alternatively take the UK approach and have a 'High Speed Diesel Train' that can run on existing routes and stop within existing signalling blocks ( i.e. the OTL class 43 'Intercity 125' / which was sold to Aus as the XPT)
Amtrak: The Road to Recovery
- Thread starter Devvy
- Start date
alternatively take the UK approach and have a 'High Speed Diesel Train' that can run on existing routes and stop within existing signalling blocks ( i.e. the OTL class 43 'Intercity 125' / which was sold to Aus as the XPT)
With a fuel crisis. Start with an intercity 125, than upgrade the corridor to 270 km/h, then to 300 km/h, then 320 or 340 km/h.
Probably could do that anyway. The US Midwest is over-built with rail lines, so pick the best ones and make them passenger only, then use a high-speed diesel train on them - shit, you could take the Intercity 125 design, have it license-built in the US with EMD power units and be done with it. Amtrak's experiments with fast trains on existing corridors saw big improvements in ridership IOTL, so combined with its own tracks (and thus the ability to control schedules without freight units mucking it up) and you can get a competitive service very, very easily.
Devvy
Donor
Wikipedia (that perennial source of accurate information!
) reports that the MBTA bought tracks and rolling stock in 1975 - this will of been butterflied away. But part of the point in having Amtrak running commuter rail is the ease of running across state boundaries. Individual states can pay for capital upgrades on their stations or sections of track without complex payments between authorities. So expect Amtrak to adopt more of a "commuting area" approach, rather then a "state" approach to running commuter rail. Ie, Boston-area commuter rail rather then Massachusetts commuter rail.Similar to Boston (above) expect a wider area to be served by "commuter" rail. Just as an example...in the UK, people will commute into London happily for 60-90 minutes on the train, let alone transfer time from the London terminus onwards. Just a 60 minute commuter train trip could be quite a long distance if the train has some decent acceleration and speed.
Combined with what TheMann has mentioned, the Mid West is vastly overbuilt with tracks in every direction. You can see it clear as day on Google Maps (look for tracks on the map view that just seem to "end", and then switch to satellite view and you can follow the old right-of-way so easily) - and because it's the Mid West, right-of-ways are very straight and flat. Plenty of potential for speedy travel.
See above - also bear in mind the stringent FRA rules about passenger trains on freight networks in OTL. They have to be stupidly strong (built like a battering ram) to withstand collisions with freight trains, which has a *huge* knockon effect on wear & tear, acceleration rates, top speed, cost.
All in good time
Glad this is producing plenty of debate - should have the second part later this evening.
Devvy
Donor
1973-1975
A Penn Central train in 1975, a remnant of what had caused the railroad industry to be turned upside down in the US
The slow rot of the freight railroads of the United States continued, despite being relieved of their passenger operations. In most areas of the north east of the US, there were just too many railroads to maintain, and too many small railroads for the system to be efficient, for the companies to be profitable. The bankruptcy of Penn Central in 1971 started things; many smaller railroads were toppled in a domino effect, a large factor being Penn Central's inability to pay the smaller railroads the trackage fees due. The mess of Pen Central, and the inability of the US economy to let rail operations simply halt, led to the US Congress to oversee the creation of the "US Railroad Administration". The USRA was, in effect, a government owned corporation whose task would be to create a new freight network by picking routes out of the bankrupt railroads to maintain. The rest would be disbanded, or handed over to Amtrak.
Big changes were also due in the Mid-West in 1973 - Turboliner trains came into service, serving on the Chicago to Minneapolis route through Milwaukee, as well as Chicago - Detroit / Cleveland through Fort Wayne. All the routes would have several departures per day, reflecting Amtrak's belief that these routes could generate far more patronage and thus revenue. Coupled with good deals on both day and weekend trips, people started to flock to the services, attracted by the city-centre locations and more modern trains. A knock-on effect, to try to make the routes more efficient, was the renovation of Chicago Union station. By design, the station was a terminus for services in both direction, with little opportunity for through running. Amtrak's plan would change all that. Most of the shops and services sat between the tracks would move into the Great Hall, with the eastern 8 pairs of tracks being connected through the station to make 8 "through" tracks complete with platforms. This will enable Minneapolis - Chicago services to run straight on to Detroit / Cleveland. While there is likely to be little demand for Minneapolis - Detroit services, it means that time spent sitting at Chicago being turned around can be avoided, and commuter services can be run across Chicago as well.
The role of the 1970s oil crisis should not be overlooked either; people low on fuel turned to Amtrak in great numbers during the crisis, and the overall rising (and unpredictable) cost of fuel had a great - and long lasting - impact on Amtrak. It would spur Amtrak's desire to properly electrify the whole of the North East Corridor (ideally with one system to reduce operation complexity) to avoid having to buy fuel for services on this route, which could also have knock on benefits for commuter rail operations based off the NEC.
By 1975, the USRA was getting a better idea of what routes it wanted to maintain within a Consolidated Railway Corporation. Amtrak was also rapidly coming up with a map of routes it wanted to take over for it's commuter operations, in areas all around the main cities. Where it could afford to, it wanted to own the lines. Where such transfers would be impossible, due to heavy freight traffic or likely insufficient demand, Amtrak would seek to partner with Conrail (or other freight railroads) and pay to run it's trains over the freight lines.
Amtrak's long distance routes were suffering from problems, primarily from equipment failures. In part this was down to the old-age of much of the rolling stock, and coupled with little investment occurring on the lines by Amtrak, this was driving passengers away. Even on the North East Corridor, the Budd Metroliners were becoming unreliable. This would need changing, or Amtrak could lose it's biggest potential for revenue. New passenger coaches, to replace the old and unreliable coaches inherited from it's predecessor railroads were required, and orders were placed in 1973 for a fleet of Amfleet passenger coaches. From 1975 onwards, deliveries commenced, giving Amtrak a high quality passenger coach to accommodate it's travellers. These would be the first in long line of Amtrak rolling stock, and did wonders in overhauling perceptions of Amtrak. No more was Amtrak solely a relic of the past, using old coaches and sitting in old and dusty seats. Now, from the passenger eye, Amtrak was the train of comfort. A related order was the large order for dual level Superliner passenger coaches, mainly intended for Amtrak's long-distance routes where Amtrak wanted to run as few trains as possible while gaining the maximum revenue. However, those trains also needed to move at speed in order to really compete and provide an attractive service, and so Amtrak started hunting for a new locomotive, fully owned (rather then leased) by them and designed for passenger operation with higher top speed and faster acceleration.
All in all, this period of Amtrak's history was mostly defined by trying to keep trains running and in service, earning revenue. Most programmes that Amtrak had commenced would not come to fruit for a few more years. Passenger levels were rising on the corridors that Amtrak had invested in (primarily Chicago to Minneapolis and Washington to New York), but the weight of running a nationwide intercity service weighed heavily on Amtrak's financial accounts. It was clear that significant investment would be required in order to offset years of deferred maintenance on it's routes, and give Amtrak a fighting chance of survival. This was something that Amtrak heavily lobbied for, and big changes to the railroad scene would commence in 1976.
A Turboliner train departing from Chicago
-------------------------------
Notes: Not much has changed here yet...it's still a little early for butterflies to take large effect. Amfleet coaches are on the way in, replacing old stock, as these are the real purveyors of the "experience" of train travel for passengers...and are somewhat future proof being capable of up to 125mph. A better rail service (I'd speculate at maybe 3 departures per day) will start to entice some passengers to travel by train down to Chicago.
The biggest change here so far is the attempted conversion of Chicago Union into a through station. This is absolutely critical to an efficient network, allowing routes to be merged together, which saves on rolling stock requirements. Terminus stations mean that firstly passengers have to change trains to cross Chicago, and also means wasted time while the train is sat in the terminus platforms being turned around - which again is lost revenue when a train is sat still. Expect to see both express and commuter rail lines joined together.
The Turboliners, in OTL, did serve in the Mid-West but on the Chicago - St Louis route - which isn't an Amtrak owned route. Yet!
Much bigger changes to come in the next segment 1976-1978
A Penn Central train in 1975, a remnant of what had caused the railroad industry to be turned upside down in the US
The slow rot of the freight railroads of the United States continued, despite being relieved of their passenger operations. In most areas of the north east of the US, there were just too many railroads to maintain, and too many small railroads for the system to be efficient, for the companies to be profitable. The bankruptcy of Penn Central in 1971 started things; many smaller railroads were toppled in a domino effect, a large factor being Penn Central's inability to pay the smaller railroads the trackage fees due. The mess of Pen Central, and the inability of the US economy to let rail operations simply halt, led to the US Congress to oversee the creation of the "US Railroad Administration". The USRA was, in effect, a government owned corporation whose task would be to create a new freight network by picking routes out of the bankrupt railroads to maintain. The rest would be disbanded, or handed over to Amtrak.
Big changes were also due in the Mid-West in 1973 - Turboliner trains came into service, serving on the Chicago to Minneapolis route through Milwaukee, as well as Chicago - Detroit / Cleveland through Fort Wayne. All the routes would have several departures per day, reflecting Amtrak's belief that these routes could generate far more patronage and thus revenue. Coupled with good deals on both day and weekend trips, people started to flock to the services, attracted by the city-centre locations and more modern trains. A knock-on effect, to try to make the routes more efficient, was the renovation of Chicago Union station. By design, the station was a terminus for services in both direction, with little opportunity for through running. Amtrak's plan would change all that. Most of the shops and services sat between the tracks would move into the Great Hall, with the eastern 8 pairs of tracks being connected through the station to make 8 "through" tracks complete with platforms. This will enable Minneapolis - Chicago services to run straight on to Detroit / Cleveland. While there is likely to be little demand for Minneapolis - Detroit services, it means that time spent sitting at Chicago being turned around can be avoided, and commuter services can be run across Chicago as well.
The role of the 1970s oil crisis should not be overlooked either; people low on fuel turned to Amtrak in great numbers during the crisis, and the overall rising (and unpredictable) cost of fuel had a great - and long lasting - impact on Amtrak. It would spur Amtrak's desire to properly electrify the whole of the North East Corridor (ideally with one system to reduce operation complexity) to avoid having to buy fuel for services on this route, which could also have knock on benefits for commuter rail operations based off the NEC.
By 1975, the USRA was getting a better idea of what routes it wanted to maintain within a Consolidated Railway Corporation. Amtrak was also rapidly coming up with a map of routes it wanted to take over for it's commuter operations, in areas all around the main cities. Where it could afford to, it wanted to own the lines. Where such transfers would be impossible, due to heavy freight traffic or likely insufficient demand, Amtrak would seek to partner with Conrail (or other freight railroads) and pay to run it's trains over the freight lines.
Amtrak's long distance routes were suffering from problems, primarily from equipment failures. In part this was down to the old-age of much of the rolling stock, and coupled with little investment occurring on the lines by Amtrak, this was driving passengers away. Even on the North East Corridor, the Budd Metroliners were becoming unreliable. This would need changing, or Amtrak could lose it's biggest potential for revenue. New passenger coaches, to replace the old and unreliable coaches inherited from it's predecessor railroads were required, and orders were placed in 1973 for a fleet of Amfleet passenger coaches. From 1975 onwards, deliveries commenced, giving Amtrak a high quality passenger coach to accommodate it's travellers. These would be the first in long line of Amtrak rolling stock, and did wonders in overhauling perceptions of Amtrak. No more was Amtrak solely a relic of the past, using old coaches and sitting in old and dusty seats. Now, from the passenger eye, Amtrak was the train of comfort. A related order was the large order for dual level Superliner passenger coaches, mainly intended for Amtrak's long-distance routes where Amtrak wanted to run as few trains as possible while gaining the maximum revenue. However, those trains also needed to move at speed in order to really compete and provide an attractive service, and so Amtrak started hunting for a new locomotive, fully owned (rather then leased) by them and designed for passenger operation with higher top speed and faster acceleration.
All in all, this period of Amtrak's history was mostly defined by trying to keep trains running and in service, earning revenue. Most programmes that Amtrak had commenced would not come to fruit for a few more years. Passenger levels were rising on the corridors that Amtrak had invested in (primarily Chicago to Minneapolis and Washington to New York), but the weight of running a nationwide intercity service weighed heavily on Amtrak's financial accounts. It was clear that significant investment would be required in order to offset years of deferred maintenance on it's routes, and give Amtrak a fighting chance of survival. This was something that Amtrak heavily lobbied for, and big changes to the railroad scene would commence in 1976.
A Turboliner train departing from Chicago
-------------------------------
Notes: Not much has changed here yet...it's still a little early for butterflies to take large effect. Amfleet coaches are on the way in, replacing old stock, as these are the real purveyors of the "experience" of train travel for passengers...and are somewhat future proof being capable of up to 125mph. A better rail service (I'd speculate at maybe 3 departures per day) will start to entice some passengers to travel by train down to Chicago.
The biggest change here so far is the attempted conversion of Chicago Union into a through station. This is absolutely critical to an efficient network, allowing routes to be merged together, which saves on rolling stock requirements. Terminus stations mean that firstly passengers have to change trains to cross Chicago, and also means wasted time while the train is sat in the terminus platforms being turned around - which again is lost revenue when a train is sat still. Expect to see both express and commuter rail lines joined together.
The Turboliners, in OTL, did serve in the Mid-West but on the Chicago - St Louis route - which isn't an Amtrak owned route. Yet!
Much bigger changes to come in the next segment 1976-1978
Devvy
Donor
Well, it seems there is no high speed, regular service in the US bar the North East Corridor. And even that one isn't particularly fast or frequent when compared against European or Japanese rail travel. It's an exploration of how rail travel in the US could look. But granted, at this early stage, for the passengers, there's not a lot of difference so far. But behind the scenes, there's a lot of difference.
Outside the North East Corridor, most of the Amtrak trains are slow & meandering trains. Daily services are the norm. Even on more busy routes, commuter services are frequently run several times in the morning in the city, and several times in the evening to get people home. Again, compare to anywhere in Western Europe or Japan, and contrast against your air travel carriers.
EDIT: PS...Here are the average speeds for the Acela Express, the fastest train the US has:
ACELA'S AVERAGE SPEED BETWEEN STATIONS
Washington to Baltimore: 70 m.p.h.
Baltimore to Wilmington: 104
Wilmington to Philadelphia: 75
Philadelphia to Trenton to Newark to Penn Station: 76
Penn Station to Stamford: 48
Stamford to New Haven to Providence: 74
Providence to Boston: 76
AVG. SPEED COMPARISON
Acela, entire route: 71
TGV, Paris to Lyon: 133
Providence R.I.: The 28 miles of track where the Acela Express can reach 150 m.p.h.
HISTORIC TRAVEL TIMES
Between Washington and New York
1965: Afternoon Congressional* -- 3 hours, 35 minutes
1985: Express Metroliner -- 2 hours, 49 minutes
2005: Acela Express -- 2 hours, 47 minutes
Between New York and Boston
1965: Yankee Clipper+ -- 4 hours, 15 minutes
1985: Shoreliner Service -- 4 hours, 18 minutes
2005: Acela Express -- 3 hours, 22 minutes
This is not particularly fast.....due to a variety of reasons (mainly despite the fact the train can do 150mph, the infrastructure can't support that speed in most areas and the train accelerates like a dog (slowly) due to it's weight)
Outside the North East Corridor, most of the Amtrak trains are slow & meandering trains. Daily services are the norm. Even on more busy routes, commuter services are frequently run several times in the morning in the city, and several times in the evening to get people home. Again, compare to anywhere in Western Europe or Japan, and contrast against your air travel carriers.
EDIT: PS...Here are the average speeds for the Acela Express, the fastest train the US has:
ACELA'S AVERAGE SPEED BETWEEN STATIONS
Washington to Baltimore: 70 m.p.h.
Baltimore to Wilmington: 104
Wilmington to Philadelphia: 75
Philadelphia to Trenton to Newark to Penn Station: 76
Penn Station to Stamford: 48
Stamford to New Haven to Providence: 74
Providence to Boston: 76
AVG. SPEED COMPARISON
Acela, entire route: 71
TGV, Paris to Lyon: 133
Providence R.I.: The 28 miles of track where the Acela Express can reach 150 m.p.h.
HISTORIC TRAVEL TIMES
Between Washington and New York
1965: Afternoon Congressional* -- 3 hours, 35 minutes
1985: Express Metroliner -- 2 hours, 49 minutes
2005: Acela Express -- 2 hours, 47 minutes
Between New York and Boston
1965: Yankee Clipper+ -- 4 hours, 15 minutes
1985: Shoreliner Service -- 4 hours, 18 minutes
2005: Acela Express -- 3 hours, 22 minutes
This is not particularly fast.....due to a variety of reasons (mainly despite the fact the train can do 150mph, the infrastructure can't support that speed in most areas and the train accelerates like a dog (slowly) due to it's weight)
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the HST was designed to operate in a mixed railway - as the vast majority of BR is mixed railway at least in theory, and despite being conceived as a multiple unit the 'driving motors' are effectively single ended locos ( and it wasn't too long before they were treated as locos rather than part of multiple unit) which has a positive effect on crash survivability the Mk 3 carriage design is pretty good and the same basic structure was also used for the 110 mph loco hauled stocked for none HST routes .
the standard format for the HST is class 43 loco- 7to9 Mk3 carriages - class 43 loco ...
each class 43 is 70 tonnes
the mk 3 coach is an all steel monocoques and reputed very stiff and crashworthy both by original and even contemporary standards
they weight between 35 - 40 tonnes tare weight
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Class_43_(HST)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Mark_3
http://www.porterbrook.com/downloads/brochures/Mk3 Brochure.pdf
This is looking great, but if I may, I'd like to make a few suggestions for both Amtrak and Conrail which could really toss a couple big curveballs.
The Milwaukee Road was bankrupt and desperate for a merger, and integrating them with the Chicago and North Western will solve the problem in the short term it does nothing to solve problems both lines have in having small geographic areas. Better idea would be to bring the Milwaukee into Conrail. Burlington Northern and Chessie System will hate that idea, but it gives Conrail the ability to run coast-to-coast, running loads all the way from the docks in Seattle, Tacoma and Portland all the way to the Eastern Seaboard, a fact that will surely make for potential opportunities in long-distance freight traffic.
Second idea is to have Erie Lackawanna stay out of Conrail and/or perhaps have Amtrak buy a big stake in the line. EL was not part of Conrail's original plans, but its bankruptcy trustees in 1975 asked for inclusion. Amtrak buying a stake in EL can get Burlington Northern off of Conrail's back - just have EL and BN agree to move each other's freight loads - and if Amtrak owns a big stake in the railroad, they have the leverage to push EL into being an all fast-freight business, which is good in that the EL route is the shortest in distance from New York to Chicago. That route is long enough that HSR trains aren't a real good option but short enough that 125 mph speeds could make it a competitive run, and the fast-freight focus (and with a little help form GE) could see them electrify it in the latter half of the 1970s. End result is this NY-Chicago electric route runs effectively as an express for all things, with 85-90 mph fast freight trains (preferably with the cantenary designed high enough to allow double-stack trains) and 125 mph intercity passenger runs, all of which running behind electric locomotives capable of maintaining such speeds without the enormous fuel consumption diesels would need to do that.
For the diesels, a word of advice I would give here is to skip the SPD40F generation and go directly to the F40PH, though I would suggest that you may wish to order these with 20-cylinder version of GM's 645 turbodiesel. By now they will worked the kinks out of the V20 version, and that extra 600 horsepower that it gives is useful for both faster acceleration and possibly designing the engines from the start for head-end power which the Amfleet and Superliner cars use. You may remember the idea for the Superliners which we spoke about in PMs earlier, are you going for it?
The Milwaukee Road was bankrupt and desperate for a merger, and integrating them with the Chicago and North Western will solve the problem in the short term it does nothing to solve problems both lines have in having small geographic areas. Better idea would be to bring the Milwaukee into Conrail. Burlington Northern and Chessie System will hate that idea, but it gives Conrail the ability to run coast-to-coast, running loads all the way from the docks in Seattle, Tacoma and Portland all the way to the Eastern Seaboard, a fact that will surely make for potential opportunities in long-distance freight traffic.
Second idea is to have Erie Lackawanna stay out of Conrail and/or perhaps have Amtrak buy a big stake in the line. EL was not part of Conrail's original plans, but its bankruptcy trustees in 1975 asked for inclusion. Amtrak buying a stake in EL can get Burlington Northern off of Conrail's back - just have EL and BN agree to move each other's freight loads - and if Amtrak owns a big stake in the railroad, they have the leverage to push EL into being an all fast-freight business, which is good in that the EL route is the shortest in distance from New York to Chicago. That route is long enough that HSR trains aren't a real good option but short enough that 125 mph speeds could make it a competitive run, and the fast-freight focus (and with a little help form GE
) could see them electrify it in the latter half of the 1970s. End result is this NY-Chicago electric route runs effectively as an express for all things, with 85-90 mph fast freight trains (preferably with the cantenary designed high enough to allow double-stack trains) and 125 mph intercity passenger runs, all of which running behind electric locomotives capable of maintaining such speeds without the enormous fuel consumption diesels would need to do that.For the diesels, a word of advice I would give here is to skip the SPD40F generation and go directly to the F40PH, though I would suggest that you may wish to order these with 20-cylinder version of GM's 645 turbodiesel. By now they will worked the kinks out of the V20 version, and that extra 600 horsepower that it gives is useful for both faster acceleration and possibly designing the engines from the start for head-end power which the Amfleet and Superliner cars use. You may remember the idea for the Superliners which we spoke about in PMs earlier, are you going for it?
Not overbuilt in terms of the traffic. Despite what you have read about declining industry & rust belt those tracks are usually near capacity. The abandoned tracks were usually old coal or grain lines that were eventually uneeded. Also count on redoing the tracks for high speed. They are often straight, but built for tow kilometer freights moving at 45 kph or less. Also since the 1950s extensive suburban industrial districts are serviced by those straights, making restriction to passenger only problematic. Generally the best tracks are the best because they carry the heaviest freight loads, much of it starting or terminating along those lines.
Nearly all major American railroads built into Chicago, and while you are right about the fact that traffic tends to take the best routes (and rail traffic levels swelled dramatically in the 1970s, 80s and 90s), this is not insurmountable and few railroad lines still around by the 70s were useless. Amtrak is gonna have to build lines and improve what it can get. That said, simply buying the lines orphaned by Conrail will give you the ability to build a considerable network in the Midwest, and as both Conrail and Amtrak are joined at the hip here, its possible to do deals to allow each other to have better lines for their specific usages. Conrail doesn't need lines to downtown cores, but Amtrak does. Amtrak is better served by routes which are great-looking in terms of geography and sights to see, but these don't help and in lots of cases hinder heavy Conrail freights. It's all a matter of planning properly, and both lines have good people for the job.
I'm surprised there are this many railfans on AH.com.
Although it might be categorized as ASB, I think a TL with a continuing Penn Central would be amazing.
Anyway, Devvy. Keep on.
Although it might be categorized as ASB, I think a TL with a continuing Penn Central would be amazing.
Anyway, Devvy. Keep on.
Although it might be categorized as ASB, I think a TL with a continuing Penn Central would be amazing.
No. Just no.
Penn Central was for my money the absolute saddest point in the history of American railroading, a company formed from two of the most legendary names in the business that went broke within two years of its creation, was an operational nightmare from the start, let its infrastructure decay to a truly frightening degree and whose failures subsequently destroyed many other roads and effectively forced Conrail to exist.
I'm proud to stay that in my railroad TL that Penn Central never existed - instead the Pennsy became the backbone of Conrail in the late 70s and effectively gave over many of its good aspects to the new organization, whereas the New York Central stayed an independent railroad.
Devvy
Donor
I'd disagree with you partly here. The Intercity 125 (or HST, or the Class 43 hauled train) was designed for use on a mixed railway - as the vast majority of rail is in Great Britain. The BR Mk3 coach is indeed a great crashworthy design, as incidents such as that at Ufton Nervet several years ago showed. Bear that in mind, and bear the great crash worthiness the Pendolino was praised for at Grayrigg, when comparing these figures:
ACELA
Built: 1998-2001
Power car weight: 92700kg
Business/standard class coach: 63100kg
Intercity 125
Built: 1975-1982
Power car weight: 62000kg
Business/standard class coach: 39000kg
Virgin Pendolino
Built: 2001-2004
Car weight: 52000kg / car (distributed traction, no dedicated power car, 9 coach version)
An Acela coach (no engines or anything), weighs more then a BR Class 43 (that's the Intercity 125 power car) - that's crazy! Despite the Acela having the benefits of modern technology, being built roughly 25 years later. Extra weight means more wear and tear on both train and track, makes acceleration a lot slower - and deceleration a lot slower. It also makes the train a lot more expensive to buy, as it has to be custom designed for the US network rather then modifications to an existing design. And it also means the train has to draw more power to accelerate the train.
EDIT: For other readers, the Pendolino is a modern high speed train (well 125mph is the maximum due to UK rules) that tilts and is well utilised on one of Britain's main express lines (HS1 - the line from London to Paris is the exception to the rule, where the Eurostar does 186mph in the UK. It's the only train that goes faster then 125mph in the UK).
This is looking great, but if I may, I'd like to make a few suggestions for both Amtrak and Conrail which could really toss a couple big curveballs.
The Milwaukee Road was bankrupt and desperate for a merger, and integrating them with the Chicago and North Western will solve the problem in the short term it does nothing to solve problems both lines have in having small geographic areas. Better idea would be to bring the Milwaukee into Conrail. Burlington Northern and Chessie System will hate that idea, but it gives Conrail the ability to run coast-to-coast, running loads all the way from the docks in Seattle, Tacoma and Portland all the way to the Eastern Seaboard, a fact that will surely make for potential opportunities in long-distance freight traffic.
Second idea is to have Erie Lackawanna stay out of Conrail and/or perhaps have Amtrak buy a big stake in the line. EL was not part of Conrail's original plans, but its bankruptcy trustees in 1975 asked for inclusion. Amtrak buying a stake in EL can get Burlington Northern off of Conrail's back - just have EL and BN agree to move each other's freight loads - and if Amtrak owns a big stake in the railroad, they have the leverage to push EL into being an all fast-freight business, which is good in that the EL route is the shortest in distance from New York to Chicago. That route is long enough that HSR trains aren't a real good option but short enough that 125 mph speeds could make it a competitive run, and the fast-freight focus (and with a little help form GE
For the diesels, a word of advice I would give here is to skip the SPD40F generation and go directly to the F40PH, though I would suggest that you may wish to order these with 20-cylinder version of GM's 645 turbodiesel. By now they will worked the kinks out of the V20 version, and that extra 600 horsepower that it gives is useful for both faster acceleration and possibly designing the engines from the start for head-end power which the Amfleet and Superliner cars use. You may remember the idea for the Superliners which we spoke about in PMs earlier, are you going for it?
Loads of interesting ideas there to bear in mind! As for the Superliners....probably not yet. Too many things stand in it's way - catenary height for starters. I'd be lying if I said I had everything worked out yet though
I'm going to stay largely clear of the freight railroads...the only reason they are popping up at the moment is due to the huge effect they will have on Amtrak getting hold of the tracks. We might have a glance at what' happened, but it won't be in that much detail.
To the others.....thanks for the comments!
Next part will probably be later on this week at some point.
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Devvy
Donor
Oh and this (forgot this point earlier!). Tracks can be easily rebuilt/relaid. Changing the direction of an alignment can't.
So given that the tracks are pretty damn straight when Amtrak gets them, means that as time progresses, they can be upgraded to decent track ready for express operations later in time.
Riain
Banned
Yes, these days land purchase and rights of way are the big costs of any new project. The curve easing between Newcastle NSW and Brisbane Qld are undertaken within the existing rail reservation because of this. If you own old tracks on straight alignments then you're halfway to HSR, if you can close level crossings on these then you are 3/4 of the way, building the quality tracks is a small part of the problem.