AHC: Strong post-war Royal Navy?

[NOMISYRRUC]

FWIW I think the improvements in the period 1945-50 have to be behind the scenes.

In the case of aircraft carriers what I think would have helped a lot is to accelerate the development of the steam catapult and angled flight deck.

AFAIK the steam catapult was first proposed in 1936 when there was no need for it and it is 9 years before the POD anyway. However, I want greater priority to have been put into its development after 1945 so that the trials of BXS-1 aboard HMS Perseus could have been brought forward from 1951 to 1947.

It would have helped a lot if someone had thought of the angled flight deck instead of the flexible deck so that the TTL AFD trials would have taken place on Warrior in 1948 instead of 1952 on Triumph as OTL.

• Eagle would still be completed in 1951, but she would have a pair of BS.4 steam catapults with 151ft shuttle runs in the bows and a 5½ degree angled flight deck. Or put another way the same configuration as Ark Royal in 1955 IOTL, less the angled flight deck. She would still have had her 1959-64 refit;
• Albion, Bulwark and Centaur would still be completed 1953-54, but they would have a pair of BS.4 steam catapults in the bows and a 5½ degree angled flight deck;
• IOTL in about 1950 Ark Royal was expected to be completed at the end of 1952 to the same design as Eagle. In the end she was completed in 1955 with a pair of steam catapults and an interim angled flight deck. However, ITTL I think she would have been completed in 1955 with an 8-degree angled flight deck and possibly more powerful steam catapults than OTL, i.e. a 151ft unit in the bows and a 199ft unit in the waist. This was effectively the same configuration as Ark Royal after 1967-70 refit of OTL. ITTL I think she would have been refitted 1964-66 (instead of Hermes) and been upgraded to the same standard as Eagle in her 1959-64 refit. That was the actual plan IOTL, but it was abandoned due to the cost. However, ITTL the work required to bring her up to the same standard as Eagle was less extensive and therefore less expensive;
• My preference is that Hermes would have been cancelled in 1946. However, IOTL the plan in 1950-51 was that she would be completed in 1955. In the event work on her resumed in 1952 and was completed in 1959 at the then astronomical cost of £37½ million (I suspect that this might be a typo in the source document). I'm unsure that the earlier development of steam catapults and the angled flight deck would have accelerated her completion and if it did she might not have received the Type 984 radar, CDS and DPT;
• Similarly my preference is that plans to rebuild the Illustrious class would have been abandoned before 1950 instead of about 1954 as IOTL. According to Friedman steam catapults were to have been fitted to Victorious before her 1950-58 refit began and the decision to incorporate a fully angled flight deck was made in July 1953. ITTL the decision would have been made in July 1949, but I doubt that it would have reduced the time to it took to rebuild her or reduce the cost of the rebuild. The decision to fit the Type 984 radar, CDS and DPT was also taken in 1953 IOTL I can't think of a way of accelerating their development by 4 years ITTL.
• I would like to say that the earlier development of the angled flight deck and steam catapult would advance the completion of HMAS Melbourne from 1955 to 1951 which would allow for HMAS Sydney to be modernised 1951-55. I would also like to say that it allowed HMCS Bonaventure to be completed in 1953 instead of 1957 and for HMCS Magnificent to have been modernised 1953-57. Unfortunately that's unlikely. However, the Dutch might have fitted a steam catapult and angled flight deck to Karel Doorman 4 years earlier and the French might have fitted a steam catapult and better angled flight deck to Arromanches.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

FWIW I would not change very much in the 1945-50 period.

The not very much would be to cancel Hermes, Tiger, Blake and Lion outright in 1946 instead of suspending them. The catalyst would be an even more austere Austerity era.

There were 4 Battle class that had reached the launching stage that were laid up incomplete and then scrapped in the early 1950s. I would cancel them outright in 1946 too.

That wouldn't save any money in the period 1945-50 or release any shipyard workers or materials required to accelerate the completion of the Eagle, Ark Royal, Albion, Bulwark, Centaur and the 8 Darings.

Finally I'd also have the Admiralty abandon its plans to rebuild the Illustrious class before 1949 because it realised that the cost of turning the into satisfactory ships was not that much less than new ships of the same size.

Eagle was laid down in October 1942 and launched in March 1946.

Ark Royal in spite of being laid down six months after her sister wasn't launched until May 1950, which was 50 months after she was laid down. This was because work proceeded at a much slower rate and stopped altogether at times.

I want to amend Post 360 by saying that the more austere Austerity era forced Ark Royal to be suspended in 1946 instead of construction continuing at a snails pace. She was resumed in 1952, launched in 1953 and completed in 1959, effectively taking the place of Hermes IOTL.

This would have allowed Ark Royal to be completed to the same standard as Eagle after her 1959-64 refit except that she wouldn't have had the 6 Sea Cat launchers and CDS would have been fitted instead of ADA.

OTOH she would have been superior to Eagle in other ways. For example she would have been completed with an all AC electrical system instead of the complicated and barely adequate AC/DC system that Eagle had in 1964. Eagle was also to have had her existing 4" armoured deck replaced by a lighter 1.5" NC armour, but this was deleted for cost reasons. ITTL Ark Royal would have been completed with a 1.5" NC armoured deck.

Eagle would still have her 1959-64 refit.

Ark Royal would follow in 1964-67 taking the place of Hermes. The refit should have included Phantomisation, fitting 6 Sea Cat launchers and replacing the CDS with ADA.

Eagle would then be refitted 1967-70 using the money spent on Ark Royal's OTL Phantomisation refit. This would be an equivalent to the USN's FRAM refits of the 1960s. The ship would be Phantomised, but most of the money would have been spent on things like refurbishing the machinery, plus fitting an AC electrical system and the lighter flight deck armour which were to have been part of her 1959-64 refit but were deleted on cost grounds.

In 1970 ITTL Eagle was Phantomised, Ark Royal had better electronics than OTL and both ships aught to have been in better material condition. IOTL Hermes remained in service with the Royal Navy until IIRC 1984 and as the TTL Ark Royal effectively takes her place she might last this long too. Eagle might be able to last that long too because of her 1967-70 FRAM/SLEP refit.

However, what is more likely to happen is that Ark Royal is paid off in 1972 (instead of Eagle) and Eagle is run on until 1978 (instead of Ark Royal) unless there is a significant improvement to the UK's economic performance. Furthermore in my TL there would also be 4 Argus class aircraft carriers laid down 1950-54 and completed 1958-61 and if more money was available it would be more cost effective to run them on until the early 1980s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Don't like GAEL, too small -not even SQUID LIMBO -No future. million pounds each mid -lat 40s.

The Admiralty wanted to order more Darings instead of the Gaels, but the slipways were too short.

Similarly more Battles would have been ordered instead of the Weapon class, but the slipways were too short.

Ditto the Castle class corvettes, which were only built because the slipways were too short for the Loch class frigate.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

http://navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_dd_battle_3.htm

THIRD BATTLE GROUP = 1.8 million pounds already spent 45/46 . to completed ALL 8 should be additional 6.2 million pounds late 1940s . IE million pounds each , when DARING costs were 1.25 million each at the same time.

SECOND BATTLE group.10 million pounds already invested for 16 BATTLE by 45/46 plus another 6 million pounds to complete late by 1940s.

First BATTLE GROUP . 16 BATTLE Mostly completed by VE day , with additional 2.7 million pounds.

http://navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_dd_battle_1.htm

http://navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_dd_battle_1.htm8 of the 1943 Battles (2nd group) actually being ordered to the same design as Anzac and Torbruk is news to me.

Also the cancellation dates from my sources are not the same as yours. That is the 16 (out of 40 ships that were ordered) that were cancelled, were all cancelled on 23rd October 1945 instead of December 1945 in your source.

My sources are that 7 Weapons were cancelled in October 1945, one in November 1945, 2 in December 1945 and 2 in January 1946.

 

[Riain]

Personally I think that no matter what course was taken in the 40s the real crunch would occur in the 60s, that was when the decisions to demote the RN were taken.

My question is what decisions were/could be taken in the 40s and early 50s that could put Britain in a better position during the 60s crunch time?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Personally I think that no matter what course was taken in the 40s the real crunch would occur in the 60s, that was when the decisions to demote the RN were taken.

My question is what decisions were/could be taken in the 40s and early 50s that could put Britain in a better position during the 60s crunch time?

As I've written in recent posts...

1. Find a way to accelerate the development of the steam catapult and angled fight deck so that Eagle, Albion, Bulwark and Centaur could be completed to "Standard C" instead of "Standard D";
2. Cancel Hermes, Tiger, Blake Lion and even Ark Royal in 1946;
3. Abandon plans to modernise the Illustrious class by 1949.

Build as many new "Standard A or B" aircraft carriers as possible in the 1950s using the money saved by numbers 2 and 3 of the above. Either the 1952 Carrier or a smaller design of 35,000 tons. These ships wouldn't wear out until the 1980s so there would be no need for the CVA.01 project in the 1960s and therefore no cancellation in February 1966.

On the other side of the coin the performance of the British economy has to be improved so that HM Treasury can find the money to build three "proper" aircraft carriers instead of the OTL Invincible class.

That is something along the lines of this...
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/argus-class-aircraft-carrier-hms-glorious.414501/

 

[PSL]

Actually according to Friedman - in exercise it was shown RN CV battle groups 1948 with AIO their network could be saturated by a dozen or more inbound threats PER HOUR . Quickly processing increased through CDS tracks to 24 and 48 , but each plotting station could only handle a few tracks at a time and there was no system to prioritize THREATS other than the officer control. NTDS had all the data on one computer allowing easier prioritizing threats. Analogue system like APS /CAMBRIA could handle 6 target tracks , which was in RN service late 1950s. But it was limited to just a few big ships.


Early 50s exercises and war-games showed 75% bombers detected by ship radar @ 53nm , while AEW detected ½ intruders 20-50nm,however 15% went undetected. In another exercise ¾ of the raiders went unopposed,while in a 1956 exercise ½ to 2/3 of the raiders were detected at 55-80nm but ¼ were not actually intercepted until 15-25nm from the taskforce. In some cases ¾ of the CAP was assigned to intercepe friendly aircraft as targets. Reportedly 30% of raiders were 'shot down', while 30% got through to hit most of the ships in the task force.



It took Canadian DATAR digital experiments in 50s to show how this networks could handle 64 targets in an 80 x 80 mile area . They became consultants for NTDS but there were still many steps along the way. USN had DLG that had 4 tracking stations on ship that could handle no more than 5 tracks each at one time. Human was the weakest link. USN exercise in mid 50s showed 3 tracker/plotter systems could handle up to 15 inbound. but exercises in the 1960s showed even with modern gear only ¼ of the raiders were intercepted while each raider generated 4 boggy reports from the task force search systems [information overload?]. In one exercise ½ of the missiles fired at raiders 'shot' down 'friendlies'. In 4 exercises only 27% +/-7% of the raiders were 'shot down'.



NTDS could continuously support task group operations since every ship in the NET had the same data and was updated at the same time. It was no problem to switched FLAG from one ship to another as a result of combat losses. Distribution of fire was controlled but it was mainly focused on fleet air defence driven by the WW-II Kamikaze experiences. As the NTDS fleet expanded each ship was able to handle nearly 6 times as many tracks as non NTDS warships, however VIETNAM WAR slowed funding. Only 30 ships had NTDS installed by 1964. It also seems the existing USN WDS could [through link-11] provide FC Solutions for another task force ship especially for ASROC , including helicopter dipping sonar.



While the RN had ADA featuring a number of small plotting stations tapped into separated AAA, ASW or surface stations - were also limited to several tracks each and this took up large part of the hulls volume including CIC etc. WDS linked all various ship weapons together for easy control plus easy block upgrades and thus large leaps in capability , without replacing the warships. Little need for block replacement



The RN preferred radio silence so they avoided all the LINKS until HMS SHEFFIELD was hit by EXOCET in 1982, because its RWR was turned off . After the FALKLANDS , the RN finally adopted LINK 11 to NTDS , fleet wide. LINK 11 could have saved HMS SHEFFIELD.



In the 1960s the British CDS & ADA systems could work as link between an aircraft carrier and an COUNTY class DDG escort , but that's it. In the 1970s the CAAIS was deployed allowing only CAAIS equipped warship ship sonar in the task force to provide targeting data for another CAAIS equipped ASW weapon [MATCH]. But CAAIS could only track 60 targets in a 48 x 48 Nm, while NTDS could track 200 targets in a 512 x 512 nm area.

Without a network - NATO battle groups , would be massacred by combined strikes from bomber squadrons SSGN squadrons and Soviet surface action groups.

These networks alleviate the need for block fleet replacements. Far too much attention is focused on the warship and technology and not enough on the larger picture that can only be provided by these 'NETWORKS'.

 

[Riain]

Cancel Hermes, Tiger, Blake Lion and even Ark Royal in 1946;

This might be tough to justify these when it would have been known that ships just like these would be needed in the near future.

Abandon plans to modernise the Illustrious class by 1949.

Amen to that. If this could be swapped to a new carrier that would be awesome.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This might be tough to justify these when it would have been known that ships just like these would be needed in the near future.

It wasn't the Admiralty doing it voluntarily.

It was HM Treasury forcing it on the Admiralty due to an even more austere Austerity Era.

Even worse government finances and an even greater shortage of foreign currency in the immediate post-war period would force the cancellation of more warships to release industrial capacity for an even more intense export drive.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This might be tough to justify these when it would have been known that ships just like these would be needed in the near future.

I was going to go even further than that and cancel all 16 Darings and Eagle in 1945. Eagle would still be launched in March 1946, but only to clear the slipway.

There are some OTL precedents for this.

All of the 16 Battle class destroyers that were cancelled in October 1945 had been laid down and 5 of them had been launched. 4 others were launched November 1945 to February 1946, that is after they were cancelled so they must have only been launched to clear the slipways.

9 of the 12 Weapon class that were cancelled between October 1945 to January 1946 had been laid down. The pair that was cancelled in January 1946 were launched in March and April 1946, presumably to clear the slipways.

 

[PSL]

The Admiralty wanted to order more Darings instead of the Gaels, but the slipways were too short.

Similarly more Battles would have been ordered instead of the Weapon class, but the slipways were too short.

Ditto the Castle class corvettes, which were only built because the slipways were too short for the Loch class frigate.

Which is why you never cancel ships already laid down at the end of WW-II! Just complete them to the best standard that THE CONTROLLER specifies. The cost to completion is easy to calculate based on the historical spending record.

The most dangerous period for RN/NATO is the feeble state of these navies between 1945-1965. So making big first step with Legacy fleet is critical. Castle/Loch class are of only marginal ASW value in the first post war decade. The type XXVI U-Boat designs [single screw turbine 850ton U-Boat with 22-24 knots top speed submerged for 6 hours ] pointed to a future where ASW escorts -that can't dash at 30 knots- are of little value. They are a waste of spending especially on new ships in the post war era.

The Controller knew this.

 

[StevoJH]

Which is they they built the Blackwoods in the 1950’s....

 

[PSL]

The BLACKWOODS and all the other Frigates of that decade and the 1960s were waste since they just duplicated the legacy fleet , but had no future growth potential due to there tiny size , thus forcing block replacements by the late 1960s. BIG BIG waste of money. Each decade a new block of bigger and bigger escorts were needed and needed badly. If these are a dozen per decade with 30 year life spans [mid life SLEP could manage 40 years], then you can rely on an base escort fleet of 36 big escort warships. They all need large helicopters hanger & decks plus a NTDS type data links plus SAM/CIWS/auto gun, plus ASW torpedoes . Yes CAAIS can work at a pinch until a regiment of Backfire bombers attack the task force from every direction in a coordinated assault with missile salvos also from SSGN and missile Kreuzers.

In the 1960s similar assaults were planned with ECHO I SSGN & regiments of TU-16 BADGERS plus TU-95 BEARS. They were planned as 'Kamikaze' type attacks, and if the exercise of the 50s & 60s are any indication , enough could get through to 'mission kill/destroy' any carrier task force.

.

 

[Zen9]

I have no idea where you're getting the use of Type 984 CDS and DPT prior to 1957.

Any overwhelming of the RN AIO prior would be the earlier manual setup.

 

[StevoJH]

Sorry, if the sarcasm wasn’t clear. There was no justification for building the Blackwoods when they could have built the same number of Type 12’s.

They were literally built to refight the battle of the Atlantic.

 

[Zen9]

My question is what decisions were/could be taken in the 40s and early 50s that could put Britain in a better position during the 60s crunch time?

I think I'll agree concerning angled deck trials and steam catapults. This would mate with moving forward the new carrier effort from '52 to '49 following decisions in '47.
By these minor changes, the decision processes can achieve more major decisions by '54/'55.
Two slips are available in '55 for new CV building irrespective of any other changes.
The design could be substantially complete prior to being laid down in '55 and too far gone by '57 to cancel. Completion likely 6 years later so this would be IOC around '62/'63.
Though this would predate the improved steam plant process, which I suspect cannot be much earlier. That only ensures a improved late 40's plant which would be a very known quantity as would solutions from the 'Malta' carrier design process.
However it might be possible to rework the design for the Y300 by '54/'55 in time for construction to begin.

 

[Riain]

I just came across a footnote in Friedmann's British Destroyers and Frigates that could have huge impacts on RN strength.

Nominal hull life, including one long refit, was sixteen years. Extension to twenty-one years assumed two long refits, which in turn cost operating time. The (1964 Fleet Requirements) Committee asked whether a third long refit could extend life to twenty-six or even twenty-eight years. The consensus was apparently that ships that old would no longer be useful. The alternative later proposed was to eliminate the long refit so as to increase the fraction of time a ship was available, reducing lifetime to 13 1/2 years. Much of the work in a long refit, rehabilitating the steam plant, was eliminated when gas turbines replaced steam. The last Type 42s will have served about 30 years before they are discarded.

I'd suggest that this long refit would have been a major factor behind the 1966 decision not to convert the first 4 Counties to Sea Slug MkII and pay them off in the mid-late 70s. To get a decent output from the Mk II conversion the ships would need a second long refit to extend hull life to 21 years.

The 1952 Type 61 and 1953 Type 41 frigates had 8 submarine diesels on 2 shafts making 14,400 shp. The 1958 Type 81 frigates had a 12,500 shp steam and a single 7,500 shp Gas Turbine COSAG powerplant on a single shaft. The 1959 County class DLGs had a 30,000 shp steam and 4 x 7,500 shp Gas Turbines COSAG powerplant on 2 shafts.

I think the basics are there for the RN to go to a CODAG/CODOG powerplant with diesels and GTs in the late 50s to allow a drastic increase in hull life without the massive cost, sort of by accident. Perhaps the Leanders could have the 4 GTs of the Counties for 30,000 shp, but with 2 diesels of 3,600 shp for slow speed cruising and find that these ships lasted for 20-25 years rather than the 16 years when they were built. The big problem would be the Counties, 14,400 from 8 diesels and 30,000 from 4 GTs leaves a 15,000shp shortfall, perhaps they could have 6 GTs or maybe get some interim GTs with 10,000 shp rather than 7,500 shp, the lack of a requirement to rehab the steam would mean it could be worthwhile to convert them to SS MkIIs.

 

[Ramontxo]

I just came across a footnote in Friedmann's British Destroyers and Frigates that could have huge impacts on RN strength.

Nominal hull life, including one long refit, was sixteen years. Extension to twenty-one years assumed two long refits, which in turn cost operating time. The (1964 Fleet Requirements) Committee asked whether a third long refit could extend life to twenty-six or even twenty-eight years. The consensus was apparently that ships that old would no longer be useful. The alternative later proposed was to eliminate the long refit so as to increase the fraction of time a ship was available, reducing lifetime to 13 1/2 years. Much of the work in a long refit, rehabilitating the steam plant, was eliminated when gas turbines replaced steam. The last Type 42s will have served about 30 years before they are discarded.

I'd suggest that this long refit would have been a major factor behind the 1966 decision not to convert the first 4 Counties to Sea Slug MkII and pay them off in the mid-late 70s. To get a decent output from the Mk II conversion the ships would need a second long refit to extend hull life to 21 years.

The 1952 Type 61 and 1953 Type 41 frigates had 8 submarine diesels on 2 shafts making 14,400 shp. The 1958 Type 81 frigates had a 12,500 shp steam and a single 7,500 shp Gas Turbine COSAG powerplant on a single shaft. The 1959 County class DLGs had a 30,000 shp steam and 4 x 7,500 shp Gas Turbines COSAG powerplant on 2 shafts.

I think the basics are there for the RN to go to a CODAG/CODOG powerplant with diesels and GTs in the late 50s to allow a drastic increase in hull life without the massive cost, sort of by accident. Perhaps the Leanders could have the 4 GTs of the Counties for 30,000 shp, but with 2 diesels of 3,600 shp for slow speed cruising and find that these ships lasted for 20-25 years rather than the 16 years when they were built. The big problem would be the Counties, 14,400 from 8 diesels and 30,000 from 4 GTs leaves a 15,000shp shortfall, perhaps they could have 6 GTs or maybe get some interim GTs with 10,000 shp rather than 7,500 shp, the lack of a requirement to rehab the steam would mean it could be worthwhile to convert them to SS MkIIs.

Yes but if you fit the leanders with diesels for cruising, you lose the great advantage of the quietness thar their steam plant give them. I understand you would shift the power to the gt for action stations and for the sprint to race up and wait listening but for most of the time those noisy diesels would be running. Everything is always a trade up of course and you may decide a longer hull life a good compensation.

 

[Riain]

Yes but if you fit the leanders with diesels for cruising, you lose the great advantage the quietness their steam plant give them. I understand you would shift the power to the gt for action stations and for the sprint to race up and wait listening but for most of the time those noisy diesels would be running. Everything is always a trade up of course and you may decide a longer hull life a good compensation.

Steam powerplants are heavy, and all that weight down low helps with stability, GTs are light, so ships need to be designed around not having that weight down low. Diesels are also heavy so ameliorate that problem somewhat as well as providing a very fuel efficient engine for slow cruising that like GTs is fast to start up. They could be mounted on rubber mounts to isolate the vibration from the hull and reduce transmitted noise, and be used more in the Cold War/Limited War roles East of Suez and less in the Atlantic on NATO ASW roles.

 

[Zen9]

I think it is too big a jump for the 50's.

But I also question the lack of marine Avon. As land based applications reached 21,000shp.

The USN was working on a single shafts ship of 35,000shp.