Errolwi
Monthly Donor
The spec for the UH-1 replacement was the ability to lift a squad up a mountain in New Guinea (which is even reasonable!)
A Blackhawk can't do this, hence the NH-90s.
The Canadian experience deploying light helicopters to Afghanistan is probably worth looking at (along with their subsequent acquisition of CH47's.)
This scenario fails on account that anyone objecting to this waste of money with "what the hell do we need them for?" just presented an almost insurmontable argument against it.
Especially the whole COIN thing. New Zealand bombing people on the other side of the planet? Thats a capability they may well refuse if it came for free.
You're not completely wrong, but you're not completely right either. In terms of military necessity, the purchase is utterly unnecessary - there are no realistic scenarios in which New Zealand a) has a need for an air combat capability, and b) is not operating with allies or partners who already have a better air combat capability. In terms of military utility, you're far better to spend the money on transports, helicopters, OPVs, MPAs, trucks, or practically anything else. So far, so correct.
However, having an air combat capability - even if it's just a handful of armed trainers, like the Macchis - is very useful in other areas. For one thing, it signifies a certain readiness to put one's money where one's mouth is when it comes to supporting allies. It reassures partners that, if things get nasty, you won't just send engineers, medics, and transports - you're actually willing to do some of the fighting and take some of the risks, too. This isn't me making stuff up, either - after NZ got rid of the A-4s, it was very noticeable how the tone at ASEAN changed. NZ ended the 1990s as a valued and desired partner in many areas, and began the 2000s being asked questions like "so, exactly why should we care about you, again?". A great deal of credibility was lost because of what was seen as a demonstration that NZ wasn't willing to take their security concerns seriously, and this had ripple effects in other areas.
Having even a small capability also reassures the people who you expect to come to your aid if you need it. It shows them that you're willing to contribute to your own defence, not just rely on them for everything, which tends to make them feel a bit better even if it's always been acknowledged they'll be doing the heavy lifting. Note that this is not necessarily a rational response - anyone who can actually invade NZ will not be stopped by a squadron or two of A-4s, so the military value of the of the aircraft for that purpose is negligible. It does show, however, that NZ is willing to at least try, even while they're waiting for the USN to steam to their rescue.
As mentioned earlier, even a small air combat capability keeps alive the possibility of expanding it if that ever looks attractive. It's very difficult to reconstruct an air combat capability once the institutional knowledge is lost. If you need it NOW, you probably should have started 20 years ago. Singapore isn't a bad example of this - they became independent in 1965, identified a need for all sorts of military capabilities, and were willing to spend heavily to develop them. By the mid-1990s they were being taken fairly seriously, but it had taken decades of determined and sustained effort to get to that point.
To answer the question "what the hell do we need them for?", it basically comes down "having options in the future". If you're willing to accept the damage it does in terms of international relations, then maybe you can do without them. But you're taking a big risk.
To answer the question "what the hell do we need them for?", it basically comes down "having options in the future". If you're willing to accept the damage it does in terms of international relations, then maybe you can do without them. But you're taking a big risk.
What is really needed is a clear expeditionary role for the NZ Defence Forces in the late 90s, be it peacekeeping in Kosovo or the Cyprus Green Line. They won't buy any new kit without a good reason for it. I think the Kiwi Govt lost sight of the bigger picture at that time.
Okay, if we take the 1997 disbandment of the RNZAF Air Combat Force as a done deal, probably the most logical way to re-introduce an attack capability without fully rebuilding the ACF is for the sheep-shaggers to buy one of the armed variants of the AW109... They've already got the type as a trainer/light utility helicopter, so they're better able to leverage off their existing infrastructure than buying a new type, and as more of a multi-role/general purpose design than a dedicated attack type it's less likely to attract political flak.
I'm actually a bit surprised that New Zealand still has any meaningful armed combat capability that is even notionally able to engage in any form of medium if not high intensity combat. From when I was living in New Zealand in the 1980's I seem to recall semi serious proposals being floated to more or less disband the traditional armed forces and focus on passive resistance by the military as a response to agression. I still keep in touch with members of my family who still live there and the concept of having an armed forces that could actually engage a serious enemy in actual combat doesn't seem to be particularly well accepted in certain parts of society.I think all of this is all well and good but not to the person you’re responding to since they were referencing a “light attack” capability. As was said, this would be particularly unpalatable politically whereas something that could be defined in more defensive terms would have better prospects.
I'm actually a bit surprised that New Zealand still has any meaningful armed combat capability that is even notionally able to engage in any form of medium if not high intensity combat.
Being able to contribute to international stability is the best way to keep international trade going.
... I seem to recall semi serious proposals being floated to more or less disband the traditional armed forces and focus on passive resistance by the military as a response to agression.
I don't think that's fair. There's a "minimum viable force" argument - for example perhaps there's no point in having 2 tanks, you need 20 in order to realistically be able to conduct armoured operations, that sort of thing. And it applies across all services. These capabilities cost a lot to maintain, and so do the facilities to maintain them and the staff to operate them. NZ has a very small population, and a huge operational space (including decision space) to cover. It's not incoherent to say that NZ can't afford to do everything, so they should focus on doing a few things well.My $.02 worth... First world western nations should have robust air sea and land combat forces capable of actually fighting (at least at a medium intensity level) so that first world western nations can help preserve international stability..
New Zealand clearly sees things differently and I respect their (I no longer consider my views relevant ) choice.
Those proposals floated around for quite a while. One of my "favourites" popped up in the mid-90s: there was a defence white paper which suggested basic training should be the same for all services, and it should focus on SAR and disaster relief duties, such as firefighting, on the basis that's what NZDF personnel would mostly be used for anyway. Thankfully that one didn't get much traction, but I suspect the same ideas keep circling around.
I doubt the phrase "light attack capability" would do as much damage as some are suggesting - anyone who wants to view the NZDF badly will do so, no matter what their arms of service are called. You can tinker with the phrasing as you like, but I think the general point still stands.
The RNZAF and RNZN were certainly very aware of NZ's SLOCs. The MPA capability is noticeably the only "real" combat arm of the air force which was retained, and although small it also performed fairly well in its role (the Fincastle Trophy got taken home several times by Kiwis, ISTR). Another defence white paper, this one from the 1970s, wanted to get rid of almost all the surface navy and replace them with SSKs! The reasoning for this was that subs would be excellent for patrolling and securing the SLOC. I suspect the fact that the RNZN also had to do a lot of other things was what got this filed under 'no', but it came up when the services were still more or less writing whatever they wanted in their parts of the defence reviews, so I suspect the RNZN was quite keen on the idea.
More seriously, NZ's security has never depended on anything as weak as their ability to defend themselves alone. It has always rested on having partners and allies who were willing to help out, and as a result of that for a long time NZDF policy was shaped by what prospective partners and allies wanted to see. Compromises had to be made along the way, partly because other powers didn't really care about the Pacific Islands in the same way NZ did, but a lot of NZs procurement and deployment decisions only made sense in the context of working with other powers.
Things came unglued a bit at the end of the Cold War. It wasn't just that the overlay of Cold War security concerns had been erased, or that a left-wing government came into power. The NZDF was also facing block obsolescence across all three services. Everyone knew things had to change, no-one knew what they should change to, and it all got a bit out of hand. I don't agree with all the decisions that were made in that era, but I can understand the pressures that were in play at the time, and I don't fault people for getting things wrong when it's unclear what's right.
Things have settled down a bit now, and for better or worse the NZDF has adapted to the decisions that were made back then and makes the best of them. I think the security environment has become rather clearer for NZ in the last 10 years especially, so perhaps they're entering a more stable period.
I don't think that's fair. There's a "minimum viable force" argument - for example perhaps there's no point in having 2 tanks, you need 20 in order to realistically be able to conduct armoured operations, that sort of thing. And it applies across all services. These capabilities cost a lot to maintain, and so do the facilities to maintain them and the staff to operate them. NZ has a very small population, and a huge operational space (including decision space) to cover. It's not incoherent to say that NZ can't afford to do everything, so they should focus on doing a few things well.
I'm naturally inclined to the point of view you hold, but I honestly don't think NZ has the population, industrial, or tax base to support armed forces which can fight at even odds against a first-world opponent, or even a determined third-world state. Last I heard the regular army is based on what amounts to a light infantry brigade, with appropriate supporting arms. Realistically, I don't see how that could be increased to even double or triple the size, and mechanising it or switching to armoured formations would a) be incredibly expensive and b) be utterly undeployable outside NZ, because of a lack of sea or airlift capacity.
We can discuss what is needed to fight at medium intensity level in many different ways, but I don't think it'll change the unfortunate calculus at work here. Tyranny of distance didn't stop the pioneers, but it sure puts a brake on the military.
I also believe smaller countries are going to need to look for creative ways to partner with other countries so they can retain at least notionally viable forces that could at least serve as building blocks for the future.
Yep.. But perhaps the smaller nation could say..The problem with this is that their bigger allies dont want to deal with the doctrinal issues of 'the New Zealanders apparently brought their armed Cessnas - how the heck do you use them ?'. What bigger allies want is for you to pay them for export versions of the same kit they use, so your forces and theirs are operationally compliant.
Yep.. But perhaps the smaller nation could say..
Sorry we just can`t afford modern 4th or 5th gen fighters, but how about we acquire and maintain a squadron of simple F5 class air craft and agree to make them available for occasional dis similar aircraft training, target duty etc.. If things go really badly during an expeditionary mission we can make them available to fly day time combat air patrol near one of your air bases to help defend the air base. We realize they probably can`t fly strike missions against likely enemies but this is the best we can do.
The smaller nation would also be able to retain the institutional knowledge to actually operate fast jets.
I`m not so sure they would get ignored. Larger nations often like the optics of having smaller nations allied to them and being willing to participate in joint operations. I suspect the larger nation would try and work with the smaller nation to figure out how to find a viable role that the smaller nation can afford, while still being of some use to the larger nation.They could. They'll get ignored.
They'll also waste a bunch of money on the simple F5 class aircraft with their token CAP capability, in order to retain institutional knowledge to operate the fast jets they cannot ever afford.
On the other hand, if they go 'We've got some strike aircraft that operate from short rough fields if you've got the CAP', then the allies Army - which has been jack of fast jets being shit at CAP since the 1960s - is likely to go 'Good to see you !'.
NZ made the right decision in not having an air force.