But even after going after other objectives in the summer of '41, the Germans came very close to Moscow in December--under much harsher winter conditions. One unit claimed to have seen sunlight flashing on the spires of the Kremlin. IIRC Zhukov wasn't yet available in August 1941 when German generals pressed for the taking of Moscow.
September 1939: has Germany lost the war already?
- Thread starter Byzantine fanatic
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But even after going after other objectives in the summer of '41, the Germans came very close to Moscow in December--under much harsher winter conditions. One unit claimed to have seen sunlight flashing on the spires of the Kremlin. IIRC Zhukov wasn't yet available in August 1941 when German generals pressed for the taking of Moscow.
Except there is zero chance of Hitler not eventually moving east. One of his key aims was wiping out "Jewish Bolshevism" in Russia and creating "living space" for Germany by killing the "subhuman" Slavs, Poles and Jews in the east. War with Russia is inevitable as long as Hitler is Chancellor.
Dude, the thread's been dead for more then six months.
In any case, the Germans in December were only close in a geographic sense. They had spent all their combat power and were hideously vulnerable. And Zhukov is less important then the Soviet armies in the way and German logistics... which were stronger and weaker (respectively) then they would be when the Germans kicked off Typhoon historically.
Particularly with Turkey getting tougher by the week due to LL. By the time Germany makes it though the mountains (If it does , which is damn unlikely IMO) the Turks are probably fairly well suplied via LL.
Assuming that, say in October 39, after realizing that UK and France will not budge on the issue of blockade, Hitler decides not to rely on the shaky possibility of future imports of fuel from the west and starts an accelerated mass program of construction of synthetic fuel plants using resources (coal and labour in the first place) from the occupied territories, such as Polish Silesia and western Czechoslovakia. After initiating the blockade, Germany lost access to around 4 million tons of oil per year imported from the west. In the end of the war Germany produced over 7 million of tons per year from synthetic plants, so a lot of work had been done here but it started later than in this ATL. So let's assume that Germany gives synthetic fuel strategic priority and starts a crash construction in October 39 of enough plants to compensate for the lost 4 mio tons a year and adjust vehicle (especially truck) production accordingly (let's they are able to overcome the rubber problems).
Assuming that the first 1 mio/year capacity is available in two years' time, and it would all be used for military purposes only, it would mean extra 80.000 tons/month for Barbarossa between October and December 41. That would probably keep in motion extra 15-20 panzer and motorised divisions. What the effect would be is a big question, perhaps greater mobility in front of Moscow or a parallel attack by the Army Group South.
Continuing with this, let's assume that in Spring 42, already 2.5 mio of the 4 mio/year extra capacity (i.e. extra 200.000 tons of fuel/month) would be ready and available for the summer 1942 campaign. Again, had it all been used for ground warfare, that could keep twice the number of German panzer and motorised divisions in motion (in Barbarossa and summer 42 Germany had 30-35 panzer and motorized divisions, though since mid Barbarossa they never had enough fuel to run them at the same time). Assuming that the vehicle production would keep up the step with fuel production, that would mean that in summer 42 the German army could attack with roughly the same strength as in early Barbarossa, at least with both army groups center and south, not just south. What effect it would have on capturing Maikop, Grozny oil fields and capturing or at least disabling the Holly Grail of the eastern front - the Baku oil fields (altogether Maikop, Grozny, and in the first place Baku, produced 80-90 percent of Soviet oil, had Baku oil been lost for the Soviet Union, the SU would barely had enough fuel to operate its tractors in agriculture, let alone fight Germany), I can't say. But it would certainly be interesting to speculate about.
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Using lots of handwavium, I see. They not only have to solve the rubber problem (which in part can also be solved by synth production). They also have a manpower shortage, it's not as if there were thousands of skilled chem-plant workers in Silesia and Bohemia twiddling their thumbs. And those plants require lots of high-pressure steel piping - the sort of thing that also goes into gun barrels.
Also, you're assuming that the whole synth fuel production goes to the Heer. Actually, the hydrogenation process is the best way to produce high-octane gasoline - i.e. avgas, which is needed by the Luftwaffe. Less advanced procedures making use of other types of coal also were necessary for the diesel for the Kriegsmarine. Now, even assuming they put the Kriegsmarine under mothballs, because it's worth nothing if they don't overrun Moscow, they also need not just tanks, but also the Luftwaffe's flying artillery for their Blitzkrieg.
Good point about rubber. As for speed of construction of synthetic plants, yes, but a) Germany even before the war had the most advanced and extensive synthetic fuel production facilities, b) it would receive strategic priority already in Oct 1939 (Germany indeed had to build gun barrels but for modern warfare fuel was indispensable and Hitler unlike his generals knew very well what the fuel situation was), and probably most importantly c) in OTL the construction of that volume of synthetic fuel plants happened anyway, just some 12-18 months later, so I don't think it was necessarily handwavium, though it would require Germany to mobilize industry faster than it happened in OTL (but that was possible).
But yes, your point is valid, the pace of production of these plants would be decisive. In this ATL the difference would be faster mobilization of industry than in OTL and as a consequence this process is forwarded by a year or 18 months.
I don't think we are on the same page here. My premise was that only the extra produced fuel (extra compared to OTL) would go to ground forces, i.e. in this ATL Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine still get as much fuel as in OTL, no change here. BTW, as for proportion of fuel used by German armed forces, substantial majority went to ground forces. Consumption of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were certainly not negligible but most fuel was swallowed by trucks of logistical forces supporting land armies.
Indeed, it was an expensive process with a unit of fuel from refined oil costing a fraction of a unit of synthesized fuel. But Germany had no other option after establishment of the allied blockade which immediately created a yearly oil deficit of Germany of 4 million tons (pre-war German fuel consumption was some 7 million tons a year), now it had to provide fuel also for occupied territories and Italy. The dependence of Germany on the 4 million tons of imported oil a year was so serious that it forced Hitler to invade most of Europe and the Soviet Union (along with other reasons, of course), wouldn't it be reasonable then if rather than just relying on fighting the whole Europe for oil Hitler would also back himself up by more synthesized fuel?
As for the consumption of coal per unit of synthesized fuel, you are right, but a) at the same time Germany produced yearly over 400 million tons of coal and coke and had recently captured coal rich Polish Silesia and Sudeten, and b) Germany produced this capacity of fuel from coal anyway, just later so the availability of coal was not a problem.
I'm attaching some reference to coal production and a table of synthetic fuel production by year.
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=208676
We'll have to disagree there, too. Germany in 1939 was already not producing enough consumer goods to meet the internal demand, skilled labor was already fully employed, and procuring things like iron and steel additives from abroad was a big problem due to the fact that Germany couldn't pay for them in valuable currencies or gold. The notion that the German industry could do much more before 1943 is essentially based on Speer's self-aggrandizing memoirs.
Quantity is a thing, but then there is quality. Building a new synth fuel plant working on hydrogenation and not placing avgas as its first priority is counter-productive, because high-octane, high-quality avgas, the sort of fuels that provides those "max speed" figures for German fighters, mainly come from that process.
As to coal, I wouldn't be too generous with that, either. Sure the Germans had lots of it - and even so, the Reichsbahn was chronically cutting its timetables. The major problem with the Ostheer in 1941 was logistics. Shift enough coal to gasoline, and you might end up with a newly made tank, a tanker wagon filled with gasoline, and a locomotive that cannot move them to the frontline.
What if Germany doesnt attack the SU and made a "good peace" with France as suggested already in the thread. So taking Alsace-Lorrainne, port use and occupying only whats absolutly necessery till the end of the war with Great Brittain. Just add in some trade pact and Germany would have an alternate source of resources - trading through France. If Brittain wants to stop this they would have to attack France.
well If it is difficult for the UK to defeat Germany on land for some time equally the Germans can not defeat the UK without risking behaviour that inevitably brings in the USA. Beyond that If there is no Pacific war, which certainly does not happen if Germany and the USSR are on goodish terms, the UK may well be able to eventually counter attack against the Germans, or more likely the Italians in the Med. if there is the USA enters and again Germany loses. If all else fails the UK will have to wait until 1947 or so and light up Berlin with instant sunshine.
And Britain would never attack collaborationist French ships, military bases, or colonies, right?
U-boat warfare might've brought in the US, had Adolf not insisted on avoiding incidents with the US in the summer of '41. But German successes against the British to June 1941 did not.
But prior to US intervention the Afrika Korps was able to stand up to the forces of the British Empire. Without a Russian front, the Axis would've been far stronger in the Med, Egypt probably would've been overrun and the prospect of losing the Near East might've induced the British to make peace. Churchill said to FDR that if the Near East were lost "continuation of the war would be a long, hard and bleak proposition, even if the US entered the conflict."
Germany didn't prioritize a-bomb research but I'd assume that after July 1945 their efforts would've been redoubled.
This France would have a ton more of legitimacy than Vichy France and attacking it could have much more serious consequences. The british of course could go with that.
I haven't read the entire thread, but has any addressed the fact that the Nazi economy wasn't built for long term sustainability? unless they somehow scale down military production a vast amount after they take France and manage to ward off the Soviets, the economy is going to collapse. Schnact himself protested the over militarisation of the economy and stuff like the Mefo bills will catch up. Loot from France and the Little Entente will only go so far.
Garrison
Donor
Firstly if Germany doesn't attack the USSR and gives France a 'good peace' then we clearly aren't talking about Nazi Germany, because humiliating the French and conquering new lands in the east were built into their ideology.
Leaving that aside there are a number of issues assuming we are talking about the situation as it was in 1940:
1-Wholesale looting of French reserves of gold, foreign exchange, raw materials and even railway rolling stock were pretty much a necessity for Nazi Germany at that point. The wheels were coming off the German economy and it was the wholesale looting of Western Europe that staved that off.
2-Using France as a trading intermediary sounds great, except Germany hasn't got the means to pay for anything. Sure they could just do what they did OTL and buy stuff from the French and then refuse to pay the bills, but that seems to go against the idea of a 'good peace'.
3-Even if you just go with the having the French pay for everything model that runs into the buffers pretty quickly. A France under the thumb of Germany is going to find it hard to get the kind of credit and insurance that mainly comes from the City of London at this time. Other problem is that the French economy requires large amounts of imports to keep running and a lot of those come from places that the British can put the squeeze on, not to mention that a lot of those imports are the same ones Germany needs. So unless this 'good peace' allows for the collapse of French industry and agriculture, which is what happened OTL, I don't see the Germans getting enough out of such a bargain to dig them out of the hole they are in.
Garrison
Donor
But what your missing is that even in OTL German coal production was inadequate to meet the needs of the German economy even before the war. The synthetic fuel project was a crash program, that's the only reason it produced the quantities it did later in the war. Sure they could have done more but it comes back to the same old question; what are they giving up to provide the steel, coal and labour needed for such a program? And for this its going to be something a lot bigger than scrapping a couple of battleships.
Oh, I'm not seeing an immediate attack on neutral France's naval bases, at least not at first. But more like what the British did in WWI. Stop neutral cargo ships in the ocean, inspect the load, and decide whether all of that, say, manganese exceeds the yearly quota - based on pre-war, peacetime French-only consumption. If it does, then seize it and the ship, because the manganese is clearly headed for Germany.
The French can try and fight against that, think the USA in 1812. If they are up for that.
The policy did not have a lot of legitimacy in 1914, yet it's what the British did.
Im not even sure the brits wont outright attack France - see OTL. I just mean that attacking this France would be much more risky than attacking Vichy France - and in either case a huge gain to Germany. And I have my doubts of London's ability to sucessfully blocade France and most of the European continent including some other neutral countries. And France is not Norway or the Netherland. Poking France is a tad more dangerous than what the brits get away with in WWI.