WWII: German Victory in Battle of Britain, could USSR win alone?

Here are the actual numbers of fighter command during this period

Note a given Squadron was expected to have 24 Aircraft assigned (not all with the Squadron) in order to be able to put up 12 planes - at any given point 1 in 4 might be undergoing airframe and component life checks/rebuild

Aircraft and components were lifed by airframe and component life usually timed by flying hours and depending on the hours this could be a check, a replace part and return said older part to factory for reconditioning or a return of the whole airframe to a factory or suitable Air Station for a complete strip down (usually by this point had the Airframe survived it would possibly be replaced with a new airframe and the older aircraft placed in reserve or sent to a secondary theatre or used for advanced training etc).

So this required a minimum of 16 aircraft for a given fighter squadron to have 12 aircraft operational - assuming that at least 4 would be U/S at any given time

At 15 June 1940 there were enough aircraft on strength for roughly 18 Aircraft per Squadron - this placed a massive burden on the front line squadrons and supporting units to maintain a 12 'operational' Aircraft strength per squadron - and this before we take into account any losses though all causes

By July 6th this average strength had risen to 21 Aircraft per Squadron and despite the heavy fighting over the summer over all strength never got as bad as June 15th and gradually improved as did the number of Squadrons and Established strength

The Luftwaffe didn't even come close to defeating fighter command - let alone force a capitulation on the UK

Taken from here

ww2dbaseNumber of Squadrons as of 1 Jul 1940
SpitfireHurricaneBlenheimDefiantTotal
11 Group8175030
12 Group532111
13 Group691117
Total19298258


Proportion of Aircraft Strength
SpitfireHurricaneBlenheimDefiantTotal
11 Group14%34%6%0%54%
12 Group7%6%3%2%18%
13 Group10%14%2%2%28%
Total31%54%11%4%100%


Weekly Strength in Number of Aircraft, Jun-Dec 1940
DateEstablishmentStrengthDeficiency
15 Jun1,4561,094-362
6 Jul1,4561,259-197
13 Jul1,4561,341-115
20 Jul1,4561,365-91
27 Jul1,4561,377-79
3 Aug1,5581,434-124
10 Aug1,5581,396-162
17 Aug1,5581,379-179
24 Aug1,5581,377-181
31 Aug1,5581,422-136
7 Sep1,5581,381-177
14 Sep1,6621,492-170
21 Sep1,6621,509-153
28 Sep1,6621,581-81
5 Oct1,7141,703-11
12 Oct1,7141,752+38
19 Oct1,7001,737+37
26 Oct1,7271,735+8
2 Nov1,7271,796+69
9 Nov1,7271,829+102
16 Nov1,7011,763+62
23 Nov1,7491,728-21
30 Nov1,7631,768+5
7 Dec1,5991,744+145
14 Dec1,6551,786+131
21 Dec1,6551,801+146
28 Dec1,6551,809+154
ww2dbase


Source(s):
Kate Moore, Battle of Britain; Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy


By comparison - taken from here - German fighter pilot availability dropped significantly over the battle

German Luftwaffe Single-Engined Fighter Pilot Strength, Aug-Oct 1940​


ww2dbase
DateNumber of Pilots
1 Aug906
1 Sep869
1 Nov735
ww2dbase


Source(s):
Kate Moore, Battle of Britain
The numbers aren't accurate, as No. 10 Group RAF (Brand) is completely ignored.

As to the actual scenario, as has been mentioned a few times, if Britain calls it quits, Stalin will recognise the buildup for what it is, and react accordingly, so the Soviets aren't caught with their pants down.
 
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Then Hitler, instead of stopping and turning west, just rolls on through Poland and straight over the Red Army in October 1939 ....
Britain would, I suggest, be only too happy to watch the Nazi's and Communists bleed each other dry .... ]
Wehrmacht lacked the capability for such a campaign in 1939 40
 
It’s nothing short of a miracle that Germany won against France
The Germans threw a unified, well lead and skilled army against a hodgehot of 4+ separate armies, two of which suffered catastropic surprise, a third of which suffered from almost uniminigable rot from within, all while having rough numerical parity. It might have shocked contemporaries, but there is nothing miracolous about the outcome with hindsight.
 
The Germans threw a unified, well lead and skilled army against a hodgehot of 4+ separate armies, two of which suffered catastropic surprise, a third of which suffered from almost uniminigable rot from within, all while having rough numerical parity. It might have shocked contemporaries, but there is nothing miracolous about the outcome with hindsight.
There were a few moments where it really could have gone wrong for the Germans during the Battle of France.
 
The Germans threw a unified, well lead and skilled army against a hodgehot of 4+ separate armies, two of which suffered catastropic surprise, a third of which suffered from almost uniminigable rot from within, all while having rough numerical parity. It might have shocked contemporaries, but there is nothing miracolous about the outcome with hindsight.
All (edit: most) of which applies to the Red Army, and especially Stalin (who, it seems, took days to come to terms with the Nazi attack) .. if it was a shock in 1941, it would be even more of a shock in 1939 ...
If the entire Panzer thrust is through Poland into Belaruss straight at Moscow, ie avoiding Ukraine, there is, I suggest, every possability of an uprising in Ukraine making things even harder for the communists ...

NOTE OTL Part of the push for the T34 came from the Finnish war. The first two prototype T-34s were completed in January 1940. The first T-34s came off the production line at the Kharkov factrory in September 1940. By the end of 1940, they had produced 183 (all of them at Kharkov, which is in Ukraine).
 
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Why ?
[it's not hard to POD this ... instead of keeping their Pact secret, Hitler and Stalin leaks their deal over Poland ... France & Britain step back from the 'guarantee' to Poland when faced with declaring war on BOTH Hitler and Stalin ...
EDIT why both ? because Hitlers and Stalins forces invade simultaneously ..
Then Hitler, instead of stopping and turning west, just rolls on through Poland and straight over the Red Army in October 1939 ....
Britain would, I suggest, be only too happy to watch the Nazi's and Communists bleed each other dry .... ]

SO - what happens then ?
Given how the RedArmy performed in Finland, before the winter stops play, the Nazi's would be half way to Moscow (advance limited only by their logistics) .... Why Moscow ? because the Nazi attack consists of a single thrust through Poland ....
Nazi success in France (which came DESPITE the 6 month 'phony war' during which defensive preperations would have been made) suggest that the early war Blitzkrieg success would work just as well against the Soviets ....
In the spring of 1940, the Nazi's advance will continue but still be slowed by logistics problems (and consolidating their gains) ==
If the Brits (& French) are sitting this out, they might be willing to sell arms to Stalin (or even Hitler) under 'cash and carry' terms, but this takes time to get going (and even longer to feed into the front lines). As does the preperation of defences .... (OTL 6 months of 'phony war' defensive preperations didn't make much difference to the speed at which the Panzers reached Paris - the Soviets would have maybe 2-3 months and that only in winter)
Is it ASB to suggest the Panzers could be in Moscow by end of 1940 ??? (instead of Paris ?)
Plus, if they do, would Stalin come to terms ??
Add into this that the Red Army still was reeling even more from the effects of the Purges...and given the fate of the SVT-40, if Stalin decides that the T-34 can be relegated until after the war in favor of producing other models...
 
All (edit: most) of which applies to the Red Army, and especially Stalin (who, it seems, took days to come to terms with the Nazi attack) .. if it was a shock in 1941, it would be even more of a shock in 1939 ...
If the entire Panzer thrust is through Poland into Belaruss straight at Moscow, ie avoiding Ukraine, there is, I suggest, every possability of an uprising in Ukraine making things even harder for the communists ...

NOTE OTL Part of the push for the T34 came from the Finnish war. The first two prototype T-34s were completed in January 1940. The first T-34s came off the production line at the Kharkov factrory in September 1940. By the end of 1940, they had produced 183 (all of them at Kharkov, which is in Ukraine).
What panzers in 1939 ? There are like 100 operational Pz III IV
 
A massive amount of German artillery was diverted to Germany to protect the homeland from bombing. Without Germany getting bombed by Britain, most of that ordnance is moving east.
Yes, but once Britain signs a peace deal the Soviets are going to be on high alert. The reason they were caught so off guard OTL was not because Stalin thought Hitler would never attack him, but because he thought Hitler would wait until he was finished with Britain to attack the USSR. If they're facing a Red Army that has been preparing for an invasion for months, mobilized all of its reserves, ect. then a few AA guns aren't going to offset that disadvantage for the Germans.
 

TDM

Kicked
I think the ratios cited in your original source were a bit extreme in favor of the Soviets. And my concerns cut to the German numbers to a lesser extent as well for the reasons you mention. Just glad none of us have to be there.
The article doesn't really seem to say where it gets its figures from it references some early stuff from the the Eisenhower Institute (links don't go anywhere for me) and a Book published in Russia in 1965 (although TBH I can't tell if it's refuting these numbers, are using them). Also I swear yesterday I saw a table with personnel numbers compared to each other at various times (like the table I linked) that had roughly similar Soviet numbers to mine but the German numbers varied from my table (increasing more towards the end hitting 5m+ at some points IIRC!) but I can't see it now?!


However as you say the variations seems to be with the German numbers not Soviet ones. However as I said the problem with numbers derived from division numbers is that divisions can often be different in reality than nominally they are on paper, and this was especially true of German ones towards the end of the war (the links is citing divisional strengths and numbers). However again for me the article is not massively clear on what it's figures are from, what they actually are or what it's saying in conclusion other than the Eisenhower institute got the population of the USSR wrong!


Now don't get me wrong I know the numbers on each side is a matter of debate (certainly early on) but all in all I'll take Glanz & House until I see something demonstrably better

However taking step back a minute, what would the take away point be here if the Germans had actually fielded millions more troops in the Eastern front during those last years* than the figures I posted listed? We know the results already so wouldn't it actually mean the red army was stronger and more capable sicne it would have done what it did against millions more Germans?



*which is a bit weird when you think about it, They massed the largest invasion ever in 1941 at 3.7m, they got close again to that for Kursk their last strategic offensive in the east in 1943, but apparently held back on both to field 5m+ in 1944 & 1945 (IIRC the table I saw) while also fighting in the NW Europe and Italy. If the argument is they're mobilisations in 1941, 42 & 43 were limited by resources they would have been more limited in 1944 & 1945.
 
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All (edit: most) of which applies to the Red Army, and especially Stalin (who, it seems, took days to come to terms with the Nazi attack) .. if it was a shock in 1941, it would be even more of a shock in 1939 ...
It was a shock because no one thought Germany would go the completely suicidal route of declaring another war before they have finished off Britain. The Soviets were planning on a war breaking out between them and the Germans only after a peace with Britain had been signed. As Germany did not wait that long, they were caught completely off guard OTL. If, however, a peace with Britain had been signed, then they would expect Germany to attack soon and prepare accordingly (start mobilizing more troops, stopping the export of raw materials like oil to Germany, ect.)
 
Yes, but once Britain signs a peace deal the Soviets are going to be on high alert. The reason they were caught so off guard OTL was not because Stalin thought Hitler would never attack him, but because he thought Hitler would wait until he was finished with Britain to attack the USSR. If they're facing a Red Army that has been preparing for an invasion for months, mobilized all of its reserves, ect. then a few AA guns aren't going to offset that disadvantage for the Germans.
But that goes both ways. The more troops are on the border, the more damaging the initial encirclements are going to be.
 
But that goes both ways. The more troops are on the border, the more damaging the initial encirclements are going to be.
If this is in 1940 then the Stalin Line wouldn't have been demolished yet so a large number of troops would be located there, hundreds of miles away from the border and in strong defensive conditions.
 
If this is in 1940 then the Stalin Line wouldn't have been demolished yet so a large number of troops would be located there, hundreds of miles away from the border and in strong defensive conditions.
I find it hard to believe Stalin would be willing to give up his conquests in Poland so easily.
 
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I find it hard to believe Stalin would be willing to give up his conquests in Poland so easily.
There would still be a large number of troops on the front lines, but if they were expecting an immanent war a decent number would be placed on the defensive lines which already existed. This would protect the locations where most of their population and industry were located, allowing them to retake the land they had lost at a later date.
 
this is BEFORE the polish campaign , afterit guess how many could still run ?
... plus OTL I guess some would still be in Germany etc. Of course, it's not just tanks, also aircraft etc.
However, if we POD some time prior to invasion of Poland (which, if Hitler plans to drive on through Poland to Moscow, is a 'must'), we have that usual magic ingedient 'Handwavium' working in the Nazi's favour :)

They will need more spares, more engineering battalians / mobile workshops etc etc - even if they have to pinch resources from elsewhere (if there's no war with Britain, there's no need to waste resources on the Kriegsmarine for a start).
One thing they could sort out is getting the Luftwaffe to effect simple repairs 'in the hangers' (like the RAF did) without the need to send the aircraft back to the factory ..
They could also be better prepared to deal with the Soviet rail guage ... (it's tempting to think they would adopt the 'rip the lines up and replace them using an automatic track laying machine', but I'm guessing that any 'solution' thought up in advance would be an over-engineeded exceedingly complicated dual guage engine & rolling stock)
... and did we mention winter clothing and fuel/oils that don't freeze ?

EDIT - of course I'm getting away from the OP assumption of a Nazi victory in BoB ... and the chances of Soviets alone ..
I would go along with the other posters assumption that a failed Sealion would folow and with half of Hitlers Panzers stuck in southern England (with no way to get home), Barbasossa would have to be called off - or at least posponed for a year ...
 
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CalBear

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All (edit: most) of which applies to the Red Army, and especially Stalin (who, it seems, took days to come to terms with the Nazi attack) .. if it was a shock in 1941, it would be even more of a shock in 1939 ...
If the entire Panzer thrust is through Poland into Belaruss straight at Moscow, ie avoiding Ukraine, there is, I suggest, every possability of an uprising in Ukraine making things even harder for the communists ...

NOTE OTL Part of the push for the T34 came from the Finnish war. The first two prototype T-34s were completed in January 1940. The first T-34s came off the production line at the Kharkov factrory in September 1940. By the end of 1940, they had produced 183 (all of them at Kharkov, which is in Ukraine).
The Heer doesn't have the logistical tail to manage it (not that they ever really did). It's tankers were also, to be really clear, pretty much shite. Even the Pz. IV was underarmored and undergunned (the 7.5cm short was a quite unspectacular against armor thanks to uts low velocity, British Matilda II tended to shrug them off like a bothersome horsefly).

The Soviets have also not begun to dismantle their border defenses (the so called Stalin Line) which began in mid 1940 as the panning was completed to resetablish the positions inside the annexed portions of Poland. Those defenses, while not Maginot Line quality, were also not as easily avoided as the French fortifications. Since the Reich needed speed above all (even Hitler realized that allowing the Soviets enough time to bring their massive reserves forward was sub-optimal). Fighting Soviet troops in good defensive positions that are liberally supported with artillery (for some reason all the old Bolshevik commanders LOVED artillery above all else) and anti-tank guns* with Panzers that are, in the main, really tankettes is not a good idea.

There is also the inescapable reality that once the Heer is in a death-match with the Red Army, even the ultra cautious French senior command is likely to decide to take advantage of the moment and advance across the Rhineland, perhaps even into the Ruhr Valley at a moment that the Reich can not afford to divert mobile forces. The Western Wall in 1939 was, to quote General Jodl, "little more than a building site" with incomplete bunkers and insufficient weapons.

* 1939 Soviet AT guns were not spectacular, even the K-53 45mm (M-1937) had trouble with the PZ. III/IV at longer range, but since around 85% of Heer armor was NOT Pz. III/IV that is much less of an issue than might be supposed. Shorter range is also much less of an issue when the gun is firing from a prepared defensive position with heavier artillery and mortar support.
 
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