Such a directive wouldn't fully explain all the internal motivations for what they were doing, especially if meant as a bluff. In fact they'd try to keep that as quiet as possible. Why would they explain in detail a bluff if they were trying to intimidate the Brits into negotiating without having to launch a naval invasion?
These are
exactly the type of orders which would clearly indicate such a bluff. We're not talking stuff that gets distributed down to the army commanders, much less the soldiery. Hitler's directives were generally limited to the most senior of the High Command and were intended not just to order strategic operations, but also provide the military with greater context for
why the operations were being conducted or planned or what-have-you. They wouldn't even have to say the invasion was a bluff: at least a single sentence that says something on the lines of "Act as pressure to the British Government to negotiate" would suffice. But there is no such thing.
You're getting way too fixated on the text of two out of context orders.
As to the issue of what was going on behind the scenes:
en.wikipedia.org
The quote does not support your claim. It states that the Germans
hoped that success in the air war would render an invasion unnecessary. The first citation is Hitler's Directive 17 which, as pointed out, contains no mention of the purpose of the air action being to make the British to negotiate so it's odd that it was included. The second citation is Stephen Bungay's
Most Dangerous Enemy, page 114. It mostly just says what that wiki quote says in different words, but with some added caveats:
"As Directive 17 shows, the issue of decision versus siege had no been resolved. All were agreed that establishing air superiority was prerequisite of everything else, and the Luftwaffe was left to get on with it. The navy hoped it would fail and the army awaited events. Everybody hoped that air action alone would be decisive, as Goering expected it to be, which was why Sealion did not interest him very much. The Luftwaffe's plans were designed to bring Britain to the negotiating table with or without an invasion."
As can be seen, nowhere is the statement made that the Germans were unwilling to attempt an invasion if the Luftwaffe achieved air superiority as mandated in Directive 17 yet the British did not crack, and thus that Sealion was a bluff. As Bungay alludes too (and then spells out in the following paragraph), the German navy pretty had already concluded that Sealion would
fail but as Bungay notes, but instead of being willing to tell anyone this they just hoped the Luftwaffe would fail so they would not have to actually try to execute a operation they knew was doomed. This would indicate that the navy, at the very least, believed Sealion was more then just a bluff in Hitler's mind. But nowhere does Bungay say that Hitler, or Goering for that matter, believed Sealion was a bluff.
The citation for this claim does not say what it claims to say that when actually examined. The citation is page 45 of William Murray's
Strategy for Defeat. Here is the sum total of what that source says on the matter:
"The Luftwaffe throughout the summer, following Goring's lead, paid minimal attention to the operational problems of a channel crossing by the army in the belief that its victory over the RAF would make an invasion unnecessary." -Page 45.
Looking at the text, what it shows is that firstly, there is no mention of Hitler like in the original claim. Only Goering. Secondly, both Goering and the Luftwaffe basically ignored Sea Lion beyond it's minimally mandated mission and was largely uninvolved it's operational-strategic planning. Thus, neither the Luftwaffe nor Goering would be in any position to know or claim that Sea Lion was merely a bluff and Murray does not even say Goering ever thought it was actually a bluff. At most, all that can be supported is that Goering and the Luftwaffe believed that Sealion would be
unnecessary, but that is not evidence that the operation was a bluff.
There is no mention of either Sealion being a bluff or Hitler using it as a bluff. Indeed the sole use of the word bluff in the entire book is when Stephen Murray quotes Goering in a argument with Kesselring about whether American fighters were now flying over Germany in 1943 on page 231, which obviously has nothing to do with Sealion. In this case, whoever made the citation seems to have hoped nobody would bother to actually check what the book says.
The evidence so far presented indicates that the Germans hoped that an invasion would be unnecessary and that the achievement of air superiority alone would be enough to make the British negotiate, but were still prepared to attempt one if that did not happen even though at least one branch of the armed forces, that is the navy, knew that such an invasion attempt would fail.
The evidence thus far presented does not support the claim that Sealion was intended as a bluff.
Also Directive 17 said to 'create the pre-conditions for an invasion' not actually launch the invasion.
Which naturally means the invasion would be undertaken once the preconditions were met.
Here is the actual text of Hitler's Directive 17:
No where does it say "win a week or two of air superiority over the invasion beaches". That's a figment of your imagination.
Even a cursory examination of your quoted text (which is identical to what I quote) can show how that is wrong. Point two states:
"
After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.
Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations."
This couldn't be any clearer: temporary or local air superiority is to be achieved over the southern ports (which means the southern coast and thus the invasion beaches). After that, raids are to be launched against these ports, but the attacks should not be too damaging so they can be kept as intact as possible. The geographic and timespan of this order is
exactly in line with the winning of air superiority over the invasion beaches on at least a temporary basis. One has to deliberately NOT read the message in order to claim that is not what it says.
