1930s Air Ministry surprise sanity options

If you sort out the Bristol Taurus earlier then their are some interesting possible butterflies for both the AM and the FAA. Both the Gloster F5/34 and the F9/37 can go into production with 1200hp engines. Also the Bristol 148 can be built as Skua substitute, 300mph top speed and a 48mph landing speed would be pretty useful on a carrier (especially the slower ones). Further, give the DH, Flamingo two 1200hp Taurus engines and you have a British built replacement for the Hudson which keeps Dollars for other purchases (machine tools to build more engines).
Put a Taurus into a Hurricane as a flying test bed and you have an radial engine fighter for the far east, there are companies who can build Hurricanes in 1937 who do not have the skill to build more advanced stressed skin aircraft such as the Gloster F5/34 and the Supermarine Spitfire. Another factor is that the one piece wing spar of the Gloster F5/34 makes it more difficult to crate up and ship compared to the Hurricane
Please have this sense of sanity in the AM cancel all ideas of the Turret fighter!
 
I know that an earlier, workable and more powerful Taurus is sometimes looked as a pet on this board - but IMO the 1000-1200 HP Taurus is a worse proposal than 1000-1200 HP Merlin, the engine capable for much more in OTL, let alone with Exe, Peregrine and Vulture RR is hopefully not designing/producing. Plus, the Merlin is in mass production by four sources in UK by 1940, and with a deal for a source in the USA.
The Hurricane with Taurus is a 300 mph aircraft, if even so. More resources spent on Taurus = less resources spent on Herclues, a really powerful & reliable radial made in UK.
 
By 1942 the Air Ministry had conceded that they needed better airfields. May as well have this "non-military" defence spending done during the depression to put money in workers pockets without spoiling disarmament talks. The British and their gardens.

I like to create optimal pit stops for working fighter aircraft. Spectacle dispersals with revetments and woods. Each with buried fuel tanks and ammo stores to ensure supply for extended periods. Accommodation shelters for engineers, armourers and crew further off in the woods, but close enough to scramble. Fast growing, tall fir trees. Leyandii? I need something with branches more off the ground, but with dense foliage further up.
Spending more between say 1929 and 1934 improving airfields means the money spent 1934-39 IOTL on extending those airfields would be saved and available for something else.

I had interpreted the OP as the Air Ministry spending roughly its OTL money between 1919 and 1939 more sensibly. However, if you are allowing more money to be spent may I nominate the following:
  1. Completing the 52 Squadron Scheme of 1923 on 31st March 1928 instead of putting the completion date back several times. IOTL only 42 of the 52 squadrons had been formed by March 1934 and one of those was in Singapore. Under the 1934-35 Air Estimates it was planned to form only 2 more squadrons with the 8 remaining to be formed by March 1938;
  2. Double the number of flying boats between 1919 and 1934 so that there were 56 in 14 squadrons in March 1934 with 2 more to form by March 1935 from 28 in 7 squadrons with one more to form by March 1935;
  3. Expand the FAA from 162 aircraft in the equivalent of 13½ squadrons in March 1934 to 210 in the equivalent of 17½ squadrons. That would give the FAA enough aircraft to provide the 4 aircraft carriers that were in commission full strength air groups and still have 36 aircraft in six catapult flights;
  4. Increase spending on Civil Aviation (which was under the control of the Air Ministry) so that Imperial Airways was twice as large. But the primary duty of Imperial Airways would be to carry mail to speed up communications and aid commerce. Carrying more passengers and freight would be a bonus.
 

perfectgeneral

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Spending more between say 1929 and 1934 improving airfields means the money spent 1934-39 IOTL on extending those airfields would be saved and available for something else.

I had interpreted the OP as the Air Ministry spending roughly its OTL money between 1919 and 1939 more sensibly. However, if you are allowing more money to be spent may I nominate the following:
  1. Completing the 52 Squadron Scheme of 1923 on 31st March 1928 instead of putting the completion date back several times. IOTL only 42 of the 52 squadrons had been formed by March 1934 and one of those was in Singapore. Under the 1934-35 Air Estimates it was planned to form only 2 more squadrons with the 8 remaining to be formed by March 1938;
  2. Double the number of flying boats between 1919 and 1934 so that there were 56 in 14 squadrons in March 1934 with 2 more to form by March 1935 from 28 in 7 squadrons with one more to form by March 1935;
  3. Expand the FAA from 162 aircraft in the equivalent of 13½ squadrons in March 1934 to 210 in the equivalent of 17½ squadrons. That would give the FAA enough aircraft to provide the 4 aircraft carriers that were in commission full strength air groups and still have 36 aircraft in six catapult flights;
  4. Increase spending on Civil Aviation (which was under the control of the Air Ministry) so that Imperial Airways was twice as large. But the primary duty of Imperial Airways would be to carry mail to speed up communications and aid commerce. Carrying more passengers and freight would be a bonus.
3 and 4 seem like good measures, but won't 1 and 2 result in large quantities of obsolete aircraft in peacetime? It seems like mobilisation. We can assume sanity would dictate a Keynesian splurge in the depression, but overtly military spending might send the wrong message to other states. The FAA starts from such a low base that four extra squadrons is a small expansion to UK armed forces.
 
Now that we're at it - is it time for a 4-engined bomber already in, say, 1937(prototype)/1938(production)?

The Stirling came from a specification issued in 1936. I'm not sure, realistically, you're going to get a requirement for four engined bombers much earlier than that - the Harrow was only just coming into service as a heavy bomber in 1936.
 
The Stirling came from a specification issued in 1936. I'm not sure, realistically, you're going to get a requirement for four engined bombers much earlier than that - the Harrow was only just coming into service as a heavy bomber in 1936.

Hmm - let's have the AM having second thoughts on the Specification B.9/32 (that called for a 2-engined bomber) in 1933, changing it to a 4-engined bomber. Thus HP does not design the OTL Hampden, but a 4-engined A/C?
Or, the Specification B.3/34 (OTL Whitley is produced) calls for a 4-engined bomber?
 
the Merlin is in mass production by four sources in UK by 1940,

Derby and Crewe is two. Glasgow wasn't into mass production until 1941, and Trafford Park/Manchester not until mid-1941.

While the Taurus was only built at the main Bristol engine plant, Bristol did have other production sources, including the aptly titled Shadow Factory 1, 2 and 3. They built a much larger variety of engines.
 
3 and 4 seem like good measures, but won't 1 and 2 result in large quantities of obsolete aircraft in peacetime? It seems like mobilisation. We can assume sanity would dictate a Keynesian splurge in the depression, but overtly military spending might send the wrong message to other states. The FAA starts from such a low base that four extra squadrons is a small expansion to UK armed forces.
The OTL RAF proper on 31st March 1934 had 75 squadrons with 828 aircraft if No. 24 (Communications) Squadron is included. Adding the 17 extra squadrons would add 70 night bombers (7 squadrons of 10) nearly doubling the force from 80 to 150; 48 fighters (4 squadrons of 12) increasing the force from 156 to 204; and 28 flying boats doubling it from 28 to 56. That would be a total increase of 158 aircraft from 828 to 986. A corresponding increase in what would become Training and Maintenance Commands would be required.

They wouldn't be obsolete by 1934 standards and they would have been scrapped or relegated to training duties by 1939 and more training aircraft in 1939 would be a good thing in itself.

It wouldn't be a mobilisation programme because the squadrons would only have their Immediate Reserve of 25% of the front-line, not the 100% reserve of airframes and 150% of engines that were required for the Home Defence Force at the time. There would be no reserve whatsoever of aircrew. IOTL the first expansion programmes, Scheme A of 1934 and Scheme C of 1935 only provided "shop window" air forces because no reserves were provided to back up the front-line. It was not until Scheme F of 1936 that the RAF was allowed to mobilise. Among other things it set up the Shadow Factory Scheme, the RAF Volunteer Reserve and provided the Home Defence Force (Bomber and Fighter Commands) with a reserve of aircraft which was 225% of its front line.

However, 1 and 2 would help the expansion of the RAF after 1934 by providing extra instructors and factory capacity in the early stages. So would 3 and 4 for that matter. That's why I want them. These measures would especially help the producers of multi-engine aircraft line Handley Page, Saunders Roe, Short Brothers, Supermarine and Vickers.

As to sending the wrong messages, the messages the UK was receiving at the disarmament conferences up to 1934 was that if anything it had disarmed too much. I don't have the figures handy, but I suspect that the French and Italian air forces of the period between 1928 and 1934 were bigger or at least as big as the RAF. The 1923 Scheme was intended to defend the UK against France and IIRC even when completed would have given the RAF a smaller force of fighters and bombers than France had in 1923.
 
The FAA starts from such a low base that four extra squadrons is a small expansion to UK armed forces.
It's American and Japanese equivalents were better off in 1934, but the difference then was smaller than it would become over the next 5 years.

In 1934 the UK had six aircraft carriers, the USA had four (Langley, Lexington, Saratoga and the recently completed Ranger) and the Japanese had four also (Hosho, Kaga, Akagi and the recently completed Ryujo). Admittedly the American and Japanese aircraft carriers could carry more aircraft between them. However, Kaga and Akagi had yet to have the rebuild that increased their carrying capacities from about 60 aircraft to 90 aircraft while Ryujo might as well have been made of cardboard because her pre-rebuild hull was so flimsy.
 
Also the FAA has the advantage of 3 fairly homegenous carriers, the USN has two whilst the IJN's are unique ships (Kaga's slower than Akagi for example). Sure the others the RN has are not exactly what you'd call stellar, Eagle's too slow and with a small air group for her size, Hermes is too small, and the Argus is just..well..shes a CVE.
 
3 and 4 seem like good measures, but won't 1 and 2 result in large quantities of obsolete aircraft in peacetime? It seems like mobilisation. We can assume sanity would dictate a Keynesian splurge in the depression, but overtly military spending might send the wrong message to other states. The FAA starts from such a low base that four extra squadrons is a small expansion to UK armed forces.
These are the details of Expansion Scheme A proposed in November 1933 and sanctioned by the Cabinet on 18th July 1934 for completion on 31st March 1939. They come from National Archives file AIR5/1370.

The total front line of the RAF proper would be increased to 1,252 aircraft in 111 squadrons (not including No. 24 (Communications) Squadron). The Home Defence Force would be increased to 836 aircraft in 71 squadrons. The total Metropolitan Air Force would be increased to 960 aircraft in 84 squadrons because 48 general reconnaissance landplanes in 4 squadrons were added to the RAF Coastal Area. The number of aircraft in the overseas commands was to be increased to 292 in 27 squadrons. The FAA was to be increased to 213 aircraft in the equivalent of 16½ squadrons for a grand total of 1,465 aircraft in 127½ squadrons.

Only £1.2 million was allocated for war reserves of equipment. Nothing was allowed for the squadron in East Africa (I'm not sure if that was a regular squadron or the Kenya Auxiliary Air Force) or for the proposed Malay Auxiliary Air Force and the proposed Singapore Auxiliary Flight.

The output of pilots would increase from 410 in 1934 to 530 in 1940. It said that the number of flying training schools would be increased by 3 to 5 and the 2 existing schools would be increased to full strength. The number of armament training camps would be increased by 4 from 3 to 7. The number of aircraft storage units was to be increased by 3, but my notes do not say what the new total would be.

The scheme required the construction of 22 new stations at home and overseas.

The personnel strength of the RAF would increase from 30,402 in 1934 to 43,375 in 1940. Both figures included 236 officers and 1,870 men in India.

The same document gives slightly different figures for the cost of the scheme. One the first page of my notes it says:
1939-40 £24 million
1940-41 £23½ million
1941-42 £23 million
1943-43 £22½ million​
Every year includes £½ million for Civil Aviation.

However, on Page 3 of my notes say that there would be Air Estimates of £24½ by 1940 (I presume 1940-41) compared to the £17.562 million presented to Parliament in 1934 (for the 1934-35 financial year). During that period the Met Vote would go up from £998,000 to £1.25 million, but the Civil Vote would be £513,000 throughout the period. The Air Estimates would stay at £25½ million after 1940.

All the above figures are the Net Estimates. The Gross Estimates were larger. The difference was Appropriations-in-Aid from other government departments. The largest of which was the appropriation-in-aid from the Navy Estimates to pay for the Fleet Air Arm. According to the Flight Archive the Gross Estimate for 1934-35 was £20,165,000 and the Net Estimate was £17,561,000. The difference was the Fleet Air Arm grant of £1,388,000 and other appropriations-in-aid totalling £1,266,600.

My proposals for the RAF in 1934 are for the Service proper to have 974 front line aircraft instead of the 1,252 proposed in Scheme A about 20% less. That would require a Net Estimate of about £20 million in 1934-35 that is an increase of £2½ million over the OTL Net Estimate.

My FAA in 1934 had 210 aircraft in March 1934 instead of 162. That would require an increase in the Admiralty's grant from £1,388,000 to 1,799,000 or £411,000. Except that the increase would be a bit less than that because the FAA was to be increased from 162 to 174 aircraft during the 1934-35 financial year as 2 of the aircraft carrier squadrons were being increased from half to full strength.

Incidentally the 213 FAA aircraft were only to provide enough carrier and catapult aircraft for the existing fleet. If any more aircraft carriers, capital ships or cruisers were built more would be required and Cabinet reports on defence requirements of the period acknowledged that.
 
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I think Langley was slightly faster, but all three are tiny with small airgroups, negligable weapons etc. if the Air Ministry gets some common sense can we get the follies refitted with a proper bow section too..needed for the larger and more modern aircraft they'd be taking on.
 
I think Langley was slightly faster, but all three are tiny with small airgroups, negligable weapons etc. if the Air Ministry gets some common sense can we get the follies refitted with a proper bow section too..needed for the larger and more modern aircraft they'd be taking on.
I agree with the idea, but to paraphrase Benson in Soap...
That's the Admiralty's job!
 
But seriously, could the narrow hulls of the Follies take such an extension? More topweight and less stability. The Admiralty was rather conservative about that, e.g. like taking X turret out of most of the cruisers during World War II to compensate for radar and extra AA guns.
 
I'd say probably, if you're just plating over the bow. The follies were decent sea boats, if rather fragile in a storm but with a plated up bow it should not adversely affect their top weight.
 
I'd say probably, if you're just plating over the bow. The follies were decent sea boats, if rather fragile in a storm but with a plated up bow it should not adversely affect their top weight.
That might increase the strength of the hull and a higher bow usually creates a better sea boat.

The other problem is the increase in displacement while the 135,000ton quota is in force and because perfectgeneral has allowed the construction of six 22,500 ton aircraft carriers in the 1930s the Follies were due for scrapping between 1937 and 1939. Therefore this would have to be done after the tonnage quotas expired and the ships were given a reprieve.

Edit

The best time to have it done would be as part of their conversions to flush deck aircraft carriers.
 
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Derby and Crewe is two. Glasgow wasn't into mass production until 1941, and Trafford Park/Manchester not until mid-1941.

While the Taurus was only built at the main Bristol engine plant, Bristol did have other production sources, including the aptly titled Shadow Factory 1, 2 and 3. They built a much larger variety of engines.

Thank you, I stand corrected.
 
Now that we're at mistakes posted on the internet: the Wikipedia article about the Whitley will want us to believe that Whitey was the 1st aircraft in the world to employ a 2-stage supercharged engine, the mighty Tiger VIII:

After the first 34 aircraft had been completed, the engines were replaced with the more reliable two-stage supercharged Tiger VIIIs. K7243, the 27th production Whitley, is believed to have served as a prototype following modifications.[6] The resulting aircraft, the first military aircraft in the world to take advantage of a two-stage supercharger, was designated as the Whitley Mk II.

From: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armstrong_Whitworth_Whitley
 
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