How could've the KMT won the CCW without changing anything on the campaigns of encirclement? Meaning that you can change some policies or actions made by Chiang Kai-Shek but without changing the situation of the CCP before 1945.
How could've the KMT won the CCW after WW2?
- Thread starter EasternRomanEmpire
- Start date
Don't try to recover Manchuria immediately. Focus on destroying the CCP base areas in north-central China instead. The KMT sending its most experienced and best-equipped troops into a faraway corner of the country without properly securing the center doomed them.
The problem with this scenario is that it's very likely the CCP sets up its People's Republic, or worse, a USSR-controlled Soviet China in Manchuria. For Chiang, it would be a big challenge to swallow his pride and give up the liberation of the Northeast as a primary goal, especially so soon after the Japanese capitulation.
The problem with this scenario is that it's very likely the CCP sets up its People's Republic, or worse, a USSR-controlled Soviet China in Manchuria. For Chiang, it would be a big challenge to swallow his pride and give up the liberation of the Northeast as a primary goal, especially so soon after the Japanese capitulation.
How serious was the idea to allowing Japanese soldiers who had surrendered in china to fight on the side of the nationalists?
It actually happened, and on both sides. Perhaps most notably was the defense of Taiyuan, controlled by KMT general Yan Xishan. His troops were backed by a division's worth of surrendered IJA soldiers, and many of them committed suicide right before the city fell to the communists.
On the other side letting the CCP having the most industrialized region of China isn't an appealing prospect either and Chiang may've thought that it would be easier to conquer Manchuria since he had already tried and failed to take the areas in Central China,
Though probably still a better choice than OTL.
Following the surrender, the Kuomintang were quick to re-secure the services of Yasuji Okamura, who was an advisor to them before the Sino Japanese War broke out and one of their most respected adversaries during the conflict itself. Of note is how he was one of the few Japanese generals who fought a clean war, being found not guilty of any war crimes, and testified for the prosecution during the Allied investigation into the Nanjing Massacre.
I'm not entirely clear on the progression of the CCW after 1945 but from what I gather, the KMT more or less underestimated both the actual and potential capabilities of the communist forces. On paper the KMT was far stronger more qualitatively and numerically, but the CCP enjoyed more grassroots support, had tons of spies in the Nationalist regime, and their on-the-ground insurgent networks were very strong, having built them up in Japanese controlled territory all throughout the war.
Chiang should have concentrated on mopping up these networks. Instead he bungled everything by overreaching in Manchuria, thinking he could unify the country in one clean swoop. Even just stopping in Shenyang might have saved the mainland ROC in my opinion.
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After relooking what happened the KMT did try to conquer Central China and even captured Yan'an though obviously it would've done better if it hadn't diverted its best troops in Manchuria.
Up until the Liaoshen campaign the KMT had the upper hand however due to desertions, Japanese weapons in CCP hands (that had been the case since the outbreak of hostilities in 1946) and much more support for the CCP than for the KMT the CCP managed to quickly conquer all of China as the Nationalists' lines were completely destroyed.
My idea would be that a less corrupt government should be able to win since the CCP would gain much less support and/or the KMT having better results against the Japanese since the terrible fight put up by the KMT and the CCP managing to fight off the Japanese with much less resources definitely was a blow to the KMT.
I think the corruption and desertions were major but were more of the "yin" to the "yang" of the crushing defeats in Changchun, Jinzhou etc. The CCP being able to secure parts of Manchuria, capture left-behind Soviet and Japanese weapons, and enlist the Manchurian puppet troops were all things that helped. They also resulted from the CCP's having generally superior organization and morale, which allowed them to make smart decisions and take advantage of opportunities better.
That said, I don't think the KMT was doomed to fail just because of these weaknesses, since they had some big advantages as well, namely the superiority in (initial) numbers and equipment. Overextending and getting routed in Manchuria just gave an energetic and motivated CCP the opportunity to pounce on the situation and continue to strike in a cascading manner that amplified the KMT's weaknesses and the CCP's advantages with each successive development. However, had that major defeat not happened and the KMT were more cautious and cognizant of their limitations, I think the CCP might not have an enjoyed such an opportunity to exploit. There would probably instead be major and possibly inconclusive fighting in northern China, with the KMT fighting pre-WWII style encirclement campaigns against the communists in places like Shandong, Hebei, and Shanxi. Supported from southern and Eastern China (Nanjing and Shanghai), plus Chongqing, I think they would do much better in these battlefields and that the US would probably start to support them within a few years as the Cold War heats up.
It is interesting to think about whether there would be a Korean war in this situation. I tend to believe there wouldn't be one because without China being unified under the CCP I don't think Stalin would give Kim Il Sung permission for the invasion.
Chiang (or whoever replaces him) would have to think very long term on this one, and accept that defeating the Communists would take loads of time. First order of business, as other said, would be to root out the Communist spy networks and consolidate its control over the south, though winning back popular support would also need to be on the agenda. The KMT would probably fare better under anyone but Chiang.
Maybe, though it would likely be seen as an extension of the Chinese Civil War, this time one where Mao has far less resources to spare for Kim Il Sung when things go south.
As much as I respect the man for his efforts and principles (at least compared with the alternatives), the more I read about Chiang the more I marvel at the flaws in his strategy and overall style. Of course his political establishment and the whole historical situation was in many ways geared against him, but there were so many issues, big and small, that he could have avoided with some more foresight and less angry impulse.
It's always kind of funny to think about how North Korea already existed for five years by the time the PRC was proclaimed, and that Korean communists played a non-trivial role in the CCP's successes in Manchuria.
1) KMT to not reduce troop levels...alienating a large section of the military and being a large recruiting pool for the PLA
2) Don't screw up the economy--
3) Don't just defend the cities and ignore country side. Keep the CCP locked into where they were.
4) Do whatever to win the population over to the KMT side and away from the CCP