ammo and supplies and this could indeed include replacement planes if needed. The Brits detected the old supply network in the south Atlantic and closed that down after Sinking the Bismarck.
If Bismarck is still around that may not have happened yet. Further the Indian ocean supply network remained in effect until 1944. In 1941 the Germans had 38 tankers and 40 in 1942, so despite such OTL tanker losses , they could continue to follow doctrine and sortie large capital ships and support them with Replenishment at Sea ops.
As far as building capital ships over uboats the trade off is not as bad as it might seem. To convert The twins from 9 x11" guns to 6 x 15" guns was each estimated to require 125,000 manhours and about 4000 tons of steel product, probably ST-52 steel and was scheduled to take about a year.
Each Type IX uboat also took about a year to build and required ~ 1000 tons of steel product, most of which was ST-52 steel and took about 300,000 man hours to build .
So for the reduction in production of 8 x IX Uboats , they could have the steel product and manpower to rehabilitated the Twins. Germany produced 148 Type IX uboats during the war from 1941-44....and you'd still have 2 million manhours of ship construction labor left over to put into completing other partially completed ships or repairing battle damaged warships.
GZ was launched and said to be 65% completed by 1940. The hull is always the biggest steel consumption in any warship construction, so its likely that completing that warships may only require another 6000-8000 tons of steel product. So reduce the IX production by another 6-8 and you have more than enough to complete both the Twins and GZ by 1941. Hell throw in another couple of IX uboats and the Seydlitz could have been completed by then too [as a CA not carrier].
As to sinking ships. The Brits only managed to average one ship sunk for every 150 sorties, hardly impressive and their were some German anti shipping squadrons that did fairly well during the early years.
As far as finding these ships, sea searching was still pretty primitive back then, even with radars. The Bismarck gave the shadowing Cruisers the slip after sinking the Hood by detecting their movements through hydrophones. After that the Admiralty had no clue were she got to for 30 hours before an American Catalina spotted her almost by chance. Even in this case Bismarck nearly got away, had it not been for the lucky rudder strike...yes just as lucky as the shot that sunk the Hood.
However when the Bismarck gave those crusiers the slip, she could just as easily have doubled back around Iceland and headed for Norway [as infact her skipper suggested]. The other RN fleet was too low on fuel to give chase and was making for port anyway.....in which case , History would record it as another humilitating battle for the RN.
The RN carrier searching capability seemed to only be about 100 miles ahead of the fleet, so the ocean is still a huge place with far to few units looking. Finding any ship would be more by luck & chance than anything else.
BTW their were a dozen convoys on the loose when Bismarck was at sea. Some were diverted and some had escorts added, but most went on their way.
Germans had replenishment at sea with fuel ammo and supplies and this could indeed include replacement planes if needed. The Brits detected the old supply network in the south Atlantic and closed that down after Sinking the Bismarck.
If Bismarck is still around that may not have happened yet. Further the Indian ocean supply network remained in effect until 1944. In 1941 the Germans had 38 tankers and 40 in 1942, so despite such OTL tanker losses , they could continue to follow doctrine and sortie large capital ships and support them with Replenishment at Sea ops.
As far as building capital ships over uboats the trade off is not as bad as it might seem. To convert The twins from 9 x11" guns to 6 x 15" guns was each estimated to require 125,000 manhours and about 4000 tons of steel product, probably ST-52 steel and was scheduled to take about a year.
Each Type IX uboat also took about a year to build and required ~ 1000 tons of steel product, most of which was ST-52 steel and took about 300,000 man hours to build .
So for the reduction in production of 8 x IX Uboats , they could have the steel product and manpower to rehabilitated the Twins. Germany produced 148 Type IX uboats during the war from 1941-44....and you'd still have 2 million manhours of ship construction labor left over to put into completing other partially completed ships or repairing battle damaged warships.
GZ was launched and said to be 65% completed by 1940. The hull is always the biggest steel consumption in any warship construction, so its likely that completing that warships may only require another 6000-8000 tons of steel product. So reduce the IX production by another 6-8 and you have more than enough to complete both the Twins and GZ by 1941. Hell throw in another couple of IX uboats and the Seydlitz could have been completed by then too [as a CA not carrier].
As to sinking ships. The Brits only managed to average one ship sunk for every 150 sorties, hardly impressive and their were some German anti shipping squadrons that did fairly well during the early years.
As far as finding these ships, sea searching was still pretty primitive back then, even with radars. The Bismarck gave the shadowing Cruisers the slip after sinking the Hood by detecting their movements through hydrophones. After that the Admiralty had no clue were she got to for 30 hours before an American Catalina spotted her almost by chance. Even in this case Bismarck nearly got away, had it not been for the lucky rudder strike...yes just as lucky as the shot that sunk the Hood.
However when the Bismarck gave those crusiers the slip, she could just as easily have doubled back around Iceland and headed for Norway [as infact her skipper suggested]. The other RN fleet was too low on fuel to give chase and was making for port anyway.....in which case , History would record it as another humilitating battle for the RN.
The RN carrier searching capability seemed to only be about 100 miles ahead of the fleet, so the ocean is still a huge place with far to few units looking. Finding any ship would be more by luck & chance than anything else.
BTW their were a dozen convoys on the loose when Bismarck was at sea. Some were diverted and some had escorts added, but most went on their way.
The biggest unknown here would be what the RN does once they know that these ships are out there. The Kriegsmarine would have to learn fast how to be carrier aviators for when they did fight the RN, because the Brits would damn sure be after this fleet. If this force hits a convoy, that Convoy has a big problem - I don't think many convoys were prepared to stop an aircraft carrier and two battleships, and almost certainly the Germans would have sent not only escorts but U-boats to back these up.
Now, if that's the case, then the RN would have to meet this threat in similar fashion. That means at least a couple battleships (Hood for sure, probably at least Prince of Wales as well) and aircraft carriers. By this point, the USN would be looking for them, too - which means at least Ranger, Hornet, New York and Texas, and probably Mississippi, and in a pinch Wyoming could end up in the thick of it, too.
Now, if that's the case, then the RN would have to meet this threat in similar fashion. That means at least a couple battleships (Hood for sure, probably at least Prince of Wales as well) and aircraft carriers. By this point, the USN would be looking for them, too - which means at least Ranger, Hornet, New York and Texas, and probably Mississippi, and in a pinch Wyoming could end up in the thick of it, too.
Such petty insults are not welcome round here. If you are that confident your arguments are correct just state your case and leave out the petty name-calling.
Yes, I never said the Germans did not have some supply network, just that they didn't have enough. The supply network in the south Atlantic was scaled for cruiser/commerce raider level support not multiple battleship/carrier support. They would have needed to do something to expand it - which would of had the potential to draw British attention.
Yes it is possible, more possible than the above suggestion (by someone not you) that the Germans build more supply submarines. This works in 1941/1942 time frame because the British are not actively hunting tankers. Get a German fleet that manages to avoid the Brits and I would bet that changes. The Brits are well aware that if you can kill the logistics support the fleet is not good for much after that. So Target 1 - the German fleet in action, Target 2 - the German logistics pipeline.
All true, with a couple of caveats - first is the "build in a year" the German steel production would have had to deal with timing, they would have had to move production around to cover the needed steel for the surface ship update/construction rather than sub production. I am not sure about the production but I do know that of the 148 Type IX produced most were produced after 1942 - which means that if the Germans want to use the surface fleet in 1941 they will have to come up with that steel in 1938-1940 time frame not the 1941 to 1944 time frame. And that is the problem, German steel production spikes after 1943. So you are comparing apples and oranges here (timing is everything
)Some German anti-shipping squadrons also did very badly. Also the 1/every 150 sorties also reflects what the British were hunting - subs and e-boats mostly. So again I feel you are comparing apples and oranges. And what sorties were you counting? All sorties including search, recon, SAR, as well as strike? I find that hard to believe that the Brits did that badly - what is your source?
Yes single ships are hard to find, but so are convoys of ships. You seem to be suggesting here that it would be hard for the British to find the Germans but the Germans could find the British at will? Does not seem likely.
Sure, not unexpected - a single ship no matter how large can only pick off so many convoys. The closest conveys were diverted and/or had escorts added. Farther convoys just went on their way, they could be diverted if Bismark seemed to be closing. More ships more reaction - maybe, the German strike fleet still only had a limited range and could only move maybe 200nm/day.
BlairWitch749
Banned
its not that surface fleet is worthless... they did take norway and sink the "glorious" carrier battle group its just that the germans cannot devote enough resources to change the basic math against them...
you are forgetting crew allotment too. a battleship uses a lot of more sailors than a u boat the ratio is about 10-15 to 1
any german operation is an all eggs in one basket situation ie norway..... the brits can concentrate the home fleet and force h in the atlantic without much difficulty they would have multiple carriers and battle ships... the germans honestly would have to wait till the japanese lured in and destroyed some capital ships
there is a great chapter about this in luftwaffe victorious i think its by mike spick
you are forgetting crew allotment too. a battleship uses a lot of more sailors than a u boat the ratio is about 10-15 to 1
any german operation is an all eggs in one basket situation ie norway..... the brits can concentrate the home fleet and force h in the atlantic without much difficulty they would have multiple carriers and battle ships... the germans honestly would have to wait till the japanese lured in and destroyed some capital ships
there is a great chapter about this in luftwaffe victorious i think its by mike spick
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That must make them a good necromancer
...I certainly am enjoying the new discussions.Well, Bismarck almost survived to make it to Brest, so if one played with reality enough to have Tirpitz ready and Graf Zeppelin finished in mid 1941, it is possible this force could be at least as successful as Scharnhorst and Gneisnau were in their Atlantic sortie. But at great risk and to what end? U-boats are a much more effecive and efficient way of sinking merchantmen.
I wonder about Graf Zeppelin at the Denmark Straits battle. Having Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin, and Prinx Eugen together, does that make it less likely that Hood and Prince of Wales join battle? The odds aren't that bad for the British.
For the battle itself, where is GZ positioned in the German force? Can GZ avoid becoming a gunnery target?
For the battle itself, where is GZ positioned in the German force? Can GZ avoid becoming a gunnery target?
Unless you play with the PoD and have the Graf Zeppelin finished in 1938-39, there would have been no way she could work up her air unit to any level of proficiency, let alone ready to face springtiime conditions in the north atlantic. Stick these landlubber Luftwaffe pilots out in the middle of the Denmark Straits in May and you will either have them puking in their bunks waiting for good weather most of the time or heroically crashing all over the place. There is no way Germany could have develped the naval aviation skills it took the USA, RN, and Japan 20 years to perfect.
Very likely Hood and PoW might decline combat with a German force consisting of two battleships and a CA, but either way, GZ is just there as an expensive target.
The Germans had two types of supply networks those that sortied from Axis territory and those that sortie from neutral ports. The Neutral ports force was stranded after the war started and operated for as long as they could. While the bulk of the surface raiders and auxiliary raiders operated in the south and mid atlantic, those were all from the south atlantic supply network.
The reason this was destroyed is because U-100 was searched and the book on codes stolen and exploited. Until that happens the RN can do nothing and if that is prevented ,they could not close down even this network.
[Source ; A couple of very heavy and expensive books I just bought titled "Battleships- Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War -II" Garzke & Dulin. and "THE U-Boat", Rossler.]
U-100 has to happen first and even then the other supply network remained in effect for years after.
All true, with a couple of caveats - first is the "build in a year" the German steel production would have had to deal with timing, they would have had to move production around to cover the needed steel for the surface ship update/construction rather than sub production. I am not sure about the production but I do know that of the 148 Type IX produced most were produced after 1942 - which means that if the Germans want to use the surface fleet in 1941 they will have to come up with that steel in 1938-1940 time frame not the 1941 to 1944 time frame. And that is the problem, German steel production spikes after 1943. So you are comparing apples and oranges here (timing is everything
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No the Type IX was just an example of how it could be done, from the cases I knew about that would have to occured in 1942/43. From the late 1930s , Admiral Raeder had be pleading with Hitler to arm the Scharnhorst & Gnesanau with three twin 15" guns instead of 9 x 11" guns. The excuses were it would make the boat even heavier resulting in even worse seakeeping. But the Seakeeping problem was another Hitler influence since he refused to fund captial ship construction for high seas against the RN. He only allowed such ship to counter French in the Baltic and maybe North Sea and thus the warship was designed to Seastate 5-6 only.
After it became clear KM would have to fight RN in 1939 the bows of the Twins were modified 4 times in total to improve seakeeping amounting to about 10 months of additional work between the Twins. Had that instead been harnessed to replace the original bow with a fulfledge "Atlantic Bow", the exchange of 9x 11" guns to 6 x 15" guns could have gone forward at the same time with both battleships recommissioned by early 1940. Apparently the turrets were designed to be quickly modified to up gun to 15" guns.
Now that I have the books [as opposed to the internet source], I see the labor was in man DAYS not manhours to replace each bow. However at that time the labor to build a Type IX Uboat was on the order of 1/2 million Manhours or about 21,000 man days. So to rebow and replace the guns for both the Twins should take ~ 240,000 mandays, roughly the same as a dozen Type IX uboats worth of labor and steel product.
If it were to be done earlier it would be just a case of reallocating resources, labour and finanances from one ship yard to another....and yes it would have to have been planned a year or two ahead of time. But it could be done.
http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/EARS/Hallionpapers/airwarfaremaritimejune96.htm
Of the 716 ships sunk almost 40% were sunk in port and the rest at sea. Further only 338 of those ships sunk were actual warships. Plus 759 sunk by mines. The UBoat figures are 368 + 68 out of 785 sunk by air attack.
When the Twins staged the Channel Dash, the FAA dispatched 600 sortie and only managed to sink a Torpedoboot and a Vboot.
For the Germans it would be much more of a target rich enviornment. For the British it would be more of a needle in a haystack search. When Graff Spee was rampaging in the south Atlantic, the RN was forced to dispatch a huge disproprtional fleet to hunt it down.
The British Admiralty decided prewar that a single surface raider was thought to be the most threatening way for the Germans to use their limited surface fleet . They especially feared a surface raider able to scatter convoys making them much easier for Uboats to pick off the stragglers. WHen such scattering did occure in the vicinity of Uboats the end result was pretty dissimal for the merchant ships.
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A possible thing to consider is if the Germans had managed to complete the GZ, it's also likely the second German carrier (Peter Strasser) would have been built. Presumably a German operation would also include a number of submarines that could try to ambush the larger RN.
I would if a reverse exchange of aircraft would have been possible with the Japanese allowing their A6M fighter designs to the Germans in exchange for some German technical support for RADAR for the Japanese had extensive experience in carrier operations that the Germans needed while German assistance in RADAR was sorely needed by the Japanese.
A staging of a German operational thrust in June of 1942 at the same time of the battle of Midway would have been interesting for the presence of the German carriers might have kept at the least the Wasp in the Atlantic along with the North Carolina and the Washington
I would if a reverse exchange of aircraft would have been possible with the Japanese allowing their A6M fighter designs to the Germans in exchange for some German technical support for RADAR for the Japanese had extensive experience in carrier operations that the Germans needed while German assistance in RADAR was sorely needed by the Japanese.
A staging of a German operational thrust in June of 1942 at the same time of the battle of Midway would have been interesting for the presence of the German carriers might have kept at the least the Wasp in the Atlantic along with the North Carolina and the Washington
I ONLY Need One Guess ...
Hey, Maybe he and I could Make a Deal ...
He Stops doing this so Often, and I type normally?
Interesting, I will have to look into those books. I am always on the look for good sources of WWII material!
Oh I agree, and had missed that connection in your earlier posts. Thanks!
Okay I buy that, it would be possible at the cost of some fewer Uboats at the beginning of the war to have the S&G upgraded and the GZ completed. I am still unconvinced that the GZ would have been anything expert a target unless the Germans did much more with building up a carrier air arm in the 1920's and 1930's. Maybe something on the order of having German volunteers train in the Japanese military? Except I don't think there is anyway in $$^%^@ that the Japanese navy will accept German volunteers.
Other than that I can't think of any navy that has a carrier that would take German pilots in the 1920's or 1930's. So the Germans would need to do an early conversion of a merchant ship (like the USN Wolverine) for training which would really tip off the British and the French - since it would need to happen in 1932 at the latest. So lots of butterflies there.
Okay I buy that the physical ships could be done...and frankly even without the GZ having a whole squadron of heavy ships would cause the British lots more headaches than the single BB.
hmmm I had really though that the British were better than that...oh well live and learn!
True, true, but I think all you would have is convoys being used as bait, with much heaver escort pulled out of the home fleet. I could see the Brits using 2-3 BB's and 3-5 CA's plus DD's in escort to giant convoys. Which begs the question of would that work? and what the impact to the British economy be in the short run.