One: immediately after crushing the four cruisers at Savo Island, Gunichi Mikawa takes his task group to sink the invasion transports off Lunga Point.
What Mikawa himself had to say (From: The Japanese Navy in World War II (pp. 242-244). Naval Institute Press.) on the subject when he was asked to review one of his staff's articles on the Battle of Savo:
[Since Admiral Mikawa had been in command of the Japanese forces engaged in the Battle of Savo Island, he was requested to read Captain Ohmae’s article for accuracy. His comments follow:]
I have read Toshikazu Ohmae’s article, “The Battle of Savo Island,” and find it well written and complete. It covers all the important facts of the battle as I remember them. There are a few points, however, that I wish to emphasize.
Upon my arrival at Rabaul, in late July 1942, as commander in chief of the Eighth Fleet, there was no indication that the quiet Solomons were soon to be the scene of fierce battle. Nevertheless, I recognized the mobile capability of U.S. carrier task forces and, accordingly, ordered my heavy cruisers to the safer rear base at Kavieng rather than Rabaul.
It was a serious inconvenience and a shortcoming that my command extended only to sea and land operations in the area. Air operations were entirely outside of my responsibility and control. I found, for example, that there was no program or plan for providing planes to the new base at Guadalcanal, and there was nothing that I could do about it.
As soon as the U.S. landings at Guadalcanal were reported on 7 August, and the invasion strength was apparent, I determined to employ all the forces at my command to destroy the enemy ships. My choice of a night action to accomplish this purpose was made because I had no air support on which to rely—and reliable air support was vital to anything but a night action. On the other hand, I had complete confidence in my ships and knew that the Japanese navy’s emphasis on night battle training and practice would ensure our chances of success in such an action, even without air support.
My two major concerns for this operation were that enemy carriers might repeat against my ships their successes of the Battle of Midway before we reached the battle area, and that our approach to Guadalcanal might be hindered by the poorly charted waters of the Solomons. But both of these worries were dispelled once we had passed the scouting lines of enemy destroyers to the west of Savo Island, and I was then sure of success in the night battle.
The element of surprise worked to our advantage and enabled us to destroy every target taken under fire. I was greatly impressed, however, by the courageous action of the northern group of U.S. cruisers. They fought back heroically despite heavy damage sustained before they were ready for battle. Had they had even a few minutes’ warning of our approach, the results of the action would have been quite different.
Prior to action I had ordered the jettisoning of all shipboard flammables—such as aviation fuel and depth charges—to reduce the chance of fire from shell hits. While my ships sustained no fires, we observed that U.S. ships, immediately after they were hit, burst into flames that were soon uncontrollable.
The reasons given by the author for not attacking the transports are the reasons that influenced my decision at the time (below). Knowing now that the transports were vital to the American foothold on Guadalcanal, knowing now that our army would be unable to drive American forces out of the Solomons, and knowing now that the carrier task force was not in position to attack my ships, it is easy to say that some other decision would have been wiser. But I believe today, as then, that my decision, based on the information known to me, was not a wrong one.
[signed] G. MIKAWA
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From Toshikazu Ohmae’s article, “The Battle of Savo Island,”:
Meanwhile, Admiral Mikawa and his staff had been making a rapid study of the situation in order to determine our next move. They concluded that the force should withdraw immediately. This decision was reached on the basis of the following considerations:
1) The force was at 0030 divided into three groups, each acting individually, with the flagship in the rear. For them all to assemble and reform in the darkness it would be necessary to slow down considerably. From their position to the northwest of Savo Island it would take thirty minutes to slow down and assemble, a half hour more to regain formation, another half hour to regain battle speed, and then another hour to again reach the vicinity of the enemy anchorage. The two and a half hours required would thus place our reentry into the battle area at 0300, just one hour before sunrise.
2) Based on radio intelligence of the previous evening, we knew that there were enemy carriers about one hundred miles southeast of Guadalcanal. As a result of our night action these would be moving toward the island by this time, and to remain in the area by sunrise would mean that we would only meet the fate our carriers had suffered at Midway.
3) By withdrawing immediately we would probably still be pursued and attacked by the closing enemy carrier force, but by leaving at once we could get farther to the north before they struck. The enemy carriers might thus be lured within reach of our land-based air forces at Rabaul.
In making this decision we were influenced by the belief that a great victory had been achieved in the night action. We were also influenced by the thought of the army’s conviction that there would be no difficulty about driving the enemy forces out of Guadalcanal.
Admiral Mikawa received the opinion of his staff and, at 0023, gave the order, “All forces withdraw.” There was no questioning of this order on the bridge of the Chokai. The signal went out by blinker, “Force in line ahead, course 320 degrees, speed thirty knots.” The Chokai hoisted a speed light and withdrew. Shortly after the signal we sighted the Furutaka’s identification lamp in the distance, and the battle was over. Our estimated dawn position was radioed to Rabaul in hope that Eleventh Air Fleet planes might be able to strike any pursuing enemy carrier.
The reasons for our early retirement were based in part on the Japanese navy’s “decisive battle” doctrine that destruction of the enemy fleet brings an automatic constriction of his command of the sea. The concept of air power (both sea-based and land-based), which invalidates this doctrine, was not fully appreciated by us at this time, nor were we fully convinced of it until the summer of 1944, and then it was too late. Another reason behind our decision to withdraw was the lack of a unified command of our air and surface forces. Under the circumstances, we in the Eighth Fleet ships could simply not expect of our land-based planes the degree of cooperation required to cover us in a dawn retirement.
The Japanese Navy in World War II (p. 242). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.
