Cont.:
The relative peace, to which Germany returned around the middle of the 1440s, was not one signed by the principal warring parties. By that time, the war had simply consumed all available resources. It being one of the earliest wars which would later come to be called “general wars” or “popular wars”, i.e. wars not (primarily) fought between professional (“knightly”) forces but, in many cases, between militias, crusading hordes, levies and the like, with a few mercenaries – often from previous aforementioned background – thrown in, this meant that most of Germany was thoroughly exhausted. For the last major powers standing – the Bund der Bünde, which thrived on its huge gains in the West, the Archduke of Austria, the Brunswick Concordance and Philip of Burgundy – this exhaustion was a financial and economic one and an exhaustion of support for further warfare among the politically relevant segments of the populace.
For many other regions, though, it meant true and bottomless exhaustion of, well, everything. The Frisian North-West, Lower Saxony and the lands along the Rhine, where Catholic forces of the Bremen Alliance and Burgundy fought against Reformist Brunswickers, who increasingly depended on foreign aid from King Erik of the Scandinavian Kalmar kingdoms, but also Eastern Swabia and the lands along the River Main, where Bündische fought against Habsburg forces, as well as the rolling forested hills of central Germany, where all parties were involved in one way or other had been severely reduced in population and infrastructure. Villages and hamlets burned, harvests repeatedly scorched, towns reduced to ruins – it was plainly impossible for the large popular armies which faced each other in this greatest continental war of the century to live off the land any longer which they had turned into one huge battlefield, by the middle of the 1440s.
As the war petered out in Germany, every principality and every bishopric, every town and every imperial knight had aligned with one of the four remaining power blocs and thus, implicitly, with either Reformism or Roman Catholicism. It left the German-speaking population of the (former) Holy Roman Empire split into two almost equally large confessional blocs – but the Reformist bloc, which was slightly larger, would splinter over the next centuries into various factions and sects anyway.
While warfare was ending, this did not mean that the four power blocs had somehow agreed on a new formula for the Empire, for living together, or anything at all. According to rumours, the armistice in the North was preceded by secret negotiations between Philip of Burgundy and Wilhelm of Braunschweig – the latter, whom the Confessional War revealed as the undoubtedly superior military leader as compared to Johann of Brandenburg, the other major princely leader of the Brunswick Concordance who had advanced plans for building up a centralized bureaucracy in his large but marginal principality, but whose bad luck on the battlefield had become a bane for the Reformers in the North, [long syntactic bracket closing:] had become an inofficial spokesperson for the Concordance –, while the armistice in the South may have followed similar talks between Friedrich of Habsburg and the mayor of Zürich, Rudolf Stüssi. Whether this be true or not, there was certainly nothing amounting to a peace treaty, or an agreement on how to reconstitute the Holy Roman Empire. No unified Reichstag would meet again – for a very long time.
There were simply too many divergencies for an agreement. This was not only true for the chasm between Reformers and Roman Catholics. If confession had been the only problem at stake, then the Brunswick Concordance and the Bund der Bünde on the one hand, and the Habsburg-dominated South-East and the Burgundian-dominated North-West (for the fifth player, the Bremen Alliance, fell apart after a decisive defeat in 1444, with some of its member territories being overrun by Concordance and Opstalbomer forces and others fleeing under the protective umbrella of a resurgent Greater Duke Philip of Burgundy) should have formed into two blocs at least.
But not even Reformers and Roman Catholics could agree on a common foundation, apart from their shared obedience to either the pope in Rome, or the pope in Avignon and its Councils. Fundamental socio-political background differences, diverging views on the essence of a future Empire, and last but not least personal ambitions prevented the formation of merely two Germanies, and caused the creation of the four (predominantly) German polities which would enter the threshold into modernity.
Among the Reformers, even before theological disagreements became more virulent towards the end of the 15th century, the Brunswick Concordance and the Bund der Bünde did not share a common vision of the future Holy Roman Empire. While almost all members of the Brunswick Concordance – most of them being secular territorial principalities – envisioned a construction not too different from the old Empire, only with an institutionalized Reichsgericht [superior court] and based on the Reformed faith, i.e. without powerful Rome-controlled prince-bishoprics, the majority of the members of the Bund der Bünde wanted political structures shaped from the bottom upwards, following the principles of voluntary confederal association and, at least in some cases, also emphasizing the importance of communal assemblies in determining policy. (The Bund der Bünde was not a uniform bloc in this respect, either, and some of its members and sub-federations would have welcomed an agreement with the Brunswickers, but in the 1440s, they saw it as their immediate priority and necessity to pursue a common Bündische policy.) From about 1440 onwards, the relatively greater internal strength of the Bund der Bünde compared to the Brunswick Concordance, which they saw as overly influenced by Scandinavia, added to the problems, for proud princes like Johann and Wilhelm would never simply join the Bund der Bünde as simple members, while the Bündische, on the other hand, refused to even think about a multi-layered corporative constitution in the typical medieval make-up, in which weaker, foreign-influenced princes would see themselves as the first estate and relegate the defiant townsmen, peasants and petty knights of the South-West to the second and third ranks. Permanent peace between both Reformed blocs was agreed upon and kept for many decades, but negotiations between delegations from the Bund and the Concordance over convening a Reformed Reichstag repeatedly broke down in 1445, 1446 and 1448. After that, both sides simply stuck with insisting on their own view of things and benignly ignoring the differences of opinion among their allies, practically treating each other like allied foreign countries, but never openly admitting to this state of affairs.
Discord within the Roman Catholic camp was no smaller, and it had a lot to do with the two major leaders, who were both unwilling, unable and uncompelled to either submit and accept the other as Emperor, or even agree on a procedure through which a third person could be elevated to that position. Friedrich of Habsburg would have liked to become Roman German King and Holy Roman Emperor [1], but as long as not even the Burgundy-influenced Low Countries and Rhineland would elect him or even assemble in a Reichstag with that purpose, he was content with the new position of arch-steward for which he could point to the legitimacy provided by the deceased Sigismund of Luxemburg, and the title of arch-duke which he had created for himself to match that role.
Philip of Burgundy never appeared to strive for the supreme position within the empire himself. On the other hand, he began to test the waters for an elevation of one of his duchies to a kingdom in the early 1440s, and this ambition, which would further cement the de facto segregation of the Burgundian and Burgundy-influenced North-West from the Holy Roman Empire, annoyed Friedrich of Habsburg to no end. Until 1447, Pope Eugene IV. was the only hurdle on the path to Philip`s goal. When Eugene died and Philip of Burgundy played a crucial role in installing the Castilian Alonso de Borja [2] as his successor, against the ambitions of Eugene`s mentee, the Venetian Ludovico Trevisan, the new Pope Pius II. [3] returned the favour by sending Philip the newly forged Crown of the Kingdom of Brabant in 1448. From that point onwards, any agreement between Philip and Friedrich was ultimately ruled out. Philip consolidated the control over his new kingdom, and corroborated his position as de facto overlord over much of North-Western Germany after the collapse of the Bremen Alliance by having members of his family installed as prince-bishops in Cologne, Münster, and Trier.
Militarily, Philip and Friedrich were also very much occupied on entirely different fronts. While Friedrich had been busy with the succession wars in Hungary from the late 1430s to the early 1440s and remained engaged in hostilities with Hussites, Poles, Lithuanians, and Ottomans, Philip continued to fight against the French King Charles, who did not tire to attempt to wrestle at least Paris and the Seine Basin from Philip and the French dukes and other powerholders either aligned with Philip or with one of the parties in the English Troubles, either way acknowledging the distant Henry VI. and not Charles VII. as their king. Neither Charles, nor his successors should manage this. This failure sealed the shift of the French capital and court from Paris to Tours, which had also become the seat of the now permanently convening États Généraux by 1448. To this end, Philip tried everything which stood in his powers to bring England back into the war – while Friedrich`s foreign policies were focused elsewhere, on Italy and the Balkans.
While Philip`s powers were certainly insufficient to bring about his desired political outcome in England, they undoubtedly contributed to the prolonging of the English Times of Troubles. When the duke of York and the Percys were close to obtaining a decisive victory over Beaufort and the dukes of Somerset and Gloucester in 1442, for example, he was defeated by the combined forces of the War Party, a city militia of Londoners, and a mercenary band sent by Philip. The war party was far from able to restore “King Henry`s peace” throughout the kingdom, though. For two years, Richard Plantagenet was forced to coordinate his operations from a base in Ireland, before he returned with full force in 1444 – even though he, too, never managed to impose his agenda completely on the weak King Henry VI. or advance his associates thoroughly enough, thus allowing his opponents to regain their strength, too, rendering the kingdom ungovernable again.
Philip`s focus on the West was as evident and perhaps inevitable as was Friedrich`s focus on the East - after all, he was not only Archsteward of the Holy Roman Empire (a claim recognised outside Austria only by the Bavarian and Franconian lands he immediately controlled, by the Margraves of Meißen and a few minor nobles in Thuringia as well as, until 1461, by the Hanseatic towns), but also King of Hungary and Croatia. Even though this other realm was also diminished as a result of his wars against multiple enemies, the rump-Hungary and rump-Croatia he was left with formed, together with his Austrian Erblande and his overlordship over Bavaria and Franconia, a solid territorial block and a bulwark against anti-Catholic/Christian forces, which beset it from all sides.
[1] Which he did IOTL, beginning a long Habsburg domination of the HRE.
[2] IOTL, he would become Pope Callixtus III. in 1455.
[3] Not to be confused with OTL´s Pius II., who acceded IOTL in 1458. IOTL in 1447, Pope Nicholas was elected – the guy who allowed Portugal to enslave any and all non-Christians in Africa, thus creating a monopoly on early Atlantic slave trade for the Portuguese for more than half a century.
I´ll try to post a confessional map of Germany around 1450 soon, and then we`re going to shift our focus Eastwards again.