Right that's what I was trying to sayFWIW, The US (1903) Tennessee Class were counted as armored cruisers by the US, with 14,500t disp. and 4x10"(25.4cm) guns
Right that's what I was trying to sayFWIW, The US (1903) Tennessee Class were counted as armored cruisers by the US, with 14,500t disp. and 4x10"(25.4cm) guns
From my own research, the IJN from the Russo-Japanese War (4 main armament gun incidents of burst barrels and gunhouse fires on their British built battleships, which is surprisingly similar to incidents aboard British battlecruisers in WWI.) This carries into WWII where US munitions, which should not have had the devastating effects they did, blew up Japanese battleships like they had no protection scheme at all. Note this was sloppy crew training combined with very touchy Shimtose explosive which was very similar to British nitro-powders of the era. Also the hoist system in use by the IJN and RN was shockingly vulnerable to an explosion and fire train down to the magazines. Anything that punched into the citadel and started a fire that was not flooded out o0r any magazine fire not contained was a loss of the ship. Hiei, Kirishima, Mutsu (electric fire in the hoist burned back down to the powder handling room, Musashi, Yamato, Fuso, Yamashiro. Even Kongo gets hers that way.Honestly, yes, I do think every British capital unit of the era was a tinder box ready to blow. Their cordite was extremely prone to exploding, and HMS Vanguard spontaneously exploded in port due to old cordite powder.
Ocean and Irresistible were also old and had been built for fighting other battleships on the high seas, so that can’t be used to dismiss the comparison. They were larger, but the extremely rapid capsizing of Bouvet is so extraordinary that can’t account for the difference, likewise with the differences in crew quality.
Like, I don’t think you understand how insane it is that Bouvet capsized in two minutes. Irresistible took much longer despite her engine rooms being completely flooded and being under heavy fire from Ottoman shore batteries, and as I said, she sank from progressive flooding destroying her buoyancy, rather than the sudden and catastrophic loss of stability that sank Bouvet.
In any case, my opinion on Bouvet and her half-sisters was formed by this forum post: https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/war...ts-just-hindsight-make-them-l-t33584-s10.html which includes a link to professional analysis of Bouvet’s stability. Even by the standards of the 1890s Bouvet’s stability was extremely bad and is clearly the cause of her extremely rapid capsize.
He was. He shouted down Beatty.A couple of thoughts on the Americans: for all his bucking the brass, Sims did manage to rise to Vice Admiral. He must have been one of those "bastards" that succeed in spite of irritating most of his superior officers (of the time), and for Fiske to persevere in spite of "Fighting Bob" Evans condemnation is also impressive by itself.
Maybe. Been reading my timeline? They should have won the Span_Am War. I'm trying to explain how they lost.And just like that, the Spanish have a fighting chance.
It’s on the (very long) list of timelines I’m planning to read at some point.Maybe. Been reading my timeline? They should have won the Span_Am War. I'm trying to explain how they lost.
Hiei, Kirishima, Mutsu (electric fire in the hoist burned back down to the powder handling room, Musashi, Yamato, Fuso, Yamashiro. Even Kongo gets hers that way.
The Japanese board of inquiry.... was a mess.Has there ever been a solid determination of why Mutsu blew up?
When Mutsu exploded and sank the following four ships were in the vicinity: the battleship Fuso, the light cruiser Tatsuta, and the destroyers Wakatsuki and Tamanami. At first it was thought that the ship had been torpedoed by an enemy submarine. Consequently, the destroyers were ordered to drop depth charges, while at the same time the survivors were rescued. In addition to her own complement of 1,321, a further 153 men of the 10th Harbour Defence Unit were on board for training and of the total of 1,474 officers and men, 1,121 became victims of this catastrophe and only 353 survived.
An investigation committee with Admiral Shiozawa Koichi in the chair was established and began its enquiry. Basing on the testimony of survivors, the committee concluded that if a fire had broken out in the neighbour-hood of the No 3 and No 4 main gun turrets and caused such a catastrophic explosion, it must have begun in the powder magazine of No 3 main gun turret. The most likely cause was self-ignition of the Type 3 shell (3 Shiki-Dan) stowed in that magazine.
The Type 3 shell was a shrapnel (Sankai-Dan) shell recently developed for defence against air attacks. Inside the body of the 40cm shell there were 735 hollow steel tubes 20mm in diameter with a length of 90mm stacked in layers and filled with white phosphorus. The incendiary bodies were expelled forwards from the detonation point and formed a cone-shaped danger zone with a diameter of up to 240 metres at the end of their trajectory. However, despite the spectacular visual effects, the danger to an attacking aircraft was low.
Large numbers of Type 3 shells were stowed in the magazines of battleships and heavy cruisers but, following the destruction of Mutsu, all had to be landed by order. The investigation committee conducted repeated experiments at the Kamegakubi Experimental Range of Kure NY in order to confirm the self-ignition of this shell as the most probable cause of the explosion. Models of the original size were produced and numerous experiments carried out. In parallel a colour-burning experiment was executed in the presence of several dozens of survivors. The colour of the smoke generated by the burning of the powder of the Type 3 shell was white, while that emitted by the propellant for the standard projectiles (common and AP) was brown. Mutsu’s survivors confirmed that the smoke emitted when the magazine exploded was brown. The tests also failed to generate self-ignition of the Type 3 shell, and it was absolved as the cause of the loss of Mutsu; as a result, the Type 3 shell was again embarked on major IJN warships.
A later investigation by divers found that the third main gun turret and its barbette had been separated from the hull and was damaged. This discovery served to confirm the assumption that the explosion had taken place in the powder magazine below No 3 main gun turret. However, the true cause of the explosion could not be established and is still unknown; again, arson or decomposition of the propellant were suspected.
The Japanese board of inquiry.... was a mess.
I think the "Japanese sailor was smoking in the vicinity of exposed and overage propellant bagged charges" is as valid as any I can entertain. San Shiki "shells" could not have been the cause if the first detonation was in the powder handling room and traveled into the adjacent magazine. Can one explain how the bursting charge in San Shiki shell BURNS? The expulsion charge that shot-gunned the WP rods was SEALED and had to be activated by an igniter charge after being thrown from the gun tube. When ignited in trajectory after a clock unlocked the fuse, that charge exploded the rods out like a giant shotgun shell.
Hence I think bagged propellent cooked off and something like a none enemy induced action Queen Mary cordite-like fire in the powder room and thence the magazine.
Dropping a LIVE mortar round on its nose amidst pallets of leaking gasoline cans is about as stupid as it comes. The Board of Inquiry is not about to report THAT THE NAVY was to blame to the American taxpayer, for it was determined that the ARMY racist personnel policies of the time of overworking untrained or inadequately trained soldiers as laborers and ersatz stevedores because they were deemed "unfit" for other service due to their skin color and not worth the time and effort to train to the acceptable standard or be provided the leadership support and safety protocols that the rest of the American ARMY expected and earned.Of course, the USN had its own kabooms. The West Loch disaster knocked out as much raw tonnage as the Mutsu explosion did, and wiped out 17 LVT's into the bargain. But the difference, of course, was that the United States could make good its losses; Japan could not. West Loch set back Operation FORAGER by only a single day!
Dropping a LIVE mortar round on its nose amidst pallets of leaking gasoline cans is about as stupid as it comes.
Why the hell did the thing have a fuse in it? I thought they were meant to be installed JUST PRIOR to being fired.Dropping a LIVE mortar round on its nose amidst pallets of leaking gasoline cans is about as stupid as it comes.
There has to be a certain allowance for human stupidity, fatigue in any weapons system, and with as many weapons as were being shipped into the Pacific in 1942-45, maybe the wonder is that there were not more accidents.
(Speaking of human stupidity, it remains the case that the Navy still suffers expensively from its effects
Still, it is also true that they greatly revised munitions loading and handling procedures after the West Loch investigation . . . desegregation would have to wait a few more years, alas.
(^^^) shows the USN will fight to the death to save their ships. It is good to know that the spirit of their grandfathers still is inside American sailors.In the letter, Gilday praised the work of Bonhomme Richard’s crew, as well as the hundreds of sailors who rushed to the scene, many without orders to do so. Several dozen sailors and civilian firefighters were hospitalized, most with smoke inhalation and heat injuries.
“There were Sailors from across the San Diego waterfront who responded to this fire — hundreds of them; many without receiving direction to do so,” Gilday wrote. “Every single fire team was led by BONHOMME RICHARD Sailors — no question, this was THEIR ship and they would walk point on every firefighting mission. Most had to be ordered … and re-ordered … to go home at some point and get some rest.
“I also met with the air crews of HSC-3; the aerial bucket brigade who dropped nearly 700K gallons of water on the blaze, day and night, from their helos. Their efforts were critical in helping get the fire under control; and they used their IR [infrared] capability to locate hot spots and vector fire teams to the source. Awe inspiring teamwork.”
It is the US Army, not the Marine Corps. How the hello should I know why the thing had its fuse screwed in? I've blanched in fear watching US soldiers monkey with ordnance they did not understand very recently. This is not restricted to one nation or one service, either. Practically not a week goes by, where I read, hear or SEE from a human factors standpoint; some poorly trained or poorly supervised or some overconfident and careless human being somewhere has initiated an accident chain that caused loss of lives and hundreds to millions of dollars worth of damage, loss of time and equipment to a military service somewhere.Why the hell did the thing have a fuse in it? I thought they were meant to be installed JUST PRIOR to being fired.
(^^^) shows the USN will fight to the death to save their ships. It is good to know that the spirit of their grandfathers still is inside American sailors.
Even if there was yard space I doubt she would have been value for money to repair given the scale of the damage.Wasn't enough to save the ship at the end of the day, but I agree just the same.
And that kind of mindset could be a difference maker if this kind of thing happened during combat ops - it could save a lot of lives and equipment, even if (as here) the ship is determined to be a constructive loss.
Part of the problem, too, is the lack of dockyard space left to do this kind of work in the United States, and that contributed to the decision to scrap Bonhomme Richard. We've lost so much of our capacity over the last few decades.
First of all that's Drydock 51 rather than 151 (the latest) so it's 100 weeks old.A fun question came up in Drachinifel's last Drydock, by the way, and I am a little surprised to see that I cannot find that it has come up here yet: "Would Germany have been better off building 3 improved Scharnhorst class with the 15” guns than trying to build the 2 Bismarck class and possibly using the spare resources to refit the first 2?"
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Drach likes the idea (see the video below for discussion). But not everyone does.
It's not the first time the idea of a modified Scharnhorst with six (2x3) 38 cm SK C/34 naval guns has come up with - as most of us know, that was something Hitler wanted, and had to be talked out of, in 1935.
Would this be a better use of money for the KM than the Bismarcks? My sense is "Probably." But would it really be much of a difference maker? No, probably not. And of course, the refit of the first two Scharnhorsts would not be a simple affair - it would have required extensive changes to the barbettes and bow structure - and worse, it would be coming during the most critical years of the war.
Video cued to timestamp:
Even if there was yard space I doubt she would have been value for money to repair given the scale of the damage.
First of all that's Drydock 51 rather than 151 (the latest) so it's 100 weeks old.
Secondly I suspect that 3 Scharnhorst might cost more than 2 Bismarcks. Its more guns (18 vs 16) more tonnes (114 vs 102) and much more horse power. (495k shp vs 296k shp). There won't be spare resources to refit the older Scharnhorst. To be honest it might cost a cruiser or two in addition to the Bismarcks.
Im not saying it wouldn't be a more efficient way to spend resources. I'd rather two Bismarcks when you are playing keep away in Norwegian fjords but I'd rather 3 Scharnhorsts before USA joins the war and commerce raids can be done.
Probably, but it's hard to say.
Refit and repair would have run $2.5 to $3.2 billion, apparently. A new America-class LHD runs about $4 billion.
But that said, the Navy says the infrastructure issues were part of the decision:
How the the loss of Bonhomme Richard will impact the Navy's operations remains to be seen. The ship was one of eight Wasp class vessels, the service's main type of amphibious assault ship. It also has two new America class amphibious assault ships, as well as a third, the future USS Bougainville, under construction. The Bougainville will be the first example of a distinct subclass, which you can read more about in this past War Zone piece.In the meantime, the Navy will have to rely on the other seven Wasp class ships, which have the job of moving around Marine Expeditionary Units, sometimes with significant airpower in the form of large detachments of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters. These Amphibious Ready Groups regularly patrol or are otherwise prepositioned around the world, ready to respond to various crises and contingencies on short notice.Admiral Ver Hage said that this reality was definitely taken into consideration when deciding to scrap Bonhomme Richard, but that there were other concerns about how the expenditure of time and resources to repair that ship might have impacted the Navy's other shipbuilding priorities and other maintenance schedules. The service has been struggling for years now to address significant maintenance backlogs and expand available shipyard infrastructure.“In the end, the decommissioning decision had a number of factors, and one of which was, what would be the impact of the dollars spent and the actual effort to rebuild, what would be the impact on the industrial base? The dollars definitely would disrupt our strategy for investment," Ver Hage said. "And then from an industrial base perspective, we had concerns that it would impact new construction or other repair work, and we knew that Gulf Coast would be the spot to get the building or the restoration done because of the capacity and their capabilities – but in the end made the decision for multiple factors, as I mentioned, that decommissioning would be the way to go."
Navy Will Spend Around $30 Million To Scrap Fire-Damaged USS Bonhomme Richard
Other options, such as turning it into a hospital ship or a submarine tender, were also considered, but none made sense financially.www.thedrive.com