Alternate Battles of the Civil War

[67th Tigers]

Actually if this had happened, instead of Burnside hurling huge numbers of troops at Lee, McClellan would have been spanked far, far worse than at Second Bull Run. He would have feared Lee had 150,000 men, and between them Longstreet and Jackson would have destroyed the Army of the Potomac.

Erm, all of the above DID ACTUALLY HAPPEN. We're not past of the PoD yet.

However, no. McClellan planned to crush Longstreet, expecting him to be driven back to Gordonsville to await Jackson's Corps. Meanwhile he'd cut lose of the O&A and march onto the R, F and A RR, resupply again and then march onto Richmond proper. Essentially he's intending on taking a similar route to Grant in 1864 (or rather Grant was repeating McClellan's well known plans for the late 1862 campaign).

 

[Snake Featherston]

Erm, all of the above DID ACTUALLY HAPPEN. We're not past of the PoD yet.

However, no. McClellan planned to crush Longstreet, expecting him to be driven back to Gordonsville to await Jackson's Corps. Meanwhile he'd cut lose of the O&A and march onto the R, F and R, resupply again and then march onto Richmond proper. Essentially he's intending on taking a similar route to Grant in 1864 (or rather Grant was repeating McClellan's well known plans for the late 1862 campaign).

Actually what happened was McClellan sat on his ass for several weeks and whined about fatigued horses as he'd been sitting on his ass for several weeks. Mind telling me how he wins the war given that Lee actually *lost* more battles against him than he won, but he didn't even try to seize Richmond or do what Lee did on a matter of course: attack the enemy and try to fight him, even if that means people actually (gasp) die in battles?

As I remember it, Grant, who did not have the feeling that his enemy outnumbered him 9,000:1 was stalemated tactically by Lee, while winning a strategic victory. McClellan, who lost the Seven Days' despite winning every battle then save one, is hardly likely to go past the Wilderness. Not to mention that the two were strategists, but of the night and day kind: McClellan wanted the soft war, an avoiding hard battles and the destruction of enemy armies and focusing on capture of territory were integral to his strategy.

Grant, OTOH, wanted to destroy enemy armies, and to do so by continuous campaigning. He also used the entirety of Union military power to work as a single goal, beyond the capacity of most organizers on either side. Admittedly he mistook Lee for Pemberton and entrusted two of his most key campaigns to bumblers because he actually accepted civilian control of the military, but he could not change those things even if he'd wanted to.

 

[Elfwine]

The question is, assuming the so-called OTL stuff happens (whether that's the real POD or is not the point), how long until McClellan finds an excuse to retreat? How long until he starts howling about being outnumbered and opposed every step of the way by Lincoln?

You'd need a point of departure where McClellan is willing to actually face the reality of his situation - both vs. Lee and his relationship to his superiors - before any possible military campaign of his can succeed.

For him to do what Grant did OTL, or even a plan along the same general lines, he has to grow as a human being so that he can face taking actual risks and accept that his superiors do not have infinite patience with his unending litany of excuses and criticism.

 

[67th Tigers]

The question is, assuming the so-called OTL stuff happens (whether that's the real POD or is not the point), how long until McClellan finds an excuse to retreat? How long until he starts howling about being outnumbered and opposed every step of the way by Lincoln?

You'd need a point of departure where McClellan is willing to actually face the reality of his situation - both vs. Lee and his relationship to his superiors - before any possible military campaign of his can succeed.

For him to do what Grant did OTL, or even a plan along the same general lines, he has to grow as a human being so that he can face taking actual risks and accept that his superiors do not have infinite patience with his unending litany of excuses and criticism.

I think you're confusing the real McClellan with the caricature. Remember, McClellan is the most successful general in the East until Grant.

May I suggest reading Rowland's hardly lauditory book: http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=...&resnum=2&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

[Snake Featherston]

From my Up With the Star timeline, two battles:

The Battle of Dalton (July) 1864:

As part of the Union campaigns of 1864, Grant had sent Union cavalry under General Phil Sheridan to join the Western armies in Georgia again. Sheridan had been ordered to disembark near the city of Dalton, where he had gained 6,000 fresh mounts courtesy of the Union's improved logistical position there. Upon arrival the next day, however, he was surprise-attacked in the morning by an exhausted, outnumbered force of Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry.

Despite being outnumbered and undergunned, the sheer shock of the attack, plus Forrest's formidable reputation led during the day to a desperate defensive battle and for most of the day the Confederate attackers, fighting as dragoons against a Union formation mostly in disarray had come within a hair's breadth of winning.

Then a shot from a Spencer Carbine hit General Forrest in the jaw, at which point the superior Union numbers and Sheridan's exploitation of the sudden psychological advantage resulted in Confederate cavalry fleeing headlong.

24 hours later General Forrest was dead.

________________________

The Second Battle of Goldsboro: July 16-17:

At the First Battle of Goldsboro, General Franz Sigel's Germans had won a major victory that had led to the unfortunate result of Sigel having grown overconfident. Expecting that he could defeat anything the Confederates threw at him, Sigel spread out his troops across a wider region than was sensible, and in one supremely foolish mistake neglected entrenchments.

In his testimony before the Joint Committee on Conduct of the War, General Sigel said that he expected to resume the attack in a day or two and expected the Confederates would not dare attack him now, when they had failed to keep much larger armies out of Richmond. As it was, however, Confederate general Jubal Anderson Early had set his troops up for a large-scale pair of attacks, and in the first day's engagement on the 15th managed to send one of Sigel's widest-scattered formations back with the rest of his troops.

On the 16th, Early launched in classic Army of Northern Virginia style an aggressive attack on Sigel's larger army. However the magic touch was gone, and in the attack while Early ended up weakening Sigel's army to the point that he could not push further south for a few weeks, the death toll among officers and enlisted men was such that this, the "last battle of Lee's army" was a Confederate tactical victory but a strategic defeat.

 

[River of Death]

Chickamauga, September 19-20, 1863

POD: Colonel John Wilder was promoted to Brigadier General for his outstanding work during the Tullahoma Campaign.

-- time skip --

At about 1 PM on September 20, General Wilder rode north with his brigade of mounted infantry, armed with 7-shot Spencer repeating Carbines. He recently heard the sounds of ighting suddenly shift to the west - bad news for him as that probably meant the Union line had given way. He arrived just in time to hit some of Hindman's and Hood's people in the left flank, disorganizing them, and giving the broken remnants of Sheridan's and Davis' divisions time to retreat along with the whole XXth and XXIst corps supply trains.

Then up rode Assistant Secretary of War Charles Dana. He had just come from where the breakthrough occured and was quite lost. After inquiring of Wilder's command, he demanded that Wilder escort him and the supply trains back to Chattanooga, believing the battle to be lost.

iOTL: Colonel Wilder, unsure of the authority of this civilian, reluctantly agreed to an extent. He provided the escort, then remained behind and allowed another thousand-odd stragglers to not be captured, as well as the large Union hospital at Crawfish Springs. But he had really wanted to go on the attack, he and his men believing that the could break right through the Confederate lines.

iTTL: General Wilder tells off this frightened blubbering idiot in no uncertain terms. He provides a small escort for the man to get back to Chattanooga, then sets up his men as he planned to attack: 1 regiment each facing right and left moving forward obliquely, 3 stacked regiments facing forward. All of his men were on foot but had plenty of ammunition.

The Confederate advance, by this time, had stalled in the Dyer field, a victim of its own success. With most of the Union right wing in full retreat, it was taking time for the Confederates to reorient their lines to the north, in the direction of the rest of the Union army. There was no coordination - Hood having just been wounded again. General Kershaw, commanding Hood's division, was moving northward unsupported, and broke one line of Union artillery, but was then slowed and disorganized by a valiant stand by Harker's brigade. Meanwhile, Generals Brannan, Negley, and Wood were using the bought time to rally a scratch line on Snodgrass Hill and the ridge to the west.

Wilder's attack was a complete surprise and hit the newly forming Condeferate lines in the rear. He breaks through, near the junction of Kershaw's and Bushrod Johnson's divisions. In the process his men are flanked on both sides and so suffer heavy casualties. But they inflict as bad as they take, with no organized resistance to their front and the ability to fire seven times before reloading. They reach the Snodgrass homestead dimished in number but supremely high in morale, and with 2 Confederate brigades shattered behind them.

General Thomas, running over from the main line in the Kelly Field, sees these developments. With many heartfelt thanks to Wilder, he asks him to hold the extreme right of the Union line, along the wooded Horseshoe Ridge. The next unit in line is the 21st Ohio, which ironically is armed with Colt 5-shot revolving rifles, an experimental hybrid weapons.

Wilder's men, plus the 21st, easily face off Johnson's division for the first few assaults, while the rest of the line deals with Kershaw's and McLaws' uncoordinated attacks. Union General Granger arrives with a division of the reserve corps and is told to relieve some of Brannan's men facing Kershaw. This in turn frees them up to take over for Wilder, who in turn shifts even farther to the west to counter the later assaults of Preston's division.

What utimately decides the conflict is ammunition - the Confederates have more on hand, and after desperately fighting all afternoon, the Union's supply is exhausted. Thomas conducts the retreat, which is for the most part orderly, though a few units do get lost/left behind/captured. The Confederates are in little condition to pursue.

---

The result: The Confederates take maybe up to 1000 more casualties than iOTL, the Union *possibly* up to 500 more (Wilder was just substituting for Granger on the ridge, so his division doesn't lose 25% casualties on the OTL flank counterattack - this partially offsets his losses for the northward attack).

What is significant is the decisive role played by the repeating rifles of all sorts. Thomas is effusive in his praise for the weapons, as are all the other Generals who serve on Horseshoe Ridge.

Also, if Wilder continues to show such good service in the Chattanooga Campaign (perhaps facing off Wheeler during the October raid), he may get promoted again, to Major General. If that happens he has a significant role in the cavalry for the 1864 campaigns.

So 2 major changes: 1st: Wilder vs. Forrest, with the Union cavalry armed with repeaters a year early. He certainly seems at least as good as anyone else in the Union cavalry arm in the west (we'll quibble about Sheridan elsewhere - but of course at the time, Sheridan was a division commander of infantry).

2nd: May be harder to pull off - but it would be cool to see a large-scale rearming of Union infantry with repeating rifles in time for the 1864 campaigns. If that happens the TL could go anywhere, including beyond the war.

 

[Valus36]

Alternate Battle of Ft. Donelson

The Confederates succesfully breakout of Grant's seige and after holding open the road that lead south to Nashville, the enitre command slips out in the night and joins Johnston at Nashville and who continues to Cornith where he reorganizes his army. With the ft. donelson garrison, Johnston's force and other reinforcments sent to him (including Van Dorn's men), Johnston goes on the offensive and on April 6th, with some 70,000 men, he suprises Grant's 40,000 men at Shiloh. After heavy fighting, Johnston delivers the knock out blow when he directs Van Dorn's men to attack up the side of the Tennesse and cut off Grant from Pittsburgh Landing, forcing Grant's men back toward Owl's Creek where they were latter destroyed.

After his victory at Shiolh, Johnston turns his attention toward Buell's 18,000 man army of the Ohio and decisivly defeats it at the Battle of Franklin, TN. With no federal army left in Tennessee, Johnston recaptures Nashville on April 22nd, 1862. The effect of this reverse of Union arms prompts Lincoln to cancell McClelan's Peninsula Offensive and transfers three entire corps to Lousiville to help regain the federal momemtum Lincoln appoints John Pope to command them. In May, Johnston, with an army of 65,000 men reinvades Kentucky and meets Pope at the Battle of Mundfordville on May 15th, and beats the tar out of him. Pope's army disintergrates and flees back to Louisville where Johnston besiges it. Pope surrenders on June 2nd, 1862. This sents shockwaves throughout the north. Johnston follows up his victory by crossing the Ohio into Indiana on June 12th.

In the east, Joe Johnston and Stonewall Jackson take the offensive and soundly beats McClellan at 2nd Manassas (McClelan, having not been able to embark for the Peninsula, is forced by Lincoln to invade Virgina from the north). When Johnston is wounded at the closing of 2nd Bull Run, Robert E. Lee is put in charge. Lee reorganizes his army and after a weeks rest, invades Maryland on May 12th, 1862. Lincoln appoints Burnside to command the army but to no availe as he is beaten in the decisive Battle of Fredrick, MY on May 30th, 1862. By July, after destroying the last peices of the federal Army, Lee occupies Philadelphia, PN. Forced to accept defeat, the Union Surrenders on July 4th, 1862. The Confederate States of America is born.

 

[67th Tigers]

To continue:

By the 10th November Lee had arrived with Stuart’s cavalry and was desperately trying to prompt Jackson into moving south to concentrate against McClellan, whilst simultaneously warning him that McClellan may suddenly turn west and strike him. This confusion cause Jackson to stay still. (As per the OTL, for all Lee’s prompting Jackson took ten days to actually get moving OTL). Longstreet’s Corps had about 30,000 infantry effectives, whilst Stuart had about 7,000 cavalry. Jackson in the Valley had about 29,000 infantry effectives. Both were well supported by artillery*.

On the 10th Lee directed Stuart and Longstreet to drive off the Federal cavalry now occupying Brandy Station. Longstreet dispatched a division (McLaws’) to support Stuart. What resulted was the (ITTL) Battle of Brandy Station.

Stuart’s cavalry had a problem. The sore tongue that had bedevilled the Federal cavalry in September and October had broken out amongst his horses, and he could only mount a few thousand troopers**. His cavalry was overmatched by the Federals, and he hoped McLaws’ infantry would give him the advantage. Pleasonton brought up Bayard’s cavalry from Rappahanock Station and repulsed Stuart and McLaws in a mixture of mounted and dismounted action, supported by superior artillery (as per the OTL).

Convinced now that Longstreet was right, Lee decided not to chance being assaulted at Culpepper, and withdrew to Gordonsville and sent more letters demanding Jackson start marching immediately, which Jackson had little interest in obeying.

McClellan’s plans meanwhile where to seize the crossing over the Rappahanock at Falmouth to Fredericksburg. Knowing that if he menaced Lee at Gordonsville that he would not be able to shift east to Fredericksburg, but being too shrewd to place a detachment between Longstreet and Jackson where it may be crushed McClellan planned to hold Longstreet in place whilst shifting base with one wing, then march southeast and concentrate astride the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Alexandria Railroad. Thus on the 11th November Porter commanding the 5th and 6th Corps marched southeast to Fredericksburg with the engineers. 1st, 2nd and 9th Corps moved to concentrate on Rappahanock station through to Waterloo under Burnside, whilst the concentrating 3rd Corps, and 11th Corps were held around Manassas and Bristoe junction ready to block any move by Jackson onto the Federal rear. When Sumner returned he was given command of this wing.

Porter’s advanced elements reached Falmouth on the 13th November, bridged it on the 14th and Porter had occupied Fredericksburg by the 15th. Lee had no option but to plan a movement behind the North Anna to occupy Hanover junction. His letters to Jackson became increasingly desperate, and Jackson finally broke camp on the 17th and began marching southwest up the valley. Cautious about the possibility of getting caught between the two like Pope at Manassas, McClellan feinted to his front, then changed base again to Fredericksburg. By the 21st he was concentrated at Fredericksburg and on the 22nd started marching south.

Meanwhile Lee was held in strategic impotence. He could not oppose McClellan with just Longstreet. Jackson’s Corps arrived on the 22nd November, the day 5th Corps occupied Milford station. The two armies then raced to Hanover Court House, but McClellan was simply closer. Lee sent Stuart ahead to secure the crossing points on the North Anna, but the river was unfortunately not defensible and the far bank (McClellan’s) was much higher than the home bank. Stuart could not stop Porter and Franklin from crossing the river. Lee’s only hope was to drive Porter across into the North Anna before the rest of McClellan’s forces could arrive.

On the 23rd Lee advanced against Porter’s forces, who had occupied a position between the North Anna and Little River with Ox Ford to their right (exactly the positions the OTL Hill’s Corps would occupy in 1864, military geography is fairly constant). Lee had no option but to throw in Longstreet’s Corps in a bloody frontal assault, which was repelled with heavy Confederate casualties. In the afternoon Lee tried again with Jackson’s arriving forces but despite a brief glimmer of hope, was repelled again when 3rd and 11th Corps reinforced the Federal line. By the night of the 23rd Lee had suffered 15,000 casualties and a Federal army was now firmly between him and Richmond.

* From Lee’s field returns, OR1, 19(2), 713

** This is as per the OTL. The difference in attitude of their two governments is what is mt notable here. Lincoln made epigrams and practiced his wit, whilst Davis immediately ordered the purchase of fresh horses.

 

[Elfwine]

One has to wonder what inspired McClellan in this timeline that was so conspicuously absent OTL. And for that matter why Jackson is playing balky and uncooperative.

 

[67th Tigers]

One has to wonder what inspired McClellan in this timeline that was so conspicuously absent OTL. And for that matter why Jackson is playing balky and uncooperative.

I didn't really depart from known plans etc. until the North Anna. Burnside was prettymuch just following McClellan's plans, although with a one week pause while the politics was sorted out (Lincoln wanted to have his say so on the battle plan) and with the assumption that McClellan didn't sent his bridging train away. The speed of movement is as OTL Burnsides move (although without a pause), the speed of getting the bridging train across is as OTL (but with the noted caveat) and Jackson in fact moves a bit faster here than OTL!

Jackson was really slow moving OTL. Lee orders him to move on the 8th November to concentrate with him, but he doesn't break camp until the 20th. He wouldn't reach the original designated concentration point until 25th or 26th.

 

[Elfwine]

Known plans are one thing. Historical behavior is another.

McClellan could plan up a storm. What is up for question is his ability to execute.

 

[67th Tigers]

Known plans are one thing. Historical behavior is another.

McClellan could plan up a storm. What is up for question is his ability to execute.

Pretty much did execute his plans OTL. He was a pretty successful General, that's why he made it to the top. As was said of him; "McClellan was too good a man to command an army in this country."

Care to guess who said that?

 

[Elfwine]

Pretty much did execute his plans OTL. He was a pretty successful General, that's why he made it to the top. As was said of him; "McClellan was too good a man to command an army in this country."

Care to guess who said that?

I'll stick with giving a at anyone who believes that.

I think I prefer this quote:

“If anything can try the patience and courage of troops it must be their fighting all day for five consecutive days and then falling back every night.”

One has to wonder how a general who would inspire such words could fight the sort of campaign capable of crippling the ANV.

 

[robertp6165]

Several factual corrections.

15 lb was the "full charge" for the 11" Dahlgren. There was no "half charge" authorised. There was no 30 lb charge in existence then or ever, the USN never approved the load (but did later approve a 20 lb charge). Experiments showed that 30 lbs of No. 7 powder would weaken and burst the gun very quickly, and the British acquired an 11" Dahlgren and tried 30 lbs of powder behind a chilled iron (armour piercing) shot. It failed to produce any effect against the Warrior target, even at 30 yds.

In the Atlanta vs Weehaken encounter the 11" charged with *15 lbs* failed to dent Atlanta's armour. The 15" cored shot charged with 35 lbs (the "far or battering" charge) did not achieve full penetration either. Of the three 15" fired one was stopped by the armour (weaker than Virginia's) but dislodged the backing, causing splintering, another hit the top of the pilothouse and dislodged it, whilst the third missed (at 100 yds against a stationary target). Atlanta struck because she was stuck on a sandbar and couldn't bring her guns to bear, making resistance pointless.

If Monitor had loaded 30 lb loads then one of the guns would have burst rather quickly, effectively destroying Monitor and leading to a CS victory.

Your data is at variance with the U.S. Navy's own tests.

 

[67th Tigers]

Your data is at variance with the U.S. Navy's own tests.

Erm, no it isn't. Did you read the article?

It mentions the proofing (which was upto 25 lbs, as I mentioned) and then mentions Dahlgren's own private tests. These weren't USN tests, and their own tests came to different conclusions than the manufacturer trying to stop the USN's conversion to 15" on the Rodman/ Columbiad pattern, for which he received no royalties.

The 15" was just about adequate against 4" laminate (but failed against 6"). The 11" was a no-hoper.

 

[robertp6165]

Erm, no it isn't. Did you read the article?

It mentions the proofing (which was upto 25 lbs, as I mentioned) and then mentions Dahlgren's own private tests. These weren't USN tests, and their own tests came to different conclusions than the manufacturer trying to stop the USN's conversion to 15" on the Rodman/ Columbiad pattern, for which he received no royalties.

Yes, I did read it, evidently better than you did. It states that the tests spoken of in the article were conducted under authority of the US Navy Chief of Ordnance, Captain Andrew A. Harwood. The tests were performed using targets constructed by the Washington Navy Yard under orders from the Navy Department. Sounds like U.S. Navy tests to me.

Also, you make it sound like Dahlgren was trying to rig the tests in favor of his guns. The article does not indicate that at all. It says, in fact...

Experiments with ordnance against armored targets were conducted several days per month at the Pencote Battery through the summer and fall of 1862. Mechanics and laborers from the Washington Navy Yard constructed a wide variety of targets, made from varying thicknesses of iron plates bolted to a wooden backing, sometimes interlaced with scrap iron, railroad rails, cable, or inch-thick sheets of rubber. Many of these targets were, in fact, armor systems designed by private inventors. Mostly, however, the targets consisted of a 4- to 4.5-inch thick iron faceplate, bolted to about 20 inches of wood, sometimes with an inch-thick iron back plate, set up against a solid bank of clay. These thicknesses corresponded to those reported on Confederate and European ironclads.

Furthermore, it states that...

Dahlgren himself was absent most of the time. Lieutenant Commander William Mitchell, recently assigned to ordnance duty, supervised the tests, recorded data, and reported results to Dahlgren, who was often too busy filling ordnance requisitions, designing cannon, overseeing ordnance production, running the Washington Navy Yard, and testing civilians’ inventions to cross the bridge to the Pencote Battery. For each test, Mitchell noted the date; dimensions, composition, and angle of the target; gun fired; type of projectile fired; type and weight of powder charge; range to the target; and number of rounds fired, as well as the effect of each shot on the target. His reports included detailed colored drawings, showing the damage inflicted by each round.
Commander Mitchell fired 11-incher no. 214 with twenty-five-pound charges at the first four targets. On 28 May, he upped the ante and began firing the 11-incher with thirty-pound charges. Thereafter, he fired no. 214 exclusively with thirty-pound charges. By 18 November, the gun had been fired a total of 157 times. In most cases, the shot penetrated clean through the target and embedded itself deep in the clay bank, even with the target angled as steeply as fifteen degrees.

So the article does show that the tests were conducted using the best available simulation of the armor which was expected to be encountered at the time. And it shows that tests...in fact, the vast majority of the tests on the 11 inch gun...were conducted using 30 pound charges, and that those charges were shown to be effective against a target armored very much like the VIRGINIA was armored.

Edit...BTW, regarding your comment about the 11 inch not penetrating the WARRIOR target...the WARRIOR's 4-inch solid rolled iron plates, tongued and grooved together, were far, far superior to what the VIRGINIA had, which was relatively crude composite armor bolted together. To imply that because RN tests showed an 11-inch Dahlgren gun couldn't penetrate the HMS WARRIOR out to 30 yards range does not in any way prove that the same gun couldn't have punched right through the VIRGINIA's armor using 30 pound charges at an equally close range (and at the battle of Hampton Roads, the ranges were sometimes much closer than 30 yards. The vessels were in physical contact at times).

 

[River of Death]

Chancellorsville +, disputed ~ May 2-3, 1863

On April 30, when Lee finally recognizes that Hooker has outflanked him with at least 3 corps, orders McLaws and 3 of Jackson's 4 divisions to go west to join with Anderson to face the main Union body. Barksdale's brigade, as in OTL remains behind.

PoD: When Jackson chooses which division to leave behind, he recalls almost a year of constant infighting and arguable insubordination by willful Major General A. P. Hill. He therefore orders the Light Division of Hill to remain behind at the bluffs overlooking Fredericksburg, and takes his other 3 divisions, commanded by Rodes, Colston, and Early, westward.

Hill had 2 more brigades than Early, so this action has many possible changes.

Potential Interesting Outcome 1: Hill manages to hold on at Fredericksburg against Sedgewick's assaults. This means no May 4 rushing of troops eastward by Lee to confront Sedgewick. It also means an even more demoralized and mentally defeated Hooker. Possible sub-outcomes include Lee turning an even larger force eastward in an attempt to crush Sedgewick against the Rappahannock River, which may or may not work. Or Lee taking solace from his protected flank to make a large May 4 assault on Hooker's main position, which almost definitely will not work.

Potential Interesting Outcome 2: Since Hill's division was last in the line of march for Jackson's flank attack, Early being there instead will not greatly change his brilliant collapsing of the XIth corps. It may change the mid-day pursuit of Sickles and the IIIrd corps near Catherine's Furnace, but that shouldn't be too big, barring huge butterflies.

More interesting is the May 3rd attack after Jackson's wounding. It was a very hard-fought battle on that day with heavy casualties on both sides - up until Hooker's effective incapacitance there was no guarantee of Confederate success. Under such circumstances, having 2 fewer brigades becomes important. Possibly Hooker and the AotP redeem themselves fighting defensively this day. If Early cannot extend far enough to the right to get to Hazel Grove and therefore link up with Lee, the Confederate attacks fail.

In such a circumstance, the battle can continue from there in one of any number of intriguing directions, including Union offensives and/or Lee crushing his army against ever-strengthening Union breastworks.

Potential Interesting Outcome 3: iOTL, not only was Jackson shot by his own men. So was A. P. Hill, and he was unable to command his men on May 3rd - Heth took over his division. That was why JEB Stuart had to take command, because the only experienced division commander on the scene was also wounded.

If Early is there instead of Hill it is entirely possible that iTTL be will not be wounded. If that happens then he definitely will take temporary command of Jackson's corps. I see no inherent reason for him to do better or worse than Stuart iOTL, barring some other butterflies.

What is interesting here is what happens after Chancellorsville. Lee is short at least 1 corps commander, possibly 2 if he does decide to split Jackson's corps up. Early has just demonstrated that he has the aptitude to command a corps, and after Hill he is the seniormost division commander in the II corps.

So imagine the Gettysburg campaign with Early in command of the II corps. Or even more fun additionally, imagine Hill still commanding his division and Ewell returning to command the newly organized III corps (since you can't place Hill under Early, but I believe Ewell is senior to him).

---

If anyone wants to expand on any of these ideas (I came up with these very briefly), you can take all the credit.

 

[Elfwine]

Some thoughts to add to what you posted, in the order they came to me:

1) Ewell is senior to A.P. Hill (and obviously Early).

2) Why would A.P. Hill hold Sedgewick off? OTL yes he has six brigades and Early has four, but I'm not sure how large they are relative to Early's offhand. (must check this). And didn't Lee detach Wilcox or someone else as well as Barksdale?

Could happen, yes, but bears thinking about before anyone runs with it, hence posting this.

3) Early vs. Stuart would be interesting. My money is on Stuart, if one had to guess whether Early would do better than Stuart OTL. Early seems OTL to have been poor at managing multiple divisions at once.

4) See point #2 in regards to the number of brigades and joining up with Lee. This may or may not matter. On the other hand, it certainly could...

5) Heth's Brigade, the luckless brigade of the ANV (first known as Field's) will probably be in better shape in this timeline. I'm not sure if that matters, but its worth noting - particularly since it doesn't get stuck with Colonel Not So Good (Brockenborough) again.

 

[midnight77]

Battle of Richmond: Final stand of Lee's army and various civilian militia. It was the death knell of the CSA. Saw the final evolution of Union tactics regarding the use of machine guns and breechloading artillery. Similar tactics would be used by the Germans in the First and Second Great Wars. Saw the complete destruction of Brig. Gen. A. J. Williams' division; which included the famed 1st U.S. Colored Regiment as well as the 3rd Pennsylvania Volunteers and the 1st North Carolina Loyalists. 8964 men went in, 392 came out. (This relates to a timeline I started and wish I could finish. However, my writing disability clamped down full force.)

 

[67th Tigers]

What is interesting here is what happens after Chancellorsville. Lee is short at least 1 corps commander, possibly 2 if he does decide to split Jackson's corps up. Early has just demonstrated that he has the aptitude to command a corps, and after Hill he is the seniormost division commander in the II corps.

So imagine the Gettysburg campaign with Early in command of the II corps. Or even more fun additionally, imagine Hill still commanding his division and Ewell returning to command the newly organized III corps (since you can't place Hill under Early, but I believe Ewell is senior to him).

---

If anyone wants to expand on any of these ideas (I came up with these very briefly), you can take all the credit.

Early is far too junior. If Ewell is unavailable, and AP Hill is down then the next two in seniority in his army are McLaws and Anderson.

BTW: Lee's "two corps" organisation was always temporary, at least until he could divest himself of DH Hill and get AP Hill in post. Preparations to divide the army into 3 Corps were underway before Chancellorsville.