USN suffered losses in the 1st half of 1942 as well, before learning the hard way to do its upmost effort to safe a stricken aircraft carrier, before abandoning it. In the Coral Sea, USS Lexington was basically salvagable, though inept damagecontrol caused her to become a burning inferno, eventually resulting in her to be scuttled, or at least an attempt to do so. USSYorktown at Midway too was not beyond the point of no return, though her captain had ordered the crew to be taken off, resulting in her eventual loss, as repairs were not properly executed, due to the crew having been evacuated. With the full crew retained on board, the possibility of her regaining control was serious, though all would be depending on the I-168 able to locate her either stationary, or underway.
The Report on Lexington..
Eleven torpedo tracks were observed. Two of the torpedoes passed under the ship; at least two hit on the port side while the ship was turning to starboard. The ship turned again and two passed, one on either side of the ship. All others passed ahead. As torpedo detonations on port side occurred almost simultaneously, it was difficult to determine the exact number of hits, but there were opinions expressed that more than two hits occurred in the general area of the port gasoline stowage and the three forward port boiler rooms.
No comment.
Dive bombers attacked simultaneously and scored two direct hits and at least five near-misses as follows:
(A) The first direct hit landed in the 5-inch ready service locker which had been converted from Admiral's stateroom, port side of main deck, frames 55 to 58. This was reported to be a 1000 lb. bomb, but the extent of damage indicates a much smaller bomb - probably a bomb weighing from 100 to 200 pounds. Such bombs were used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor and in later attacks against ENTERPRISE and CHESTER. This bomb has an instantaneous fuse and probably penetrated the light side plating just under the flight deck where it detonated. The 250 Kg general purpose bomb used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor had a delay-action fuse resulting in detonation after a travel of about 36 feet from the first point hit. The 250 Kg bomb also caused much greater damage than did the bombs which struck LEXINGTON. The Gunnery Officer stated that the powder in the 5-inch cartridges in this space was ignited and burned and split open the cases, but that no 5 inch projectiles were noted to have detonated. The immediate consequences of this bomb hit were as follows:
(1) No. 6 - 5"/25 gun was put out of action and a number of its crew were killed.
(2) Three men on No. 4 - 5"/25 gun were killed.
(3) The light metal joiner bulkheads in the Admiral's and Chief of Staff's cabin area were disrupted.
(4) Fires were started in Admiral's and Chief
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of Staff's cabin which were soon reported under control. The upholstered furniture in these cabins was very difficult to extinguish after catching fire.
(5) A serious fire developed in the marine quarters, port side of main deck, just abaft the Chief of Staff's cabin. This fire probably was a continuation of the fire forward. It was soon extinguished.
(6) The flight deck above the 5-inch ready service compartment was bulged upward slightly, the wood deck was splintered, but the damage was not sufficient to cause any interference with flight operations.
(B) The second direct hit was scored on the port side of the smoke stack structure about nine feet above the .50 caliber machine gun platform and at about frame 103. This was reported to be a small bomb, probably about 100 pounds. This Bureau considers that it was the same type of bomb as struck the 5-inch ready service locker. It had instantaneous fuse action. The immediate consequences of this hit were as follows: -
(1) Fragments killed several people manning the port .50 caliber battery.
(2) Fragments penetrated the stack and killed and injured several men on the starboard .50 caliber platform.
(3) Fragments killed and wounded several persons in after 5-inch gun control station and injured several in sky control station forward. These latter injuries may not have been a direct result of the bomb detonation.
(C) The third bomb explosion was a near-miss on the port side, centered at about frame 87. This bomb was probably of the same type as the first two. It detonated on contact with the water and resulted in the following damage:
(1) The forward three 20 mm gun hinged-platforms in the port boat pocket (frames 84 to 97) were blown upward and inboard, putting these guns out of action.
(2) Fragments penetrated the shell plating in this vicinity and water entered at least two of the provision storerooms outboard on the third deck. These compartments were closed which effectively localized the flooding.
(D) At least two additional near-miss bomb explosions occurred on the port quarter. These bombs detonated on contact with the water and caused the following damage:
(1) Fragments entered the carpenter shop and nearby spaces. No serious damage resulted.
(2) The 5"/25 caliber gun platform on the main deck level was inundated by the splash from the explosions.
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(3) Fragments hit the gun bulwarks (25 lb. STS) and one fragment was known to have penetrated the bulwark killing one man. A great many fragments were rejected, however, and the ship's personnel considered that the bulwarks here, as well as forward, saved many lives.
(4) The mastic deck covering on the 5-inch gun platform flew up and severely injured one member of the gun's crew.
(E) There were several additional near-misses at such an appreciable distance from the ship that they probably caused no damage to the ship. At least two of these were reported on the starboard side aft. Several of these bombs were observed to detonate deep in the water.
A small amount of machine gun strafing was noted, but it was not part of the tactics of all attacking aircraft.
No comment.
Torpedoes...
Summary;
a. 2 hits believed at frame 85.
b. hull plates buckled outward that location.
c. Shock damage punched into boiler rooms 2,4,6 (note compartmentation). Steam pipes crack and water floods compartments to depths about no more 1/3 meter when damage secured and compartments pumped out.
d. inner final TDS bulkhead held.
No further comment.
Fuel and av-gas stowage.
5) There was no damage to main propulsion machinery and the ship continued to make 25 knots for some considerable time after the three boilers were secured. Shock damage to electrical equipment was inconsequential.
(6) It was reported that oil seeped up through the third deck into compartments located outboard of the longitudinal bulkhead.
Immediately following the torpedo hits the ship took a port list of 6-7 degrees due essentially to the torpedo explosion in way of the boiler rooms. The drafts of the ship on leaving Pearl Harbor were 34'-6" aft and 31' forward. The ship had refueled on May 3, and the drafts at the time of the attack were not definitely known.
Prior to the attack the following were, in general, the liquid loading conditions in the ship.
(I) PORT SIDE
(1) Forward of Frame 75.
All gasoline tanks filled. All inboard and outboard voids surrounding gasoline tanks filled with fresh water. All fuel tanks filled with oil.
(2) Frames 75 to 133.
Outboard layer of F. O. tanks (emergency tanks) filled with oil.
Second layer (sluice tanks) empty.
Third layer (service tanks) filled with oil.
Fourth layer (reserve feed tanks) filled with water.
Water bottoms port side were filled with feed water.
(3) Aft of Frame 133.
Innermost layer empty. Outboard layers filled. Fuel oil bottoms aft frame 140 to 173 being used as service tanks.
(II) STARBOARD SIDE.
(1) Forward of Frame 75.
Same as for port side.
(2) Frames 75 to 133.
Outboard layer F. O. tanks (emergency tanks) filled with oil.
Second layer (sluice tanks) empty.
Third layer (service tanks) filled with F. O.
Fourth layer (reserve feed tanks) empty.
Starboard feed bottoms empty.
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(3) Aft of Frame 133.
Approximately same as for port side.
Lift damage: summary; Both primary forward lifts knocked out. Air pressure system damaged by shock from torpedoes. Motor rooms for lifts were shock damaged, motors dismounted or misaligned. Inner TDS bulkhead punched in a 15-20 cms, no leaks. deck bulged up. Compartments flooded as safety measure with CO2 upper and seawater (mistake) lower.
Comment.
This was probably a ground fault condition established in the lower compartment since the loads in the area from the description were still live.
INTERNAL EXPLOSIONS AND RESULTANT FIRES
The combined bomb and torpedo attack lasted only about 7 or 8 minutes - probably measured from the time of the first hit - and had been completed by about 1132.
At 1247 a violent internal explosion shook the ship. Its intensity was reported to be greater than the previous
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torpedo explosions and its center appeared to be just forward of the elevator well - about the third deck level.
See previous comment about elevator lift power compartments.
Summary about fires.
e. Fires in the admiral's compartment renewed and new fires spread forward from the IC motor rooms.
Fire fighting in this general area was greatly hampered by dense smoke in all spaces affected; by loss of pressure on some of the starboard firemain risers; by nonavailability of fog nozzles; by non-availability of asbestos suits and new type rescue breathing apparatus. The drain pumps in the drain pump room forward in the hold, frames 41 to 44, which are shown in the Damage Control Book to be connected to the firemain forward were not used for this purpose as they develop a pressure of only 35 lbs./in.2. Fire hoses led forward from after fire plugs were also used.
Comment; It is apparent from (^^^) that the USN knew about these bolos and had not remedied this problem BEFORE Coral Sea. Why? No comment.
f. Apparently there was a fuel air explosion caused. (Read the report of survivors to note evidence as to location (Motor lift IC rooms) and results.
t was reported that the vent ducts, believed to be the natural supply ducts from the Gas Pump Room which terminated in the CPO mess room, had been capped prior to the beginning of the action. After the major internal explosion these vent pipes (about 8" diameter) were reported to be ripped open.
Comment: Natural vent path into the hanger. No isolate valves?
At 1445 a second internal explosion of major intensity occurred in the elevator well. Prior to this time it had been reported that brown hydraulic oil covered the deck in the elevator well. Smoke was entering this well in increasing volume through the vent ducts from one or more of the following spaces: - The General Workshop, the I. C. Room, and the I. C. Motor Generator Room. This smoke was noted to be light brown in color.
Speculation: postwar evidence from the Japanese indicated that elevator (lift) wells were natural gathering spots for fuel air mixtures that formed aerosol bombs that detonated inside their own flattoips. needing only an igniter event such as a spark or fire to set off the mix. Since there was a fire casualty in the immediate vicinity of the affected lift, this might have set off the mist on Lexington.
A large fire immediately broke out in the hangar space and the only airplane in this space (located about frame 125) caught fire - probably at the same time. The water curtain at about frame 82 was turned on and was fully effective until the water pressure failed sometime after 1530. Following this explosion all light and auxiliary power circuits in the forward part of the ship failed, as a result of which ventilation to the forward machinery space failed, causing this space to be abandoned in about twenty-five minutes.
Comment: Must have been one hell of a fire to drive the DC parties out of there. Apparently there were DC crews who fought it for some length of time. See previous remarks in report about shortage of breathing apparatus and firefighting suits and portable pumps.
The fires moved aft.
After 1530 an explosion occurred in B-21-4T on the port side of the 2nd deck outboard, which blew out some
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shell plating and smashed one of the uptakes below. This may have been caused by fuel oil vapor.
The remaining part of the engineering plant was secured and abandoned at 1630. At about 1630 two destroyers came alongside and passed two fire hoses apiece up to the flight deck. The pressure in these lines was two low to be really effective.
Comment: Note underlined.
It was reported that the after magazines had all been flooded. Efforts had been made to flood the forward magazines but it was not known whether these measures had been effective. A further attempt was made to flood the forward magazines by flooding with hoses through the forward ammunition trunks.
There were twenty-seven torpedoes on the torpedo mezzanine along the starboard side of the hangar aft which could not be removed due to failure of the torpedo elevator.
These torpedoes were sprinkled continuously until firemain pressure was lost.
There were 1000-pound bombs in the machine shop which were definitely reported under the water which had flooded into this space. There were 100-pound bombs in the bomb-handling room on the middle half deck abaft frame 64.
At 1707 the order was given to abandon ship. All personnel were taken off in good order. A total of 2770 officers and men were safely evacuated to escorting cruisers and destroyers.
Comment: Power failed, pumps failed and attempts to secure or dump live ordnance was rendered impossible. Lexington's captain ordered "Abandon Ship".
At 1727 a large explosion occurred about amidships. Photos were made as this blast occurred. This was followed by a great explosion further aft which was believed to have been caused by detonation of the torpedo warheads. As a result of this explosion the after elevator blew off and several planes parked on the flight deck aft were blown into the air. A photograph was also taken of this explosion.
The ship at this time was still nearly on an even keel with a small list to port and a small trim down by the head.
A destroyer was ordered to sink the LEXINGTON with torpedoes. Two hits were made on the port side with little visible effect, followed by one on the starboard side. The ship finally sank on approximately an even keel about 2000.
At about this same time a violent explosion occurred and the effects were noted by ships as far as twenty miles away.
Comment: Note underlined. The decision to abandon when it was apparent the ordnance could not be secured was the correct decision. The scuttle one might quibble, but as it was a mid-battle situation and the enemy was presumed to be combat capable, it appears to have been correct. Tow out under those conditions was deemed impossible. Nearest suitable allied port was at least 5 days away.
DISCUSSION
All evidence indicates that the violent explosion which occurred at 1247 resulted from an accumulation of gasoline vapor in the I. C. Motor Generator Room, in the presence of operating electrical machinery which was capable of producing electric sparks.
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The exact paths by which the gasoline vapor entered this space are not known, but it is believed that as a result of the torpedo hit in way of the gasoline stowage, small structural leaks permitted a mixture of gasoline and water to enter the I. C. Motor Generator Room directly through the outboard bulkhead and/or into the space below this room from which vapor or gasoline might have worked up through the deck, which had been distorted. It is probable that gasoline also entered the gas pump room and eventually produced vapor in the ventilation supply duct which leads through the after CPO bunk room into the CPO mess room. Gasoline had undoubtedly mixed with water in A-50-V and gasoline vapor had probably risen in the ventilation supply duct which leads from this void into the CPO mess room.
The flash of the explosion undoubtedly entered the gasoline control room, ruptured the vent duct referred to above which passes through this space and caused an explosion in this duct which was transmitted to the duct from A-50-V. The fires in the CPO spaces were reported to have been started from the blast and flame coming from these ducts. Ventilation ducts through General Workshop were also reported to be split open by the explosion but fire did not start there immediately - probably because of the small amount of inflammable material in that space.
It is quite conceivable that the first explosion consumed most of the oxygen in the central station group of spaces, (Comment: This KILLED the damage control party in the vicinity so it was not contained as a mechanical casualty. See previous comment in the report. (^^^) McP.) so that insufficient oxygen remained there to support a fire. There were some indications of carbon monoxide, the presence of which would be expected after an explosion of this kind. Carbon monoxide itself mixed with air in certain proportions is highly explosive. The small explosions which occurred in the area may have been from subsequent accumulations of small amounts of gasoline vapor or of carbon monoxide. The light brown smoke which poured into the elevator well very probably contained carbon monoxide and other unburned gases which may have flashed or become ignited in some manner as soon as they came into the presence of sufficient oxygen.
The main volume of gasoline and water in the port gasoline stowage compartments was not directly exposed to the fire in the early stages, because if the first explosion had ruptured the holding bulkhead inboard of these stowage spaces large quantities of gasoline and water would have poured directly into the I. C. Room, and that room would have been open to the sea.
It is quite possible that the torpedo hit was at rather deep draft, producing greater structural damage in the lower part of the torpedo bulkheads than in the upper part. (The evidence that the TDS utterly failed. McP.) The fact that no one reported torn blister plating in this area is negative evidence suggesting a deep hit. The damage to the holding bulkhead was somewhat greater than would be expected in a five-bulkhead system (My mistake, Lexington had the 5 cell system. McP.) . This is largely attributable to the fact that all - or all but one - of the voids inboard of the gasoline tanks were filled with liquids. If the hit were at deep draft the center of the explosion, because of the form of the hull, would be brought nearer to
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the holding bulkhead and this also would contribute to increased damage of the holding bulkhead. If gasoline and water had leaked through this bulkhead below the I. C. Motor Generator Room - as would be probable with a deep torpedo hit - the subsequent leakage of gasoline or gasoline vapor up through the deck into the I. C. Motor Generator Room would be very probable.
RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of the study of this case the following recommendations were made for immediate application to SARATOGA, and, in so far as applicable, to all other aircraft carriers: -
(1) SARATOGA to keep layer of tanks inboard of gasoline tanks void and filled continuously with inert gas mixture. (NOTE: The first part of this recommendation, to keep these spaces void, had previously been made to both SARATOGA and LEXINGTON). This step should operate to reduce shock damage to the holding bulkhead in case of a torpedo hit in this area.
(2) SARATOGA to segregate port and starboard gasoline systems in order to avoid the possibility of pressure being put on a damaged system from an undamaged system.
(This means installing manual isolate valves and pipe section cutoffs where needed. McP.)
All Carriers: -
(3) In event of suspicion of gasoline vapors following attack operate exhaust ventilation in affected compartments as considered practicable. Early operation of these systems should prevent dangerous concentrations of gasoline vapor.
(4) Shut down all electrical equipment subject to sparking throughout entire affected area, except where it is considered safe and desirable to run exhaust ventilation blowers.
(5) Inspect all vent ducts from spaces involved to guarantee tightness. This should be done periodically before an attack, and again after the attack.
Steps were also taken to insure that the following equipment would be on board each carrier at the earliest possible date: -
(1) 15 asbestos suits
(2) 60 Type A rescue breathing apparatus
(3) 1 Fog nozzle for each fire plug
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[END]
Final comment. It is hard to accuse dead men, who died at their DC stations... of inept damage control. OTOH, the [local] DC party leader who failed to secure those electrical systems in the lower IC room below the elevator well before flooding it with seawater thus created the spark condition for the air-fuel mist in the lift well and CPO mess spaces adjacent made the initial error.
The Lexington went down hard. I note that the lessons learned were already known, so the loss was preventable prior, but NOT DURING Coral Sea.
Details matter.
McP.
en.wikipedia.org
