Run into a meat grinder at the French border.My only POD is that Belgium and Luxembourg are not attacked. I dunno what they would have done otherwise
Run into a meat grinder at the French border.My only POD is that Belgium and Luxembourg are not attacked. I dunno what they would have done otherwise
Fixed for ya mateRunning the Frenchs into a meat grinder at the border.
The "demonstrations of military superiority" assumptions are more likely to be right if the Germans don't actually DOW anybody, Austria invades Serbia, Russia mobilizes, Germany mobilizes, France mobilized, Britain mobilizes their navy.This can work for Germany to *win* a *diplomatic* victory, security by a live, lethal, expensive demonstration of military superiority. So it would not quite be "winning the Great War". So, it would be countable as a win, but not the kind of win sought by the Schlieffen Plan.
It *can* work if Entente and British governments and publics are highly sensitive to political and diplomatic factors, feel a need to assure themselves and the outside world they are "in the right", and judge skeptically that any war effort, especially a protracted one, to force Germany and Austria-Hungary to release Serbia from "captivity" ----- the Central Powers would call it "accountability", must be "really worth the blood of our men".
If, the Entente governments and publics instead, are up in an anti-Austrian, anti-German lather, worked up over their *overreaction* and collective punishment of poor little Serbia, committed to protecting Slavdom and Orthodoxy, determined to halt Teutonic bullying and redeem Alsace-Lorraine, and for Britain-- resisting their rising naval and commercial challenger.....and if the Entente governments and publics can remain high on their own supply and indignation indefinitely, or its functional equivalent, 18 months or two years...........with mobilization they will accrue major advantages making German and Austrian maintenance of its forward defensive lines of territorial integrity and/or the occupation of Serbia, unworkable, and placing them in a position where a deeper Entente invasion, occupation, is inevitable, and if they wish, a partition is entirely possible.
So, the approach you discuss is workable, but only under a particular set of political/behavioral assumptions about Entente intentions/constraints/restraints. If those assumptions are wrong, the approach become sub-optimal to neglectful to suicidal-by-omission.
Why? What prevents the Austrians from messing up and getting Galicia occupied?but I bet Austrian Galicia won't fall
You're correct - that's how it works best as a militarily supported alliance-diplomatic strategy, in support of their Austrian ally's military response to a bedeviling political terrorist problem.The "demonstrations of military superiority" assumptions are more likely to be right if the Germans don't actually DOW anybody, Austria invades Serbia, Russia mobilizes, Germany mobilizes, France mobilized, Britain mobilizes their navy.
Germany doesn't declare war on Russia until the Russians cross the Austrian Border (or at least until the Russians declare war on Austria themselves).
In the meantime there are at least a few more days of peace to crash import stuff, ship stuff out to the colonies, fit out merchants as raiders.
Germany has to accept war with a fully mobilized Russia and France but OTL they handled that anyway, and here the front is shorter with another blockade hole.
If the long war happens anyway, sure the Allies have thedisadvantage of France is more intact, but I bet Austrian Galicia won't fall, the province not ruined, no blood on the snow etc...
Why? What prevents the Austrians from messing up and getting Galicia occupied?
In strategic terms, quite possibly or probably not as crucial an ally as France.Belgium is a crucial ally of the UK at this time,
If Britain holds off on involving itself in a Germany versus continental Entente fight 1914, later intervening in 1916 seems like an almost surefire way to get the worst of both worlds, having a war, and being on the losing side. Staggering/delaying British entry would give Germany and the CPs too much time to wear down or outright defeat the Serbs and the Russians, and attrite down the French, so that none of the three are as much of an asset when Britain starts fighting Germany on the ground. Also, Britain's DoW against Germany was probably critical in influencing the decisions of littoral European (Italy, Portugal, Greece) and non-European (the Dominions, Japan, the USA) to join the war, so they won't join and contribute until London does. All to Franco-Russian-Serbian detriment.I could see Britain getting involved in 1916, maybe:
Oh, a delay in British entry into the war until 1916 is almost certainly enough for Germany to win, if a win is defined *down* moderately to the crushing of Serbia and having Russia peace out with the loss of border territory. And it could be sufficient to lead to a more drastic defeat of Russia, putting any timetable for impact of British blockade, submarine warfare or provoking US entry beyond wartime relevance, and thus enabling a thorough defeat of France any British Expeditionary Force in Western Europe as well.Is it enough for Germany to win? Debatable.
Nope, in fact, if Britain is neutral for a whole year or two before going to war with Germany, the USA will probably become accustomed to as brisk and profitable a wartime trade with Germany and Austria-Hungary (as purchasers of southern cotton, midwestern grain, POL, fertilizer) as with France and Russia. While France and Germany will raid each other's flagged commerce with surface and submarine raiders, France will not be able to impose a close or distant blockade on Germany, nor vice versa. Germany, likewise will probably follow cruiser rules when employing submarines against French and Russian merchant ships and not sinking neutral merchants without warning, unless they wish to bring Britain into the war instantly.America is also likely to get involved at some point (it needs those debts from France and the UK!), and if the British still successfully blockade Germany it becomes a matter of attrition that the Entente is far more likely to win.
But would the French truly believe their Entente Cordiale pal would apply that to them?The 1839 treaty of London guarantee the neutrality of Belgium, under protection of British empire against any aggressor !
How much better would "the optics" for declaring war look for the Cabinet answering questions from Parliament in the public in this alternate August 11, 1914, compared with OTL 3 August, 1914. In OTL, Germany had DoW'ed Russia, and issued ultimata to France to back off from defending its borders and Belgium to let it pass, with troops on the march. In the alternate August 11, 1914, while Austria-Hungary might be shelling/attacking Serbia (as also happened OTL), Germany would not have declared war on anybody who had not declared war on her first. If it were fighting French or Russian soldiers anywhere it probably would not be on their soil but still in a phase of defending its own soild from their attacks or encountering Russian forces who had invaded the territory of their Austrian ally.AFAIK the British Parliament had already decided to get involved in WW1 and only used the Schlieffen Plan as an excuse, so the declaration of war is delayed by a week.
Well, the Germans need to decide which thing they wish to do. Diplomatically and optically, west-first, even if limited and leaving Belgium (but probably not Luxemburg) uninvaded and inviolate, is still quite a different thing than attacking *no* neighbors, and declaring war on noone, and fighting in the first instance only defening the Austrian ally's and one's own soil.The OP didn't mention the usual east first. So Germany could still do west first but without invading Belgium, if so it might make some sense to move into the Longwy and Briery basin along the French border, both to prevent their being used by France, and to forward protect German ore fields in Lorraine, in this scenario the Germans have the density to hold upper Alsace.
No attempt to actually take the French fortress cities, but the bulk of the army still west to defeat French counter attacks.
2 corps are sent east immediately to east Prussia and 1 corps (and 1 cavalry division) sent to Silesia to assist the Austrians on their flank.
The Austrians are expected to keep the second army in Serbia and defeat the Serbians (or at least occupy Belgrade).
Basically the Germans attack neither east nor west, wait on events, defeat any attempt at invasion sharply, defeat the Serbs, secure a favorable peace conference.
(with out any German invasion east or west, Britain could stay neutral for a bit, making a quick peace much more likely, if the Germans were making reasonable demands)
I hadn't thought of the arguments in favor of this. Good point. Still, this seems to be an argument in favor of deploying in this way in order to inflict maximum attrition on the French Army via operational means, without as much promise as the Schlieffen Plan to either a) compel the entire French Army to fight to the death ready or not and possibly get killed in the first campaign defending vital centers, or b) seize vital resources and terrain from the French for follow-on campaigns that the French must also reclaim at all costs if they wish to regain their strength. Compared to this, the plan you discuss could damage and defeat many French units, but not necessarily beyond repair or reconstitution, and they would have most of their command and industrial and demographic resources available for reconstruction of their forces in real time. So the approach works best for a theory of victory that assumes a negotiated peace conference is more probable than a war of attrition to the last man and last ounce of national perseverance and strength.The basic choices in the immediate aftermath of such a decision would be to either hold the full strength of the Western German armies in the West, or to disburse some of the forces, (perhaps about 1.5 armies) eastward. The advantage to holding the full strength cocked and ready in the West is that if the French invaded the Ardennes, (after August 20th), then it might be possible for the German right to unleash a devastating counterattack upon the French 4th and 5th Armies as these reached the eastern regions of the Ardennes.
I hadn't thought of the arguments in favor of this. Good point. Still, this seems to be an argument in favor of deploying in this way in order to inflict maximum attrition on the French Army via operational means, without as much promise as the Schlieffen Plan to either a) compel the entire French Army to fight to the death ready or not and possibly get killed in the first campaign defending vital centers, or b) seize vital resources and terrain from the French for follow-on campaigns that the French must also reclaim at all costs if they wish to regain their strength. Compared to this, the plan you discuss could damage and defeat many French units, but not necessarily beyond repair or reconstitution, and they would have most of their command and industrial and demographic resources available for reconstruction of their forces in real time. So the approach works best for a theory of victory that assumes a negotiated peace conference is more probable than a war of attrition to the last man and last ounce of national perseverance and strength.
Could the German follow up offensive make it to Paris and key ports serving Paris before culminating and the assembly and formation of adequate French units to block them?Assuming a refused German right has defeated the French left after this has advanced through the Ardennes, then the Germans could opt to then go on the offensive in the West.
There where several guys did where against Schlieffen just didn't got the command seat,the guy become Belgium military governor was ironically oneI think the main problem with most "Germany goes East" PODs/TLs is that they require a very significant shift in German thinking that goes beyond purely military matters.
The Schlieffen Plan wasn't created in the void, it had a context to it. A two front war was considered hard or even impossible to win in the long term, and the Schlieffen Plan was the way German thinking had to face that prospect. Quite simply, it tried to cut one of the fronts short before it even began. In hindsight we know the OHL engaged in a lot of wishful thinking to arrive at the conclusions they did, especially when Motlke kept the gist of already unlikely-to-succeed plan with even less resources than Schlieffen had envisioned.
Suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that Moltke the Younger is replaced by an unnamed general who recognizes the Schlieffen Plan is little more than a fantasy. After arriving to the conclusion that France can't be knocked out of the war easily, and seeks to find another alternative. German military planners had recognized the dangers of a two front war, but the other option, Russia, is evidently impossible to knock out quickly. This brings us to the first big problem: German military thinking would need to somehow accept the risk of a protracted two front war as a prerequisite for a Russia first strategy.
In hindsight, we know that this could've been a valid strategy, with how unstable Russia was. Would the Germans work under the same assumptions, tho? From their perspective, they would have to fight a several years long war in Russia against their strategic depth, at the risk of ending like Napoleon, and after that, they would still need to beat the French into capitulation.
That doesn't sound so bad knowing the what happened OTL, but politically, the OHL going from "home by Christmas" to "best case scenario is a several year long grueling campaign into Russia" wouldn't be easy to justify. From here there are two options: either the Kaiser and his cronies dismiss our unnamed general for defeatism, or they accept his carefully though assessment. The first option escapes the present discussion, but the second one brings us to our second problem: German political thinking wouldn't have acted the same if the assumed the consequences of going to war in July 1914 were several years worth of war and more uncertainty over the result. Of course, OTL the Schlieffen Plan was also a gamble, but to put it roughly, the Germans had believed their own fantasy and were irrationally confident of the Plan, to the point where no suitable back up plans were prepared. A shift to a Russia forst strategy requires a lot of analysis that would dispense with such illusions.
Going more for the political angle, and again with the power of hindsight, it's easy to see that Germany could win the most by dismembering Russia and creating a network of satellites states, a la Brest Litovsk, that would have provided a safer alternative to overseas colonies that were vulnerable to the British. Once again though, what we can ascertain with hindsight clashes with German thinking of the time. The dominant current of thought in Germany back then was Weltpolitik, which argued in favor of an expanded overseas empire and a blue water navy fit for it. Even if it succeeds, a Russia first strategy would naturally end with more gains in the East and a more lenient peace in the West, which doesn't fit well with this. The situation vis-a-vis the British would also be unchanged without any channel ports, and they were considered the main rival by the naval lobby and adherents of Weltpolitik. All in all, German ambitions would need to flip and be moderated to being a continental power, at least for the time being. This is easier said than done when the momentum the Weltpolitik movement carried for decades by 1914.
TLDR, getting Germany to go east is way more complicated than someone in the OHL deciding so.
The fact that they didn't get the command despite their logical objections only strengthens my point, tho.There where several guys did where against Schlieffen just didn't got the command seat,the guy become Belgium military governor was ironically one
And maybe if OHL is saying that is the only type of result the Army can deliver in the next decade, the German government says, “nah this Serbian crisis is not an opportunity for war”.TLDR, getting Germany to go east is way more complicated than someone in the OHL deciding so.
Exactly, that's where I was going. Having Germany go east while everything else stays the same isn't realistic.And maybe if OHL is saying that is the only type of result the Army can deliver in the next decade, the German government says, “nah this Serbian crisis is not an opportunity for war”.
seniority, that accounted more people thought(The fact that they didn't get the command despite their logical objections only strengthens my point, tho.
Yes and no. The fact that the people who happened to be in charge adhered to the plan was indeed a factor, but I explained at length how the OHL couldn't easily break with currents of politcal thinking and political expectations that went beyond them. In fact, overestimation of their own capabilities and poor strategic thinking were a problem all throughout Wilhelmine Germany and hardly restricted to the Heer.seniority, that accounted more people thought(
IMHO it was a wee bit more complicated.I think the main problem with most "Germany goes East" PODs/TLs is that they require a very significant shift in German thinking that goes beyond purely military matters.
The Schlieffen Plan wasn't created in the void, it had a context to it. A two front war was considered hard or even impossible to win in the long term, and the Schlieffen Plan was the way German thinking had to face that prospect. Quite simply, it tried to cut one of the fronts short before it even began. In hindsight we know the OHL engaged in a lot of wishful thinking to arrive at the conclusions they did, especially when Motlke kept the gist of already unlikely-to-succeed plan with even less resources than Schlieffen had envisioned.
Suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that Moltke the Younger is replaced by an unnamed general who recognizes the Schlieffen Plan is little more than a fantasy. After arriving to the conclusion that France can't be knocked out of the war easily, and seeks to find another alternative. German military planners had recognized the dangers of a two front war, but the other option, Russia, is evidently impossible to knock out quickly. This brings us to the first big problem: German military thinking would need to somehow accept the risk of a protracted two front war as a prerequisite for a Russia first strategy.
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That doesn't sound so bad knowing the what happened OTL, but politically, the OHL going from "home by Christmas" to "best case scenario is a several year long grueling campaign into Russia" wouldn't be easy to justify.
Unfortunatly I never ever came across an explanation for this very lonesome and only personaly made decision of Moltke the Minor since including the mobilisation period 1912/1913 there actually were for many years fully worked out plans for a war on two fronts against Russia as well as against France. For the period of 1913-1914 there was at least a study (no fully fledged plan) for.... Of course, OTL the Schlieffen Plan was also a gamble, but to put it roughly, the Germans had believed their own fantasy and were irrationally confident of the Plan, to the point where no suitable back up plans were prepared. A shift to a Russia forst strategy requires a lot of analysis that would dispense with such illusions, and German actions in 1914 (and before) would reflect that.
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Probably not. The logistics constraints and French reserves would probably be enough to keep the Germans out of Paris even assuming a crushing victory in the Ardennes.Could the German follow up offensive make it to Paris and key ports serving Paris before culminating and the assembly and formation of adequate French units to block them?
Very creative and interesting! But what is the German purpose, objective, and endgame here? Occupy the North Sea ports? - for later long-term naval use? So no one else has them? To own their Belgian and Dutch hinterlands to territorially buffer and secure most of northwest Germany including the Ruhr, and absorb the agricultural and industrial capacity of these small but rich states? OK - these are all feasible military missions that get *some* tangible reward, but the do not engage or damage the threat of the French Army.Maybe if the objective is to control North Sea ports they could gamble that France either won't honour its treaty obligations or will be too slow to act. They then take Belgium and Netherlands and hope to defend the Scheldt line aiming to get a stand off. Plan B is to go for Alsace Lorraine and then offer to return it or pull back in return for indefinite cease fire.
Would it work? Probably not, but it gives a chance of a quick resolution in the West that could be good enough to effectively cripple the Russians in the East. And it isn't as much a strain on logistics as Schlieffen.