What If - Finland had been prepared for the Winter War?

Conscript Training in the 1920's

Conscript soldiers and women

Up to this point we have studied Finnish conscript soldiers with reference only to military hierarchies and comradeships, the disciplinary methods and strategies of resistance or submission and their army experiences, with almost no reference made to women. This reflects how most men chose to recollect their military service. Their social relationships to women who were important in their lives at the time – mothers, sisters, female friends, girlfriends or wives – are largely left out of the narrative. However, this exclusion is not complete. In brief passages, even mere sentences or subordinate clauses, women are glimpsed now and again. In the 1972–1973 collection, some men mention in passing that they had a girlfriend or a wife either in their home district or in the garrison town. E.g. Kalle Leppälä (b.1913) had a girlfriend and even became engaged to her during his year in military training. He only mentions her existence as if by accident when accounting for the number of leaves of absence he obtained during his service. In his 357 pages of army memories, the longest story in the material examined by the author of this thesis, he writes nothing at all about what the forced separation from his partner felt like, how he coped with it or how they stayed in touch. Eero Tuominen, whose narrative is extraordinary in its emotional openness and articulateness, is an absolute exception, as he describes the longing for his girlfriend after reporting for service, the bliss of spending time with her on his one precious home leave, the anxiousness that she should find someone else while he was gone, and his sorrow and bitterness as her letters grew increasingly infrequent and their contact eventually flagged.

In Mika Waltari’s otherwise so open-hearted army book, the author only mentions the existence of his own girlfriend on page 91. According to Waltari’s autobiography, he met and fell in love with the woman who later became his wife one month before he reported for military service. In Where Men Are Made, however, he never tells the reader anything about her more than that she has blue eyes and a blue hat. It is not clear whether this was to guard his privacy or because he felt she did not really have a place in a book about his military service. Nevertheless, Waltari effectively omits the woman he chose to share his life with, although she evidently was an extremely important element in his life during his military training. He only hints at the happiness of four days on home leave having something to do with being in love, but he is rapturous in describing his return to camp after “a short sad goodbye” from his fiancée. It is ambiguous whether his happiness that night, back at camp, is due to being in love with his girlfriend or with the return to his groupd of soldier-comrades: “I undress in the dark, in the midst of sleeping boys breathing, the familiar smell of foot cloths and boots. Oh, everything, everything is beautiful.”

Seducers, beaux and innocents

An important part of the military culture reigning in interwar Finnish Army barracks seems to have been the repertoire of “naughty” marching songs. These songs ranged in content from raw pornographic and sometimes misogynist imagery to joyful celebration of the mutual pleasures for both man and woman of sexual intercourse. In all of them, however, a self-image of soldiers was cultivated – sometimes soldiers in general, sometimes the soldiers of one’s own unit in particular – as irresistible seducers of women, always on the move towards the next conquest. The soldier’s relationship to women in these songs, sung on heavy marches to cheer up the mood and copied in the soldiers’ autograph albums, was that of a classic Don Juan. This was also the image of soldiers’ relationships to women in popular Finnish films of the 1930’s. Advertisements for military farces alluded to the power of attraction military uniforms had for women. Using military metaphors for soldiers “conquering” women was usual in the screenplays. Recounting their own time as conscript soldiers, however, men gave a much more diverse picture of the conscripts’ force of attraction on women than in the wish-fulfilling fantasies of indecent songs. Some did not mention the soldiers having had any contact with women during their year of Service – apart from the “Sisters” at the service club, who were usually older than the soldiers, extremely highly respected and regarded as sexually out-of-bounds – whereas others mention that dating local women was common among the soldiers.

In these army memories, men do not brag about having been successful among women as they were soldiers. Some point out that it was hard to find female company in a large garrison town, with a considerable surplus of conscripts. An ordinary penniless infantry man had great difficulty competing with conscripts in the artillery, cavalry and navy who had fancier uniforms – not to mention the NCOs and officers with their well-fitted uniforms and golden insignia of rank. The class barriers in interwar society reoccur in some stories about how girls in finer clothes had to be “left to the officers” at a large ball at the theatre of Kuopio in 1929, or how ordinary soldiers from the countryside mainly dated country girls who worked as housemaids in the town houses of Oulu in 1925–1926. Many conscripts seem to have been rather sexually innocent at 21, as mention often is made of “experienced” or “more experienced” comrades, “womanisers”, who told their comrades wild stories about their sexual adventures or were observed with obvious fascination by their comrades. Contacts between soldiers and prostitutes are mentioned in a small number of stories – although none of the informants admit having paid for sex themselves – but they were evidently extensive enough to worry the military authorities, because of the spread of venereal disease. In this regard, the military system sent the conscripts a double message; the military priests demanded self-restraint and abstinence, lecturing the soldiers on the irresponsibility, filthiness and devastating effects on future marital happiness of contacts with prostitutes. The army medical service, however, took a more pragmatic approach, instructing conscripts who had sexual intercourse during leaves to visit the hospital when they returned for preventive treatment. Concealing venereal disease was punishable.

Mika Waltari, who was the most enthusiastic describer of warm and close comradeship among male soldiers in the author’s material, is also the only one to write at length about the significance of women within the military. His soldiers talk and dream about women when they are in camp and they eagerly date girls when they are back at their town barracks in Helsinki. However, women appear as distant and exotic in this world of men. To some they are creatures to be pursued, seduced and conquered, big game to brag to one’s friends about. Yet to Waltari and his close friends, who are middle-class and with a “good upbringing”, they are above all associated with a vision of the future, of marriage, of emotional satisfaction and security in a stable partnership. One night in camp, Waltari and his comrades lie around talking shyly about these things. “Of course we could talk and brag about the most incredible erotic adventures we have had, which are more or less fantasy. In fact most of us are very innocent, in the dangerous borderlands of manhood. Now that we are healthy and a new strength is growing in our limbs, we all feel distaste for brute erotic looseness. A dark night in some bushes or naked hostel room would be a heavy fall for us. Now that we have something to give, we want to keep ourselves pure – that same word that made such an irritating and banal impression in Christian morality lectures. Now we want to some day, when our true moment has come, give our whole strong youth. Get engaged and married when that time comes. In all of us glitters the beautiful illusory dream of a home of our own. Without our knowing, we are growing closer to society. Free, unfettered youth and the social system are always each other’s enemies. But here, through submitting, a deeper and greater solidarity has unconsciously been impressed upon us.”

In the depiction of this scene, Waltari reproduces an image, familiar from the storys by middle-class men writing in Suomen Sotilas, of conscripts as “pure” young men, living a stage of their lives centred on the community of conscripts, predestined although not yet ready for marrying and heading a household. This image was actually a vital precondition for the notion that the army was the place ‘where men were made’. If the recruits were already living in mature relationships, they would already have been real men and military training could not have been legitimised by claiming it brought them into this state of being. Waltari also makes an association here between submission, military service, becoming a loyal, responsible and useful male citizen, and getting married. Soldiering and fatherhood – in the sense of being responsible for a family of one’s own – thus join each other as two significant currents taking the young man towards adult, mature manhood and patriotic useful citizenship. The silence around marriage and serious partnerships in the other sources does not mean that they were not an important among the lower classes as well. In Pentti Haanpää’s army book, this is only hinted at through a few clues in his stories, yet in analysis it emerges as a key factor behind Haanpää’s criticism of military life. The Jäger sergeant major in his opening story not only goes home to take over his family’s little farm, as previously cited. He “fetches” a girl from the garrison town to live and form a family with her. She is not mentioned before the third to last sentence of the whole story although the Jäger evidently has had a lasting relationship with her. Haanpää lets the reader understand that the Jäger eventually finds a fulfilment that army life can never give him in a classic rural Finnish lifestyle based on marriage, fatherhood, land ownership and productive work. Twice he uses the word “barren” to describe the gritty military training fields, implicitly contrasting them to the proper place of a Finnish man, a field of corn or a timber forest where his labour bears fruit.

One explanation for the omission of girlfriends and wives in army stories and memories might be the habit of “undercommunicating” one’s marital status that ethnologist Ella Johansson has noted in the barracks and working camp culture of Swedish mobile workers in the early twentieth century. Being married and thus head of a family was strongly a part of the ideal for adult men. Yet this was played down among the workers, together with social and economic differences, in order to create a conflictfree atmosphere (one might say an illusion) of equality between men. This would seem to apply to both army barracks culture and the narrative tradition stemming from it. Sexual adventure with women was over-emphasised in army stories, whereas serious commitment with women was under-emphasised.

Finally, the silence of most men on what it was like being separated from one’s mother, sisters and possible female partners – sometimes for a whole year without a single home leave – should probably also be understood as informed by the narrative tradition of commemorating military service. This tradition was reflected and reproduced by the ethnologists organising the 1972–1973 collection. Among the more than two hundred questions they asked their informants, the only one touching upon the existence of women in the conscripts’ lives was a subquestion’s subquestion, under the topic of how evenings off-duty were spent in the barracks: “Was alcohol ever brought into the barracks? What about women?” The otherwise exhaustive questionnaire omitted any references to how the soldiers’ families related to their departure; if and how the conscripts stayed in touch with their families during the service; how they took care of possible problems arising at home due to their absence; or what home-coming was like. These subjects evidently did not belong to the story of a military experience shared by all conscripts. In a sense, leaving out women from the story of Finnish soldiering had a similar effect of strengthening the taken-for-granted notion that women and military matters had nothing to do with each other.

Conclusions: Class, Age and Power in Conscript Stories

Memories and stories about military training in the 1920’s show that popular images and notions varied and partly contradicted the pro-defence viewpoint. Many depictions of the disciplinary practices in use lie closer to the critique of the cadre army delivered by Social Democrats and Agrarians in the period, although men who recounted their own experiences of military training did not subscribe to the notions of its morally corruptive effects on conscripts. Class and age affected how men’s army experiences were formulated. Comparing Pentti Haanpää’s and Mika Waltari’s army books, the contemporary class divisions and politics of conscription serve as an explanatory pattern for the differences between them. From the vantage point of the 1970’s and old age, other men mixed the polarized interpretations of the interwar period into a kind of synthesis that did not serve the purpose of defending or criticising the cadre army, but of crafting a part of their own life-history.

Through his description of military comradeship, Mika Waltari conveyed an image of Finnish conscripts as boyish youngsters, blue-eyed boy scouts on the threshold of manhood and adult life. This was a prerequisite for the notion that military training could project them on a path to a higher level of being, to mature citizenship. That effect gave a positive meaning to the hardships they had to endure along that path. Through forming a community of comrades, a brotherhood-in-arms, Waltari’s citizen-soldiers supported and spurred on each other to learn and train for the task of men, defending the country. At the same time they were taught the self-control and unselfishness needed to submit. This experience, Waltari claimed, endowed conscripts with the self-confidence to face adult manhood with its responsibilities. The effect of Waltari’s narrative – whether it was his intention or not – was to defend the cadre army system by offering an attractive solution to the paradox between adulthood and submission, and claiming that it only changed men for the better.

Pentti Haanpää, on the contrary, suggested an image of Finnish conscripts who were no compliant young boys when they arrived for military service, but rough-hewn adult workmen. Military training had no personal value for them, and without a war to fight the hardships and humiliations involved appeared to them as meaningless sadism and oppression. Haanpää’s soldiers felt offended by military discipline and reacted by resistance and recalcitrance in any form available – shirking, cheating and lying. Haanpää had no use for the sedative notion of supportive comradeship that lessened the strain of life in a cadre army. In his portrayal, comradeship was more about an inflicted life together. He did not attempt to idealise military comradeship or even describe the conscripts’ ways of being men as particularly sympathetic. The message emerging from his stories was rather that this was what common Finnish men are like, like it or not, and if the cadre army system stood in contradiction to it, the military system had to change. To Haanpää’s workmen, the army was an oppressive interruption robbing them of autonomy and dignity, but to Waltari’s middle-class students it offered an opportunity to boost their white-collar self-image with the prestige of being not only warriors, but also the military leaders of their generation. Waltari wrote in the “white” tradition, describing an affinity between men in military service, united across all other differences by gender, nationality and soldiering. Haanpää’s images of soldiering were closely aligned with the political critique of the standing cadre army as an institution corrupting men, both through the oppressive violence of a detached officer caste and through the roughness of comradeship in the “unnatural” circumstances of men living isolated from society in an all-male military hierarchy.

These differences are interestingly congruent with those between the ‘modern’ middle class and traditional rural and working class views. Industrialisation and urbanisation, it has been argued in previous research, robbed the middle-class of its traditional stable foundations: landownership or autonomy as a self-employed artisan. In the emerging modernity, every middle-class man had to prove and demonstrate through “making himself” in the fierce competition of the marketplace. This notion of a need to demonstrate an ability that was not inherited as a social position from one’s father is strikingly similar to Mika Waltari’s eagerness to demonstrate that “he can make it where the others do”. Pentti Haanpää’s conscripts, on the other hand, navigate within a largely rural value system where great value is put on the autonomy based on controlling one’s own labour. The soldiers depicted by Haanpää try to claim a degree of self-determination by using strategies of obstinacy and wilfulness, similar to the contemporary culture in teams of male workmen, for example in forestry or railroad construction, as described by Ella Johansson.

The culture of shirking and malingering could also be conceptualized as Eigensinn, a term that Alf Lüdtke has used to describe how contemporary industry workers on the continent temporarily distanced themselves from the hierarchies and demands of the workplace, refusing co-operation and gaining some sensation of pleasure through teasing fellow workers, walking around, talking to people, taking unauthorized breaks or just daydreaming; anything one was not supposed to do during working hours. Eigensinn or wilfulness, as outlined by Lüdtke, is thus not a form of resistance against the system, but rather attempts by individuals to temporarily ignore or evade the system, to create moments and places of independence from and disregard of the surrounding social order, insisting on time and space of one’s own. Conscripts displaying Eigensinn thus did not necessarily want to challenge or change the military system. Rather, they needed some space to breath within it. In spite of the variations and differences across the 1972–1973 reminiscences, and the evident development towards better treatment of conscripts over the course of the interwar period, the collection as a whole reflects many experiences of military discipline, especially during recruit training, as containing elements of meaningless harassment reminiscent of Haanpää’s imagery. The explanations offered for superiors’ bullying, in terms of NCOs and officers taking out their personal frustrations and aggressions on their subordinates, are also in line with Haanpää. Yet none of the men who wrote about their military training after the Second World War really attacked the pre-war cadre army system in the same wholesale fashion as Haanpää. The cadre army had proven its worth in the war, and even if some men expressed bitterness over how they had been treated and wanted to expose the power abuses that had occurred, the general tenor in 1972–1973 was that interwar military training in its very hardness was necessary and useful.

Since it was not necessary any more to either attack or defend the institution itself, the stories written down in the 1970’s are actually less black-and-white than the interwar literary depictions. They needed neither the demonising story about an officer corps rotten throughout, nor the idealised myth of conscript soldiers’ unreserved solidarity and comradeship. Accounts of bullying and sadistic superiors could be accommodated in the same narrative with very appreciative descriptions of well-liked officers. Good comradeship and group spirit were mentioned in the same breath as violent conflicts among the conscripts were revealed. In the final analysis, many former soldiers evidently adopted the notion of military service as “a school for men”, a place where conscripts grow, harden and develop self-confidence through the very hardships they suffer, in order to invest a largely disagreeable or partially even degrading experience with a positive meaning. However, they did not idealise submission in itself nor the collectivist fusion with the group as Waltari did; theirs were individualist stories of their ability to cope.

Historian Thomas Rohkrämer has found the same pattern of a “growth narrative” surrounding nineteenth century German military service. The training, Rohkrämer claims, was intentionally laid out with an extremely hard and even humiliating recruit training in the beginning followed by slowly ameliorating circumstances. Once the soldier had adjusted to army discipline and taken on the behaviour his superiors wanted, he could enjoy certain rewards; a high social status in relation to civilians, an economically carefree existence, and a boosted attractiveness with women due to the “military bearing” and the gaudy uniforms of the epoch. Rohkrämer asks why so many men rallied round the cult of the military in the Kaiserreich and offers the explanation that military service was understood as an initiation that was accepted and celebrated afterwards. Once the hardships of military training had been endured they could reap the benefits from public notions of men with military education as characterised by energy, vigour and resolution.

From the early 1930’s on, a political consensus over the military system gradually emerged. As we have seen, the conscript army of independent Finland started out with severe image problems. Some of these were inherited from the standing armies of the authoritarian monarchies that served as organisational models for the Finnish cadre army. Other problems burdening the Finnish Army derived from the fact that it had been created in the midst of a civil war where its main task was to crush an internal socialist revolution. This initial ballast was further exacerbated through reports of the bad conditions that conscript soldiers were exposed to throughout much of the 1920’s. The pro-defence debate in interwar Finland must largely be understood against the background of widespread negative images of the existing military system. While pro-defence advocates made great efforts to disseminate positive images of military service, they had to compete with popular notions of the conscript army as a morally and physically unhealthy place for conscripts, as well as a culture of story-telling about personal experiences of military training that often highlighted the brutal treatment and outright bullying of conscripts.

Military service was described as strongly formative of conscripts’s physical and moral development, both by the critics and by the supporters of the existing military system. As the military system became a part of cultural normality, as the worst conditions were corrected, and as people grew accustomed to conscription and increasingly came to accept it – although not necessarily to like it – there was less need to talk about its impact. However, this was more the case in the political arena and the ideological propaganda of “civic education” than in the popular culture of telling stories about individual experiences of military training. Even if the notorious bullying of conscripts obviously diminished over the period, men still found personal use for the claim that going through a harsh and demanding training had made a positive difference to their personal life history.

Analysis of the parliamentary debates over the conscription system shows a prolonged scepticism and reluctance within civilian society towards the conscription system created by professional officers during the Civil War. There was a swift transition during the Civil War from widespread pacifism and doubtfulness over the expediency of any national armed forces towards a broad acceptance of the general principle of conscription. The need for maintaining a Finnish army was no longer disputed. However, peacetime military service within a standing cadre army was initially criticised by the parties of the political left and centre. They drew on a long international tradition of republican, liberal and socialist critiques of standing armies. The liberal and conservative MPs, on the other hand, were conspicuously restrained as they presented the existing military system as a grim necessity. They largely refrained from celebrating any character building effects of military service. In spite of their glorification of the feats of the White Army in the “Liberation War” of 1918, politicians at the centre and right were wary of expressing any opinions that could be labelled as militarist. They were susceptible to public concerns over bad conditions in the garrisons and the maltreatment of conscripts and throughout the 1920’s resisted the military’s requests for more money and increased conscripted manpower.

Those politicians who wanted a people’s militia centred their critique of the cadre army on its alleged moral dangers for conscripts and the threat to democracy of a closed caste of professional officers. However, their reasons for doing so evidently had much to do with other issues of a political and economic nature; namely, the control over the armed forces in society, the enormous costs of creating and maintaining national armed forces, and the importance of conscripts in the workforce of a poor and largely agrarian society. In their rhetoric can be identified references to both idealised images of the Finnish national character and visions of egalitarian citizenship in the new democratic republic. The Agrarians alluded to a stereotype of Finns as autonomous freeholders, with a natural patriotic instinct to defend their property and families, yet averse to authorities and submissiveness. The Social Democrats expressed a more anxious notion of working-class men as susceptible to indoctrination and political corruption through military service. Nonetheless, they simultaneously tried to describe young workers as class-conscious, strongwilled men who would fight only for the good of the people and not the for the bourgeoisie.

Over the course of time, the parliamentary debates demonstrate a slow movement from strong scepticism towards acceptance of a conscripted standing cadre army; from strong notions that such an army could form a threat to democracy towards embracing it as a safeguard of the democratic republic; and from intense concerns that army life would corrupt conscripts towards confidence that it would at least do them no harm. One objective of the interwar commemoration of the “Liberation War” was to portray a view of the recent past that supported interwar patriotic mobilisation and military preparedness and counteracted the scepticism and reluctance surrounding the conscript army.

The heroic stories about the Jägers conveyed images of the Finnish nation as ready for action, notions that national freedom and prosperity were based on military force and valorous heroism, and a message of the invincible strength of passionate, self-sacrificing patriotism. According to the heroic stories, the Jägers were zealous young warriors, driven by flaming patriotism and antithetical to old-school aristocratic officers, such as the older and more experienced Finnish officers who had served in the Russian army before the war. In the campaign to oust “Russian” officers from leading positions in the armed forces, it was claimed that the Jägers represented a new kind of officer, capable of motivating and filling conscripted soldiers with enthusiasm for military service and patriotic sacrifice. The Jägers of heroic stories were living examples of a Finnish military readiness that was now demanded of every young conscript in order to secure national independence. The national-warrior attitude to soldiering incarnated by the Jägers was made the objective of the military education of conscripts – with Jägers as models, planners, executors and leaders. Military thinkers within and associated to the Jäger movement claimed that Finland’s military and political situation demanded soldiers who had received a moral
education instead of being drilled into mechanical obedience. These “new” national soldiers had to be strong-willed soldiers, motivated by patriotism, self-discipline, a sense of duty and a spirit of sacrifice. Moreover, they had to be led by officers embodying these same virtues to the highest degree; officers like the Jägers themselves.

The project of idealistic officers and educators to morally train a “new” kind of Finnish citizen-soldier was put into concrete form with the project of giving the conscripts a “civic education”. The magazine for soldiers, Suomen Sotilas, used the rhetorical technique of associating the wished-for, well-disciplined citizen-soldier with strength and courage in an attempt to influence the readers’ self-understanding and behaviour. The magazine offered its readers images of military training as a process where conscripts matured into adult citizens marked by vigour, a sense of duty and self-restraint. Acquiring the skills and virtues of a good soldier, the young man would simultaneously develop into a useful and successful citizen. The hardships he had to endure would be meaningful and rewarding in the end, both for the nation and himself as an individual.

The magazine wrote abundantly on Finnish military history, challenging the readers to honour their forebears’ sacrifices and meet the standards set by previous generations, but also reassuring present-day conscripts by conjuring a sense of sameness, affinity and a shared national character, marked by hardy, valorous and unyielding character among Finnish men in both the past and present. However, the notion that army life could be corrupting of conscripts’s morals was also surprisingly conspicuous in the magazine, mainly in storys written by clergymen. These “moralist” writers obviously regarded “false” notions among the young conscripts as a great challenge to their educational project and attempted to push their own definitions of true character, centred on self-restraint and dutifulness.

Finally, this study has contrasted the official rhetoric surrounding conscription with the stories that conscripted men told about their personal experiences of military service. The analysis of Pentti Haanpää’s and Mika Waltari’s accounts of military service connected the stark differences between them to both contemporary political disagreements over conscription and the class background and social prospects of the men they served with. As demonstrated by Haanpää,
Waltari, and the collection of reminiscences written in 1972–1973, the social practices of military service in the 1920s were often divisive as they confirmed the class hierarchies and political conflict lines in civilian society. Educated young men such as Mika Waltari were confirmed in their consciousness of belonging to the nation’s elite. They were given an opportunity to prove their physical fitness and leadership qualities. Men from working-class environments, on the other hand, could find that disciplinary methods perceived as bullying and harassment confirmed their understandings of the “white” army and capitalist state as oppressive of lower-class men. Most men did not find much use for the trope of military comradeship in their army stories. It was important to Mika Waltari in his construction of military service as a development process within a tightly knit collective, but not to either Pentti Haanpää who attacked the military system by portraying it as corrupting human relationships, or the men writing down their memories of the army in the 1970’s, who essentially wanted to tell a story of their individual ability to cope and their personal development.

As this analysis has shown, the images of soldiering in oral popular culture largely contradicted the loftiness of military propaganda. These popular images underscored the hardships and abuses that conscripts had to endure. Superiors’ incessant shouting, formal and distant relationships between officers and men, exaggerated emphasis on close-order drills, and indoor duties such as making beds and cleaning rifles, gratuitous punishments and widespread bullying of subordinates – these were all central elements of a “dark story” about soldiering especially in the 1920’s. Even those with positive personal memories indicated an acute awareness of these negative popular images. It was usual to ascribe seemingly meaningless harassment to “Prussian” military customs unsuitable in Finland and ineffective on Finnish men. Individual superiors prone to bullying could be disparaged as weak in character and lacking real leadership qualities. Another strategy was to belittle and play down the harassments as only “proper” to military life and something a man could take with good humour.

The dominant narrative form in the army reminiscences was, however, to construct the story about soldiering as a process of personal growth, through hardships and even humiliating experiences, towards selfconfidence, independence and adult citizenship. Here, the rhetoric of military propaganda and popular stories met. Although the origin of this narrative model is uncertain, military educators and army authorities undoubtedly worked hard to repeat and reinforce it in official military ideology. Yet to the extent that men accepted this offering of prestige and recognition in exchange for their allegiance, they put it into the much bleaker constory of their own experiences of hardships, conflicts and bullying. Thereby, they maintained a counter-narrative to official images of soldiering. The fact that politicians and military educators abstained from playing on language nationalism in their rhetoric on conscripting conscripts is more intriguing. In a sense it is natural that national defence would be a constory where national unity was emphasised and internal differences in domestic matters were downplayed. Yet as we have seen, internal class differences did push their way into debates on conscription and even military propaganda. In this particular constory, the class divide was evidently deeper and more poisoned by mutual distrust than the language divide. In the wake of the Civil War, it was perhaps easier to imagine a national community of “white” Finnish- and Swedish-speaking soldiers once more defending the country against the Bolsheviks than to imagine the workers and the bourgeoisie as brothers-in-arms united in valorous patriotism.

Modernity and tradition

The mass parties of the political left and centre at first associated the standing conscript army with authoritarian, warlike monarchies of the past, an insular aristocratic officer caste and oppressive treatment of the rank-and-file. The Social Democrats and Agrarians saw the cadre army as an obstacle to democratisation and antithetical to a new era of equality, social progress and societal reforms - the kind of modernisation they themselves envisioned. In the Agrarian’s arguments for a militia, no need to change or modernise Finnish men was expressed. On the contrary, they argued against the cadre army by celebrating a timeless masculine national character, an inherent aptitude for warfare in Finnish men, which they claimed had been proven once again in the Civil War of 1918. The Finn’s love of freedom and fighting spirit would only be stifled and corrupted if he was incarcerated in barracks and drilled into mechanical obedience by upper-class officers. In a people’s militia, on the other hand, soldiers would remain inseparable parts of civilian society, mainly occupied with productive labour and impossible to corrupt morally or politically. In their own vision of social progress, the Social Democrats hoped that conscripts would form part of a politically self-conscious workers’ movement that would force through a modernity marked by social justice. The cadre army system threatened to put a check on that movement by defending capitalist interests and drilling young workers into compliant tools of the propertied classes.

The war hero cult surrounding the Jägers, as well as the military propaganda aimed at giving the conscripts a “civic education”, included powerful images of the “Liberation War”, marking the dawn of a new era of Finnish military. The heroic stories about the Jägers supported notions of the brand new national armed forces as representing something new and progressive in Finnish society. They powerfully associated the “liberation” of Finland from Russia with a national “coming of age” manifested in military action. Military reformers wrote about a “new” age of warfare that needed strong-willed, self-propelled and self-disciplined soldiers who fought for their nation out of their own free will and patriotic conviction. In nationalist propaganda, the Jäger officers were constructed as a “new” kind of youthful and modern military leader who could fulfil the moral and technical requirements of a new era. The military propaganda directed towards conscripts in training strongly connected this “new” military image with citizenship. Military training was supposed to educate the conscripts for modern citizenship. This not only included preparing for defending the new nation and enduring the horrors of modern warfare. It also meant acquiring the energy, discipline and precision that characterised a member of an industrialised civilised nation. The army was ‘a school for men’ – the kind of men that the new Finland needed.
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The stories of men who did their military service in the 1920’s testify that the “corporal spirit” criticised as old-fashioned and dysfunctional by contemporary military educators was alive and well in the Finnish armed forces. The “dark stories” about tyrannical superiors browbeating the conscripts resonated with critical claims about the questionable ideological and moral impact of this particular military training on conscripts. Their persistence through much of the 1920’s was highly problematic for those who wanted to represent the cadre army as part of national modernity and progress. The literary scandal surrounding the publication of Pentti Haanpää’s Fields and Barracks in 1928 provides an ample illustration of the frictions between those in Finnish society who hoped the army would change Finnish men and those who thought the army itself was the problem, not the solution. The press reviews deserve some attention, since they present us with a condensed picture of how conscription was connected with conflicting visions of modernity.

The socialist press lauded the book as a truthful and realistic depiction of army life from the perspective of ordinary soldiers. The non-socialist press, on the other hand, greeted the book with dismay. The magazine of the Civil Guards, Hakkapeliitta, accused Haanpää of downright lying, “poisoning young souls” with mendacious and coarse rubbish. The reaction it evoked in the pro-defence establishment was summarised in the headline of an editorial in Suomen Sotilas: “A desecration of the army”. Yet many book reviews and commentaries in the centrist and conservative civilian press also admitted that there was some truth to Haanpää’s stories. There were nuanced comments made, for example by the military philosophy teacher Hannes Anttila, about undeniable deficiencies in the conscripts’ conditions and the need for officers to read Haanpää to understand some of their conscripts better. Still, the non-socialist press claimed that Haanpää had limited his description to only the bleakest and gloomiest aspects of military life. It was said that he lacked self-criticism, “true education” and the analytical capability of putting his observations into a larger constory. Professor V.A. Koskenniemi, one of the greatest literary authorities of the era, dismissed the book as “sketch-like minor art” and noted that Haanpää’s laudable prose was tainted by the cheap trick of “boyishly defiant exaggeration”.

To many non-socialist reviewers, the types of men Haanpää portrayed seem to have been a greater concern than his images of the bad treatment of conscripts. The conservative newspaper Uusi Suomi criticised him for having identified himself with “the worst and most immature sections of the conscripts”. An editorial in Suomen Sotilas claimed that there was a minority among the conscripts who lacked “a clear understanding that military service is not meant for pampering and enjoyment, but a severe and difficult school preparing for war”. These elements among the soldiers, wrote the editors, were “morally often quite underdeveloped, unpatriotic, even criminal”. A columnist in the agrarian Ilkka newspaper branded Haanpää’s book as mostly expressing “hatred of lords and masters” and its author as “one of those men still serving in the army who are impossible to educate because they do not comprehend what it means to be under somebody else’s command”. The critic Lauri Viljanen wrote, “In accordance with his nature as a writer [Haanpää] feels the greatest sympathy for those individuals who find it the hardest thing in the world to grow accustomed to any form of societal discipline.” These reviews implied that beyond some fine adjustments, it was not the military system that needed fundamental change. Haanpää’s obstinate conscripts were the ones that really needed to be thoroughly reformed. They were seen as remnants of a primitive Finnish society of isolated villages, characterised by wilfulness and a smouldering hatred of any authority, unable to adjust to a new and changed society and citizenship.

On this point, the young modernist author and critic Olavi Paavolainen was the most outspoken, as he reviewed Fields and Barracks for Tulenkantajat (The Torchbearers), a cultural magazine and mouthpiece of young artists oriented towards Western European culture and modernity. Paavolainen had done his own military service at about the same time as Haanpää. He found Field and Barracks “disgusting” because its author never rose above “the same low and unintelligent level of thinking and feeling” inhabited by the human types he depicted. Since Haanpää was no town dweller, but “the disciple of untamed conditions” – i.e., underdeveloped rural regions – he lacked “the intellectual and theoretical passion to solve problems”. Nevertheless, Paavolainen asserted that “anybody who has served in the army can testify that the majority of conscripts think and feel like Private Haanpää”. Yet he continued, “How one learns to hate [the Finnish] people during military service! Not because it is supine, incapable and slow, which qualities are offset by its honesty, tenaciousness and toughness – but because it has an insurmountable dread of any order, regulation and – without exception – any commands. It holds resisting any instructions as a matter of honour. (…) This desire for recalcitrance expresses a basic trait in the Finnish national character.”

Paavolainen thus actually agreed with Haanpää’s description of Finnish men and their reactions to military discipline, but saw the reason for their mentality not in some deep-rooted folk culture, but in nineteenth century nationalist agitation by the educated classes. The Finns, he wrote, had always been told in speeches and historical works that their hallmark was not to obey orders and not to accept the yoke of any masters – because these masters had always been foreign. The notion that every command and all lords and masters were bad things had been impressed upon the Finns by both national romanticism and socialism, claimed Paavolainen. It was time for Finnish men to liberate themselves from “the idealisation of a nation of virginal people living in the wilderness and a national culture of lumberjacks”, replicated by Haanpää. Paavolainen saw the cure in modern military training: “Look at the boys who come home from the army: how differently they move, walk, talk, eat and think. Their brains, used to executing orders, work keenly, their bodies shaped by exercises and sports are lithe and obedient. In them is the stuff of a modern civilised nation. Military service has been a first-rate school. (…)”

For want of anything better, Paavolainen found military training to be an excellent instrument for implanting a notion of “a new rhythm of life” in the Finnish people. Life in the modern world, he wrote, with its “telephones, offices, newspapers, street traffic, universities, radios, sports, transatlantic liners, train timetables and stock exchange news” was impossible if people had no concepts of discipline, exactitude and timetables. In the wake of the traumatic events of 1918, optimistic and idealistic visions of the Finnish citizen shaped by military training held out the promise that such military training would defuse the threatening revolutionary potential in Finnish men from the lower classes and mould them into self-disciplined, dutiful, patriotic soldiers ready to sacrifice themselves for the nation. Their sense of comradeship with their fellow soldiers from all layers of society would ensure their loyalty to the existing social structure and direct their armed force outwards, towards a common enemy. The Jäger myth displayed how the dangerous passions of youth could be channelled and disciplined through nationalism and military training into a force that had a burning zeal, yet protected existing society against inner and outer foes instead of threatening it. The editors of Suomen Sotilas assured their readers that when the well-trained and self-disciplined citizen-soldier returned from the barracks to civilian society he was indelibly marked with characteristics that would support the nation’s progress towards modernity and prosperity without internal strife.

Yet a neat dichotomy cannot, after all, be made between a modernist middle class supporting a thorough re-education of Finnish men in the fields and barracks of the cadre army on the one hand, and recalcitrant peasants and workers resisting change on the other. The same circles that envisioned the military producing patriotic and useful male citizens often – whenever it suited their purposes – referred to the heroic national past, military traditions and an inherent unyielding bravery and coarse fighting skill in Finnish men. For example, the Jägers stood for the new nation and its ideal citizens, but in their strong and bold manliness also evoked memories of the Finnish forefathers, linking the modern nation to a mythical past. “The spirit of the forefathers” was presented as binding obligation on conscripts to show that they were not lesser men.

On the other hand, the political opposition and resistance to the cadre army and prolonged peacetime military service were not necessarily based on an opposition to modernity or modernisation as such – although Pentti Haanpää did idealise an archaic, agrarian way of life. Social Democrats and Agrarians also wanted progress into modernity, only they each had different visions of what kind of modernity was desirable for Finland. Neither of these parties really resisted the militarisation of Finnish manhood, although conscription would have looked very different if the militia army they proposed had been realised. The militia project expressed another view of the relationship between a man’s task as a soldier and his task as a productive peasant or worker, a son, a husband or a father, where only open war was reason enough to tear a man away from his proper and primary places as a man. In this sense, the militia model implied a weaker polarisation and separation of male and female citizenship than the cadre army model that was realised.

Cultural conflict and compromise

The scandal surrounding Fields and Barracks appears as the last great furore of the tensions surrounding conscripted soldiering in the early years of national independence. A gradual movement from an atmosphere marked by conflict towards political and cultural compromises can be discerned throughout the interwar period. In the political sphere, the politics of conscription slowly converged as first the Agrarians and then the Social Democrats gave up on the idea of a people’s militia and embraced the existing regular army, as the apparently most realistic protection against Bolshevik Russia and a safeguard of parliamentary democracy in the face of rising right-wing extremism. The professional military establishment met the Agrarians halfway by incorporating the Suojeluskuntas movement ever more firmly into the national armed forces.

A great deal of the officer corps obviously only realised very slowly how radically the conditions for the military training and the treatment of soldiers had changed after 1918, when universal male conscription was combined with national independence and parliamentary democracy. Incompetent NCOs were allowed to terrorise contingent after contingent of conscripts and severe hazing of younger soldiers was tolerated or even thought to serve the recruits’ adjustment to the military world. However, the material scarcity and shortage of officers and NCOs with adequate training that had plagued the army in the early 1920’s slowly eased. In the face of massive public criticism as well as the emergence of new ideas about military philosophy, the armed forces eventually seem to have responded and made some partial adjustments to how conscripts were trained and treated. As a result, the regular armed forces’ image in the public improved towards the end of the 1920’s and was mainly positive in the 1930’s. Conscription and military training became less controversial as the population became used to its existence and ever more men returned from their year in the army without having been noticeably corrupted.

Over the 1930’s, the public image of the Finnish conscript army improved, as it became associated with the protection of positive national values among ever broader layers of society. Men’s (and in the last half of the 1930’s, many young women’s) experiences of military service became ever more positive and surviving its hardships and challenges became a matter of pride. Society was undeniably militarised to some degree as ever more men and women thought of military service as “a natural part of every citizen’s duties” and “a matter of honour for a Finnish man or women”. However, the political compromises and easing tension around conscription did not mean that Finnish men from all layers of society suddenly and wholeheartedly embraced the army’s civic education curriculum. At least within military training, the antagonisms between young conscripts and the disciplinary projects of both moralist educators and drillmasters continued, albeit in gradually less harsh forms. Writers in Suomen Sotilas continued to complain about the “false ideals of manliness” among the soldiers. Conscripted men continued to report on experiences of abusive treatment or excessive disciplinary harshness.

The interwar period was a period of contest between different notions of the military. Yet to judge by the materials studied, there was no clear winning party in that contest, no unambiguous persuasion to consent, no evident hegemonisation” taking place. The proponents of the cadre army system and the particular form of a self-disciplined military associated with it certainly benefited from the factor of institutionalisation; military training in the cadre army was a fact throughout the period and most conscripts had to undergo its practices, whether they wanted to or not. However, the comprehensive picture of developments in the 1930’s is one of incomplete convergence and persistent lines of division. Army stories display how both conscripts and officers often reproduced the social and political demarcation lines of civilian society within the military sphere. Many men certainly enjoyed the training and comradeship in the military, but few wanted or were able to verbalise friendship and intimacy in their reminiscences. Instead, their stories highlighted how group solidarity often meant either violently establishing outward boundaries towards civilians, other contingents or other units, or “comrade discipline” within the group in the form of ritualised group beatings. When the fact is added that the military treated conscripts differently depending on their educational background and political outlook – barring suspected socialists from officer’s training – one must question to what extent military training in practice really served the cause of a greater national unity.

There was a recurrent notion that the Finnish common man was a brave soldier, but jealous of his self-determination, reluctant to conform to hierarchies and suspicious of “lords and masters”. This unyieldingness was sometimes criticised, but actually more often idealised as evidence of a particularly Finnish manliness. This becomes apparent in images of the civil guardsmen in the Civil War, in the political rhetoric of the Agrarians, as well as in Pentti Haanpää’s and many other men’s army stories. Men who were too eager to comply with the military educational objectives were derided as “war crazy” by their comrades in military training. According to the army stories, exaggerated expressions of dutifulness and patriotism were shunned among the conscripts. Sociologist Knut Pipping described a similar mindset among the soldiers in his own machine gun company during the Second World War in his 1947 dissertation. Heroism or bravery was appreciated only to the extent that it served the wellbeing and survival of the group, not as an end in itself. Historian Ville Kivimäki has analysed Pipping’s account as displaying how the soldiers used their own standards for evaluating each other, including heavy drinking and womanising, certainly not the ideals of the “conservative” military. The most iconic Finnish post-war Finnish war novel, Väinö Linna’s The Unknown Soldier (1954), depicted Finnish soldiers in the same vein as Pipping, brave and tough fighters, scornful of ostentatious discipline and lofty patriotic rhetoric. However, Kivimäki points out that even if Finnish soldiers in the Second World War openly rejected many of the values of the military, their own values took for granted that a man had to, and would, fight and defend the nation.

This concludes the Posts on Conscript Service in the 1920’s. Next will be a look at the Suojeluskuntas and Lotta Svard organisations in the 1920's, followed by a quick look at the origins and early years of the Suomen Ilmavoimat (Finnish Air Force).
 
Placeholder - Suojeluskuntas and Lotta Svard Part I

The Suojeluskunta in the 1920's – the Finnish Civil Guard

I - Introduction

Earlier in this thread, we looked at the origins of the Suojeluskunta in the Finnish Civil War and the preceding unrest. In this post, we will go on to look at the Suojeluskunta and the associated Lotta Svard organisation for women in the 1920’s as a prelude to examining their changing roles and responsibilities through the 1930’s. At this point, I should state that the historical content in this Post is very largely based on the excellent English-language writeup on the history of the Suojeluskunta and Lotta Svard organizations written by Jarkko Vihavainen, to whom all credit goes for a very thorough presentation for organizations on which there isn’t that much available in English.

As mentioned in the earlier posts on the Suojeluskunta (Civil Guard), this was an organisation of a type that is a little difficult for many in modern Western societies to grasp as the “Civil Guard” type organisation is somewhat alien a concept to our modern military organizations. That said, groups such as the Suojeluskunta (Civil Guard) are not all that uncommon in many areas of Europe and this types of volunteer military organization was widespread in the countries that liberated themselves during the the dismantlement of Tsarist Imperial Russian and indeed the Suojeluskunta and Lotta Svard organizations served as models for similar organizations that were setup in neighbouring countries in the Baltic and Scandanavia between the World Wars (and afterwards in some cases).

For example, the Latvian Aizsargu Organizācija ("Guards Organization") was a paramilitary militia that was created on March 30, 1919 by the Latvian provisional government as a self-defence force during the period of unrest and civil war that followed the Bolshevik Revolution. In 1921, the Aizsargi was reorganized to follow the example of the Finnish Suojeluskunta, with its own newspaper (Aizsargs - "Defender"/"Guard"), a women’s wing (the ("Aizsardzes") and a youth wing (the "Jaunsargi"). In January 1940, there were 31,766 aizsargi, 14,810 aizsardzes and 14,000 jaunsargu. The organisation was disbanded in June 1940 as a result of the Soviet occupation of Latvia but a similar organisation was reconstituted in 1991 (known as the Zemessardze, or National Home Guard) when Latvia once again became a free nation.
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Representatives of the Suojeluskunta visiting the Aizsargi organisation in Jelgava 1924. (Photo from Latvian War Museum)

In Estonia, a similar organisation existed from 1918 to 1940. This was named the Kaitseliit (National Defense Force), and again was in many regards very similar to the Finnish Civil Guard organization and system, having originally been formed as protection against the public disorder accompanying the Russian Revolution and then participating in the War of Independence. The attempted Communist coup in Estonia on December 1 1925 dispelled any doubts about the necessity for the Defence League Organisation and led to its strengthening. The Kaitseliit had its own newspaper, "Kaitse Kodu!" ("Defend Your Home!"), in 1927 the Women's Home Defence (Naiskodukaitse) auxilary was founded, in 1928 the boy scout organisation Young Eagles (Noored Kotkad) was invited to join the Defence League and finally in 1932, the Defence League’s Girls’ Corps (the Kodutütred) was established. These organisations were all abolished by the Soviet Union in 1940, but after Estonia regained independence, they were reconstituted in 1991. Today the Kaitseliit is three times larger than the standing Estonian Army and would act as a key component in meeting any threat to Estonian independance.
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Hiiumaa Kaitseliit

Note: A subsequent post will look at the Latvian Aizsargu Organizācija and the Estonian Kaitseliit as well as the relationship between Finland on one hand, and Estonia and Latvia on the other.

It should also be noted that in the early history of the United States there were a number of militia groups that bear a striking resemblance to the Finnish Suojeluskunta (Civil Guard), but over time these institutions have died away or have been swallowed into larger and more "orthodox" defense organizations such as the US National Guard. The Civil Guard in Finland has in fact been compared by many to the “modern” National Guard Units of the United States, but this is not accurate nor is this a good comparison. There are some similarities but the differences are also significant. While the principle behind the Civil Guard is not unique to Finland it is very different than what most in the West are accustomed to hence the confusion many have on the history and role of the Civil Guard.

II - Bitter Winners and Sore Losers - Reds and Whites in the 1920s

As the turmoil of the Great War and the Revolution in Russia finally calmed down along the Finnish borders in the early 1920s, many Conservatives had already begun to feel that the "War of Liberation" had ended too soon and in an inconclusive fashion. New critics joined in the public discussion by openly accusing the political leadership of wasting what some now saw as a unique opportunity for territorial expansion into the historic Finnish lands of Eastern Karelia by signing the Treaty of Tartu - some went even further, cursing the moderate politicians for their decision to stay out of the Russian Civil War, thus allowing the Bolsheviks to retain their hold on Petrograd and indirectly helping them to win. Back at home many felt there were still accounts to be settled with the radical left. The survival of the SDP as the strongest political force in the country was especially galling for many White veterans of the Civil War.

In the 1920s, the Akateeminen Karjala-Seura (the Academic Karelia Society or AKS) soon became the dominant group among Finnish university students after three volunteer veterans of the Heimosodat (Kinship Wars) had created the organisation in March 1922 (and in fact the AKS controlled the student union of the University of Helsinki from the mid-1920s right up to 1944, when, OTL, it was disbanded). Its members often retained their membership after their student days ended and the AKS therefore quickly expanded its influence among young civil servants, teachers, lawyers, physicians and clergymen as well as in the officer-class of the Army throughout the country during the 1920s. Most Lutheran clergymen had been strongly pro-White during the Civil War and the influence of the AKS further increased the nationalistic character of the Finnish Lutheran Church – and the Lutheran Church was one of the most influential organizations for the changing of public opinion in the country. The AKS and its propaganda focused on "uniting the oppressed tribe of Karelians with rest of Finland" strongly affecting the worldview of the entire first generation of educated Finns living in independent Finland, resulting in a common mood that was relentlessly anti-Soviet and expansionistic.
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AKS Poster

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The AKS’ 20 year anniversary book (1942): “Me Uskomme / We Believe”. OTL, the organization was banned in 1944 – after the Finnish government broke its alliance with Germany — as a “fascist” organization. One of the important goals of the AKS was to unite the Finno-Ugrian-speaking areas of Soviet Karelia which were traditionally Finnish into Greater Finland. Stalin sent many thousands of Karelian and Ingrian Finns to their deaths in Siberia and Central Asia both before and after the war, and brought in Russians to replace them. Today, in most of Soviet Karelia and Ingria only Russian is spoken - after 2.000 years of being the Finnish heartland, almost no Finnish peoples remain.

The political and philosophical ideology of the AKS had its main roots in the philosophy of the 19th century Finnish statesman Johan Vilhelm Snellman, who emphasized a strong national state and the need to bring the Finnish language into the forefront of Finnish cultural life, which was at that time dominated almost exclusively by the Swedish language. The nationalistic ideology of the AKS also stemmed from the common European discussion of national rights based on the 14 points of President Wilson. The experience of the Finnish Civil War bolstered a deep anti-socialist sentiment in Finnish nationalist circles of that time. One of the slogans the AKS used was "Pirua ja Ryssää Vastaan!" (“Against the Devil and the Ruskies!”) where the devil is a reference to the Society's main domestic enemies, the socialists and the communists. Despite holding views that might be seen as similar to those of the Fascist movement of Italy, there were no influences from abroad - the AKS was founded before the Fascist march on Rome and its origins were purely domestic. The group was founded by Elias Simojoki, Erkki Räikkönen and Reino Vähäkallio. The initiation ceremony involved among other things kissing the flag of the AKS, within which was sown the bullet that Bobi Siven had shot himself with (Sivén, a Finnish nationalist, had shot himself in protest when Finland relinquished control of the Repola and Porajärvi Parishes to the Soviet Union in accordance with the Treaty of Dorpat). All members taking the oath for the order kissed the flag and the bullet in the initiation ceremony.
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Akateeminen Karjala-Seura. Sällskapet odlade flitigt olika ritualer. I fanan som användes i sådana sammanhang hade man sytt in den kula som ändade martyren Bobi Sivéns liv. Här ett fackeltåg vid dennes grav på tioårsdagen av organisationens grundande 22/ 2 1932.

Many of the founders of the AKS were veterans of the Karelian wars and thus had first-hand knowledge of the plight of the Karelian-speaking population in Soviet Karelia. The Karelians were considered to be a part of the Finnish heimo (folk) and their fate was of the utmost importance for the AKS. The Academic Karelia Society's program was centered on their main demand: the liberation of Eastern Karelia from Soviet Russia and the freeing of the Karelian kinfolk. Working towards this goal was mainly done by propagandist efforts to keep the matter in the public eye. The AKS also organized aid to Finnic minorities in Soviet Russia and refugees from there and promoted cultural efforts to help the Finnish-speaking minorities of northern Sweden and Norway. They also tried to cultivate a closer friendship between the newly independent states of Finland and the Finno-Ugric states of Estonia (and to lesser degree Hungary).

Domestically the AKS was an emphatic proponent of a strengthened army and for strict restrictions against Socialists and Communists, although at the same time the AKS stressed the need for improving the lot of the working classes in the interests of the national community. It also promoted the Finnish language becoming the first language in the country, especially in the Universities and in the state bureaucracy. Initially the group was ambivalent towards democracy but under the chairmanship of Vilho Helanen it came to oppose the concept. As a result, in the 1930s, the AKS was an ally of the ultra-right Patriotic People's Movement party (IKL). The AKS also maintained close ties with a militant secret society called Vihan Veljet (literal translation from Finnish: "Brothers of Hate" - this was a militant clandestine group within the Akateeminen Karjala-Seura (AKS). Members swore a blood oath to foster and uphold hatred toward the Russian people. Some authors claim that Vihan Veljet was actually a group inside the AKS, not a separate organization, but there is not much evidence either way).

OTL, after the end of World War II, the organization was labeled "fascistic" and officially disbanded on the order of the Allied Control Commission, and the archives of AKS were hidden or destroyed. Prominent former members include many academics, bishops, business leaders, generals and politicians (e.g. president Urho Kekkonen). Many officers of the Finnish army during the wars of 1939–1940 and 1941–1944 were members of the Society.

Note: By way of further background, a subsequent post will give a brief overview of the historically Finnish lands within the Soviet Union, their history and their subsequent fate at the hands of the Russians both before and after WW2.

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This gives some idea of the areas that the Akateeminen Karjala-Seura rightly considered to be part of “Greater Finland” by virtue of being traditionally inhabited by Finno-Ugric speakers. In particular, the territories along the eastern border of Finland to the White Sea, which had for as long as history has been recorded been populated by Finnish Karelians were called Eastern Karelia in Finland. Most of the poems in the Finnish national epic, the Kalevala, were collected from this area and as the ideas of Finnish nationalism gained ground at the end of the 19th century, supporters of a Great Finland hoped that the territory would be incorporated to Finland. The Finnish populations of theses territories were not at the time inspired by the same idea, most of them were members of the Russian Orthodox Church rather than Lutherans and preferred the traditional Russian administration, referring to the Finns from Finland as “Swedes”.

At the beginning of 1918, the supporters of “greater Finland” began to organize expeditions in order to persuade the Eastern Karelians to join Finland. The Senate and the Commander-in-Chief (Mannerheim) supported the projects. Mannerheim even went a step further and promised not to put his sword into the scabbard (the Order of the Day of the Sword Scabbard), until White Karelia and Aunus were liberated from Lenin’s “hooligans”. This led to fighting between the Allies and Allied-supported forces and the Finnish expeditionary forces in the region as the Allies sought to keep the Murmansk Railway in Russian hands so as to enable military supplies to continue to be transported to the Russian military as the Allies endeavoured to keep the Russians in the War against Germany. Perhaps unfortunately for the dreams of the Finnish nationalists, the Finnish alliance with Germany at the time firmly placed Finland in the enemy camp and meant that the Allies actively fought against them in 1918.

After Germany and Russia signed the Brest Peace Treaty on 3 March, 1918, the policy of the Finnish government became more cautious. In April and May 1918, preparations were made in Mannerheim’s headquarters for an operation in Aunus, in order to encourage “Finnish” thinking and to assist the Russian White forces in the liberation of St Petersburg from the Bolsheviks. The Senate, however, prevented this project from being carried out. Mannerheim believed that the White Russians would show their gratitude by ceding Eastern Karelia to Finland. The idea of incorporating Eastern Karelia into Finland became more intense during the Heimosodat (Kinship War) expeditions of 1918-1922, and afterwards when the members of the Akateeminen Karjala Seura (Academic Karelia Association), became rather more powerful and influential. After 1922 Mannerheim did not publicly give his support to these projects and in the 1930s they were overshadowed by other issues, but as we will see, the issue again came to the fore after the Winter War broke out.

A Note on leading members of the Akateeminen Karjala-Seura

Vilho Veikko Päiviö Helanen: (24 November 1899, Oulu - 8 June 1952, Frankfurt, West Germany). Vilho Helanen was a Finnish civil servant and politician. A student as the University of Helsinki he gained an MA in 1923 and completed his doctorate in 1940. From 1924 to 1926 he edited the student paper Ylioppilaslehti and around this time also joined the Academic Karelia Society. He served as chairman of the group from 1927-8, from 1934-5 and again from 1935-44, helping to turn the Society against democracy. Helanen visited Estonia in 1933 and was amazed at the high levels of popular support for the far right that he witnessed there, in contrast to Finland where it was a more marginal force. As a result he was involved in the coup attempt of the Vaps Movement in Estonia in 1935. Helanen was a major inspiration for the Patriotic People's Movement and a close friend of Elias Simojoki, although he did not join the group. He formed his own group, Nouseva Suomi, in 1940 which, despite his earlier radicalism, became associated with the mainstream National Progressive Party. Rising to be head of the civil service during the Second World War he was imprisoned after the war for treasonable offences. Following his release he worked for Suomi-Filmi and also wrote a series of detective novels.

Lauri Elias Simojoki (28 January 189, Rautio – 25 January 1940) was a Finnish clergyman who became a leading figure in the country's far right movement. Himself the son of a clergyman, as a youth he saw service in the struggle for Finnish independence and then with the Forest Guerrillas in East Karelia. A student in theology at the University of Helsinki, he became involved in the formation of Academic Karelia Society, serving as chairman from 1922-3 and secretary from 1923-4. He advocated the union of all Finnish people into a Greater Finland whilst in this post. Strongly influenced by Russophobia, the student Simojoki addressed a rally on 'Kalevala Day' in 1923 with the slogan "death to the Ruskis", after accusing Russia of dividing "the Kalevala race".
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Simojoki was ordained as a minister in 1925 and he held the chaplaincy at Kiuruvesi from 1929 until his death. He became involved with the Patriotic People's Movement and, in 1933, set up their youth movement, Sinimustat (The Blue-and-Blacks), which looked for inspiration to similar movements amongst fascist parties in Germany and Italy. The movement was banned in 1936 due to its involvement in revolutionary activity in Estonia, although Simojoki continued to serve as a leading member of the Patriotic People's Movement. He was a Member of Parliament from 1933-1939 and founded a second youth group, Mustapaidat (the Black Shirts), in 1937, although this proved less successful. When the Winter War broke out in 1939 Simojoki enlisted as a chaplain in the Finnish Army. He was shot on active duty, while putting down a wounded horse in no man's land, and died of his wounds on 25 January 1940.

Erkki Aleksanteri Räikkönen (August 13, 1900, St Petersburg - March 30, 1961) was a Finnish nationalist leader. He attended the University of Helsinki before taking part as a Volunteer in the ill-fated mission to secure independence for Karelia in 1921. Like most of those who took part in this action he joined the Academic Karelia Society (AKS), in his case helping to found the movement along with Elias Simojoki and Reino Vähäkallio. He quit the AKS in 1928 to join the Itsenäisyyden Liitto (Independence League), a group that had been formed by Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, Räikkönen's most admired political figure. Räikkönen took this decision in response to the banning of the Lapua Movement, a move that had left the far right in Finland without a wide organisational basis (groups like the AKS only having a small, elite membership). Along with Herman Gummerus and Vilho Annala, Räikkönen was the founder of the Patriotic People's Movement (IKL) in 1932. He would not stay a member long however as the group soon became purely Finnish (isolating the Swedish-speaking Räikkönen) and moved closer to Fascism, which he opposed. After leaving the movement he contented himself with editing the journal Suomen Vapaussota, whilst also becoming involved in the Gustav Vasa movement, a right wing organization for Finland's Swedish-speaking population. He ultimately emigrated to Sweden in 1945 and lived out his life there in retirement.

And on the other side of the political spectrum....

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Finnish Communists equally felt that the Civil War had been only the beginning of their struggle against their counter-revolutionary opponents. Openly backed by a steadily strengthening Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Finland, the SKP, trained new “Red” military forces in Soviet Karelia where radicalized former Social Democratic leaders and over 5000 refugees from the Red side of the Civil War were actually promoting virtually similar goals to their Conservative opponents – the unification of Eastern Karelia and Finland, except in their case, under the Communists. As a result of their work Finnish was the second official language in the new Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and propaganda broadcasts from the Petroskoi (Петрозаво́дск) Radio openly threatened listeners in Finland that the day of reckoning would soon come. New cadres of Red Finnish officer cadets were trained annually in Leningrad, and after the failed uprisings of the 1920s the Red Army even organized a Karelian unit of their own in the form of the Karelian Jaeger Brigade (Каре́льская е́герская брига́да). Because of the fresh memories of the Heimosodat (Kinship Wars) and the postwar status of Eastern Karelia as a "Red Piedmonte" where Finnish revolutionaries were clearly preparing for revanche, the official relations between Helsinki and Moscow were thus understandably icy.
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1928. The Karelian Jäger Battalion on parade in Petrozavodsk

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March 12, 1930. The first company of the Karelian Jäger Battalion

After the suppression of the Karelian uprising of 1921-1922 the Central Committee of C.P.S.U.(B.) on March 5th 1922 decided to start Finnicising the Karelian Labour Commune. The leadership of the Karelian Labour Commune went to the so-called "Red Finns". The Finnish language became the official language in the Commune and was used as the main language in Karelian schools and as the language used for cultural and political work among Karelians. On July 25th 1925 the Karelian Labour Commune was transformed into the Autonomous Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic (AKSSR). From a political perspective the "Red Finns" saw the AKSSR as the outpost of the "world revolution" in the North of Europe. There objective was to expand the AKSSR into "The great Red Finland" and even "Red Scandinavia".

This policy also included the creating of a special national military unit within the AKSSR. On October 15th 1925 in Petrozavodsk the Karelian Jäger Battalion was established personally by the Chairman of the AKSSR Soviet People's Commissar Edvard Gylling. The battalion consisted of four companies, with the battalion quarters in Petrozavodsk, in the buildings of the former Orthodox theological seminary on Gogol Street. The first battalion commander was Eyolf Igneus-Mattson, holding the position till 1928. The first commissar was A.Mantere. In 1927 he was replaced by Urho Antikainen. In October 1931 "due to the aggressive external policy of Finland towards the USSR" and because of the high number of convicts in the territory of the AKSSR, the battalion was transformed into the Karelian Jäger Brigade. The Brigade formation was completed by December 25th 1931. The brigade commander, by recommendation of Edvard Gylling, was Eyolf Igneus-Mattson.
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Eyolf Igneus-Mattson: Igneous-Mattson was born to a well-to-do Swedish family on the Åland Islands (Finland) in 1897. He graduated from the Higher Technical School in Helsinki and participated in the Red revolt, after the defeat of which he escaped to Soviet Russia, where he finished military training at the Petrograd International Military School. From the summer 1919 he was the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 164th Infantry Regiment (in August 1919 renamed the 2nd Finnish Regiment), he took part in the battle at Sulazhgora Heights and was decorated with the Order of the Red Banner. He graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army. From 1925-1928 he was the commander of the detached Karelian Jäger Battalion, from 1931-1934 commander of the detached Karelian Jäger Brigade. In November 26th 1935 he was promoted to the rank of Kombrig (Brigade General). In 1936 became the head of the sub-faculty of general tactics in the M.Frunze Military Academy of the Red Army. In May 28th 1936 he was arrested. He was released in 1946, rehabilitated in 1957 and died on May 25th 1965.
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Early 1930's. The Red Army's Karelian Jäger Brigade on the march

The Karelian Jäger Brigade consisted of two Jäger Battalions (the Petrozavodsk and the Olonets), one artillery battalion, one field company and one communications company. The Brigade was a territorial military unit - the soldiers served their five-year terms near their homes by way of serving several 8 to 12 months musters. In the case of mobilization two more battalions would be formed (the Zaonezhsky and the Vepsky). In June 1932, when the Karelian registration and enlistment office was liquidated, the Brigade Headquarters was supplemented with enlistment and quartermaster departments. The territorial formation of military units was usual for the Red Army at the time, but the name "Jäger" was unique within the Red Army. It was proposed by the leadership of the AKSSR as an analog of the Finnish jäger units. Another big difference was that all commanding posts it the Brigade were held by Finns and Karelians.

The Karelian Jäger Brigade was the only military unit on the territory of the AKSSR. In the case of war with Finland the Brigade operational plans were to cover Petrozavodsk from a Finnish invasion. The last stand, as in 1919, was planned to be the Sulashgora Heights. As an alternative there were plans to move the Brigade to the Kola Peninsula to repel any British landing forces. The activities of the "Red Finns" were carried on to a background of increasing political repression. In the spring of 1930 the OGPU arrested a group of "Red Finns" holding commanding positions in the detached Karelian Jäger Battalion. A second wave of arrests began in 1932 and involved mainly the officers of the 2nd (Olonets) Battalion of the detached Karelian Jäger Brigade. 20 men were shot as a result of the investigation for "counterrevolusionary rebel organisation".

In 1933 the OGPU "disclosed" the so called "plot of the Finnish General Headqurters". Some of the commanding officers of the detached Karelian Jäger Brigade were subjected to arrest and removed from their positons. From January 1934 a Josef Kalvan was appointed as brigade commander (known as “The Latvian”, Kalvan was born in January 25th, 1896 to a peasant family. He was decorated with the three Orders of the Red Banner. In November 26th 1935 he was conferred the rank of Kombrig (Brigade General). He was arrested on December 2nd 1937 and executed on September 12nd, 1938) and in 1935 the "Red Finns" were removed from the all leadership positions in Karelia and the detached Karelian Jäger Brigade was disbanded. At the end of 1935 the 18th Yaroslavl Infantry Division was stationed on the territory of AKSSR, with some units of the Karelian brigade now incuded within this Division. The majority of the Officers, NCO’s and Soldiers of the Karelian Jäger Brigade were killed during the mass political repressions of the later 1930’s.

The Karelian ASSR NKVD “… found and destroyed a counterrevolutionary rebel organisation. This organisation emerged in 1920 with the coming to Karelia of the group of bourgeois nationalists: Gylling, Mäki and Forsten, that held leadership positions on the Karelian Revolutionary Committee. By spreading their counterrevolutionary activity and including into it Finnish and Swedish political emigrants, former members of Finnish Social-Democratic Party Rovio, Matson⁸, Vilmi, Usenius, Saksman, Jarvimäki and others this counter-revolutionary group seized the main Party and Soviets posts in Karelia. The activities of this counterrevolutionary organisation were directed towards the intervention and capture of Soviet Karelia by Finland…Holding the main commanding posts in Karelia this nationalist organisation organised … preparation of armed uprising by the means of … creating of the infantry jäger brigade, staffed by national commanding and political officers. In this brigade they spread their counterrevolutionary propaganda and used it as a base for creating rebel organisations on the all territories of the Republic, this activity was performed in close junction with the "rights", working in Karelia…"

The draft of the "unreliable" Finns and Karelians into Red Army was stopped by 1938. By the end of summer 1939 the few remaining Finnish officers were called from the reserve and in the middle of November there was a mass draft of Finns and Karelians. At the time in Petrosavodsk was formed the 1st Infantry Corps of the so called "Finnish People's Army"… “(The Corps commander and Minister of Defence in the government of the puppet Finnish Democratic Republic was Komdiv (Division General) Aksel Anttila - former Karelian Jäger Brigade Headquarters Deputy Chief).

An interesting Case Study: Edvard Gylling, Chairman of the AKSSR Soviet People's Commissar and “Karelian Fever”.

Edvard Otto Vilhelm Gylling (30 November 1881, Kuopio – 14 June 1938) was a prominent Social Democratic politician in Finland and later the leader of Soviet Karelia. He was a member of the Finnish Parliament for the Social Democratic Party of Finland from 1908–1917 and was active during the Finnish Civil War as the Commissar of Finance for the revolutionary "red" Finnish government. On 1 March 1918, when a Treaty between the socialist governments of Russia and Finland was signed in St Petersburg, the Treaty was signed by Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin from the Russian side and by Council of the Peoples Representatives of Finland Edvard Gylling and Oskari Tokoi. After the Reds lost the war, Gylling fled to Sweden but later moved to the Soviet Union. He became one of the main leaders of the Karelo-Finnish ASSR as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Karelo-Finnish SSR from 1920–1935. He was accused of nationalism, removed in 1935 and arrested in 1937. There are some contradictions concerning Gyllings death. According to earlier Soviet sources, Gylling died in August 1944, but according to other sources he was actually executed earlier, 1940 or 1938. According to the most recent information, the most likely date of his execution was 14 June 1938.

Gylling more than anyone else was responsible for what has become known as Karelian Fever. Karelian Fever struck in the United States and Canada in the early 1930s, affecting mainly, but not exclusively, first generation Finnish-Americans. Finnish immigrants to North America were divided roughly into two categories: the Church Finns and the Hall Finns; the latter tended to lean to the left politically and some were active Communists. When recruiters went to the Halls to extol the virtues of the Russian Soviet way of life, many were tempted to leave America. The Depression was making life very difficult for farmers, miners, woods workers and small business owners; they were "experiencing the ruthless exploitation of capitalism." At the time, an interesting situation prevailed in Karelia, the Russian province located near the southwestern border of Finland. Dr. Edvard Gylling, a brilliant Finnish Communist, had become the prime minister of the province and hoped to make it a mainly Finnish-speaking area. In the first Russian Five-Year-Plan strategists assigned production quotas for Karelia which Gylling knew could not be met without financial help and skilled workers from other countries, specifically the United States and Canada. So the call went out for Finnish-speaking construction workers, loggers and fishermen to come to the “workers' paradise” and bring money and equipment with them.

Inasmuch as the first generation of American Finns could read English only with difficulty, they got a very slanted picture of conditions in Russia from the Finnish Communist papers, the Tymies and Eteenpain. According to Mayme Sevander who has done serious research on the topic, as of 1996 she had identified 5,596 people who responded to the call, selling their belongings in North America and taking the money to Karelia. Boatloads of several hundred sailed together to the strains of the Internationale and the waving of red flags. They were an idealistic people, willing to work hard to establish a new society. The largest groups left in 1930-31, but by 1934 the size of the groups had diminished to as low as eight or ten. Of the almost 6,000 who emigrated, only 1,346 returned. Seven-hundred-ninety men and sixty-three women are known to have been executed during Stalins purges; many others died in labor camps of starvation during the Finnish-Russian War and during World War II. Some still live in Karelia. (See “From Soviet Bondage” by Sevander, 1996).

If you’d like to read more on this subject, try the following books:
• The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin's Russia by Tim Tzouliadis
• They Took My Father: Finnish Americans in Stalin's Russia by Mayme Sevander
• Karelia – a Finnish-American Couple in Stalin’s Russia by Anita Middleton
• Soviet Karelia: Politics, Planning and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1920-1939 by Nick Baron

Returning now to Edvard Gylling any explanation of Karelian Fever must begin with the life and career of Edvard Gylling, whose life can be divided into two halves. He was born in Kuopio, Finland in 1881 and up to June 1918 he resided in Finland. He grew up in a prosperous middle class family and became steeped in Finnish patriotism and Finnish cultural identity early in life. Gylling grew up in a family of women, his mother and sisters raised him as his father was often away on assignment for the Finnish state railway. On the family estate he learned his love for the countryside and became aware of the poverty that then afflicted so many in rural Finland. Gylling entered the University.of Helsinki in 1900 at the height of Russification under the hated Russian Governor General Bobrikov. He joined the Old Finn Party, believing, like other members of that party that conciliation toward the Russian authorities would encourage Bobrikov to mitigate his policies. Gylling won a scholarship to study in Germany for 6 months in 1904. He returned to Finland to find his homeland, the Grand Duchy of Finland, in a state of revolution. Gyliing had been exposed to socialist ideas in Germany and on his return he quickly joined the Finnish Social Democratic Party.
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Edvard Gylling

Starting from 1905, Gylling became prominent in the Finnish Social Democratic Party. He entered Parliament and became the party's expert on agrarian matters. He also continued his academic career, writing his doctoral dissertation in 1909 and joining the faculty of the University of Helsinki in 1911. Gylling became a pioneer in the application of statistical methods to historical research and also became the official demographer of the city of Helsinki, conducting a census for the capital and for Finland as a whole. Such works are still widely consulted. Gylling's publications in the first decade of the 20th century concerned the sorry plight of the Finnish crofters who were emigrating to the U.S. in large numbers. He also wrote about the exploited state of the Finnish peasantry when Finland had been a Swedish province. Gylling addressed the Finnish Crofter's Association and drafted the Agrarian Program for the Finnish Social Democratic Party. His work on agrarian issues and his statistical research made him acutely aware of how serious were Finland's demographic losses, primarily to the U.S., in the period 1894-1914.

Sosialistinen Aikalislehti was Finland's first Social Democratic journal, for which Gylling served as editor in chief from 1906-1908. He was a prominent member of the SD party but also decidedly a moderate and a non-Marxist who wanted to work in parliament via coalitions with bourgois parties. With the Russian revolution of 1917, Gylling sought first and foremost autonomy for Finland if not outright independence. The Provisional Government in Russia refused to grant Finland independence but the Bolsheviks did in December 1917. Despite Gylling's efforts at mediation between his own countrymen, civil war broke out between radical socialists and members of the working class opposing the large landowners and the middle class. Gylling deplored the conflict, seeing that it would only compound the demographic losses already incurred from emigration. In whatever he did Gylling found a unifying principle in Finnish nationalism. He deplored the emigration from Finland of the early 20th century just as he deplored the Finnish civil war. Both phenomena undermined the demographic stability of Finland. In politics Gylling was committed to compromise and negotiation and believed that even the most contradictory principles could be reconciled. He very reluctantly accepted the appointment as Member of the Revolutionary Government and Minister Plenipteniary for Finances and was the last high-ranking member of the Red government to leave Finland, doing so in May 1918. The victorious White government refused his offer to negotiate, and put a price on his head and as a result, Gylling, disguised as a woman, escaped to Stockholm where he spent the next two years of his life, from 1918-1920.
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In 1906 Gylling was engaged to Fanny Achren. Both had been raised in central Finland and had a strong love for rural Finland. Edvard and Fanny were married on June 14, 1906. Gylling would be executed on their 32nd wedding anniversary by the Soviet regime as a bourgeois nationalist. His wife's execution would follow shortly thereafter.

Gylling spent two years in Stockholm before receiving permission from Lenin himself to head the new Karelian Workers' Commune. In Stockholm Gylling had somewhat reluctantly joined the new Finnish Communist Party founded by his former school mate O.W. Kuusinen. Lenin wanted Soviet control over Karelia secured. Gylling wanted to create a Finnish homeland under the aegis of the new Bolshevik government. He negotiated from Lenin agreements on the use of the Finnish language and restrictions on the immigration of Russians to Kareliaand in the process transformed himself from a prominent Finnish Social Democrat to an important Soviet official as the Permanent Chairman of the Karelian Council of People's Commissars. In the Soviet Union Gylling quickly became the most important political figure in Karelia. By 1923 he was Permanent Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

The road to power in Karelia had not been direct, however. From Stockholm in 1918, he had written Lenin of a plan to make Karelia, in the far northwest corner the new Russian Republic, a place of refuge for Red Finns fleeing the victorious Whites after the Finnish Civil War. Lenin was not interested, but in 1920 when Lenin sought to secure Soviet control of Karelia before negotiations that fall which would determine the Soviet northwest border, Gylling's earlier proposal appeared useful. He invited Gylling to Moscow where the two conducted negotiations on Karelia's future status. Lenin promised that Karelia would retain a Finnish character, and Russian immigration would be kept to a minimum. Gylling acquired a measure of budgetary autonomy for Karelia and made Finnish equal to the Russian language in official transactions. In fact, in schools and in official business as well as in record keeping, Finnish replaced Russian as the language of Karelia.

Gylling wrote an article in 1925 on his plans for the future development of Karelia, revealing his concept of Karelia as a distinctive region of the Soviet Union, geographically, geologically and economically bound to the Finno-Scandinavian plateau of which it was an integral part. For Gylling, Karelia's proximity to Finland and its tradition as the place where the events of the Finnish national epoch, The Kalevala, had occurred were far more significant than Karelia's position as a constituent part of the Soviet Union. Gylling maintained the Finnish character of Karelia through the 1920's. With the imposition of Stalin's First Five Year Plan in 1929, Russian in-migration in the form of a large, new work force would surely change the ethnic character of Karelia and do so dramatically. Gylling decided to recruit an ethnically Finnish work force in North America. He had seen the North American Finnish diaspora form earlier in the century. Since the 1920's it had often sent aid to Karelia.

In late 1928 or early 1929, Gylling travelled to Moscow to argue for the continued ethnic and economic autonomy for Karelia despite pressures imposed by the First Five Year Plan calling for fast paced industrial development. Gylling feared that the high industrial targets would mean the recruitment of a Russian work force that would dilute the Finnish character of Karelia. K. Rovio, head of the Karelian Communist Party, also shared Gylling's commitment to a Finnish Karelia. In March 1931 Gylling and other prominent figures from Karelia again travelled toMoscow to make a special case for the right to recruit workers from abroad. Gylling drafted the petition requesting permission to invite lumberjacks and others skilled in the timber industry to come to Karelia and assist in the exploitation of Karelia's "green gold." At the Sixteenth Party Congress held the summer before, Molotov had called for inviting foreign workers and experts to contribute to the Soviet Union's industrial development as part of the First Five Year Plan. Gylling now built on Molotov's suggestion (which came direct from Stalin) to plead for a foreign, i.e. Finnish work force for Karelia. Gylling knew that such a work force existed in North America. He had calculated the demographic losses as a historian and statistician in Finland and now he hoped to recruit that work force for Karelia in order to maintain Karelia's Finnish character. He would conduct such recruitment under the protection of Molotov's recent directive. In effect, Gylling would recruit the Finnish North American diaspora to his Finnish homeland of Karelia.

However, by the end of the 1930's Gylling and the North American Finns whom he recruited to live and work in Soviet Karelia would come to share the same fate. Gylling's position in Karelia began to deteriorate in 1935. In early 1935 Gylling presented his production goals for Karelia in Moscow. He faced a hostile audience - Moscow was about to withdraw Karelia's budgetary independence – which had been negotiated by Gylling in the early 1920's. Important members of the Soviet government had begun to question the presence of so many North American Finns in Karelia, a border region next door to Finland, which was known to be hostile to the Soviet Union. In October 1935 he was forced to sign a denunciation of Finnish nationalism in Karelia, the very policy that he had earlier maintained with Moscow's support. The following month he was recalled to Moscow where he joined Rovio, who had been sent there in August. Both men were replaced by Russians. Some of the Finnish Americans believed that Gylling had been promoted, not understanding that their own security was now as precarious as his. 1938 saw a dramatic turn in the fortunes of Gylling and the North American Finns whom he had recruited to Karelia. Gylling was arrested and shot in June 1938. As of July 1 1938 the Finnish language was outlawed and in Karelia Finnish newspapers and the Finnish radio station were shut down and Finnish books were burned.
Finnish Americans were now caught up in the holocaust that had begun in late 1936 in the rest of the Soviet Union. Many of those Finnish Americans who had joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were arrested and executed. Most of the children were spared, that is anyone in the Finnish American community under age 21 by 1938. There were, however, tragic exceptions. A 16 year old Finnish American studying in the Petrozavodsk Conservatory was arrested and shot. The secret police as elsewhere had a quota of victims to meet. But in Karelia another element came in to play: circumstances had given those who envied the work ethic, prosperity, and higher standard of living of the Finnish Americans the opportunity to exact revenge. The newly appointed Russian administrators of Karelia now exacted a terrible toll on the North American Finns, who had worked so hard under Gyllings leadership.

Edvard Gylling was executed in June 1938. His wife, Fanny, was executed shortly thereafter. Of the almost 6,000 North American Finns who emigrated to Karelia, only 1,346 returned. Seven-hundred-ninety men and sixty-three women are known to have been executed during Stalins purges; many others died in labor camps of starvation during the Finnish-Russian War and during World War II. Some few escaped over the border to Finland or managed to return to North America by other means. Some still live in Karelia.

You can read some of the survivors stories here: http://www.d.umn.edu/~apogorel/karelia/survivors.html#ruth

Obviously, news and information trickled across the border, with refugees and escapers from the Soviet Union providing some information. It was not just a perceived threat that Finland faced. But from immediately after the end of the Civil War, with conflicts still endemic along the border and the Bolsheviks consolidating power, Finnish Conservatives responded by further improving their efforts to create a new and stable status quo within the country. Their program of creating a new Finland was predicated on the support of the paramilitary Suojeluskunta organization, the Civil Guards militia that soon became one of the key cornerstones of post-war Finnish society. "We must win the working class over to the side of our nation!" was one of the key propaganda slogans of the AKS (and the Army), and the chief aim of all civic activity in Finland during 1920s was indeed focused on improving the sense of Finnish national unity that had been tarnished by the Civil War. This was to be achieved by binding all segments of society together, "uprooting" Communism in the process. The Suojeluskunta and its associated female volunteer organization Lotta Svärd formed an umbrella group organizing various kinds of activity: training manuals, lectures, citizenship courses, national youth organizations (Sotilaspojat for boys and Pikkulotat for girls), sport clubs and actual military training and practices. The unifying theme in both organizations was the pessimistic worldview where an invasion from the East, from the Soviet Union, was not only probable, but imminent (a viewpoint that, given the activities on the Soviet side of the border and subsequent events, was certainly valid).

II – The Suojeluskunta in the 1920’s

At the same time, the end of the Civil War had brought the Suojeluskunta a challenge. The existing Suojeluskunta organizations had been originally organized as voluntary units for maintaining local security in the chaos of the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Empire, a situation which was no longer valid. With the ending of the Civil War and the White victory, Finland was now truly independent, but with the Soviet Union across the border, with Red Finns organizing and training in Soviet Karelia, and with a dissident working class, many of whom had actively fought for the Reds in the Civil War, Finland needed to safeguard itself against both interior and exterior enemies. The Finnish Army was still very small as we have seen, and as a “Cadre” Army could not have coped with any foreign attack on its own. Having an internal paramilitary organization which would guarantee the safeguarding of Finland against external and interior enemies was seen as important – in the event of external conflict, this organisation would provide trained reinforcements to the Army, and in the event of internal conflict, the organisation could be counted on to be politically reliable and support the Government in putting down any renewal of armed internal opposition.

The Suojeluskunta was seen as the organisation which would enable these security objectives to be met, but to do this the organisation needed to be redesigned and uniformly rebuilt nation wide. Redesigning and restructuring the new organization raised a number of critical questions, debate over which continued well into the 1920s. The more important of these questions included:
- Should Suojeluskunta membership be voluntary or obligatory?
- What should be the main missions of the Suojeluskunta?
- What relationship should the Suojeluskunta have to the Finnish Army, the Finnish political system, and local authorities?

On the 4th of July of 1918, representatives of 171 local Suojeluskuntas gathered in the town of Jyväskylä. The decisions and resolutions made in Jyväskylä had a profound impact on the future of the Suojeluskuntas and greatly influenced the first piece of legislation on the Suojeluskunta, which was a statute legislated by the Finnish Senate on 2 August 1918. The statute was short in text and rather vague on some matters, but it cleared up things considerably and put in place the legislative groundwork needed for creating the new organization. At the same time it recognized the status of the Suojeluskuntas on the part of the State. Matters covered in the legislation included:
- The Suojeluskunta was defined as a State-wide voluntary organization with local and district levels. Each local area would have a local Suojeluskunta;
- The country would be divided to Suojeluskunta districts, all of which would include several localities. Basic organizational structure was defined, with Local and District HQ’s and Chiefs, as well as how these should be created;
- The Suojeluskunta organization would not be part of the Army, but would be a separate entity having its own Commander-in-Chief;
- Membership eligibility requirements were set as being “trustworthy males of at least 17 years of age”. The process of selecting members was that they must be volunteers with a recommendation. Members could be active or passive;
- The Suojeluskunta oath was introduced for all Suojeluskunta;
- The Suojeluskunta were given rights to accept donations and to own property.

The Organizational and Command Structure of the Suojeluskunta

The statute also set out the organizational and command structure for the Suojeluskunta (usually abbreviated to Sk). Initially, there was no overall HQ, and in military matters the Suojeluskuntas were directly subordinate to the Defense Ministry. The statute made the leader of the Senate's Committee of Military Matters, Major-General Wilhelm Thesleff the first Commander-in-Chief of the Suojeluskuntas and gave the Suojeluskuntas their own representative in the Defense Ministry.
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Major-General Wilhelm Thesleff (July 27, 1880 in Vyborg - March 26, 1941 in Helsinki): as the first Minister of Defence of Finland and briefly the Commander in Chief of the Finnish army, Thesleff was the first Commander-in-Chief of the Suojeluskuntas. Thesleff began his military career in 1894 at the Hamina Cadet School from which he graduated in 1901. He continued his military studies in St Petersburg at the Nikolai General Staff Academy over the years 1904-1907 and the the Officers Cavalry School from 1910-1911. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, 12 June 1912. Thesleff fought in the first world war in the Russian army (1914-1917), until he was captured by the German's in Riga in September 1917. In October 1917 he was transferred due to a request from the Military Committee to serve as a liaison officer between the Finnish Jäger battalion fighting under German command and the Germans.

He deposed the unpopular Colonel Nikolai Mexmontan. He was the commander of the Finnish Jäger Battalion 27 from 6 November 1917 until 25 February 1918. In March 1918 he was appointed as a liaison officer with the German Baltic Division during the Finnish Civil War. After the Finnish Civil War Thesleff became the War Minister (from 27 May 1918 - 27 November 1918) in the first cabinet of Juho Kusti Paasikivi. He was promoted to the rank of Major General on 14 June 1918. After the resignation of Major General Wilkma, as War Minister, Thesleff became Commander in Chief of the Finnish military forces from 13 August 1918. The first Paasikivi Cabinet had leant towards Imperial Germany but after Germany was defeated in the First World War the cabinet resigned. This also meant the end of Thesleff's political career.

However, in 1919, the Suojeluskunta became an independent organization within the Finnish defense structure, with its own independent HQ (initially named the "Suojeluskunta Toimisto" but in April 1919 renamed "Suojeluskuntain Yliesikunta," commonly abbreviated to Sk.Y). Initially the HQ had only two sections, Military and Financial. Georg D. von Essen was elected as the first leader of the Suojeluskunta HQ and later (in 1919) to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the now independent Sk organization (a position he held until 1921, when General Kaarlo Malmberg took over).

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Georg D. von Essen: Commander-in-Chief of the Sk organization:

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From 1921 to the end of WW2, General Kaarlo Malmberg held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the now independent Sk organization.

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The Suojeluskunta Flag

The Command Structure of the Suojeluskunta:

• Suojeluskuntain Yliesikunta (Sk.Y = Sk General Headquarters): The high command of the Suojeluskunta, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Suojeluskunta. When the Sk.Y was first established in 1919 it had two departments, in less than a year the number had increased to seven.
• Suojeluskunta Piiri (Suojeluskunta Districts): Each District controlled a number of Local Suojeluskunta Areas (usually two to three). Each district had a small District HQ lead by the District Chief (Piiripäällikkö). Most of the time Sk District HQs had 4 members and 2 alternate members.
• Suojeluskunta Alue (Suojeluskunta Areas): Each Area contained one or more local Suojeluskunta Units and had a small Sk Area HQ.
• Local Suojeluskunta: The Suojeluskunta Unit for one municipality or town.

At the Local Unit Level, officers were generally ranked as follows, but ranks would vary with the size and structure of the actual Unit:
• Paikallispäällikkö = Local Chief
• Koulutuksen Valvoja (Kapteeni) = Training Supervisor (Captain)
• Osastonjohtaja (Ylikersantti) = Detachment Leader (Staff Sergeant)
• Osaston varajohtaja (Kersantti) = Deputy Detachment Leader (Sergeant)
• Poik.urheilujohtaja = Boy Sport Leader
• Joukkueenjohtaja = Platoon Leader
• Ryhmänjohtaja = Squad Leader
• Ryhmän varajohtaja = Deputy Squad Leader

By 1920 about 93 % of Finnish municipalities and towns had local Suojeluskunta Units. Local Units were generally identified by Arm Sleeve bands unique to each unit as per the example below:
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Arm sleeve from the 1920's from the local Suojeluskunta unit of the town of Forssa

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Arm sleeve from the 1920's from the local Suojeluskunta unit of the town of Turku

Suojeluskunta Districts

Each area of Finland was broken down into Suojeluskunta Districts. This section provides maps showing the location of the various districts and how these changed over time.

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Suojeluskunta District Map 1918-1926

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Civil Guard District Map 1930

Selection of Suojeluskunta officials:

The Finnish President selected and appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Sk organization, but the Commander-in-Chief also had to be approved by Sk organization delegates before selection. Meetings of delegates consisted to 2 elected delegates from each Sk District and a Meeting could be called by the Suojeluskunta Chief-of-Staff or by five Sk Districts by written request.

The Suojeluskunta Commander-in-Chief appointed the Chief of each Sk District but before the District Chief was appointed, he also needed to be approved by the Sk District HQ of the Sk District he was about to lead. District HQ members were selected for a two year period and were elected by Representatives of Local Area Suojeluskuntas within each Sk District in annual meetings held in February. In these annual Sk District meetings each Local Area Sk within the Sk District had 1 - 3 representatives depending on the size of the local Suojeluskunta. Additional Sk District meetings could be called by the District Chief and by the Sk District HQ.

Each Local Area Suojeluskunta HQ was lead by the Local Chief (Paikallispäällikkö), who headed the local Suojeluskunta HQ, which had 4 members and 2 alternate members. Members of these Local Area HQs were elected for a period of one year in general annual meeting held in January.

Selection of Sk. Members:

Sk members were divided to two categories: Actual members and Supportive members. Supportive members paid the membership fee, but didn't have the right to vote in Suojeluskunta elections, had no right to wear Sk uniforms and had no responsibility for attending Suojeluskunta training.

The information below concerns only Actual members:

The conduct demanded from those willing to become Suojeluskunta members was quite clear: They had to be trustworthy Finnish males of at least 17 years of age (those willing to join but who were under 21 needed permission from their legal guardian). To be more precise, in this case being trustworthy meant not having a criminal past or the “wrong” kind of political ideals. Ex Red Guard members from the Civil War never had any chance of joining and neither did Communists (who were basically seen as the enemy). As a rule Social Democrats (the moderate left) were also unwanted until the previously mentioned reconciliation between the Social Democratic Party and the Suojeluskunta organization in 1930. The existing members (especially the Chief of the Local Suojeluskunta) decided who was considered trustworthy and who was not. If members of the Local Sk organisation weren’t familiar with the applicant, then written recommendations from two trustworthy persons were needed.

As mentioned in an earlier post, in 1930, in one of the more dramatic moments in Finland’s history, Marshal Mannerheim, working closely with Vaino Tanner, engineered a reconciliation between the Suojeluskunta organisation and the leading Finnish leftist political party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Together, in newspaper articles and in a number of joint speeches across Finland, they emphasized the need for a spirit of national unity and the dangers of the rising move towards totalitarianism in Europe. This affected opinions within both organizations and started a swing within the SDP towards a more positive opinion of Finland’s defense organisations and the need to increase military spending. Prior to this rapproachment, Sk members had not been welcome within the SDP, but after the “Reconciliation,” opinions on both sides had started to change.

Within the Suojeluskunta, the leadership encouraged members to take the first step in removing hostility between the SDP and the Sk-organization. A formal event welcoming both Social Democrats into the Suojeluskunta, and Sk-members into the SDP was held on the 15th of March 1930. The symbolic significance was large, but the actual results for members of both organizations were not immediately so. The symbolic significance was large, but the actual results for members of both organizations were not immediately large. By the 10th of April 1933, only about 1,000 Social Democrats had joined Sk organization. However, with Marshal Mannerheim, Vaino Tanner and other SDP politicians and party leaders working together to emphasis the need for Finland’s defences to be strengthened, and new financial incentives for Sk. training included within the State Budget from 1933 on, membership of the Sk began to grow significantly from 1934 on.
Suojeluskunta leaders and some (but by no means all) SDP leaders worked together to emphasis the need for Finland’s defences to be strengthened, and continually emphasized that the Suojeluskunta was a “Finnish” organisation, and not a “political” organisation. With SDP membership no longer being a bar to Suojeluskunta membership, and with the changes in military training that began to take place from 1931 on, membership of the Suojeluskunta began to grow significantly from 1931. An added encouragement was provided by the new financial incentives for Suojeluskunta training included within the State Budget from 1931 on, as well as the support offered by both state-owned and private businesses for Suojeluskunta membership. While there was still Union opposition, it became ever more muted over time as more and more Union members joined.

The growth in numbers of “Active” Suojeluskunta members from 1930 – 1939 was indicative of the success of the “Reconciliation”:
1931: 88,700
1932: 89,700
1933: 101,200
1934: 109,500
1935: 126,700
1936: 152,500
1937: 161,900
1938: 201,000
1939: 276,300

The large surge in membership in 1936 coincided with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War whilst the additional large membership surge in 1938 concided with the Munich Crisis and the now obviously looming threat of another European War. These were the active members capable of military service in the event of war. In addition, there were the “Veteran” members, those who were classified as too old for active military service or who worked in a wartime-critical job and who were refused permission to leave their jobs but who kept up their training and who were grouped into “Home Guard” units. There were some 55,000 men in this category, grouped into Battalion-strength units and organised under the Home Guard Command structure.

OTL/ATL Note: In reality, the reconciliation didn’t occur until 1940, after the Winter War, and while Sk. Membership in 1930 was the 88,700 given, in 1939 Sk. membership was 119,500 rather than the 276,300 given. This is significant as the Sk. Membership were the core of the Reservist Army, providing the bulk of the Reserve Officers and NCO’s as well as a substantial number of trained soldiers who carried out active training throughout the year. In this ATL scenario, the number of such soldiers has effectively more than doubled, and as we will see when we come to the changes in military training that took place through the 1930’s, there are further changes that result in a much larger number of non-Sk Reservists receiving annual “refresher” training. The end result, as we will see, is a larger, highly-trained and well-equipped Reserve Force available at the start of the Winter War.

After 1920, Suojeluskunta members who were at least 20 years old had one vote in the elections of his Local Suojeluskunta and until the statute of January 1934 could also be selected for a responsible position in his Suojeluskunta. After the Statute of January 1934, Suojeluskunta members got one vote in the Suojeluskunta elections after belonging to the Suojeluskunta for one year. As kind of a "old member bonus", they could also get another vote. This "old member bonus" vote was available to those who had belonged to Sk for 15 years, or were over 40 years of age and had belonged to the Sk for at least 10 years. The statute also required those selected for responsible positions to be at least 21 years of age.

Those wanting to join, but younger then 17 could join Boy Units (Poikayksikkö). In the 1920’s, these Suojeluskunta Boy Units didn't give military or weapons training, but instead concentrated on sports. The First Boy Units had been the so called "Squirrel Companies" organized soon after the Civil War for 13 - 16 year old boys wanting to join the Suojeluskunta . In that first try sports alone proved too little to maintain interest, but later in the 1920s interest reappeared and this time it proved more long lasting with a resurgent Suojeluskunta Boy Units ecoming active from 1928. Boy Units also worked to aid recruiting of new members to Sk. Once members of Suojeluskunta Boy Units reached the age of 17, they were transferred from Boy Units to the ordinary Suojeluskunta units. Sports and other activities of the Boy Units attracted many boys to join and about 70 % of them moved on to join the regular Suojeluskunta after reaching the required age. In 1939, the Boy Units had a membership of approxinmately 200,000, a substansive percentage of Finland’s teenage males under the age of 17.
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Suojeluskunta Boy Unit Member

The Suojeluskunta Oath

The Suojeluskunta Oath for active Sk-members before the Suojeluskunta Law of 1927:
“Minä N.N lupaan ja vakuutan kaiken sen kautta, mikä minulle on pyhää ja kallista, että tulen rehellisesti toimimaan Suojeluskuntien tarkoitusperien, Suomen puolustuksen ja laillisen yhteiskuntajärjestyksen turvaamisen edistämiseksi sekä ehdottomasti alistumaan esimiesteni määräyksiin sekä etten vastoin esikunnan suostumusta eroa Suojeluskunnasta, ennenkuin kuukausi on kulunut siitä, kun olen esikunnalle ilmoittanut haluavani Suojeluskunnasta erota.”

“I (first-name surname) will promise and declare by all that is holy and dear to me, that I will sincerely act to promote the goals of the Suojeluskunta, Finnish Defence and the securing of the legal social order and that I will absolutely submit to the orders of my superiors and that I will not resign from the Suojeluskunta without the permission of HQ, or until one month has passed from me informing HQ about my wish to resign.”

The Suojeluskunta-Oath for active Sk-members after the Suojeluskunta Law of 1927:
“Minä N.N lupaan ja vakuutan kaiken sen kautta, mikä minulle on pyhää ja kallista, että Suojeluskunnan varsinaisena jäsenenä rauhan ja sodan aikana rehellisesti toimin isänmaan ja laillisen yhteiskuntajärjestyksen puolustukseksi, alistun sotilaalliseen järjestykseen ja kuriin sekä täytän minulle kuuluvat velvollisuudet ja annetut tehtävät”.

“I (first name surname) promise and declare by all that is holy and dear to me, that during peace and war as an active member of the Suojeluskunta I will act sincerely for the defence of the fatherland and the legal social order, I will submit to regimentation and military dicipline and will fulfill the duties and tasks assigned to me.”

Main functions of the Suojeluskunta during peace:

The primary functions of the Suojeluskunta were defined as “Giving military training to its members” and “Assisting Finnish Armed Forces when needed.” In the 1920s local Suojeluskuntas in the border areas were also often used to assist with border patrol and protection duties as there were far too few Frontier Guard units to adequately patrol Finland’s lengthy borders with the Soviet Union.
Additional functions of the Suojeluskunta were defined as:
Supporting athletics and sports
Assisting authorities when asked (Police Officials & the Government in general)
Propaganda (Publicity)
Suojeluskuntas were very active in supporting athletics and sports,

Assisting authorities in a wide variety of situations where organized and armed troops might be included: This included missions like searching large areas, guard duty and assisting in the apprehension of dangerous criminals. The Finnish Prohibition from 1919 - 1932 resulted in many requests to provide assistance to the authorities as searching for illegal stills hidden in forests demanded a lot of manpower. Some Suojeluskuntas were enthusiastic about destroying illegal stills even without the authorities asking them, while other units were less inclined to provide assistance.

Propaganda: Publicity created by Sk organizations was typically quite subtle. Instead of derogatory and chauvinist speeches, Sk publicity favored organizing popular events using sports, choirs and orchestras as attractions and included some patriotic parts (music, poems etc.) in the programme. Suojeluskuntas also had their own their magazine: "Suojeluskuntalaisten Lehti" ("Magazine of Sk-Members") published by "Kustannusosakeyhtiö Suunta" ("Publishing-Ltd Suunta"), which was replaced with the Sk-organization published "Hakkapeliitta" in 1925. From 1926 on, “Hakkapeliitta” was a weekly color magazine with tens of thousands of subscribers. However, it wasn't the only such publication. "Suomen Sotilas" ("Finnish Soldier") was also a popular magazine and many Sk-Districts had their own magazines. The fact that the large majority of opinion leaders in Finland in the 1920s and 1930s such as teachers and priests, had a positive attitude towards the Sk-organization didn't do any harm either.
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Aikakauslehti Hakkapeliitta 49/1929, kansikuva. Kannen tekijä tuntematon

As we will see, from the early 1930’s on, the Sk-organisation worked increasingly closely with the military to produce short Films and “News” clips promoting the military and the Suojeluskuntas (from the mid-1930’s on, these were generally shown in Cinemas before the main feature and were rather well-done) as well as Training Movies and Training Pamphlets and advertising campaigns promoting various aspects of the military and the Suojeluskuntas. An excellent example of this was the campaign supporting the Government’s initiative in introducing School Dental Nurses which simultaneously extolled the role of the Army in bringing the need to the attention of the Government. Another such campaign was that supporting the introduction of “School Meals”, again both supporting the Government initiative, again extolling the role of the Army in bringing the need to the attention of the Government and praising the Lotta Svard organisation for their voluntary work in implementing and running the program for the benefit of all Finnish children. Such campaigns served to more and more create a favorable impression of the Suojeluskunta and Lotta Svard organizations across the entire poltical spectrum.

Suojeluskunta Finances:

The Sk organization and its units were financed from four main sources:
• Voluntary funding: These included donations, membership fees and money collected by Suojeluskunta and Lotta Svärd organizations as entrance fees to functions they had organized and so on. This was the largest source of funding for local Suojeluskuntas.
• Funding from the State Budget: This started when the Finnish State decided to pay the wages of some hired personnel of the Suojeluskunta organization. The sums increased as the Sk organization grew larger, but the Suojeluskunta always remained an inexpensive tool for helping to maintain the defense capability of the Finnish State. State Funding for the Sk at all times remained less than 2% of the yearly State Budget and less then 12% of overall defense spending.
• Funding from Municipalities, Towns and Cities: These typically financed local Suojeluskunta units (as long as left wing parties didn't have a majority on the local council). From 1930 on, almost all local Suojeluskunta units received Municipal / Town funding.
• Business profits from firms owned by Suojeluskunta: Three parts of the Suojeluskunta-organisation were organized as independent companies from early 1927 and also did business outside the Suojeluskunta-organization, functioning for all intents and purposes as commercial entities (which in fact they were). These organizations were:
o Suojeluskuntain Ase ja Konepaja Oy (SAKO = Weapons and Machine Factory of Suojeluskunta).
o Suojeluskuntain Kauppa Oy (SKOHA = Shop of Suojeluskunta).
o Suojeluskuntain Kustannus Oy (= Publishing House of Suojeluskunta).

For fundraising, the chapters organised numerous informal events and lotteries. It is estimated that about one fifth of all get-togethers in Finland in the 1920’s were organised by the Suojeluskunta and as many again by the Lotta Svärd – and by the end of the 1930’s, the figure was probably twice this, meaning the Suojeluskuntas / Lotta Svärd organizations were a key component within Finland’s social fabric. To this end, the Suojeluskunta chapters had several hundred choirs, orchestras, and theatre groups as well as numerous buildings that served a dual function as Armouries, Drill Halls and Social Venues (indeed, if you were a Suojeluskunta member, as often as not your wedding reception took place in a Suojeluskunta Hall).
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Suojelusjunta Choir

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Suojelusjunta Band

With the ongoing reorganization and restructuring of the Finnish Armed Forces from 1931 on, the Suojeluskunta-organisation came to play an important role in various aspects of defence and was allocated either increased funding or direct support from the military as the organisation came to assume these roles. In addition, the Defence Ministry in some cases contracted direct to the Suojeluskunta businesses – for example, purchasing weapons from SAKO and contracting out the making of training films and pamphlets to Suojeluskuntain Kustannus Oy (something we will look at in more detail in a later Post). These activities all resulted in increased indirect funding for the Sk. Overall, the financial costs of the Suojeluskunta were minimal when compared to the contribution the organisation made to Finland’s Defence. All the training carried out by Suojeluskunta members was voluntary, most local units built their own Unit Halls with voluntary labour and donated materials and into the 1930’s, members and local units paid the costs of weapons and ammunition.
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A typical Suojeluskunta Local Unit Hall in a rural area....constructed by volunteers and using donated lumber

III – Suojeluskunta Training in the 1920’s

Training in the Suojeluskuntas did not start well. After the Civil War, the Armed Forces picked the best trained and most competent Officers and NCO’s. Meanwhile the Sk organizations had trouble hiring capable Officers and NCOs. The low quality and inexperience of the Sk Officials responsible for training manifested itself in low quality training throughout the whole Sk. organization. In December 1918 the leadership of the Suojeluskunta decided that the Sk. organization as a whole needed its own Officer School. The Officer School ("Päällystökoulu" aka "Sk.Pk") was established in 1919 in the town of Hämeenlinna and the first course for Sk Officers was held in there in October 1919. A few Sk Districts also organized their own courses for Sk Officers, and from 1921 some Sk Officers also started being trained at the Kadettikoulu (the Officer Cadet School of the Armed Forces), although the number of Sk officers trained through the Kadettikoulu proved minuscule compared to those trained by the Sk Officer Schools (some 1,100 Officer-trainees over the first three years).
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Hämeenlinna Päällystökoulu (Officers School)

Over the course of the 1920’s, several new buildings were added to the School and the training given progressively improved and diversified. One of the key factors in improving the situation through the 1920s was that starting from 1921, professional soldiers (primarily Officers from the Finnish Army) replaced the highly-motivated but less professionally-skilled nationalists and independence activists who made up the initial training cadre. Generally speaking, those Conscripts who were selected for Reserve Office Training received basic junior-level Officer Training while completing their conscript service. A very very small number of these Reserve Officers then went on to enter the Cadre Army as full-time Officers, where they went through the Kadettikoulu (the Officer Cadet School of the Armed Forces) training (touched on in an earlier post). Of the remaining Reserve Officers, many went on to join the Suojeluskunta – from 1931 on this was an expectation that was almost always fulfilled – and it was within the structure of the Suojeluskunta training program that these Reserve Officers received the bulk of their more advanced Officer Training. Junior Officer Training at this time (the 1930’s) was very tough and very professional, with the curriculum content constantly being updated and revised based on experience from exercises and from Officers attached to foreign armed forces from 1931 on (a program initiated by Marshal Mannerheim).
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Officer Candidates from the Suojeluskunta Officers School participating in a Field Exercise in June 1934.

And while the training through the last half of the 1920’s had been good, in the last half of the 1930’s it was excellent, (we will examine the training content for both the Suojeluskunta Officers and NCO’s and the Cadre Army Officers and NCO’s in detail in a later post). Suffice it to say at this stage that during the 1930s, some 319 Suojeluskunta Officers courses were held there with almost 15,000 participants. The average course length at the Sk Officer School was initially 8 months with about 800 hours of training but by 1935, this had reduced in length to 6 months but with approximately 1400 hours of training. From 1934 on, more specialized courses were also introduced, where advanced and specialized training was offered to selected Suojeluskunta Officers. It could well be said that the Suojeluskunta Officers School, graduates of whom filled almost all Junior and many Senior Officers positions in the Finnish Army of the 1939-1940 Winter War, trained the officer core for the Finnish Army in the Winter War. The high quality of training given to Suojeluskunta officers (and to NCO’s) in the 1930’s permeated outwards into the training given at all levels of the Suojeluskunta, immensely improving the quality of training through the whole organization.

The Content of Sk Officer Training in the 1920’s:

The educational standard required of Sk Officers was confirmed in May of 1921. The level of education and basic training required for Sk Offices was set as being at least 5 years of secondary school or equivalent schooling, together with Sk Officer courses and passing the Sk Officers Exam. And having met these requirements didn't necessarily guarantee promotion. In 1923 the courses and studies for Sk-Officers were also standardized. The Course of Study included much theoretical and doctrinal knowledge, so reading and studying the listed books from the curriculum was an important part of preparation. The subjects studied by Sk Officers included:
• Military Forces doctrine
• Suojeluskunta doctrine
• Weapons doctrine
• Terrain doctrine
• Fortification doctrine
• Tactics
• Company tactics
• Machinegun tactics
• Artillery tactics
• Horse management

Subsequent to the Military Review of 1931 ordered by Mannerheim, a number of other subjects were progressively added to the curriculum over the course of the 1930’s. These included (among other subjects):
• Armour doctrine
• Close Air Support doctrine
• Anti-Aircraft doctrine
• Anti-Tank doctrine
• Inter-arms coordination

If mobilization had taken place in the 1920s, Sk Officers would have been ordered to fill the ranks within the Army for which they had received training when they had carried out their Conscript Service in the military. This was a clear organizational weakness and would have been a waste of resources – this was recognized in the Military Review of 1931 ordered by Mannerheim and was addressed in the subsequent military reforms of the early to mid 1930’s, as we will see.

In 1933, as one of the many reforms of the military being undertaken, the Suojeluskunta created a separate Sk NCO School. Prior to 1930, Sk NCO’s had generally received Junior NCO training during their Conscript Service and on joining the Sk, were generally assessed and appointed to NCO positions after having been a member for some time and having proved their worth within the organisation. The Sk NCO School was created to provide Sk NCO’s with both Senior NCO training (for Sergeants, CSM’s, Warrant Officers) and to provide NCO’s with the training to allow them to fill positions that would in the past have been held by Junior Officers. The objective was to ensure NCO’s were capable of stepping up in the event that Unit Officers were killed or incapacitated during combat.

Sk Member Training Requirements in the 1920’s:

Starting from 1921, active Sk members were required to participate in at least 12 days (about 100 hours) of training per year. The training would usually last one to several days at time and was organized as garrison/camp type training sessions. In theory the emphasis was on shooting and battle training. In reality however, early Sk training included lot of close order drill, while battle training was less common and shooting was a rare treat. It also proved to be a problem for the Suojeluskuntas to achieve the 12 days/year training levels for their active members. Only the very best of the Suojeluskuntas units managed to meet the yearly training requirement in the 1920s. There were also issues around the specialized Branches with their own demands for specialized training for members of their units (Pioneers, Signals, Artillery being examples).
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Early Suojeluskunta Training Session in a Local Unit Hall

Maneuvers were expected to play a large part in Sk training, but the first large maneuvers held by Sk organization didn’t take place until 1929 (with 283 officers and 3,841 NCOs and men near the town of Jyväskylä). Following the 1931 Military Review, this changed rapidly and by 1934, Annual Regimental exercises were being held, while by the late 1930’s it was not uncommon to hold multi-Divisional exercises involving tens of thousands of participants.
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Local Suojeluskunta Unit conducting a route march exercise, 1920’s

As the level of military skill expected from members of the Sk was standardized, its men were divided into two classes:
A class:
A1: Men fit for frontline service under 40-years old.
A2: Men fit only for guard duty or over 40-years old (only infantry).
B class: Those who had not passed Sk-private exams.

The Timetable for Sk-Private courses, (Includes the time for each training component, based on the Suojeluskunta Rule Book):

General military training – Total 13 Hours
Military forces doctrine, laws and regulations 9 hours
Routine duty 2 hours
Garrison duty 2 hours

Drill training – Total 20 Hours
Close order drill 12 hours
Open order drill 8 hours

Battle training and field service – Total 64 Hours
Individual battle training 26 hours
Squad battle training 20 hours
Field Service 18 hours

Field works 4 hours
Anti chemical weapons training 10 hours
Equipment training 15 hours
Shooting training 15 hours
Sports education 8 hours
Maintenance 6 hours
Total 68 hours
GRAND TOTAL 155 Hours

Types of Sk Training:

Typically, City Suojeluskuntas had several companies, while the largest ones had Battalions and the Helsinki Suojeluskunta had Regiments. In the 1920s training in the rural Suojeluskuntas was typically exclusively for infantry. At that time only the Suojeluskuntas of the largest city units were trained in other branches of arms such as:
Artillery (few Suojeluskuntas Artillery units outside of the larger cities)
Cavalry (also few Suojeluskuntas Cavalry units outside of the larger cities)
Bicycle troops
Engineers (only in Helsinki and on a very small scale)
Signal units (starting in 1927)
Medical units (starting in 1919 but also with very few Suojeluskuntas Medical units outside of the larger cities)
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Suojeluskunta Bicycle Troops on a training weekend, early 1930’s

Artillery training started within the Sk in 1919. The first artillery weapons used were the "75 VK 98" mountain guns, but starting in 1920 the Sk also received other guns. The Sk-Artillery Training Units were made up of 2 gun and 4 gun strong batteries called "Sk Batteries". These Sk Batteries were directly under the command of the Sk.Y. Between 1918 - 1921 the Sk also manned static batteries of 152-mm fortification guns located in the Suvanto-Vuoksi area to guard against the Bolshevik threat. Shooting with live-fire ammunition was quite limited as the older gun types were typically in rather poor shape and there was an ammunition shortage for modern guns.

Shooting as part of training:

Shooting was and is a vital part of the military skillset. The Suojeluskunta included practice shooting and shooting competitions into its activities from the start, but early on this wasn't easy. Hunting was popular among the Finns living in rural areas, but the usual hunting weapon had been a shotgun, not a rifle. After the Civil War the Finnish military dumped a mixed bag of captured rifles on the Suojeluskunta and even the more standard types like the Mosin-Nagant M/91 rifles that were received by the Suojeluskunta were often in very poor shape. Between 1918 and 1923 the Sk organization also found it difficult to find acceptable quality ammunition at reasonable prices. The basic necessities needed for shooter training were accurate rifles and good ammunition, so the rifles needed to be repaired and an adequate supply of ammunition organized.
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Erikoisaselajien koulutus jatkui koko talven ja kevään. Pistooammuntaharjoitukset on kuvannut Werner Mauritz Gestrin, Tampereen museoiden kuva-arkisto

Rules used in early Sk shooting competitions can sound odd to todays shooters. Hits were measured as centimeters from the center of the target, and sighting in shots or using rifle slings for support was forbidden. Some Sk members who had the money and wanted good shooting results bought new (usually 7mm x 57 caliber) Mauser rifles at their own expense. Because Japanese and Mosin-Nagant rifles of the Suojeluskunta and their ammunition were what they were, a special handicap system was introduced for them. Basically the handicap system worked like this: Shooters using Japanese rifles recieved 5% compensation and shooters using the Mosin-Nagant rifle recieved 10% compensation, those who used the new Mauser rifles didn't get any compensation. In a way the compensation system didn't always work as perceived. Many of the most successful shooters took trophies using self-loaded ammunition with Mosin-Nagant rifles. The Suojeluskunta soon had the best competition shooters in Finland.

In the 1920’s, the Sk-organization in principle emphasized military shooting (fast and precise shooting at various distances), but in reality the emphasis remained on sports shooting (shooting accurately from pre-known distance). The Suojeluskuntas also built hundreds of shooting ranges for their own use. The number of Suojeluskunta organized shooting competitions and their participants skyrocketed in the 1920s. One of the goals of Sk organization was to make shooting one of the main national sports and one could say it succeeded to a large extent. Shooting continued to be a central part of Suojeluskunta training through the 1930’s but following the 1931 Military Review, the emphasis really was placed on military style shooting – and in particular, fast and precise shooting at various distances and at moving or pop-up targets. Competition shooting still took place, but the Sk emphasized that practice for competitions was in the individuals own time. Indeed, shooting training received a great deal of attention, with constant improvements being introduced. Initially, shooter training used standard bullseye or cutout targets (as in the photo above) but in the 1930’s, Combat Range Training with mechanically-controlled popup targets was introduced. These Combat Ranges became increasingly sophisticated over the decade of the 1930’s.

In the later 1930’s, from around 1937 on, training in shooting was further and even more extensively revised based on Lindberg’s psychological studies. Measures taken included replacing all of the old “bulls-eye” targets with man-shaped pop up targets that fell when hit and repetitious “snap-shooting” range training against the same man-shaped pop-up targets, creating a reflexive reponse pattern that became ingrained after constant repitition (constant repitition was stressed as the key to success). Stimulus-response, stimulus-response, repeated hundreds of times as a training conditioner. The Suojeluskuntas began building new “snap-shooting” ranges which focused on developing combat-shooting, rather than target-shooting skills. With the work largely being done by voluntary labor, changes were quick to be made and by 1938, most Suojeluskunta shooting ranges were all of the “new model”, although old-fashioned target shooters tended to be somewhat resistant.

Many of these ranges permitted Company-sized live-firing exercises to be conducted, giving units valuable tactical battle-skill training under more realistic conditions and there was one training area set up specifically to allow Regimental-sized live-firing exercises – this particular range was in constant use all-year round, by the late 1930’s, most Regiments carried out one 2-3 day exercise per year on this Range. By the time the Winter War broke out, almost all Suojeluskunta members had gone through the new shooting training – and all those who had completed their compulsory military service in the 1938 and 1939 Intakes had certainly received this training. Also as part of incorporating the new shooter training, the Lindberg-developed techniques to train soldiers to consciously adjust their physiological responses had been carried out. This was largely through a combination of breathing exercises and “battle-conditioning” training under conditions of extreme stress and exertion simulating real combat as closely as possible – intense physical exercise followed by range snap-shooting accompanied by simulated grenades and artillery explosions in the main. Conscripts of course received far more intense training, with live bullets being fire overhead on top of everything else. All this moved the standard of shooting of the average Suojeluskuntas member to a very high standard.

Despite the new weapons being introduced to the Army and the Suojeluskunta through the 1930’s, many still preferred the old Mosin-Nagant Rifles, particularly in shooting competitions – and good marksmanship was always emphasized – both the Finnish Army and the Suojeluskuntas emphasized in their training that “every Soldier is first and foremost a Rifleman. One Bullet, One Kill.”

As documented in the Suojeluskuntas Hakkapeliitta magazine, the 1937 World Shooting Championships were a real success for Finnish marksmen and for the M/28-30 Rifle, pride of the Suojeluskuntas even as late as 1937.
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"SAKO bullet is 'the old tenwalker'" (left), Olavi Elo - a double World Champion and sleeper of team Finland (right)

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The opening ceremony. From left to right: former President P. E. Svinhufvud (Ukko-Pekka), President Kyösti Kallio, Field Marshall C.G.E. Mannerheim and General Hugo Österman

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Ukko-Pekka preparing to fire (left).

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Some of the participating nations (20 in total).

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The Gold Medalists

And here’s some further illustrations of shooting competitions, targets and the Rifles used.

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The 1937 Mosin-Nagant M28/30 – popular in Shooting Competitions, but by the time of the Winter War replacement in front-line use by a combination of the Finnish Army’s new Semi-automatic Lahti-Saloranta 7.62mm SLR and the Suomi SMG was well underway.

When it came to repairing and building rifles "Asepaja" (Weapons Workshop, later known as SAKO) started in 1919 and proved very useful, but results of its hard work appeared slowly. A temporary solution to the ammunition shortage was loading ammunition with simple equipment in local Suojeluskuntas, and this continued until the ammunition shortage passed.

The Sk Navy

Another interesting part of the Sk-organization directly under the Sk.Y and having its own uniforms was the Sk-Navy. The idea for the Sk-Navy was based on the British Auxiliary Fleet and appeared in 1919, but it took until 1923 for the idea to materialize. Their training was closely related to coastal defence training, which was also one of the special branchs of the military for which the Suojeluskunta provided training for its members. Apparently there was a considerable amount of enthusiasm for the Civil Guard Navy, since the training spread quickly over much of Finland - by the late 1920's there were 76 local sea civil guard units (typically each municipality, town etc had its own local civil guard). These included not only local sea civil guards in the coastal areas around the Baltic Sea and Lake Laatokka/Ladoga, but also many which were located in inland lakes. The number of vessels used in the 1920’s was quite small (as were the boats used), but their number was large on a Finnish scale. Participants in the first Sk-Navy maneuvers included: About 200 boats, 14 tugboats, and about 650 men. In the 1920’s, their planned wartime use was supporting the coastal artillery with guard, communications and transport missions. Members of the Sk Navy had also received training in laying and clearing sea mines and were expected to become familiar with signaling, naval guns and torpedoes. The obligatory minimum amount of training for Sk Navy members was 6 days/year.
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Sk-Navy on exercise: Summer 1931

The number of local Civil Guard units providing this type of training increased in the 1930's. The Sea Civil Guard of Helsinki was from the start one of the best equipped units of the Sk-Navy) but in the early years they were short on boats and equipment. On establishment in 1928, they had no boats at all, the first boats acquired were two old open top whaling boats, which were bought by the unit itself in 1930. In 1931 the bough the SP 19 "Merikotka": this was an old sailing boat capable carrying 9 men. In 1932 the Lotta-Svärd organisation donated SP 20: an old motor boat 11-meters long.

As mentioned in an earlier Post, Motor Torpedo Boats and Fast Minelayers were an early component of the Finnish Naval Construction Plan of 1931. Production construction commenced in 1935, with Hietalahden Laivatelakka awarded a contract to build fifty of these boats over a five year period, delivering 10 per year from 1936 through to 1940. In addition, a number of smaller shipyards were awarded contracts to build a further fifty as a Fast Minelayer version over the same period. Later consideration was given to fitting out a third version as an Anti-Submarine Patrol Boat, primarily for service in the Gulf of Finland with the objective of restricting access to the Baltic for Soviet Submarines. A contract for this type was placed in late 1937, and around twenty five had entered service by the time the Winter War broke out. Crew generally consisted of 3 to 4 Officers and 19 Enlisted Ranks.

As an offshoot of the MTB Program the Navy had also decided to build a large number of small Coastal Fast Torpedo Boats on the basis that they wouldn’t cost a lot and if the Soviet Baltic Fleet sortied, they could “swarm” the defences through sheer weight of numbers, with their small size and speed making them difficult to hit. As the threat of war loomed larger in the late 1930’s, more of theses boats were rapidly constructed and by the time the Winter War broke out, some 200 of these Coastal Fast Torpedo Boats were in service, also manned by Sk-Navy personnel. At the same time as the MTB’s were being constructed, a number of underground bases were tunneled into islands scattered around the Gulf of Finland coastline. These underground bases included docks, ramps for pulling the MTB’s and CFTB’s out of the water for routine maintenance and repair and for winter storage, spartan accommodation bays, engineering workshops and fuel and munitions storage. These were intended for wartime use only and were generally only maintained in peacetime by a small number of Naval Reserve (all Suojeluskunta Navy - the Sea Civil Guard) personnel. Locations of these bases were kept a closely guarded secret.

At the same time as the decision was made to purchase these Boats, the Navy decided that both the Boats and the Bases would be manned by Sk-Navy personnel, who while they would remain members of the Sk, would be integrated more closely into the Naval organisation. The decision to assign Suojeluskunta Navy personnel to crew these boats came as a welcome surprise to both the Sk and to the Sk-Navy personnel involved. Competition to get into the units became quite fierce in the late 1930's - and the units had no trouble at all ensuring that they were always fully manned. With approximately 4,500 Sk-Navy personnel manning the Boats, and a further 4,000 odd personnel manning and guarding the Bases, the Sk-Navy grew to a considerable size through the last half of the 1930’s.

The Sk Air Force

The Sk-Air Force was formed in 1935, specifically to augment the Ilmavoimat in the event that War broke out. The SK-Air Force will be covered in detail in the Posts covering the growth of the Air Force in the 1930’s.

The Suojeluskunta and Sports:

The reason why the Sk organization supported sports was quite simple: Fit people make better soldiers and, in general, wide spread sports which maintain fitness have positive effects on a community. Sports played an important part in the Suojeluskunta and the Sk organization also contributed to their development in Finland. Possibly the still most visible effect was introducing "pesäpallo" (basically a Finnish version of baseball, with the main developer of this sport being Sk-Officer Lauri "Tahko" Pihkala) in 1922 and it became so popular and widespread that it is still nowadays a Finnish national sports.
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Sk-Officer Lauri "Tahko" Pihkala

For the Sk organization popularizing pesäpallo had purposes beyond developing physical fitness and team spirit: Short spurts and dashes which ended by throwing a hand grenade sized ball were also useful skills for war. The most important sports for Suojeluskunta were skiing, running, gymnastics, and field & track sports. Of these, skiing slowly became the most important. In fact, the Sk-organization even developed a new kind of cross-country ski (which also become the Finnish military ski), which were handier in forests than traditional Finnish skis and winter-training increasingly emphasized tactical movement into and out of combat on skis, as well as ski-warfare tactics and winter-combat and survival training.
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Suojeluskunta Unit on a Winter Warfare Training Exercise, mid-1930’s

As mentioned earlier, the Suojeluskuntas was also responsible for the introduction of the "KäsiKähmäTaistelu” fighting technique from 1930 on, first into the Suojeluskuntas units in and around Tampere where, despite the reconciliation between the SDP and the Sk, street-fights between the Lahtarit (“the Butchers”) and the Punikit (“the Reddies") continued well into the decade. "KäsiKähmäTaistelu”, or KKT as it was usually referred to, could loosely be classified as a sport, although in reality it was an eclectic, efficient and extremely brutal form of combat incorporating techniques from wrestling, grappling, striking and kicking, with many elements borrowed from the Japanese and Korean Martial Arts Lindberg had studied. In military usage, KKT incorporated physical endurance training, psychological techniques, the practical usage of cold steel weapons (knives, machetes, entrenching tools, bayonets and rifles), knife and stick fighting techniques and aspects of close quarter combat such as sentry removal.

From 1934 on Lindberg was Chief Instructor of Physical Training and Unarmed Combat for the Finnish Army and also for the Suojeluskuntas, a position which he utilized to ensure the rapid expansion of KKT training throughout the Finnish Army, the Suojeluskuntas and into High Schools through the new (from 1934 on) Military Cadet organisation that replaced the Suojeluskuntas Boy Soldiers and the Lotta Svard’s Girl-Lotta organizations. Partially as a result of the rising level of expertise in KKT, the street-brawls between the Lahtarit and the Punikit began to fade away – for one thing, the results were becoming a little lop-sided, but there were other reasons for this as well (largely economic, with rising standards of living all-round). By 1938, most Suojeluskunta units conducted weekly (usually on a weeknight) KKT training sessions.

The Suojeluskunta had started rewarding its best shooters and its fittest members with fitness medals in 1921. The Suojeluskunta fitness medals were issued in three classes and naturally getting the 1st class medal demanded the most fitness. In the late 1930’s, KKT was included, with regular gradings, inter-unit competitions and medals. One could in a way say that the Sk-organization was the most important sports organization in Finland before WW2.

Members of the Suojeluskunta - Who and What Kind of Men They Were and what were there Political Views:

The Suojeluskunta wasn't a political organization on its own, but in the 1920’s at least, its members generally belonged to a specific side of the political spectrum when it came to political views. Generally speaking, the political views of Suojeluskunta members covered the spectrum from the center to the extreme right. The organization was at all times openly anti-communist and while in general it didn't really like moderate left-wingers either, even in the 1920’s it tolerated them better. However, the difference in political views between the average Sk member and the average Finnish citizen was not as large as one might expect, even after the Civil War. In the 1920s and 1930s Finnish political views in general were oriented more towards the right-wing than they are these days. In the 1920’s, there was some active participation by local SK organizations in elections, largely in support of political parties and local politicians who supported the Suojeluskuntas through municipal and government funding.

From 1919 on, expressing party political or anti-government opinions in public had been forbidden for Sk Officers, as had been using the organization for political purposes. The Sk organization wasn't a player in State-wide politics (the elections for Parliament and the President). Instead, starting from the early 1920s, the Sk leadership tried their best to keep the organization non-political, but it did have its own interests in mind in municipal level elections. To secure funding from municipalities and towns, local Suojeluskunta units needed political parties favorable to the Sk organization to have a majority on local municipal / town councils. As a result, local Suojeluskuntas did their best to get all their members and supporters to vote in local elections for parties which supported providing funding for the local Suojeluskunta units. Which party the SK members supported and how they voted didn't really matter as long as they voted for one that supported providing funding. The political parties that supported the Suojeluskuntas in the 1920s basically included all the non-Socialist ones. Post-reconciliation on (from 1930), the SDP also officially supported providing funding for the Suojeluskuntas and this resulted in almost all municipalities and towns providing funding, removing the motivation for the Sk organisation to participate even in local elections.
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The siege mentality of the first decade of Finnish independence was most strongly visible in political campaigns, as this election ad from the 1920’s shows. "The Civil Guards prepare to defend their country without expecting any praise or salary. Help them in their efforts. Vote National Coalition."

In the 1920’s, the Communists and Social Democrats were seen as natural political enemies by the Suojeluskunta. This was partly due to the inheritance of hate from the Civil War, but also partly because of very different political ideals. And the hate relationship with left-wingers wasn't all one sided. Both the Social Democrats and the Communists attacked the Sk organizations at several levels, trying to weaken or destroy them all together. The high level attacks that took place inside the parliamentary political system included demands for the abolishing of the Sk organization and concurrent demands for the stopping or cutting State funding to the Sk organization. At municipal/town levels, those councils with a left -wing majority could end funding to local Sk’s (and did), but they couldn’t do much else. The dirtier method used by the more extreme left-wingers was "työmaaterrori" (workplace terror) which included ridicule, and even physical assaults against their co-workers who were Sk-members and White Army veterans of the Civil War. The Left-wing press was also active against Sk organizations until the 1930 Reconciliation. However, it should also be kept in mind that through the 1920s and increasingly in the 1930s, Finland had several political groups which nowadays would be considered extreme right wing and there was nothing forbidding Sk-members from being members of these – and many were.

Until 1930, the Finnish Social Democratic Party strongly opposed defense spending and many members actually believed that further wars could be won by non-violent methods like general strikes. By contrast, some educational establishments and firms favored Sk members when accepting students and hiring personnel. From 1930 and “The Reconciliation” on, much changed. With the SDP no longer opposing defense spending or local funding for the Sk organisation, the politics around the Sk grew less controversial. The Communists still actively opposed the Sk, and vice-versa but it was between the Communists and the more extreme Right movements that the more overt political conflicts took place, as we will see in the next post.
 
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Placeholder - Suojeluskuntas and Lotta Svard Part II

The Lotta Svärd Yhdistys (Organisation)

Finnish women first began to take part in patriotic activities during the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, a period of attempted Russian domination of Finnish nation-building which came to be known as the "years of oppression.” They founded their own women’s unit to help the Kagal, a Finnish secret society that opposed the oppressive government of Governor General Nikolai Bobrikov. The work of the Women’s Kagal consisted mainly of relaying the Kagal’s secret messages and collecting funds. The women also took part in supporting the Jaegers, the Finnish volunteers secretly sent to Germany during World War I to be trained as elite light infantry in preparation for a war against Russia. After the Jaegers returned to Finland, a large number of them took part in the Finnish wars as high-ranking officers. The Finnish women aided the Jaeger movement by supporting the Jaeger volunteers on their way to Germany. This patriotic activity among the women was widespread, but partly unorganized.

Lotta Svärd was a Finnish voluntary auxiliary paramilitary organisation for women, inarguably the most important voluntary organisation for women in Finnish history and was the worlds largest women’s national defence organisation. As with the Suojeluskunta, is a little difficult to describe correctly as there was no similar organisation in the USA, Britain of other Western European countries (again, as with the Suojeluskunta, similar organisations existed in the Baltic States and Scandanavia, but they were modeled on the Finnish organisation). While the USA had women in the military, as well as volunteer womens groups, and the British had women in the military (the Womans Land Army, the Womens Voluntary Service, the Auxilary Territorial Service, the Womens Auxilary Air Force being British examples) there is no easy direct comparison to the Lotta Svärd, which was very much an all-encompassing women’s organisation which was directly connected to the day to day needs of both the Finnish nation and the Finnish military. Members of the Lotta Svärd had a supreme sense of duty to the service of the Finnish nation and the pride in this overriding duty had always been a factor in the internal doctrine of the organization. The ideals of dedication, service, and pride in one’s nation were all important beliefs to Lotta members.

The origins of the Lotta Svärd lay in the Finnish Civil War and were rooted rooted in a long standing Finnish tradition of unofficial female groups that supported various civil organizations. As Finland prepared for independence, these organizations were a public service, providing food to volunteer fire departments and local governments. As the civil war approached, Finnish women activist organizations became more closely associated with the Suojeluskunta (the Finnish Civil Guard) organization. Under the umbrella of the Suojeluskunta, unofficial women’s organizations developed that provided food, clothing, and organized fund raising activities for the organization and their local community. As the Finnish Civil War erupted, the efforts of the Suojeluskunta were directed to support the Finnish White Army and the main purpose of the womens groups was initially to assist the Suojeluskunta with medical services and logistics. As the Civil War went on, activities for these women branched out to include additional tasks such as creating army equipment, cooking for soldiers in camps, and acting as telephone operators. In some areas, female volunteers were messengers and even acted as guards.

In the Civil War, some women on both sides wanted to take part in active combat. Throughout the areas controlled by the Reds, women’s guard units sprang up, comprising in all about 2000 armed women fighters. On the “white” side there were evidently also some women who desired do more that assist with medical services and logistics. An incipient debate on the matter in the Agrarian Party’s Ilkka newspaper in March 1918 was cut short by a prohibition against “White” female fighting units issued by the White commander-in-chief, General C.G.E. Mannerheim (1867–1951). Mannerheim wrote in an open letter “I expect help from Finland’s women in meeting the many urgent needs of the army, such as caring for the sick and wounded, manufacturing clothing, caring for the home and comforting those who have lost their loved ones. Fighting the war on the front, meanwhile, I hold to be the exclusive right and duty of the male.” Fifteen years later, Mannerheim would adjust this stance, as we will see.
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Finnish Red Guard Women, 1918

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Finnish Red Guard Women - 1918

The Red leaders also tried to prevent women from joining armed units, the main difference between the white and red leadership in this regard was that the Red leadership could not control what happened on the ground in their local communities. For example, in the city of Tampere, the local Social Democratic Women’s Association had nothing to do with the formation of local women’s Red Guards in March-April 1918 and probably even opposed them. According to historian Tuomas Hoppu, the women’s Red Guard in Tampere was not the result of any desire on part of the Red Guards to recruit women as reinforcements. The women’s guards were formed by independently acting women enthused by the revolution and inspired by the examples of women’s guards in revolutionary Russia as well as their own male relatives’ activities as guardsmen. Women were also attracted to the women’s guard by the relatively good pay in what was a time of high unemployment and scarcity.
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Vartija ja vankeja Fellmanin pellolla Lahdessa. Guards and prisoners at Felman field. You can see rows of people who had been arrested and brought to this field in Lahde. 20,000 reds were collected here in April and May of 1918. Most of the women and children were sent home while the men were sent to various prison camps. Here too in Lahde was where many women were executed

That there was a strong cultural taboo against women taking up arms is evident, and it was a taboo that was expressed in executions and the intense vilification of the female red guardsmen as “bitch wolves” by the victorious Whites in 1918. In face of this taboo, it is remarkable how many women of the working classes evidently found the idea of female soldiering perfectly intelligible. On the white side, however, women obediently stayed within the sphere of action assigned to them by the military – although it is also significant that Mannerheim felt he had to order them to do so. The spontaneity and scope of the White women’s auxiliary activities in the combat zones show that the “white” women did not regard the war as only men’s business, in which they had no part or share, but as a joint venture where men and women had different tasks to fulfil but in which women actively participated.
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Verna Erikson, a young student, was a Helsinki White Guard. This image became a popular iconic photo, a sexualizing of female resistance. The photo was originally published on the front cover of the Suomen Kuva Lehti (Finnish Photo Magazine) in June 1918, just shortly after the civil war ended. Although there are photos of white women of the civil war time, they were not the ones collected. Rather, because Mannerheim frowned on women carrying guns, images of mother or grandmother in active resistance were put in the bottom of the drawer. Except for this photo of Verna. It has lived on, although she apparently died of cancer shortly after posing for this photo.

After the end of the Civil War, the Lotta Svärd emerged as a separate organisation. The name comes from a poem by Johan Ludvig Runeberg, part of a large and famous Finnish book written in poetic form, “Vänrikki Stoolin Tarinat” (The Tales of Ensign Stål), the poem described a fictional woman named Lotta Svärd. According to the poem, a Finnish soldier, Private Svärd, went to fight in the Finnish War and took his wife, Lotta, along with him where she sold the soldiers drinks and boosted their morale. Private Svärd was killed in battle, but his wife remained on the battlefield, taking care of wounded soldiers.
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Private Svärd went to fight in the Finnish War and took his wife, Lotta, along with him

The name was first brought up by Marshal Mannerheim in a speech given on May 16, 1918 and in August of 1919, von Essen, the Commander-in-Chief of the Suojeluskunta at the time, used the term “Lotta Svärd” to describe the various womens volunteer organizations in his writings. This term caught on with the different organizations and soon many carried the name Lotta Svärd, with the first known organisation to use the name Lotta Svärd being the Lotta Svärd of Riihimäki, founded on November 11, 1918 (although another source states November 19, 1918).
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Lotta Svärd of Riihimäki

On January 23, 1919 the Lotta-Svärd Chapter Nr. 1 (Lotta Svärd – Osasto N:eek: 1 / Lotta Svärd: Division 1) was founded in Helsinki. This was a Swedish-speaking chapter and its rules served as a model when more chapters were founded in other parts of the country. The name Lotta Svärd started turning up more frequently in the associations’ names, and inquiries about the rules and founding proceedings were sent to the leaders of the Suojeluskuntas. The commander of the Suojeluskunta, Lieutenant Colonel Georg Didrik von Essen, issued an order on August 29 1919 that Lotta-Svärd Chapters should be founded in conjunction with Suojeluskunta Chapters and this also happened over the period 1919-20. By the end of 1919 there were over 200 independent, more or less organized Lotta-Svärd chapters in Finland. However, without common rules cooperation was difficult and caused confusion. As the number of the Lotta Svärd associations and the workload caused by it in the Suojeluskuntas Headquarters quickly grew, it became apparent that some sort of central management had to be established to take care of the things concerning Lotta Svärd. The decision to establish a national Lotta Svärd organization was finally made by the Sk.Y on May 11, 1920. As a consequence the national Lotta-Svärd organisation was founded in May 1920 and, while the date of the Lotta Svärd Association's (Lotta Svärd Yhdistys) establishment is unclear, it was added to the official registry on 9 September 1920. At the founding meeting common rules were presented and approved. The rules had been made by a committee chaired by Helmi Arneberg-Pentti and also approved by the von Essen as Commander-in-Chief of the Suojeluskunta.

Greta Krohn was appointed as the first national head of the Lotta Svärd Yhdistys on Jan 20, 1921. The first members of the board of management were Dagmar von Essen, Ruth Serlacius, Maja Ahlberg, Suoma af Hällström, Siiri Bäckström and Lolan Vasström. Substitutes were Greta Silvenius and Karin Herliz. Mrs Krohn was however relieved of her duties by von Essen early on as apparently she was making too many decisions on her own. On October 10 1921 the new Suojeluskunta Commander-in-Chief Lauri Malmberg appointed Helmi Arneberg-Pentti as the new leader of the Lotta Svärd Yhdistys, she however resigned in 1922 and was replaced by Dagmar von Essen. Dagmar von Essen was followed in 1924 by Tyyne Söderström who held the post until 1929, when Suojeluskunta Commander-in-Chief Malmberg appointed Fanni Luukkonen (a teacher) who would lead the organisation until the end of WW2.
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Lottakenraali Fanny Luukkonen (1882-1947), chairwoman of the organization from 1929 to 1944

In the founding charter, the Mission of the Lotta Svärd Yhdistys was stated as “The Mission of the Lotta Svärd organisation is to awaken and strengthen the Suojeluskunta-idea and advise the Suojeluskunta-organisation to protect creed, home and fatherland. The Lotta Svärd organisation will implement this by:
• Acting to increase the nations will to defend and to uplift the moral condition of the Suojeluskuntas;
• Assisting with the medical functions of the Suojeluskuntas
• Assisting with the provisioning of the Suojeluskuntas
• Assisting with fund-raising for the Suojeluskuntas
• Assisting with office functions for the Suojeluskuntas and gathering funds for financing its own activities and for the use of the Suojeluskunta-organisation.

Apart from assisting the Suojeluskunta, the Lotta Svärd Yhdistys role expanded in the 1920’s to include helping civilians through charity work. As national defence planning became more thoroughly organized and integrated through the 1930’s, the Lotta Svärd Yhdistys took on additional roles and responsibilities, as we will see later in this Post. Suffice it to say at this stage that the Lottas were key in altering the viewpoint of a very male-dominated society as the members of the Lotta Svärd proved that a woman’s role was important to the survival of the Finnish nation. The members of the Lotta Svärd served the Finnish nation as they felt it was their calling, and with pride they took on the duties that needed to be done for Finland to survive. There were many Finnish soldiers who called the members of the Lotta Svärd angels and these angels shone when their nation called on them in the hour of greatest need.

Lotta Svärd unit organisation

Structurally, the Lotta Svärd Yhdistys was organized similarly to the Suojeluskunta, with a Central Board, District Boards, Local Units and Village Sections, largely paralleling the Suojeluskunta organisation. Within this overall structure, the organisation was strictly divided into branches that were defined by the type of work done by the volunteers and in which new Lottas were placed according to their skills and education. This guaranteed an efficient way of working in both war and peace. At first various names were given to the branches but eventually they were called Medical, Catering and Supplies. As the organisation grew and new tasks were received, and as the situation changed during the wars, the division into branches and their tasks was modified to better fit their purposes.

The Lotta Svärd organization was closely connected to the operations of the Suojeluskuntas on all levels. This benefited both parties. The Suojeluskuntas needed the help and support of the Lotta Svärd organization in the areas which were best suited towards women and which most required workers. Similarly, the Lotta Svärd organization was often able to operate only because of the settings provided by the Suojeluskuntas s: office space and a supply of raw materials for the work of the provisioning and equipment divisions.

Before the founding of the national Lotta Svärd organization the standard requirements for new members were minimal. The only requirements in some local divisions were that the applicants be women over the age of eighteen who had “a good reputation”. Later, when the national organization was founded in 1920 and new rules were set, the requirements for new recruits were defined more closely. According to these new requirements all new applicants were accepted as long as they had a good reputation and their loyalty towards the legal social order could be trusted. The requirements did not set an age limit, but applicants under the age of eighteen needed to have permission from their guardians. Another regulation added the requirement that acting members who had committed themselves needed the permission of their husbands to be able to join the acting group. These requirements were later specified further in the rules made in 1921.
According to these rules, the local districts could accept any woman who was loyal to the Finnish Government, and who had the recommendation of two well-known and trustworthy people. In the 1930s the organization started putting new applicants on probation for a period of 3-12 months before they could be accepted as members. During the probation new applicants were educated in the work of the members and the principles of the organization. At the end of the probation period the applicants were given a test; those who passed it were accepted as new members. These requirements were followed until 1943, when the growing need for new recruits forced the management to start accepting new members on lesser grounds.

Lottas chose to take part in the organization’s work out of their own will. Their only motivation was their sense of duty and the fact that they wanted to do their own part in order to help their country survive the trials of war. Their work was both voluntary and largely unpaid; it was not until December 1939 that the Ministry of Defense decided to start supplying the acting Lottas with a small daily allowance.

Membership Categories were initially:
• Acting Lotta: Women were now trained to perform additional tasks beyond nursing and provisions, including air surveillance and signaling. This group was divided into categories according to where they were located.
• Supplies Lotta: Other active members of Lotta Svärd who worked in their assigned sections.
• Supporting members: They paid the membership fee, but didn't actively work in Lotta Svärd Association. They also didn't have the right to vote or be candidates in its elections (unlike other members).
In 1937, these categories were expanded.
• Acting Lotta: They were now divided into sub-categories, depending on whether they served in their home area or outside it.
• Reserve Lotta: They had similar training as Acting Lottas, but they had no orders for serving in any specific place. They functioned as reserves, and could be called upon to reinforce or replace Acting Lottas. They were also divided into sub-categories, which were determined by whether they served in their home area or outside of it.
• Supplies Lotta A: In mobilization, they would be called to serve in a task or profession that they had been trained for.
• Supplies Lotta B: All other Lottas not defined in the categories above.

To become a member of the Lotta Svärd, applicants needed two well-known and trustworthy persons to recommend them. The board of the local unit evaluated the applications and accepted new members. Upon acceptance, members took a pledge to the organization.

The Lotta-pledge -1921
"I [first name surname] pledge with my word of honor, that I will honestly and according to my conscience assist the Suojeluskunta in defending creed, home and fatherland. And I promise that I won't give up working in the Lotta Svärd Association, until one month has passed from me verifiably informing the Local Board of my desire to resign from the Association. "
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Lottas giving their Lotta Promise in a church in Turku

Etiquette and Behavior

Lottas were expected to act in a virtuous way and avoid causing disapproval in any way. During wartime the clothing and etiquette rules were slackened somewhat. In warm weather, Lottas were allowed to open the two top buttons of their shirt and roll up their sleeves (which then could be attached to shoulder buttons). During wartime, critics within the organization claimed that many of the newer members who had joined in the last half of the 1930s lacked the high ideological standards of the earlier members. In a way the critics were correct, the organization received huge number of new members in a short time, and many of the newer members, coming as they did from families with SDP backgrounds, did not share the same beliefs as those members from “White” families.

According to the rules, the purpose of the Lotta Svärd organization was to invoke and strengthen the ideology of the Suojeluskuntas and to aid the Suojeluskuntas in protecting religion, home and country. The organization carried out its purpose by attempting to raise the people’s morale and will for national defense and also by working for national defense in various fields of activity. At the same time the organization aimed to raise Finnish women to be model citizens. A Finnish woman was supposed to be patriotic, self-sacrificing, brave, enduring, responsible and skilled. The organization’s ideology was based on Christianity, morality and patriotism, which was also engraved in the organization’s Golden Words, which were an essential part in the crystallization of the “Lotta spirit”. The Golden Words were as follows:
1. May the fear of God be the greatest strength in your life!
2. Learn to love your country and your people!
3. Value your Lotta ideals. Only when you are righteous, pure and sober can you be a true Lotta!
4. Always demand the most from yourself!
5. Be good!
6. Be loyal even in the smallest things!
7. When you encounter misfortune, remember the greatness of our goal!
8. Respect your Lotta sisters and aid them in their work, thus you can strengthen the feeling of unity!
9. Remember the work of the past generations. Respect your elders, for they have done more than us!
10. Be modest in the way you behave and dress!
11. Submit to self-discipline in order to raise the discipline of the organization!
12. Lotta, remember that you represent a great, patriotic organization. Be wary of doing anything that may hurt it or damage its reputation!

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The Golden Words

The Lotta Svärd disciplinary regulations and the Golden Words obliged every Lotta to remember that they represented the whole organization. The discipline was absolute concerning the use of alcohol and tobacco: the organization forbade Lottas from using alcohol while on duty and while wearing the Lotta uniform, and smoking was not allowed in public. Lottas were also not allowed to use make-up while wearing their uniforms, and the use of jewelry was restricted so that only wristwatches and wedding and engagement rings could be used. Improper behavior could result in disciplinary measures or in the worst case expulsion from the organization. Although the rules were usually strictly followed, some problems did emerge. The tense wartime atmosphere gave rise to all sorts of negative rumors about the behavior of Lottas on the front lines. There were of course some actual cases of rule-breaking, for example drinking or smoking in public, but in most cases the rumors proved to be baseless. Additionally, most of the rule-breakers were young women who had only recently been accepted into the organization during a time of great need for new recruits, and who had not had time to adopt the organization’s ideals. All in all, only 346 Lottas, comprising only 0.38% of the 232,000 members, were ever expelled from the organization for breaking the code of behavior.

The typical punishments that Lotta Svärd used for members that broke the rules were transfer or being sent back home. The most severe punishment was sending the member back home to her own Lotta Svärd local unit, which could issue an official warning, or suggest the member resign. During the Winter War some 130,000 Field Lottas served, and only 346 received suggestions to resign, or were suspended.
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But despite everything, romance flourished. Boys will be boys and Girls will be girls….

The Lotta Svärd Branchs

Lotta Svärd Medical Branch

At first the tasks given to the Medical Branch were basically the same as during the Civil war, i.e. first aid and assisting the Suojeluskuntas. New orders in 1922 however said that every Suojeluskunta chapter, company and division should have a certain number of Medical Lottas to perform duties at the front (treating and transporting wounded and sick soldiers, arranging first aid stations) as well as on the home front with similar and other medical tasks. The greatest undertaking of the Medical Branch was however the establishment, equipping and staffing of fully equipped 250 bed Mobile Field Hospitals, of which there were eight by 1933 and some ninety by 1939, fully staffed by Lotta Svärd-trained Nurses, Medical Assistants plus ancillary personnel (cleaners, cooks, laundry personnel, administrative, etc). All the equipment for these Mobile Field Hospitals was funded by Lotta Svärd fund-raising through the 1930’s and it was a gargantuan national undertaking by the organisation that went on year after year – in fact, it was the organizations largest effort - but the end result was that when the Winter War broke out, almost every Regimental Combat Group in the Suomen Maavoimat was equipped with a Mobile Field Hospital. At the same time it was also the first measure of support which was primarily meant to help the National Defense and not the Suojeluskuntas, which the Lotta Svärd organization had been firmly supporting up to that point.

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Lottas on a Medical Training Course

While the Field Hospitals were created and largely staffed by the Lotta Svärd, they were placed under Maavoimat Command from 1935 on, as the Lotta Svärd Yhdistys became more closely integrated into the overall defence organisation. Lotta Svärd Medical Branch personnel were assigned Maavoimat ranks and, on mobilization, became part of the Maavoimat. Annual Regimental exercises from 1936 on included Lotta Svärd Medical Branch personnel and the Mobile Field Hospitals. On the outbreak of the Winter War, the Lotta Svärd Medical Branch followed their mobilization plans and moved out with their assigned Regiments, staffing Field Hospitals, Hospital Trains and front-line First Aid Posts.
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Front-line Lotta Medic – Winter War – taking a break at a frontline First Aid Post

In the early years of the Lotta Svärd Organization, members were not formally trained very well. The first courses started in the summer of 1922. Nursing training was in high demand, though teachers were scarce. Short medical courses, concentrating on gathering bandage material and medicines, were organized by doctors in the area. Until 1929, medical Lottas were trained at regional training centers on two-week-long basic courses or, if they were unable to attend these courses, they could receive the same training by taking evening classes for a longer period of time. Of course, such a short training was not enough to prepare the Lottas for actual medical care. Although they wanted to operate near the frontlines, the Suojeluskunta gave the impression that they would never be able to do so. However, in a presentation given in 1925 by Professor Hjalmar von Bonsdorff it was proposed that medical Lottas could work in field hospitals as nurses or their assistants if a war broke out. It also proposed that the training periods for medical Lottas should be lengthened to correspond to these tasks.

These guidelines were soon followed when a committee set up by the central board planned and organized six-month-long training periods for nursing assistants. These started in 1928 and proved to be highly effective. Numerous 6-month nursing courses were organized and by 1938 about 65 percent of Lottas belonging to the nursing section had participated in these courses. Even with the preparation that had gone on, there were not enough trained medical personnel and perhaps the single most important task of the Lotta Svärd Medical Branch was to train additional Lottas for duties at hospitals, helping the regular nurses, and also for duties in the hospital trains and front-line First Aid Posts. There was certainly no shortage of new volunteers for these tasks. The Lottas also took medical care of evacuees. Not all Lottas in the Medical Branch were available to serve in these militarized units for various reasons – but many of these personnel could and did carry out voluntary supportive work such as the manufacturing of bandages and other similar equipment. Other duties included by Medical Branch Lotta’s included the washing and mending of the clothes of wounded soldiers - their aim was that when someone left the hospital he would always have clean, neat, whole clothes. Not only humans were looked after by the Lottas, animals also needed caring for. Especially in the countryside animals were left without veterinary care during the War and it was left to the Lottas to look after them. Horses in particular had a hard time and received special care from trained Lottas. The war brought some surprises, as the Medical Branch Lottas also had to perform some unexpected tasks such as writing letters home for soldiers that were not able to do it themselves, and be good listeners when someone wanted to talk to someone about their difficult experiences at the front (these tasks were often performed by the “Small-Lotta’s” (more on this Girl-Lotta organisation later). Lottas also delivered information regarding evacuees to their relatives in the army. Libraries were set up at hospitals, and entertainment arranged. The Medical Branch Lottas also took care of the canteens at hospitals. Some of the Lottas in the Medical division were called Blood Lottas, because they were responsible for transporting donated blood. Perhaps the toughest job was performed by the Lottas at the KEK centres were dead soldiers were washed, dressed and put in coffins before being sent home to their relatives.

Lotta Svärd Catering Branch

The Catering Branch was the biggest in the Lotta-Svärd Yhdistys (organisation), and it took care of food supply during Suojeluskunta manoeuvres, parades and during other public events – one that deserves mentioning is the 1938 celebration of the 20 year Anniversary of the end of the Civil War - some 900 Lottas and 120 field kitchens were involved in the festivities. The Catering Branch also assisted during large Army and Suojeluskunta manoeuvres. Over the years the activities of the Catering Branch became quite diverse, partly thanks to the book “Muonuttajien Ohjeet” published in 1926 and later additions to it. The “bible” for the Catering Branch was the Catering Lottas’ Handbook (Lotta-Svärd publication Nr 10) written by Elli Malmgren. Lotta-cafés were organized by the Catering Branch and held all over the country, with the income from the cafés being used to buy more equipment.

As we will see in a later Post looking at the construction of the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus through the last half of the 1930’s, the Lotta-Svärd Catering Branch was responsible for the food supply to the volunteers working in Karelia building fortifications. From 1935 on, Catering Branch Units from all over Finland travelled to the Karelian Isthmus on a regular basis every summer to support the construction volunteers, with thousands of Lottas taking part. On the outbreak of the Winter War, Lotta-Svärd Catering Branch personnel staffed Field Kitchens for almost every unit in the Maavoimat down to the Company level and as with Medical Branch personnel, were integrated into the Maavoimat, assigned Maavoimat ranks and operated as part of the military units they were attached to. Many Lotta Catering Branch personnel operated Company Field Kitchens close to the front lines and, like all Lotta personnel operating as part of combat units, were armed with individual firearms. Many were involved in combat at the height of the Winter War, a not inconsiderable number died in action.
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President Svinhufvud inspecting a Lotta Field Kitchen

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Lotta Field Kitchen in operation

One Lotta Catering Branch Field Kitchen Unit attached to an Infantry Battalion was even awarded the Mannerheim Cross (tragically, this was posthumous. Attacking Russian units in overwhelming strength had broken through the Finnish defence line in a surprise flanking move and were penetrating the Finnish rear area. The girls of the Field Kitchen Unit were all that stood between the attacking Russian regiment and a key crossroads. Caught by surprise, rather than running, the unit of young Lottas immediately counter-attacked, catching the Russians by surprise and decimating the initial attackers with well-aimed fire from their Suomi SMG’s before going to ground and holding the Russians off until a scratch Finnish unit of REMF’s from the Battalion HQ arrived to contain the breakthrough. Unfortunately, the three Lotta’s of the unit that survived the initial attack later died from their wounds. The attacking Russian unit was wiped out to a man. “The Last Stand of Field Kitchen Unit #1239” will be covered in a much later Post when we get to the actual fighting).

At the start of the Winter War the Lotta Catering Branch baked 200,000 kg of bread every day for the troops, this enormous task was organized through special Baking Units and local chapters worked shifts to maintain the supply. Commercial Bakeries, School and large farm kitchens were all used. Food was also organized for evacuees and other civilians affected by the war, and for Field and Army hospitals and hospital trains. It was a mammoth undertaking, and with the Lottas carrying out this work, large numbers of men were thereby available for front-line combat.

Lotta Svärd Supplies Branch.

The roots of this branch can also be found in the 1918 Civil War. When the priest in Siikajoki, O.A. Salminen and his wife Maija learned about the outbreak of the Civil War, they organized knitting meetings for the women, and the response was good. Wool was collected and converted to mittens, socks and other winter clothing to be sent to the front. In the first years of the Lotta-Svärd organisation, the activities were similar; knitting, sewing and mending, mainly equipment and clothing for the Suojeluskunta and for the Lottas themselves. New gear was also acquired and some stored for (war)time use. All uniforms, armbands and patches were made by the Lottas. Naturally they also took part in bookkeeping and other tasks related to Suojeluskunta equipment. In the 1920’s, members who belonged to the Supplies Branch received on-the-job training. In the 1930’s, training became more formalized as the Supplies Branch took on more and more responsibilities and became organized in a more military fashion. Training pamphlets were written, formal Courses were held and annual exercises were held in conjunction with the Suojeluskunta. The equipment section arranged courses on gathering materials and on creating supplies, uniforms and equipment such as webbing, magazine pouches and camoflauge suits, in some cases professional tailors or military tailors taught these courses.
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Lotta Svärd Supplies Branch units at work

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Snowsuits being sewed at a Repair Workshop

As part of the military restructuring of the 1930’s, the Lotta Svärd Supplies Branch took over all responsibility for the making of Uniforms and clothing for both the Suojeluskunta and the Army. Starting in the early 1930’s, they began making snow camouflage suits for the army and many more were made during the war. Being outside the strictly military chain of command prior to the Winter War, the Lotta’s were also more open to unconventional ideas and approaches and were also more interested in their menfolk’s comfort and well-being. This resulted in some unusual innovations, such as the mottled brown and green summer camouflage uniforms that were introduced in the late 1930’s and which proved highly effective in the months of summer combat in 1940. The the Lotta Svärd Supplies Branch was also responsible for the design and manufacture of the boots worn by Finnish soldiers – and the new 1937 issue boots proved far more comfortable and durable than the previous Army-issue boots. The Lotta Svärd Supplies Branch was also responsible for all military laundries, with Mobile Field Laundry Units established and railroad cars converted into mobile laundry facilities that could be moved closer to the front.
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Laundry was mainly washed by hand.

The Suomen Maavoimat also used large numbers of horses for logistics and large numbers of personnel were needed for horse handling and care. As the Maavoimat was reorganized, wherever possible Lotta Svärd Supplies Branch were assigned to positions necessary for horse handling and care, again freeing up many thousands of men for combat roles. Likewise, in 1937, the bulk of rear-area Quartermaster positions were reassigned to Lotta Svärd Supplies Branch. And as more trucks became available through the 1930’s in the event of a Mobilization, plans called for Lotta Svärd Supplies Branch to supply the Drivers for these (as well as drivers for all remaining public transport – primarily trams and buses). In the 1920’s, this Branch consisted mainly of elder Lottas, who carried out their Lotta duties by doing handiwork; and it also had the smallest number of members. However, as the Branch took on added responsibilities, it acquired more and younger members.
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Lotta with Horse (the Finnish Army relied on thousands of horses for transport, these tied up a great number of personnel, by 1939 most of whom were Lottas)

Lotta Svärd Fundraising Branch

This branch collected funds and supplies for supporting the Lotta-Svärd and Suojeluskunta organisations. This was done through lotteries, soirees, different festivities and by selling magazines and badges. “Office” was added to the Branch’s name in 1925 in connection with updating of the organisation’s rules. The first courses on activities such as chemical warfare protection and mobilisation manoeuvres were organised in 1927. In 1932, the Branch was split into two, with the Lotta Svärd Fundraising Branch continuing to be responsible for all fund-raising, materials and social activities, the Office and Administration Branch taking responsibility for all administration-type activities and in 1937 the newly formed Lotta Svärd Guards Branch taking responsibility for more directly military-related activities.

Lotta Svärd Office and Administration Branch

From 1932 on, the Lotta Svärd Office and Administration Branch took responsibility for all administration-type activities. This Branch took care of Field Post Offices within the military, Communications (which included both telephone switch board operators, telegraph operators and radio operators), administration and office/typist jobs in the Suojeluskunta, Maavoimat, Ilmavoimat and Merivoimat as well as their own offices (freeing “manpower” for the front).
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Lotta Radio Operator

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Lottas Censoring Soldiers Mail

Office and Administration Branch personnel also worked as translators, Metrological Lottas carried out weather observations and prepared weather reports, there was also a separate unit within the Branch that took over responsibility for Mobilization Management from 1935 on. This was a crucial task, and one that we will examine in detail when we look at Mobilization Planning and preparation shortly.
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Meterological Lottas at work

Lotta Svärd Guards Branch

Established in 1937, this was perhaps the most “combatant” of the Lotta Svärd Branches and was largely formed as a result of increasing pressure from young women who had completed their Military Cadet Training (more on this later) while at School, and who wanted to take a more “active” role in Finland’s defence than the traditional roles of the Lotta Svärd permitted. This pressure combined with the needs of the military for more manpower in front-line units and led directly to the formation of the Lotta Svärd Guards Branch. Units were created and personnel were assigned for Searchlight Batteries, Rear-area Anti-Aircraft Gun Batteries, Chemical Warfare Protection, Intelligence, conducted Air Surveillance, worked as Air Raid Wardens and Civil Defence personnel and conducted Sea Surveillance. Air surveillance courses and mobilization exercises started in 1932. Further courses were added in the late 1930s which included anti-chemical weapons training in 1936 and signal training in 1937.

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Lottas practicing sound ranging

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Lotta Searchlight Unit in action

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Lotta Searchlight Unit posing for Foreign Photographers

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Lotta Searchlight Units before the Winter War

Lotta Sea Surveillance groups were formed in coastal areas, where they worked closely with the Suojeluskunta and with the Coastal Artillery, Coastal Jaegers and the Merivoimat (Navy). Sea Surveillance Lotta’s were trained in observation techniques, radio operating and artillery fire control. In the Winter War, it was the Air Surveillance Lottas who became the most well-known abroad. They were photogenic and easily spotted by foreign reporters, who were largely Helsinki based (with their movements outside Helsinki strictly limited and closely monitored due to well-founded fears of reporters also being Soviet spies). Beginning in early 1939, the Maavoimat also began to assign Lotta Svärd Guards Branch personnel, along with Boy and Girl Military Cadets of the 15-16 year old Class to the TJ-R150-24 (Taisteluajoneuvo 24x150mm Raketti) Rocket Launcher Battalions that were rapidly being formed. These units were leavened by a sprinkling of above-age soldiers, together with above-age NCO’s and Officers to provide command experience. All Lotta Svärd Guards Branch personnel were trained in the use of weapons and were armed for personal defence.

From 1936 on, the Ilmavoimat had there own Lotta Svärd Branch, which we will look at in detail along with the Ilmavoimat in the 1930’s. Suffice it to say at this stage that Ilmavoimat Lotta’s took on many roles within the Ilmavoimat.
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Lotta Svärd Ilmavoimat Auxilary – Lotta Pilot ferrying newly-acquired aircraft from Britain to Finland

The history of the Small Lottas

Activities for girls were discussed was as early as in 1921 in a local meeting in the Mikkeli Lotta Svärd unit. Katri Langenkoski and Betty Tiusanen suggested that separate groups for 10-15 year old girls should be founded within the Lotta-Svärd organisation but received no response. When Langenkoski became a member of the central board in 1929, she again began working to promote this idea. The plan was presented by chairwoman Fanni Luukkonen at the annual meeting in 1931 where she suggested that the idea of Girl Lottas should be tested, a proposal which wone the board’s approval.

It is almost certain that the existence of the Soldier-Boy groups within the Suojeluskunta had inspired the Lottas. That same year the first rules for the Girl Lottas were approved, and leaders for the Girl Lotta work were also selected by the central board. Fanny Munck, head of the Supplies Branch, was given the task of designing a badge for the Small Lottas. Their uniform was basically the same as the normal Lotta dress. As an alternative to the normal cap, a blue beret with the local chapter’s insignia was agreed on. In 1933 an armband was approved as part of the uniform. Applicants were to be approved by the local chapter, girls between the age of eight and 16 and with their parents’ approval could apply. When the girls turned 17, they could (with the approval of the local Small Lotta leader) apply to be a “real” Lotta. The term “Small Lottas” was used up to 1943 when it was officially changed to “Girl Lottas”.
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Small-Lottas - 1930

Activities

The activities of the Small Lottas were to learn to love their home, their parents, their faith, their fatherland and to respect their elders. To facilitate activities, the girls were divided into two separate age groups; 8-13 and 14-16 years old. On the schedule was singing, gymnastics, games, sports and useful skills such as sewing, cooking and first aid. In the Small Lotta Guide Book of 1938, it was emphasized that the younger girls should not take part in the older girls’ activities and that too much stress should not be put on anyone. Courses for Girl Lotta leaders were held at Tuusula with approximately 50 participants on every course. Trips and camps where the girls could meet friends of the same age from other parts of the country were very popular. Programmes at the camps consisted of both playing and games as well as activities such as orienteering. Competitions against the Boy-Soldiers were also arranged.
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Small-Lottas at Summer Camp

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Small-Lottas on a navigation exercise

With the formation of the school-based Military Cadet organisation in 1932 (something we will cover later in this Post), the Small-Lotta organisation expanded to include the Girl-Cadets. As part of this move, in increasing emphasis was put on military-style training for the older girls. This included Military Drill, Physical Fitness, Rifle, Pistol and Machinegun shooting, Marksmanship, Small Unit Tactical Drills, a large dose of Outdoor Activity and Orienteering (both summer and winter) and, from about 1933-34 on, training in the new hand-to-hand combat technique of KäsiKähmä Taistelu" (or KKT as it was more widely referred to).

At the time, the decision to teach both Boy and Girl Cadets the same skills was somewhat controversial – the more conservatively minded wished to perpetuate the Lotta Svärd role in providing support to the military. This however conflicted with the ever-increasing demands on manpower of the Armed Forces as they expanded their capabilities through the 1930’s. Nationalism and the needs of the military conflicted with more traditional concepts of female roles, and it was the needs of the military that won out, as we will see. The roles that women filled in the “mobilized” military continually expanded, and while they received more or less the same basic military training as men but at a less physically demanding level, women were never permitted to participate in front-line combat units. However, Girl-Cadet Training was the first step in preparing women for a greater role in the military and it was greeted with remarkable enthusiasm by many of the female students (but, it must be admitted, not by all….).

Cadet Training itself generally consisted of a half day per week, but for Secondary School Students, every second Saturday was generally also a Cadet Training Day, and from about 1935 on, Summer Camp Training for both Boy and Girl Cadets under the auspices of the military and the Suojeluskunta/ Lotta-Svärd organisations became more and more common. As we will see in a later post looking at the construction of defensive positons on the Karelian Isthmus, extended Summer Camps were also introduced from 1935 whereby Boy and Girl Cadet Volunteers who chose to could spend a major part of their summer holidays working on the preparation of the Karelian Isthmus Defences and receiving further military training at the same time.

Small-Lottas during the Winter War

The role of the Amall-Lottas’ during the Winter War was generally to work as reliable and eager helpers. The older (14-16) girls were very useful in assisting their older “sisters” in the following areas:

Medical Branch: In the hospitals, the Small-Lottas worked in canteens, kitchens, laundries, worked as waitresses, helped feed wounded soldiers who were unable to feed themselves, acted as messengers, worked on switch boards, sat and talked to wounded soldiers, wrote letters for them, helped with sewing and ironing and manufactured bandages.

Catering Branch: The girls worked in canteens, cafeterias and military shops as well as working as dishwashers, cleaners and waiters, and assisted in baking and distributing bread and other food supplies for the army.
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Small-Lottas assisting the Catering Branch – washing dishes

Supplies Branch: During the wars the girls manufactured a considerable amount of clothing and gear for the soldiers. E.g. gloves, socks, knee pads, helmet covers, ammo belts…The small Lottas also helped in mending and repairing clothes and gear.
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Small-Lotta’s sewing for the Soldiers

Fundraising Branch: The Small-Lottas helped in fund raising, collected radio license fees, food, books bottles, scrap metal, wool and rags for use at the home- and real front. They arranged entertainment and soirees for evacuees and children.

Office Branch: The Small-Lottas helped in offices, switch boards and post offices. During the evacuation of civilians from front-line areas, the Small-Lotta’s filled a key role in the evacuation management, organizing billets for evacuees, escorting evacuees to their billets and acting as guides and liasions for evacuees. They also took a leading role in making flower arrangements for funerals and helped with the caring of grave yards. The older girl lottas also looked after the younger children.
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Small-Lottas operating a Telephone Switchboard

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Lotta Funeral

Guards Branch: Older girl lottas (15-16 years class) participated in air and sea surveillance, crewed Searchlight Batteries and rear-area Anti-Aircraft Gun Batteries together with their older sisters and formed a major percentage of the personnel in the TJ-R150-24 (Taisteluajoneuvo 24x150mm Raketti) Rocket Launcher Battalions that were being established as an emergency measure from early 1939 on (a period when personnel shortages were acute as the Finnish military prepared against the ever-increasing threat of war from the Soviet Union).

Growth in Lotta Svärd Membership

In 1930, the Lotta Svärd organisation had 63,794 members. As with the Suojeluskunta, the reconciliation between the Social Democrats and the Sk-organisation in the early 1930’s also had its effect on the Lotta Svärd. Unlike the Sk-organisation where growth was almost non-existent in the period immediately after the reconciliation, the effects showed almost immediately with a substantial increase in the number of Lotta Svärd members as large numbers of women from Social Democratic families started to join. The growth in numbers of Lotta Svärd members from 1930 – 1939 was as follows:
1930: 63,794
1932: 74,842
1934: 86,022
1935: 122,344
1936: 165,623
1938: 172,755
1939: 242.045

By 1939, with 242,000 volunteers, the Lotta Svärd was the largest womens voluntary defense organisation in the world, while the total population of Finland was less than four million. And by 1939 there were in addition 79,000 members in Lotta Svard girl-units (the Small-Lottas) and 42,000 suppporting members. Lotta units and personnel were allocated a variety of roles and responsibilities when the country was moved to a war footing. The real importance of the Lotta Svärd organisation during wartime was in the ability for its active members to free equal numbers of men from work, the homefront or in rear-area military support positions, making them available for front-line military use. Approximately 100,000 Lottas and some 30,000 older girl-Lottas were assigned to take over jobs from men, who were thereby freed up for military service. The numbers of men that were made available to the Finnish Field Army this way was comparable several additional divisions. In addition, those Lottas and older Small-Lottas in the Guards Branch effectively filled a large number of rear-area combatant positions that would otherwise have needed men, freeing up even more men for front-line service.

As funding for the military increased along with economic growth through the 1930’s, and the size of the mobilized Armed Forces grew, manpower shortages were more and more evident. To cope with this, an ever-increasing role was allocated to women. Initially, the Lotta Svärd organisation was asked to perform some supporting work within Military Hospitals, Catering, Supplies and Administration. In 1934, with the Armed Forces Reorganisation legislation, a far wider range of rear area positions within the Army, Air Force and Navy were opened up to Lottas aged 18 and over. And once the door was opened, it proved impossible to close. Women became more and more indispensable to fill gaps in the military’s strength. And where there were personnel-availability gaps, it became more and more expedient to fill these with Lottas.

By the late 1930’s, Lottas were filling many rear-area combatant positions – and the formation in 1937 of that most “combatant” of the Lotta Svärd Branches, the Lotta Svärd Guards Branch, merely formalized what was already more a less a fait accompli. In 1937, this was legislatively systemized, with the military mobilization system being extended to include the Lottas, with approximately 130,000 Lotta and Small-Lotta members (almost half the Lottas overall strength) allocated to roles within the military where they manned supply and base depots, drove vehicles, filled rear area maintenance, office, signals and intelligence positions, served as ground crew in the airforce and filled base positions in the Navy, Air Force and Army. In addition, Lottas, Small-Lottas, Boy-Soldiers and overage Home Guard members manned rear-area anti-aircraft and searchlight batteries as well as air-raid warning posts. The partial (and it was an emergency measure) manning of the TJ-R150-24 (Taisteluajoneuvo 24x150mm Raketti) Rocket Launcher Battalions with Lottas was probably the peak of the militarisation of the Lottas. All Lotta personnel assigned to active service positions within the military were assigned weapons, as were many assigned to Home Front units, and by 1939 almost all younger Lottas had completed a short period (3 months) of military basic training.
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Lotta Air Surveillance Post

But the most significant contribution made by the Lottas was the filling of a large number of medical positions within the Defence Forces. This was a war-time role that had been anticipated, planned and actively trained for. The Medical Branch of the Lotta Svärd trained large number of Assistant Nurses and Medical Assistants. Training of assistant nurses was started in the 1920's with two-week long courses. In 1929 the training program was made more effective and practical by lengthening the course to three weeks and adding a six month long practical training period in military hospitals. From 1932 on, these “3 weeks + 6 months” courses were ongoing in Viipuri, Tampere, Turku and Helsinki. The medical branch of Lotta Svärd also gathered medical equipment: By the autumn of 1939 they had equipment for 90 well equipped 250-bed Field Hospitals with 22,500 beds ready for use, as well as having gathered equipment for numerous Battalion First Aid Posts and Casualty Clearing Stations. During the Winter War, approximately 60,000 Lotta Svard Nurses, Assistant Nurses, Medics and Medical Branch personnel worked in Army Field Hospitals, Military Hospitals and Hospital Trains, making up most of the rear-area medical strength.
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Lottas undergoing Medical Training

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Lotta Medic on the front-line treating a casualty - Spring 1940

The Lotta Svard organisation was also assigned responsibilty for handling food supplies for evacuated civilians and homefront troops, looking after families of reservists serving at the front and caring for evacuated civilians. Evacuation Management Sub-units were created from the mid-1930’s on for these purposes, with plans drawn up and training exercises carried out.

Lotta-Svärd Equipment

The Lotta Uniform

The first Lotta Svärd clothing regulations were issued in 1921 and comprised of a grey jacket, belt and skirt made from the same coarse fabric that the Suojeluskunta (the Finnish Civil Guard) used for their uniforms. This clothing, too warm and constrictive, was replaced two years later. In 1922 the Lotta dress code was approved nation-wide at the annual meeting. The dress was grey wool or cotton cloth, with loose white cotton collar and cuffs. The dress could not be shorter than 25cm from the ground (this was changed to 30 cm during the war). Together with the dress, the Lotta-Svärd badge was worn on the collar. The badge was normally silver but later versions were only silvered. Winter trench coats retained the coarse cloth from the old uniforms, but the summer version was similar to a raincoat. Many items, such as the summer field caps were similar to those used by Suojeluskunta. Sports clothing (such as ski clothing) was not as formal and often included trousers instead of a skirt.

On the left arm, a cloth badge and band showed which branch the Lotta belonged to. On festive occasions, a band showing the district was also worn on the left arm. The Lotta cap was the same model as the Suojeluskunta cap and was made of a similar cloth to the dress. A cockade in the cap showed the colours of the Suojeluskunta District that the Lotta belonged to but later on the blue and white Army cockade was used. A white cotton apron was often used, especially by Catering and Medical Lottas. Other badges worn (on the left breast pocket) were the course star, badges received for 10 or 20 years in service, and different sport badges. Awards and medals were allowed to be worn on special occasions, and Medical Lottas with nurse training were allowed to wear the nurse’s badge of their organisation.

The rules for wearing Lotta clothing were quite strict:
• The only medals and insignias allowed with it were badges of honor plus of course the merit- and fitness-badges of the Lotta Svärd.
• No makeup was allowed and hair had to be kept inside the hat.
• Wedding rings and a watch were the only jewelry allowed.
• Drinking alcohol, smoking and immoral behavior were strictly forbidden while wearing Lotta clothing.
• Going to the frontline without permission was forbidden during combat.

Probably the most important, and at times controversial, insignia for the organization was Lotta-pin designed by Eric Vasstrom and introduced in 1922. The main motif of the pin was blue "hakaristi" (Finnish variation of swastika) and with a heraldic rose in every corner. The probability of confusion increased greatly after national-socialists got into power in Germany. The grey uniform-like clothing with a pin that had a swastika-like symbol caused foreigners to sometimes mistakenly think Lottas were connected with the German nazi-party.
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The blue Lotta "hakaristi" with a heraldic rose in every corner

Officially Lottas were also supposed to salute soldiers and each other with their own salute, in which the right hand was placed over the breast so its fingers extended all the way to point of left armpit. However, this salute was rarely used.

Lotta Dish Sets

Right from the start, the Lottas played an important role in catering at big public occasions and for parties, so large-scale porcelain services were needed. These were manufactured by Arabia between 1920 and 1944. Early services differ from later ones by being standard restaurant versions with the Lotta-Svärd logo added; these early versions are quite scarce today. At first, services were quite small but as the organisation grew in the 1930’s more and more types were added. (OTL, as the organisation was disbanded after WW2, the porcelain often came to a poor end. Services were donated to other organisations or split between members. Some were hidden in attics and other places to wait for better times. In the worst cases, everything was destroyed as happened in most of the bigger cities. Hence porcelain from smaller districts is more commonly found than those marked as being from city units. A lot of enamelled dishes, pans and pots were also manufactured and used, as they were cheap and sturdy in field use. These were also marked with the Lotta logo. Very few have survived since they were simply worn out and thrown away).
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Lotta Cup and Saucer

Lotta-Publications

The Lotta-Svärd organisation published a lot of printed material, most between the years 1930 and 1944. Three main groups of material are the Lotta Organisation’s magazines, public magazines and other material such as a Helsinki City Map.

Christmas Lotta

The earliest publication was the Jul-Lotta Christmas magazine from 1922, this was in Swedish and made by Lolan Vasström of the Western Uusimaa district to raise funds. The following Christmas both Finnish and Swedish versions were published and all the funds earned were directed to the Lotta-Svärd central board to be used as they saw fit. The sales exceeded all expectations and the profit was over 72,000 finn marks. In 1922 Lolan Vasström transferred all publishing rights to the central board, the Magazine continued to be an excellent money maker and the profit was shared between the districts and local chapters. In 1930 and 1931 a childrens Christmas magazine named Lotan Joululahja was published but never gained much popularity.
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1934 Lotta Christmas Magazine

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1943 Lotta Christmas Magazine

Lotta-Svärd magazine

The publishing of its own magazine was raised at the 1923 annual meeting but it did not happen until 1928 when Hilja Riipinen brought it up in a speech at the Vaasa Lotta. At this stage it was felt to be very important and the board was convinced, that same year the first issue was published. Hilja Riipinen was the editor of the magazine until 1936 when she was suceeded by Fanni Luukkonen. The magazine contained general information and stories written by the editors as well as pieces sent in by Lottas. From 1942 there was also a version in Swedish, and it was not just a translation but contained unique material in addition to material sourced from the Finnish version. The Swedish version is easily recognized by the yellow front page. Both versions of the magazine were published until the Lotta-Svärd organisation was disbanded.

Other publications

Not much written material was produced in the 1920’s, apart from the Christmas-Lotta Magazine – what was produced were mainly instructions and handbooks e.g for catering and medical Lottas. The handbook for catering was written by Elli Malmgren while the medical handbook was the result of teamwork. The most important Lotta book of the 1920’s was “The White Book” which contained stories of women’s roles in the Civil War. This was targeted at the general public and was the idea of Hilja Riipinen. The Suojeluskunta Song Book was another wide-spread publication.
In the 1930’s considerably more material was published. “The Golden Words of Lotta-Svärd” were the rules that every Lotta should obey, this was written by Luukkonen and Riipinen and given their graphical form by the artist Furuhjelm.The idea came from the “Commandments of the Fatherland” as published in the Porvoo community. Later the same kind of rules were written for the Small or Girl Lottas. More song booklets were published, pictorials showing the work of the Lotta organisation and later on a book on the subject of the Lottas in the WinterWwar. This book was also translated to Swedish and Hungarian (in 1942). A numbered print was also available. The next large work was a collection of frontline soldiers’ letters home. The book was titled “Unknown Finnish Soldier” and teacher Elsa Kaarlila had over 4000 letters to choose from. The profits from the book went to the care of war invalids and others suffering from the war.

In 1942 a book on Field Marshal Mannerheim was published, titled “Lottas and the History of our Fatherland 1: Mannerheim and my Fatherland” The book was later used for educational purposes. Another similar book was written for the Small Lottas - both books were written by Katri Laine. Other books aimed at the general public were “The Promise of the Young” “Women and the Mothers of Heroes” “The Direction and the Road”. Instruction books were published for the Office, Communications, Meteorological and Air Surveillance Lottas. Several song books were published in the 1940’s. In 1941 the magazine “The Field Lotta” first appeared, in that year with three issues and the following years eight issues. The magazine was intended for Lottas stationed away from home and contained greetings, messages and general organisational info and was distributed by the Lotta districts and border offices.

Small Lotta publications

As with the “real” Lottas, the Small Lottas also had their own magazine, this was first called Pikkulotta and later renamed Lottatyttö in 1943. First published in 1938, the aim was to produce a high quality, appealing but easily understandable magazine for the young. Puzzles, competitions and different stories were part of the content, together with poems and pictorials. A very popular reoccurring story was the one of the little girl Aune Orvokki, whose life the readers got to follow. Aune was the youngest daughter of a family in Kainuu whose father had recently died. Aune’s mother kept the readers informed of Aune’s life in letters, and the PikkuLottas sent Aune letters back with their greetings. Other publications were song books and handbooks, books on handicrafts and hobbies. In 1943 and 1944 a magazine for Girl-Lotta Leaders was published in both Finnish and Swedish.
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Pikkulotta (Small-Lotta) Magazine

OTL Note: The Abolition of Lotta Svärd and the Years That Followed

OTL, the Continuation War ended on September 19th, 1944, when Finland signed an interim peace treaty with the Soviet Union. The 21st article of the treaty required Finland to abolish all “Hitler-minded (fascistic) political, military and military-oriented organizations as well as other organizations which practiced propaganda against the United Nations and especially the Soviet Union.” Although the Finnish government and the leaders of the defensive forces felt that the Civil Guards could not be considered to be a “Hitler-minded” organization, the treaty’s reference to military organizations gave reason to assume that the article’s main purpose was the abolition of the Civil Guards. As the Lotta Svärd organization was closely connected with the Civil Guards in its operations, the Lottas could also feel the same foreboding. At that point, the main concern of the organization’s management was the future of its members who had suffered because of the war. In addition, the management worried about the families of the war invalids and the war orphans whom the organization was committed to aid. In order to make sure that this welfare work would continue, even if the organization was abolished, the management set up Suomen Naisten Huoltosäätiö [the Foundation of Finnish Women] to which it donated a large part of the organization’s properties and funds (Lukkarinen 303). This foundation still exists to this day, though its name was changed in 2004 to Lotta Svärd Säätiö [the Lotta Svärd Foundation].
Under the terms of the interim peace treaty, the Civil Guards organization was abolished on November 7, 1944. Soon afterwards, on November 23 of the same year, the Lotta Svärd organization was also abolished. At the time of the abolition, the Lotta Svärd organization consisted of 232,000 members, of whom 150,000 were active members, 30,000 were supporting members and 52,000 were Little Lottas. Approximately 300 Lottas had been killed in the line of duty during the years the organization had operated.

The establishment of the peace treaty drastically changed the atmosphere in Finland. Thousands of organizations were abolished in accordance with the 21st article of the treaty, and the ideals the members had lived by were labeled as “criminal” by many politicians who wanted to avoid further conflict with the Soviet Union. Many former members of these abolished organizations had to either deny or keep quiet about their pasts for many decades. As a result of this, the Lotta Svärd organization was hardly even discussed for almost 50 years. Although the 1980s saw a national restoration which returned its honor to Lotta Svärd, the restoration could not fully erase the negative images that the peace treaty and its interpretations had left behind. This situation finally improved in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union, which changed the operating environment of Finland’s foreign policy, and thus also influenced the Finns’ interpretation of their own recent history. On September 13, 1991, a committee led by the Minister for Defense organized an event in celebration of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Lotta Svärd organization. The purpose of this event was to give Lottas official recognition from the State for their work during the war years for the first time since 1944. The Finns’ attitude towards the Lotta Svärd organization had been getting steadily more respectful since the 1980s, but it was this event which encouraged former Lottas to start talking in public about their experiences as members of the organization. Since then, many associations which aim to uphold the memory and spiritual heritage of the Lotta Svärd organization have been set up all over Finland. Additionally, in recent years researchers have become more interested in the Lotta Svärd organization, and this has led to many research papers and memoirs being written. After almost 50 years of silence, the Lotta Svärd organization is finally gaining the attention it deserves.

While a large part of the above Post on the Lotta Svärd organization has history that has been “tweaked”, much it contains is historically accurate. The Lotta Svärd organization played an important role in supporting Finland’s national defense both materially and spiritually during the war years. Besides supporting the troops, the Lottas helped free soldiers for the front lines or other national defense duties by taking on tasks that would otherwise have belonged to men. One of the organization’s most important achievements during the war years was creating and upholding the nation’s will for national defense. The sheer number of members in the organization made it possible for the organization to influence both homes and the whole society by simply setting an example. Thus, it is greatly thanks to Lotta Svärd that Finland’s home front managed to mentally endure the war years so well. Although Finland had suffered greatly in the Winter War and the Continuation War, the results of the war could have been much more devastating for Finland without Lotta Svärd’s help. One can only speculate whether the Finland today would still exist as it is now if Lotta Svärd had never existed. They are an organisation whose members deserve to be remembered with respect and honour.
 
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The Suomen Ilmavoimat (Finnish Air Force): a Brief History through the 1920’s

The Suomen Ilmavoimat (Finnish Air Force): a Brief History through the 1920’s

I - The Birth of the Ilmavoimat

Finland was part of the Russian empire from 1809 until the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the first steps in Finnish aviation were taken with Russian aircraft. The first Finnish pilots were trained in Russia in the Imperial Army and the Russian military had a number of aircraft stationed in the country during WW1 as part of the Air Arm of the Imperial Russian Baltic Fleet, with Military Air Stations in Ahvenanmaa, Turku and Helsinki. Aircraft flown were Farman HF.XVI Maritime recon a/c -1915, Farman MF.11 Maritime recon a/c -1916, Schetinin M-9 Maritime a/c -1917, Schetinin M-16 Maritime recon a/c -1917 and Schetinin M-5 Trainer a/c -1917.

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Farman HF.XVI Maritime recon a/c -1915

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Farman MF.11 Maritime recon a/c -1916


The Maurice Farman MF.11 Shorthorn was a French reconnaissance and light bomber biplane developed during World War I by the Farman Aviation Works. It was essentially a Farman MF.7 with a more powerful engine, and a more robust and aerodynamic fuselage, which was raised above the lower wing on struts. The aircraft was also fitted with a machine gun for the observer, whose position was changed from the rear seat to the front in order to give a clear field of fire. Its name derived from that of the MF.7 Longhorn, as it lacked the characteristic front-mounted elevator and elongated skids of its predecessor. Its maximum speed was 66mph (106kmph), it could reach an altitude of 12,000 feet and had an endurance of 3.75 hours. Interestingly enough, at the beginning of World War I, Russia had an air force second only to France, although a significant part of the Imperial Russian Air Force used outdated French aircraft of which the Farman’s were some. The Imperial Russian Air Force used large numbers of seaplanes, but at least in the Gulf of Finland, the bases in Finland were subsidiary to the large seaplane base in Reval (Tallinn). The Imperial Russian Air Force aircraft hangars for seaplanes in Reval (Tallinn) harbor were some of the first reinforced concrete structures in the world.

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The old Imperial Russian Air Force aircraft hangars for seaplanes in Reval (Tallinn) harbor – photo from 2007

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Schetinin M-9 Maritime a/c -1917 – those captured by the Whites in the Civil War were later used by the Ilmavoimat as a Primary Trainers

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The Grigorovich M-9 (alternative designation ShCh M-9, sometimes also known as the Shchetinin M-9)

The Grigorovich M-9 (alternative designation ShCh M-9, sometimes also known as the Shchetinin M-9) was a Russian World War I-era biplane flying boat, developed from the M-5 by Grigorovich. The first M-9 was ready in 1915 and its maiden flight was carried out on January 9, 1916 at Baku. On September 17, 1916, the test pilot Jan Nagórski became the first to make a loop with a flying boat. During the Russian Civil War, M-9s participated in the air defence of Baku, dropping approximately 6,000 kg of bombs and 160 kg of arrows. The aircraft also carried out photo reconnaissance, artillery spotting and air combat sorties. The M-9 was also used for the first experiments on sea shelf study, participating in the finding of new oil fields near Baku.

Nine M-9s were captured by Finland during the Russian Civil War. One was flown by a Russian officer to Antrea on April 10, 1918. It sank the following day during type evaluation. Eight more were taken over at the airfields at Åland and Turku. The aircraft were used until 1922 by the Finnish Air Force.

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Schetinin M-16 Maritime recon a/c -1917

The Grigorovich M-16 (alternative designation ShCh M-16, sometimes also known as the Shchetinin, Schetinin or Stetinin M-16) was a successful Russian World War I-era biplane flying boat of the Farman type, developed from the M-9 by Grigorovich. The M-16 was a version especially intended for winter operations, with better aerodynamic qualities. It was somewhat larger than the M-9. Six M-16s fell into Finnish hands during the Russian Civil War. The first Finnish parachute jump was done on June 17, 1922 from an M-16 by a parachuter named E. Erho. The aircraft were flown until 1923. With a maximum speed of 120kph and an endurance of 4 hours, it was a capable maritime reconnaisance aircraft of it’s time.

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Grigorovich / Schetinin M-5 a/c -1917

The Grigorovich M-5 (alternative designation Shch M-5, sometimes also Shchetinin M-5) was a successful Russian World War I-era two-bay unequal-span biplane flying boat with a single step hull, designed by Grigorovich. It was the first mass production flying boat built in Russia. The aircraft designer Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich completed his first flying boat (the model M-1) in late 1913, and produced a series of prototypes, gradually improving the design, until the M-5 appeared in the spring of 1915, which was to be his first aircraft to enter series production, with at least 100 being produced, primarily to replace foreign built aircraft, including Curtiss Model K and FBA flying boats. The M-5 was of a wooden construction, the hull was covered in plywood and the wings and tailplane were covered in fabric. Aft of the step the hull tapered sharply into little more than a boom, supporting a characteristic single fin and rudder tail unit, which was braced by means of struts and wires. It was normally powered by a 100 hp Gnome Monosoupape engine mounted as a pusher between the wings, but some used 110 hp Le Rhône or 130 hp Clerget engines. The pilot and the observer were accommodated side-by-side in a large cockpit forward of the wings, the observer provided with a single 7.62 mm Vickers machine gun on a pivoted mounting.

Most of the M-5s served in the Black Sea or in the Baltic, initially with the Imperial Russian naval air arm and later with both sides in the Russian Civil War. Some remained in service until the late 1920s as trainers, reconnaissance and utility aircraft. One M-5 fell into Finnish hands when it was found drifting at Kuokkala in 1918. The aircraft was flown by the Finnish Air Force until 1919, when it sank.

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Another photo of a Grigorovich / Schetinin M-5 a/c -1917

Soon after the declaration of independence, the Finnish Civil War erupted and the Russians generally sided with the Reds – the communist rebels. The Whites managed to seize a few aircraft from the Russians but had to heavily rely on foreign pilots and aircraft. Sweden refused to send men and material but individual Swedish citizens came to help the Whites. The editor of the Swedish daily magazine Aftonbladet, Waldemar Langlet, bought an N.A.B Albatross aircraft from the Nordiska Aviatik A.B. factory with funds gathered by the Finlands Vänner ("Friends of Finland") organization. This was the first aircraft to arrive from Sweden. It was flown via Haparanda on 25 February 1918 by the Swedish pilots John-Allan Hygerth (who became the first commander of the Finnish Air Force on 10 March 1918) and Per Svanbäck. The aircraft made a stop at Kokkola and had to make a forced landing in Jakobstad when the engine broke down. This aircraft was later given the designation F.2 in the Finnish Air Force ("F" came from the Swedish word "Flygmaskin" (aircraft)). The Swedish Count Eric von Rosen gave the Finnish White government its second aircraft, a Thulin Type D.
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Thulin Type D– this aircraft was a Swedish-built Morane-Saulnier L, a French parasol wing one or two-seat aeroplane of the First World War. The Type L became one of the first successful fighter aircraft when it was fitted with a single machine gun that fired through the arc of the propeller, which was protected by armoured deflector wedges. Its immediate effectiveness in this role launched an arms race in fighter development, and the Type L was swiftly rendered obsolete. The original Type L used wing warping for lateral control, but a later version designated Type LA was fitted with ailerons. Built by Morane-Saulnier, large numbers of the Type L were ordered by the French Aviation Militaire at the outbreak of the war, being designated the MS.3. In total about 600 Type Ls were built and, in addition to the French air force, they served with the Royal Flying Corps, Royal Naval Air Service and the Imperial Russian Air Service. The aircraft had a maximum speed of 78mph and an endurance of 4 hours.

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The pilot of the first FAF plane was a Swedish noble and air force enthusiast, Count Carl Gustaf Ericsson von Rosen, son of a famous explorer. Eric von Rosen had been using a swastika as a personal owner's mark. He originally saw the symbol on runestones in Gotland, while at school. Knowing that the symbol signified good luck for the Vikings, he utilized the symbol and had it carved onto all his luggage when going on an expedition to South America in 1901. Being a friend of Finland, he gave the newly-independent state an aircraft, which signified the beginning of the Finnish Air Force. The aircraft, a license manufactured Morane-Saulnier MS Parasol/Thulin D, was marked with his badge, a blue swastika, and this blue swastika was adopted as the official symbol of the Suomen Ilmavoimat decades before anyone had even heard of the Nazi Hakenkreuz. The white circular background was created when the Finns tried to paint over the advertisement from the Thulin Air Academy. The swastika was officially adopted after an order by Mannerheim on 18 March 1918.

Von Rosen, incidentally, was also to become the brother-in-law of Hermann Göring, when his wife's sister, Carin von Kantzow, married Göring. Göring was flying Eric von Rosen in bad weather from Stockholm to Rockelstad Castle, at Lake Båven in Sörmland, Sweden. Due to bad weather conditions, Göring had to stay at the castle. There he became acquainted with the sister of von Rosen's wife, Carin von Kantzow. She was at that time married to a Swedish officer, but would go on to become Göring’s future wife.

The pilot, Lieutenant Nils Kindberg, flew the aircraft to Vaasa on 6 March 1918, with von Rosen as a passenger. As this aircraft was donated against the will of the Swedish government, and no flight permit had been given, it resulted in a 100 kronor fine for Kindberg for leaving the country without permission. This aircraft is considered by some to be the first aircraft of the Finnish Air Force, since the Finnish Air Force didn't exist during the Civil War, and since it was only the Red side who flew a few aircraft with the help of some Russian pilots. The von Rosen aircraft was given the designation F.1. The F.1 aircraft was destroyed in an accident, killing its crew, not long after it had been handed over to the Finns.

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Lt Nils Kindberg in the cockpit of the first Finnish Air Force aircraft - a Morane Parasol/Thulin Type D, at Umeå in Sweden on the morning of the 6th of March 1918

Air activity of the Reds

Most of the airbases that the Russians had left in Finland had been taken over by the Whites after the Russian pilots had returned to Russia. The Reds were in possession of a few airbases and a few Russian aircraft, mainly amphibious, with 12 aircraft in all. The Reds did not have any pilots themselves, so they hired some of the Russian pilots that had stayed behind. Among the machines acquired by the Reds were three Nieuport 10’s, one Nieuport 17, one Nieuport 21, three Nieuport 23 fighters, one of the SPAD S. VII and one Rumpler 6B –fighter. On the 24th of February 1918 five aircraft arrived in Viipuri, and were quickly transferred to Riihimäki. The Reds created air units in Helsinki, Tampere, Kouvola, and Viipuri. There were no overall headquarters, the individual units served under the commander of the nearest front line. A flight school was created in Helsinki, but no students were trained there before the fall of Helsinki.

Two of the aircraft, one reconnaissance aircraft (a Nieuport 10) and one fighter aircraft (a Nieuport 17) that had arrived at Riihimäki were sent to Tampere, and three to Kouvola. Four Russian pilots and six mechanics also arrived to Tampere. The first war sortie was flown on March 1, 1918 over Naitenlahtiwith a Nieuport aircraft from Tampere. The 1st recorded bombing took place on 10 March in Vilppula. It seems likely that the Reds also operated two aircraft over the Eastern front. The Reds mainly performed reconnaissance, bombing sorties, spreading of propaganda leaflets, and artillery spotting. The Reds' air activity wasn’t particularly successful. Their air operations suffered from bad leadership, worn-out aircraft, and un-motivated Russian pilots. Some of the aircraft were captured by the Whites, while the rest were destroyed.

Air Activity of the Whites

In January 1918 the Whites did not have a single aircraft, nor pilots, so they had asked the Swedes for help. Sweden was a neutral nation and would not send any official help. Sweden also forbade its pilots to go to Finland. However, one Morane-Saulnier Parasol, and three NAB Albatross arrived from Sweden by the end of February 1918. Two of the Albatross aircraft were gifts from individuals supporting the White Finnish cause, while the third was bought. It was initially meant that the aircraft would be used to support the combat operations of the Whites, but the aircraft proved unsuitable. The Whites also did not have any pilots, so all the pilots and mechanics came from Sweden. One of the Finnish Jägers, Lieutenant Bertil Månsson, had been given pilot training in Germany, but he stayed behind in Germany trying to secure aircraft deals for Finland. 2 Flying Detachments were formed, one in Vilppula (Kolho) from 28 Feb and one in Antrea from 25 March. From Kolho, Flying Detachment I was transferred to Orivesi on 21 March, to Vehmainen on 28 March and finally to Tampere on 10 Apr. The Aviation Detachment of the Karjala Corps was established on 16 April 1918.




During the Civil War the White Finnish Air Force consisted of:
  • 29 Swedes (16 pilots, two lookouts and 11 mechanics). Of the pilots, only 4 had been given military training, and one of them was operating as a lookout.
  • 2 Danes (one pilot, one lookout)
  • 7 Russians (six pilots, one lookout)
  • 28 Finns (four pilots of whom two were military trained, six lookouts, two engineers and 16 mechanics).
The first Air Force Base of independent Finland was founded on the shore near Kolho. The base could operate three aircraft. The first aircraft was brought by rail on March 7, 1918, and on March 17, 1918 the first aircraft took off from the base. In 1918 the Finns took over nine Russian Stetinin M-9 aircraft that had been left behind. White air activity consisted mainly of reconnaissance sorties. The first operative recon mission was flown in the morning of 18 March over Lyly with an NAB type 9 Albatros aircraft. Two more recon missions were flown in the afternoon of the same day. As the front line moved south, towards Tampere, the AFB was moved first to Orivesi and then to Kaukajärvi near Tampere. On the 11th and 12th flights on 31 March, 8 incendiary bombs were hand-dropped on Tampere and on 2 Apr 3 explosive bombs were dropped. All in all, the contribution of the White air force during the war was insignificant. From March 10, 1918 the Finnish Air Force was led by the Swedish Lt. John Allan Hygerth. He was however replaced on April 18, 1918, due to his unsuitability for the position and numerous accidents.


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Captain Mikkola with his pilots on the ice of Vakkolahti in front of the Nieuport 23 fighter in March 1919. Pitkäsilta is visible between the wings and in the middle is the Sortavala church. To the left of the church is the Sortavala school.

The German Expeditionary Force brought several of their own aircraft when they intervened in the Finnish Civil War, including one Rumpler 6-B Flying Boat, but these aircraft did not contribute much to the overall outcome of the war. The German aircraft flew recon missions over Ahvenanmaa starting from 2 March 1918 and over South-Finland starting from 3rd March. Three bombs were dropped on the Kouvola Railway Station on 27 April 1918 and the Germans established small air stations in Finland, 2 at Helsinki, 1 each at Loviisa, Koivisto and Suursaari.

The First Years

The German intervention in the Finnish Civil War had the result of binding Finland to Germany both politically and economically. A German Officer, Hauptmann(Captain) Carl Seber, was put in command of the Finnish Aviation Force from April 28, 1918 until December 13, 1918.

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Hauptman Carl Seber

Seber was an experienced aviator, having been awarded the Knight’s Cross of Saxony's St. Henry Order on 4 July 1915 whilst serving in Feldflieger-Abteilung 23. His citation reads: “Leader of the Royal Saxon Feldflieger-Abteilung 23 since December 1914, Hauptmann Seber performed heroically as an observer on many occasions. He carried out an especially gallant act on November 18, 1914 when, with Oberleutnant [Gottfried] Glaeser, they forced a superior French plane down with shots from a pistol on their return from Amiens.” Seber had not actually commanded Feldflieger-Abteilung 23 “since December 1914,” but took command on 10 January 1915. Seber was also a recipient of the Prussian Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Classes as well as the German Army Observer Badge.

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Hauptman Seber (standing behind the Mascot)

Seber was largely responsible for the development of the Air Force as an independent arm of the Finnish military and he stressed the importance of the maritime aircraft. By the end of the Civil War, the Finnish Air Force had 40 aircraft (these were already a mixture of 14 aircraft types, mostly seaplanes), of which 20 had been captured from the Reds (the Reds did not operate this many aircraft, but some had been found abandoned by the Russians on the Åland Islands). Five of the aircraft had been flown by the Allies from Russia, four had been gifts from Sweden and eight had been bought from Germany.

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The "basic aircraft" of Sortavala Air Station was the Friedrichshafen 49C, n:eek: C.72-18. Under the pontoons there are rollers for ground transport. Maintenance Sergeant O. Koivunen beside the aircraft. Information: produced in Germany, wooden, two-seat, wingspan 16,7 m; length 11,6 m; empty weight 1485 kg; Max speed 140 km/h; Bentz Bz IV 6-cylinder engine 220 hp; used at Sortavala 26.6.1918 - 22.3.1919.

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Various aircraft types lined up at Sortavala on the 5th of February 1919 for the inspection of General Mannerheim. In the front, two Stetins, an M-15 and an M-5, behind them a Nieuport 23, a Rumpler C.VIII and a 6B, also a Friedrichshafen 49C


Santahamina, Koivisto, Sortavala and Lappeenranta (transferred to Utti in June 1918). 5 Flying Detachments and a Flying Battalion were established in October 1918. Finnish pilots and mechanics were sent to Germany for training. The revolution in Germany and the end of the War put an end to aircraft acquisitions from Germany and also to co-operation and training with the Germans.

The birth of the FAF during the Civil War had more symbolic value than real strategic significance. Since the commanders of the future Finnish Army had no practical knowledge of the usage of combat aircraft, the new organization, named Suomen Ilmavoimat (Finnish Air Force) became an independent branch of the armed forces. After the Civil War this originally temporary solution became the new norm, and thus the FAF became one of the oldest "independent" air forces in the world. This position gave the early commanders of FAF considerable freedom to test new tactics and methods, and during the 1920s 1930s the air force was as a result able to avoid stagnation and conservative resistance to change. The FAF was free to test and operate without hindrances. Yet the combination of the fast paced development of aircraft designs and the limited military spending of the young republic created a situation where innovative tactical solutions were often the only thing that enabled the otherwise obsolete equipment of the Ilmavoimat to remain usable in any potential conflict.

The first steps were the establishment of air units and training programs, and at this point the presence and influence of foreign air units based on Finnish soil was immense. The first military aircraft used in the country were based from the naval aviation bases built by the Imperial Russian Army or Navy during WWI, later on followed by German air units that were in turn quickly replaced by a British naval aviation unit that operated on the Gulf of Finland during the chaotic postwar years. At this point the Ilmavoimat was trying to gain more aircraft from any and all available sources on a limited budget, and all available planes were bought from the Entente powers and from rebellious German garrison troops based in the Baltic states – these were added to the air fleet left behind by the withdrawing Russian Army. Due this "grab what you can"-policy the Ilmavoimat operated 20 different aircraft types in the early 1920s and still had an extremely limited number of aircraft in service. This type variety was to prove a fairly permanent problem in later times, especially for the FAF technicians.

In the summer 1918, after the War of Independence was over, the Ilmavoimat was organized into five air stations, three of which also acted as training centers. Because of the enormous number of lakes in the country, sea planes were regarded as the most suitable type of aircraft, thus four out of the five air stations were in effect sea plane harbours. All of the stations were located in southern Finland, as their main mission was surveillance and in this way the network served well to cover the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga areas.

The Establishment of the Sortavala Air Station:

The responsibility for establishment of I Field Air Station at Sortavala was given to Lieutenant Väinö Mikkola. The detachment came to Sortavala on the 23rd of June 1918. The mission of the air station was to patrol the Lake Ladoga (Laatokka) sea front. Aerial reconnaissance was important to the Finnish Army supreme command. Lieutenant Väinö Mikkola established the Sortavala Air Station and was the first commander. He was undisputedly the most experienced pilot in Finland. He had received his pilot training during 1915 - 1916 in Russia, St. Petersburg and Baku. During World War I Mikkola served as the commander on the aircraft hangar ship Orliza on the Gulf of Finland and after that as the commander of the Hermanni Air Station. Mikkola joined government service in January 1918 and in May he was registered in the Finnish Army. He was promoted to captain in July and given the first Finnish military pilot's wings number 1 on the 17th of September 1918. He served as the commander of the Sortavala Air Station till the 4th of December 1919 when he was ordered to take command of the Aviation Battalion at Santahamina. On the 16th of May 1920 he was promoted to Major. The location for the air station was on the western shore of the Vakkolahti bay that divided the town of Sortavala into two parts. Later Vakkolahti turned out to be too small for air operations and in 1924 the unit moved south to Kasinhäntä.
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Capt. Väinö Mikkola established the Sortavala Air Station and was the first commander. First Finnish military pilot's wings no 1/17.9.1918. Mikkola died on the 7th of September 1920 together with Lieutenant Leijer and Ensign Durchman when their Italian flying boats crashed in the Alps during a transfer flight to Finland. This date is now the annual Finnish Air Force memorial day

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The original four pilots: From left: Ensign Rafael Hallamaa, Captain Väinö Mikkola (commander), Captain Leonard Lindberg (Kotsalo) and Sergeant Eero Heinricius.

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Ensigns Alexander Tschernichin and Rainer Ahonius in their flight suits on the pontoon of the Stetin M-16 sea plane. Both served later as the commander of the air station: the first at Vakkolahti and the latter at Kasinhäntä

Pilot training in the Sortavala air station was started in 1919. Because of many technical problems with the aircraft there weren't many to be used. The situation eased a bit when Capt. Mikkola flew the Stetin M-16 flying boat "Winter-Farman" to Sortavala in July. This aircraft type was the most important in the early 1920s until the I.V.L. A22 Hansas arrived in 1923. In February 1920 I Aviation Detachment at Sortavala had four aircraft, two Georges-Levys (3.B.401 and 3.B.402), one Farman (2.b.101) and a Rumpler C.VIII (2.B.350). In the end of July another Farman arrived from Turku. From the Russian war booty Farmans two more were assembled in 1921 which enabled a high level of training activity till 1923. In summer 1923 Aviation Detachment 3 had one flyable Caudron (1.E.15), one Rumpler in repair (2.B.350) and one Farman stored.Because of the strategic location of the Sortavala Air Station it had a very important mission in the surveillance of the eastern border till the Tartu Peace Treaty. Because of skirmishes along the border during 1921 – 1922, two Brequet reconnaissance planes fitted with skis were transferred to Sortavala. The planes returned to their base in March 1922.

The situation at Sortavala in the early 1920’s, that of limited aircraft and a shoestring budget, was also typical of the other Air Stations in this period. The Ilmavoimat had 31 aircraft of 14 different types in 1919. By 1920 the air force aircraft situation was still poor. During 1918 and 1919 the air force had acquired 54 aircraft and now they were mostly destroyed or in poor condition without leaving a mark in the development of the Finnish Air Force. In October 1920 the air force had 26 aircraft of seven different types. Of those aircraft the six Georges-Levy flying boats could be operated only during the open water summer-season. In a crisis the air force could operate nine aircraft during wintertime and 15 during summertime. At the beginning of 1921 the air force was practically without sea planes. This situation would slowly change over the early 1920’s.


1919-1922: The immediate Post-War Years and French Influence

After the defeat of Germany, the German officers left the country and the Finnish Air Force lost its first actual commander. Also, Finnish Pilots who were being trained in Germany were forced to return. The next commanding officer of the Ilmavoimat was Lieutenant Colonel Torsten Aminoff (December 14, 1918 to January 9, 1919). He was CiC for too short a period to achieve anything, but under his replacement, Lieutenant Colonel Sixtus Hjelm (January 10, 1919 to October 25, 1920), the Ilmavoimat received it’s first budget and the Air Force Chief of Staff, Captain Bertel Mårtenson, bought three Fokker D. VII fighters together with six Junkers J.1 low-level ground attack, observation and Army cooperation aircraft.
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The Junkers J.I (manufacturer's designation J 4; not to be confused with the earlier, pioneering J 1 all-metal monoplane of 1915/16) was a German "J-class" armored sesquiplane, developed for the low-level ground attack role in close cooperation with friendly ground troops. It is especially noteworthy as being the first all-metal aircraft to enter mass production. It was a slow aircraft, but its metal construction and heavy armour was an effective shield against battlefield's small arms fire. In an extremely advanced design, single-unit steel "bathtub" that ran from just behind the propeller to the rear crew position, acted not only as an armour, but also both as the main fuselage structure and engine mounting setup in one unit. The armour was 5 millimetres (0.20 in) thick and weighed 470 kilograms (1,000 lb). It protected the crew, the engine, the fuel tanks and the radio equipment.

The aircraft could be disassembled into its main components – wings, fuesalage, undercarrage and tail – to make it easier to transport by rail or road. A ground crew of six to eight could re–assemble the aircraft and have it ready for flight within four to six hours. The wings were covered with skin of aluminum that was .19 millimetres (0.0075 in) thick. This could be easily dented so great care had to be taken when handling the aircraft on the ground. The J.I was well-liked by its crews, although its ponderous performance earned it the nickname "furniture van". The aircraft first entered front service in August 1917. They were used on the Western Front during the German Spring Offensive (Kaiserschlacht "Kaiser's Battle") of March 1918. The production at Junkers works was quite slow due to poor organization. There were only 227 J.Is manufactured until the production ceased in January 1919 (some of the production continued after the end of the war). None were apparently lost in combat, a tribute to its tough armoured design, but a few were lost in landing accidents, and other mishaps.

The aircraft was usually armed with two fixed, synchronized machine guns firing between the propeller blades and with a single flexible gun for use by the observer. Two downward-firing guns were sometimes installed for the observer, but the difficulty of aiming these guns from a low, fast-flying aircraft rendered them ineffective, and they were quickly removed. A radio link connecting the aircraft with friendly ground troops in the forward area was also generally provided. The J-I had a maximum speed of 96 miles per hour, could climb to 6560 feet in 30 minutes, and had an endurance of 2 hours, a very creditable performance for an aircraft of relatively low power. The good performance of the aircraft was due in large part to the low value of the zero-lift drag coefficient of 0.0335 and the high value of the maximum lift-drag ratio of 10.3. The J-I was among the most aerodynamically efficient of the World War I aircraft anf very effective in it’s ground-attack role. The Ilmavoimat acquired six Junkers J.I’s in early 1919, the aircraft would remain in service until 1932 and continued experience with the use of these aircraft led to the formulation of the Ilmavoimat’s ground-attack and close-support doctrine. This in turn would later lead to the establishment of the highly effective ground-attack squadrons of the Ilmavoimat which would go on to fight through the course of the Winter War so effectively, following a tactical doctrine which the British and Americans only came to adopt years later.


Following the departure of the Germans, Finland sought aviation expertise from the West. France was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Finland and the planning of the Finnish Aviation Force strategy, aircraft types and training was given to a delegation of French aviation “experts”. While command of the Ilmavoimat was retained in Finnish hands, Finnish pilots and mechanics were sent to France for training. Under French pressure, the Finnish HQ cancelled a deal (signed after the German capitulation) to buy Fokker D.VII-fighters and Albratros recon aircraft from Germany while the French aviation experts in Finland, led by Major Raoul Etienne, the commander of Aviation Section of French Military Delegation in Finland (the "Commission Francaise Militaire de Finlande, Aviation" stressed the importance of the land-based aircraft and, unsurprisingly, in April 1919 recommended the purchase of 30 Breguet 14 aircraft from France, aloowing twenty to always be ready for service and ten in repair at any time. There was a strong opinion in favour of sea planes in the Finnish Aviation Forces, partly due to the cost of building airfields and consequently, the Ilmavoimat compromised and purchased 20 Great War-vintage Breguet fighters and 12 Georges Levy flying boats whilst at the same time beginning the long process of creating the necessary infrastructure and training systems to maintain and improve the Ilmavoimat. Of the twenty Breguet 14 A2 aircraft ordered in 1919 (the order also included over two hundred (221) used Fiat A-12bis engines from French surplus stock for the aircraft), the first four arrived to Finland in July 1919. In 1921 ten more aircraft arrived, followed by eight in 1922. The planes delivered in 1921 were without engines. The type remained in Finnish service until 1927. One aircraft (3C30) remains today in the Central Finland Aviation Museum, where it is undergoing restoration.

The Bregeut 14 A2 could carry four 10 or 12.5 kg bombs, a camera and a wireless transmitter. It had dual controls for the observer with armament consisting of one synchronised fixed Vickers machine gun for the pilot and twin TO3 ring mounted Lewis machine guns for the observer. Machine guns and the ring mounting were not always installed in Finnish aircraft, sometimes the observer had only a single mg. Michelin bomb racks were located under the lower wing, just outboard of the inner interplane struts. The aircraft formed the backbone of the Ilmavoimat for several years. The first aircraft were assigned to the 2nd Aviation Detachment (Ilmailuosasto 2, Ilm.Os) at Utti, which was in 1921 renamed to 1st Aviation Detachment (Ilmailuosasto 1) and in 1924 to Land Reconnaissance Squadron (Maatiedustelulaivue, Ma.T.L) and finally in 1926 to Land Flying Squadron (Maalentoeskaaderi, M.L.E). In summer they were often operated from Perkjärvi, which was the only full size airfield, besides Utti, in Finland. After 1920 also the Aircraft Factory at Santahamina had a small airfield. During winters the Breguets were operated all over the country on skis.

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Bregeut 14 A2

At Utti French mechanics assembled the first aircraft and French instructors taught Finnish pilots to fly the Breguets. Instructors included Lieutenants Bourdon and Moutonnieux and Sous-Lieutenant Discours. Some aircraft were probably assembled at Santahamina. The first Finnish pilot to perform aerobatics in Finland was Captain Gunnar Holmqvist. He made a vertical turn and side slip with a Breguet (2C461) on 4 September 1919. Four Breguet 14 aircraft were moved from Utti to Perkjärvi on Karelian Isthmus on 30 August 1919. From there reconnaissance flights were made to the St. Petersburg area, where the forces of General Judenitsh were observed. On 25 October 1919 Captain Holmqvist and his observer Captain H. Lilja photographed Russian Red and White Army positions and bombed the Komandantsky (called Kolomäki by Finns) airfield. Their aircraft took one hit from Russian anti aircraft fire. Reconnaissance flights on the south east border were also made in 1920 and 1922.

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The Breguets were the first true combat aircraft of the Ilmavoimat

In the summer of 1920 Telefunken radios were used for the first time in artillery spotting rehearsals at Perkjärvi, these were continued on a yearly basis from 1920 through to 1923. Using the Breguets, the Ilmavoimat also started to fly a mail service between Helsinki and Tallinn from 12 February 1920. The hard winter had isolated Estonia from the rest of the world, but also made flights over the Gulf of Finland somewhat safer. The ongoing peace negotiations with Soviet Russia had increased the need for diplomatic contacts and ten return flights were made through to March 10th, when the sea was again open, by 2nd Lts Armas Anthoni, Carl-Erik Leijer and Tauno Hannelius (later Hannus) and the French Sergeant Major (Maréchal des Logis) Pierre Burello, carrying diplomatic mail and occasionally a VIP. On March 3rd one of the planes carrying a diplomat made a landing on Wrangler Island (Prangli?) 25 km north east of Tallinn, due to fuel shortage. The service was not continued in 1921, but in February 1922 mail flights were made from Santahamina in Helsinki to Lasnamäki airfield in Tallinn. The book "Finland I Krig 1939-1945" has a photo on page 29 showing the Finnish Foreign Minister in full flying outfit standing in front of a Breguet 14. The text says "Foreign Minister Holsti returning from Warsaw in 1922". It seems unlikely that he really flew from Warsaw, but was rather being transported from Tallinn to Helsinki.

The Ilmavoimat sent 1 M-16 to help the Estonians in the Estonian War of Liberation in January-February 1919. While voluntary Finnish expeditionary forces took part in the so-called Olonets Campaign (part of the Heimosodat) in Eastern Karelia in April-June 1919, the Ilmavoimat did not participate. However, in June-August 1919 the Ilmavoimat reconnoitered Soviet territory and sea and bombed Soviet ships and submarines that entered Finnish territorial waters. The Ilmavoimat also attacked Kronstadt harbour as a retaliation to Soviet bombings of Finnish territory. The Tartu Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union was concluded on 14 October, 1920, the last guerilla fighters retreated to Finland as late as February 1922 and the borders between the two countries were finally established on 1 June 1922. In the summer of 1920, Finland raised its defensive preparedness in Ahvenanmaa (the Asland Ilands) as the province wanted to join Sweden and the Swedes were interested in taking possession. The League of Nations resolved the situation in 1921 before the dispute lead to any military actions being taken.

In 1921, in conjunction with the purchase of the Breguet 14 A2 aircraft, the Ilmavoimat had also purchased 12 Georges Levy G.L. 40 HB2 Flying Boats from France for maritime reconnaissance and patrolling. The Georges Levy G.L. 40 HB2 was a three-seated amphibious biplane aircraft designed in 1917 with a maximum speed of 90mph, a cruising speed of 71mph, a range of 248 miles and was armed with 1 machinegun and up to 400lbs of bombs. The aircraft was designed by Blanchard and Le Pen and the aircraft was also known as the Levy-Le Pen. It was claimed to be the best French amphibious aircraft of World War I, but that is probably due to the limited production of such aircraft in France at that time. The Ilmavoimat was not happy with this purchase - three aircraft were lost in accidents that claimed lives - and it was nicknamed "the flying coffin" in the 1920s.

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The Georges-Levy GL 40 HB2 seaplane proved to be a "flying coffin" and was one of the reasons why the French influence ended and the domestic aircraft industry was started up

A New Commanding Officer for the Ilmavoimat

In October 1920 the Ilmavoimat received a new commander when a young (29) former cavalry officer, Jager Major Arne Somersalo was tasked to reform and expand the FAF. The young commander realized that he had only nine combat-capable Breguets at his disposal, and that the new air force had to acquire all kinds of technical equipment to enable the training of new pilots. All military airfields available for use at this time were constructed for the needs of Imperial Russia, and thus located at places of secondary importance for the new strategic situation. There were thus many challenges to be overcome. Commander-in-Chief of the Suomen Ilmavoimat from 1920 to his death in action in 1944, Somersalo had a strong influence on the future of FAF. He strongly opposed the early conceot of a general workhorse plane type, forcefully advocating the creation of separate bomber, air reconnaissance and fighter units. Somersalo argued that in the future fighter units would be the most important element of FAF, a force that he envisioned to develop into a "combat-worthy service that controls the national airspace in all military fronts." He also fiercely defended the independent position of FAF while maintaining otherwise supportive attitude towards cooperation with Army and Navy.

Somersalo met with much opposition over the course of his career, even considering resignation in 1926 after the General Staff decided to continue further down the path recommended British General Walter Kirke. However, Somersalo made the decision to continue to “fight from within” and his persistence paid off in the early to mid-1930’s, as we will see.

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Arne Sakari Somersalo (born 18 March 1891 in Tampere as Arne Sommer - died 17 August 1944 near Riga, Latvia) was a Finnish officer and anti-communist activist. Somersalo was educated at the University of Helsinki before studying natural sciences at the University of Jena. One of the Jagers who fought for Germany during the First World War he was appointed as an officer in 1916. He would later claim that the war had been the death of old Europe and argued that one of its main positives was that it had "rescued our nation from the deadly, slimy embrace of a loathsome cuttlefish" in reference to Russia. He transferred straight to the Finnish Army and from 1920 to 1944 was the commander of the Finnish Air Force. He became peripherally involved in politics in 1926 when he started contributing to the right wing journal Valkoinen Vartio and then was instrumental in founding the fiercely anti-communist Finnish Defence League. He joined the Lapua Movement in 1930 and then the Patriotic People's Movement (IKL) in 1932, when he considered resigning from the Ilmavoimat and standing for election to Parliament.

However, with his promotion to Kenraalimajuri in 1932 and substantial increases in the Ilmavoimat’s budget looming, he made the decision to withdraw completely from politics and focus his career on the continued strengthening of the Ilmavoimat. It was primarily Somersalo’s continued advocacy of the creation of separate air reconnaissance, bomber, ground-attack / dive-bomber and fighter units and the building up of fighter units as the most important element of the Ilmavoimat that was instrumental in the decisive role played by the Ilmavoimat in the Winter War. Promoted to Kenraaliluutnantti on 3 Oct 1941, Somersalo continued to command the Finnish Air Force through the Peace between the Winter War and Finland’s entry into WW2. He was killed in action near Riga, Latvia on 17 August 1944 as he was visiting the 1st Polish Armoured Division (the Black Devils, then fighting under command of the Suomen Maavoimat) in the advance southwards through Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and into Poland in 1944.


(ATL Note: This differs from the OTL. In reality, Somersalo resigned as commander-in-chief of the Ilmavoimat in 1926, disheartened by the Military High Command's decision in 1926 to plan future expansion on the Kirke Memorandum. For Somersalo, the continuing uphill struggle was too much, and he resigned. His successor was Col. Vaino Vuori, an infantry officer with no experience in military aviation who took no risks and decided to follow the guidance of "foreign experts". In reality, Somersalo's legacy faded fast. Somersalo went on to become involved in politics, editing the right wing journal Valkoinen Vartio from 1926 and then founding the fiercly anti-communict Finnish Defence League. He joined the Lapua Movement in 1930 and then the Patriotic People's Movement (IKL) in 1932, serving as the Member for Turku in Parliament from 1933 to 1935. He was also the editor in chief of the IKL party newspaper Ajan Suunta from 1931 to 1935. Recalled to active service for the Winter War, he acted as Chief of Staff for the frontline at Suomussalmi and was awarded the Order of the Cross of Liberty for his actions. During the Winter War, Somersalo acted as liaison officer for the German SS Division Nord on Finnish Lapland. He was killed in action near Kiestinki (Kestenga), USSR on 17 August 1941).

As a part of this ongoing development, Finland made a choice typical of the era, and sought to create a national aviation industry to provide the Ilmavoimat with new trainers and later on licence-build and domestic-made combat aircraft as well. The idea was first proposed in 1920 (Somersalo firmly believed in the benefits of the plan and organised a strong political lobby to support it), and a year later the first repair workshop of the Ilmavoimat was expanded into the Airforce Airplane Factory (Ilmavoimien Lentokonetehdas, IVL) and immediately begun to manufacture the Caudron G.3 trainer aircraft built under licence, which was followed very shortly by the building under licence of the A22 Hansa (a license-built copy of the German designed Hansa-Brandenburg W.33). With the creation of IVL the Ilmavoimat and Finnish industry had established the basis of an effective and reliable maintenance system for Finnish combat aircraft. Initially the factory was administered by the War Ministery, with the repair workshop and factory acting as separate departments under the Ilmavoimat. For practical reasons they were combined together in 1928, and the State Aircraft Factory (Valtion Lentokonetehdas, VL) was born.
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Ilmavoimien Lentokonetehdas, IVL – late 1920’s

Caudron G.3 Primary Trainer -1920-1924

The Ilmavoimat purchased twelve Caudron G.3aircraft from France in 1920 for use as primary trainers. Six of these were built in Finland by the newly established Santahaminan Ilmailutelakka between 1921 - 1923. Two aircraft and spares were purchased from Flyg Aktiebolaget on April 26, 1923 together with a Caudron G.4 for 100,000 Finnish markka. The aircraft was easy to fly and repair and thus very suitable as a trainer. The Finnish-constructed aircraft had worse flying characteristics than the French machines due to a bad wing profile. The FAF used a total of 19 Caudron G.3 aircraft, which was called Tutankhamon in Finland. The Caudron G.3 was used by the FAF between 1920 and 1924.
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The Caudron G.3 was a single-engined French biplane built by Caudron, widely used in World War I as a reconnaissance aircraft and trainer. It first flew in May 1914 at their Le Crotoy aerodrome. The aircraft had a short crew nacelle, with a single engine in the nose of the nacelle, and twin open tailbooms. It was of sesquiplane layout, and used wing warping for lateral control, although this was replaced by conventional ailerons fitted on the upper wing in late production aircraft. Following the outbreak of the First World War, it was ordered in large quantities. Usually, the G.3 was not equipped with any weapons, although sometimes light, small calibre machine guns and some hand-released small bombs were fitted to it. It continued in use as a trainer after ceasing combat operations until after the end of the war. One aircraft (1E.18) is currently being repaired at the Hallinportti Aviation Museum.

IVL A.22 Hansa - ordered 1922, retired 1936, reactivated 1939, retired 1940

The IVL A.22 Hansa was a Finnish-licensed copy of the German Hansa-Brandenburg W.33, a two-seat, singe-engined low-winged monoplane flying boat. The Hansa-Brandenburg W.33 was designed in 1916 by Ernst Heinkel and entered German service in 1918. Twenty-six aircraft of this design were built, only six of them before the collapse of Germany. The W.33 proved to be an excellent aircraft, with the Hansa-Brandenburg monoplanes considerably influencing German seaplane design. Several copies appeared in 1918, such as the Friedrichshafen FF.63, the Dornier Cs-I, the Junkers J.11, and the L.F.G. Roland ME 8. After the war a version of the W.29 was used by Denmark, while Finland purchased a number of W.33 and W.34 aircraft from Germany.


In 1921 Finland purchased a manufacturing license for the W.33. The first Finnish-built Hansa made its maiden flight on November 4, 1922 and in Finland was designated the IVL A.22 Hansa. This aircraft was the first industrially manufactured aircraft in Finland, and during the following four years between 1922 and 1925 a total of 120 of this aircraft-type were manufactured for the nacent Ilmavoimat. The IVL A.22 Hansa would become the second most numerous aircraft built in Finland for the Finnish Air Force and would continue to be used in maritime service until 1936. The A.22 Hansa had a crew of 2 and was a single-engined floatplane with a maximum speed of 99mph. The A.22’s were finally retired from service and mothballed in 1936 as the Ilmavoimat’s aircraft modernisation program picked up speed. As the threat of war came closer in the late 1930’s, approximately 80 of these aircraft were brought back into service and were initially used for Maritime Patrol activitives over the Gulf of Bothnia, largely being flown by student pilots. They were used in the same role over the summer of 1940 before being finally retired on the signing of the Sept. 1940 Peace Treaty with the USSR.
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Hansa-Brandenburg. Technical information: Wooden, two-seat sea plane. Weight 2124 kg, Max speed 170 km/h, wingspan 15,85 m, length 11,10 m, endurance 6 hours. Weapons: navigator's twin machine gun, bombs 4x10 kg


Of Note: The Finnish Broadcasting Company Yle has been transferring it's archives to the internet and one of the videos is about the Finnish Air Force Airshow in 1926. The plane in the film is 4F66 which was the 66th Hansa build in Finland. It was taken into service in 20th December 1924. To see the video click the link and press "play" below the image and next to "armeijan lentonäytös". If you have enough bandwidth you can choose bigger image by pressing "play" and then select "asetukset" from right hand top corner and then select "1 Mbps tai nopeampi" and "tallenna asetukset".
http://www.yle.fi/elavaarkisto/?s=s&g=1&ag=1&t=&a=47

A new, longer version of this film has also been published. More Hansa’s and a Brequet 14. Use this link.
http://www.yle.fi/elavaarkisto/?s=s&g=1&ag=1&a=2306

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Two Hansa-Brandenburg W.33 reconnaissance seaplanes, Finnish Air Force (the paler AF-38?) by Kuutsalo island with boat-houses near - 1924

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Seaplane Pilot in Flight Suit (Left photo). Flying overall, boots, life west, parachute, leather helmet and goggles. "The mannequin" Chief Master Sergeant Viktor Törhönen. Notice the squadron insignia on the fuselage behind IL-46.

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Hansa startup for engine test. During startup the propeller was turned only "once behind the compression". This lessened the fear of getting hit by the propeller during startup. There was often a fire in the carburetor during startup. The fire was usually suppressed by the mechanic putting his hat over the intake. Notice the squadron eagle insignia on the fuselage.

The Gourdou Leseurre-GL-22 Fighter (ordered 1923)

After his appointment and on realising that Finland lacked any practical fighter aircraft force, Somersalo in 1921 drafted the Air Force Development Plan, which planned for a fighter strength of 136 aircraft. It was decided to fill this need by acquiring the first squadron from abroad and then build up to the total strength by construction of the remaining aircraft in Finland. In October 1922, the Ilmavoimat Headquarters sent a tender to the Dutch Fokker, the French Gourdou & Leseurrelle and the British Aircraft Disposal Company requesting one fighter for comparison purposes. Bids were received and the aircraft were ordered in January 1923. A Fokker DX, Gourdou Leseurre-GL-21 and a Martinsyde F.4 Buzzard arrived in the country rapidly. After evaluation, the Gourdou-Leseurre was selected and 18 GL-22 machines were purchased (allowing some for spares) and the aircraft arrived in Finland in the summer of 1924.
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Gourdou Leseurre-GL-22 at the Aviation Museum of Central Finland. With a maximum speed of 153mph, a service ceiling of 14,600 feet, a range of 280 miles and armed with 2 forward firing .303 Vickers machineguns, this was a capable, if not outstanding, fighter in it's day.

Caudron C.60 Primary Trainer - ordered 1923, retired 1936

The Ilmavoimat purchased 30 Caudron C.60s from France in 1923. A further 34 aircraft were licence built in Finland between 1927-1928. The Finnish Air Force had a total of 64 Caudron C.60s in service, where they were used as primary trainers until 1936, when they were retired as more modern trainers were brought into service. With a maximum speed of 93mph, a ceiling of 13,120 feet and an endurance of 5 hours, they were a typical biplane trainer of the 1920’s.
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Caudron C.60 Trainer

Overall, it has to be said that the Suomen Ilmavoimat flight operations through the 1920's suffered from a lack of vision and goal. Flying was an end in itself, there was little real understanding of how to use air power in a real war and the Ilmavoimat would not have been capable of accomplishing the wartime missions assigned to the service. While flight hours climbed steadily, most of the flights were training flights and there wasn't a lot of tactical training because many of the pilots were inexperienced and needed advanced flying training and sea plane conversion training. There were also a number of fatal accidents over this period - between 1923 and 1930 there were 20 fatal accidents with 42 persons lost. The end result of this was that the Hansa also received somewhat of a reputation as a "flying coffin" althought it should also be kept in mind that the Ilmavoimat flew more with the Hansas than with all other types combined.

Foreign Advisors - directing the Ilmavoimat into a dead-end for a time....

With the basic requirements for future development programs more or less in place, Finland now once again sought foreign military expertice and guidance from the victors of the Great War. This time a military advisor team arrived from Britain, led by General Walter Kirke. The British advisors created a development program that was planned as a temporary basis for the future Ilmavoimat. The program conflicted with the views of Somersalo in many cases. British officers disregarded the importance of fighters and instead promoted the offensive capabilities of air arm, envisioning the bombing of enemy territories as the main future mission of FAF. The Kirke Memorandum was strongly influenced by the ideas of the Italian theorist Giulio Douhet, but its general outlines were strictly conservative. The memo emphasized the importance of flying boats and naval aviation for Finnish coastal defense and recommended future investments in naval bomber aircraft.

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The British General Kirke created his memorandum as an outline for the short-term development of the Ilmavoimat. Despite this fact his work directed the development of the Ilmavoimat into a dead end for a considerable period of time after its central ideas had been proved obsolete and unpractical.

While the Suomen Ilmavoimat had carried out advanced air combat and bomber training to it's pilots and navigators starting from the mid-1920's, little attention had been paid to joint exercises with the Army and Navy, largely due to the reluctance of the Ilmavoimat to participate in such exercises. The British Specialist Committee had stressed in their study the importance of joint exercises in developing the Air Force and while these became routine in the late 1920's, they were only adequate at most. There were shortcomings in the planning and execution of the exercises, with a major problem being that the exercise leadership was unware of the Ilmavoimat operating capabilities. Another common problem were ongoing communications problems between the Ilmavoimat Pilots and the Army units they were operating with. There were all issues that would be addressed successfully through the 1930's.

Meanwhile, through the last half of the 1920's, the Kirke Memorandum and the British influence was having it's effect on the Ilmavoimat.
 
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Suojeluskunta in the 1920s - updated post has been added

For anyone interested, I have posted an update in one of the earlier placeholder posts for the Suojeluskunta. More to come.
 
Some things I noted about grammar:

Arm sleeve from the 1920's from the local Suojeluskunta unit of the town of Forssan
This should be: of the town of Forssa

Arm sleeve from the 1920's from the local Suojeluskunta unit of the town of Turun
This should be: of the town of Turku
 
Yeah, you just have to love Finnish grammar. There are 15 grammar cases, compared to English, which only has one.

I'm astonished to see that a Canadian is interested in our history.
 
Yes, but the person writing this WI story is Canadian.

Funny guys :D

Actually, I'm a New Zealander (that's how the ANZAC volunteers arrived in the story) who immigrated to Canada many years ago with a long time interest in Finland (almost got to move to Helsinki to work on an IT project for the Finnish Post Office about 15 years ago - bought a couple of books on Finland, got hooked on the Winter War and the rest is history ;) ). Worked with a bunch of guys from the Finnish Post Office for a week or so and discovered many similarities to New Zealanders (the drinking......, the long silences...., the drinking games...., did I mention the drinking......). Anyways, it was fun and we got on like a house on fire.

That said, corrections on my interpretations of Finnish are welcome. I use online translation software, a grammer and a dictionary and I'm learning as I go. But still, it's damned hard to translate accurately and these mistakes creep in so I welcome any comments on translations and explanations on obscure pieces of Finnish history. Which of course, is being tweaked....

Kiitos.......Nigel
 
An amazing piece of work...

... This TL influenced my Greater Finland and its actions in the HMS Heligoland TL. Pray continue. Our approaches aren't the same, but you are a fund of Finnish capability.

Cheers!:)
 
Placeholder Post on the Lotta Svard has now been completed....

If you are interested, a fairly comprehensive Post on the Lotta Svard was inserted where I had left a Placeholder Post.
 
Just finished catching up. Quite an impressive work. The history is incredibly well documented and the tweaks are subtle and believable.

I was fortunate to visit the defenses near Joensuu a few years back and have a small number of pictures on my harddrive. I'd be happy to send them along if you can use them, though you seem adept at gathering all the material you need yourself!
 
Just finished catching up. Quite an impressive work. The history is incredibly well documented and the tweaks are subtle and believable.

I was fortunate to visit the defenses near Joensuu a few years back and have a small number of pictures on my harddrive. I'd be happy to send them along if you can use them, though you seem adept at gathering all the material you need yourself!

Thx, I'll take you up on that offer. Any and all photos welcome - it's hard tracking these down and funnily enough, Joensuu crops up in the post I'm preparing right now. I'll send you my email address via personal message - let me know if you don't get it.

Kiitos..........Nigel
 
Finnish Government and Politics of the 1920s and 1930s

Finnish Government and Politics of the 1920’s and 1930's

As mentioned briely in an earlier Post, after the Civil War the Finnish Parliament, controlled by the Whites, voted to establish a constitutional monarchy to be called the Kingdom of Finland, with a a German prince as king. However, Germany's defeat in November 1918 made the plan impossible. Finland’s brief alignment with Germany had initially somewhat soured relations with the victorious Allies and Mannerheim, the ex-Tsarist Finnish military commander-in-chief during the Civil War (who had opposed German aid and alignment with Germany) was appointed Regent of Finland.

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After Germany had been forced to surrender in November 1918, General Mannerheim was elected Regent of Finland (from 12 December, 1918, till 27 July, 1919)

As Regent, Mannerheim travelled in Finland and abroad to support Finland’s interests. He also favored supporting the White Russian cause in the Russian Civil War that followed the Bolshevik Revolution. However, the white Russians were still aiming at maintaining the frontiers of the old Russian Empire and Mannerheim played a cautious game, unwilling to commit Finland to intervention without the support of the Allies and recognition of Finland’s independence from the White Russians. In foreign policy, he had to attend to Finnish interests in the tense situation caused by the Russian Civil War. He held to the view that Finland should participate in the occupation of St Petersburg and establish good relations with the government that might replace the Bolshevik Regime. On the other hand, he could not commit himself to the plans of the Russian anti-revolutionaries unless they were able to reorganize their ranks and recognize the right of Finland to independence. He even went as far as to consider leaving the law on the Republic form of government unratified in July 1919, a kind of coup d´etat.

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Mannerheim as Regent, with his Cabinet

The constitution of Finland decreed that the President of the Republic was to be elected by 200 presidential electors, chosen by the people in a general and universal election. The first president would, however, be elected by the parliament. In spring 1919 the principal candidates for the presidency were K.J. Ståhlberg, president of the Supreme Court, backed by the Republican-aligned groups (Progressive Party, Agrarian Party and Social Democrats), and General Mannerheim, backed by the monarchists (the Coalition Party and the Swedish National Party). The so-called Suojeluskuntas circles backed Mannerheim. A delegation of Jägers even went as far as to try and persuade Ståhlberg to withdraw his candidacy. However, in the event, Mannerheim’s support was insufficient - in the presidential election on 25 July, 1919, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg got 143 votes, Mannerheim 50 votes, L.K. Relander one vote and Väinö Tanner one vote. Those who had voted for Ståhlberg regarded his election as a victory of Finnish nationalism and as a guarantee of peace. It was a bitter disappointment for the supporters of Mannerheim, and Ståhlberg found it difficult to find a suitable ADC among the officers.

Mannerheim as a Civilian

For his part, Mannerheim did not wish to withdraw into retirement, but finding a suitable new career was not an easy task. He spent some time travelling outside the country, and in Finland, Mannerheim’s skills and abilities were made use of in a number of confidential posts. He was Chairman of the Finnish Red Cross 1922-1951, and with his authority and support contributed to the establishment of the Mannerheim Child Welfare Association in 1920. Mannerheim regarded socio-political work for the benefit of the nation as the best policy of defence. Similarly, he emphasized that "the youthful strength and belief of the scouts were the best safeguards of our freedom and hopes for the future."

In 1921 Mannerheim accepted the chairmanship of the Finnish Red Cross. The request was put forward by Richard Faltin, Mannerheim’s school-fellow who had been a military surgeon in the Russo-Japanese War, in the First World War and in the Finnish War of Independence of 1918, and was fully familiar with the work the International Red Cross did during the wars to impartially alleviate pain and suffering. It was Faltin who had cured Mannerheim’s fever after the battle of Mukden in 1905. Mannerheim’s sister Sophie was the head nurse in the same hospital with Faltin and was very active in the Finnish Red Cross. One of the reasons for accepting this post may have been, as it has been said, that Mannerheim wanted to emphasize the unpolitical nature of his person in a situation when he was being an object of dispute among the Civil Guards. Mannerheim worked actively in the office of the Red Cross in the 1920s and 1930s, when, for example, an ambulance was equipped to be sent to the Abyssinian War. He also reached a prominent position in the International Red Cross. In the 1940s Mannerheim had little time to participate actively in the work of the Red Cross but he remained chairman till his death.
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Mannerheim at a Finnish Red Cross Function

Mannerheim was invited to be the first honorary scout of the Finnish Scout Association on 16 August, 1919. He had great regard for the scouts’ ideals of chivalry and self-sacrifice, and was of the opinion that these ideals would help them "to win over their more underprivileged brothers into the service of the good and the noble." On 15 February, 1920, he donated to the scouts the so-called Mannerheim badge to be awarded for merit in scout activities. The badge was designed by Akseli Gallen-Kallela. Mannerheim remained a supporter of the scout movement, and in 1936 he was chosen honorary chairman of the Finnish Boy Scouts. Reciprocally, the scouts participated in the Flag Day parade in 1919 and were prominently represented – altogether 11,000 young scouts – at Mannerheim’s funeral.
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Mannerheim meeting Finnish Boy Scouts

After the world war, a group of people, including Mannerheim’s sister Sophie, who was the head nurse in the Surgical Hospital of Helsinki, Arvo Ylppö, assistant professor of pediatrics, and Erik Mandelin, began to consider ways of increasing the efficiency of child protection and welfare in Finland. Their objective was to diminish the rate of infant mortality and to help young people at the threshold of adulthood. Mannerheim contributed to these activities by placing his name and home at the disposal of the child protectors. When General Mannerheim’s Association of Child Welfare was established on 4 October, 1920, in Mannerheim’s home, the general became its honorary chairman. He supported various campaigns, for example the extension of the activities of agricultural clubs, and the organization of the activities of child sponsors. Mannerheim’s authority and reputation was useful to assist with the organization of various initiatives, to settle disagreements and to maintain foreign contacts. The association still functions today in Finland under the name of the Mannerheim Child Welfare Association.
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In 1919 a national collection was organized to donate Mannerheim money as a present from the citizens. This collection yielded 7.5 million marks, and from these funds Mannerheim donated resources to support the pension societies of officers and widows of war, to fight the so-called Spanish Inflienza disease, and to help war orphans. He wanted to alleviate the misery of the poorer citizens and reduce the bitterness between the different social classes.

Also in 1920, Mannerheim was elected Chairman of the central Board of Governors of the newly formed Union Bank of Finland (formed when three smaller Banks merged). The fusion was an attempt to alleviate some of the impacts if the depression experienced at the end of the First World War as Finland’s exports to Russia (formerly its major market for exports) shrank to nothing.Mannerheim continued as chairman of the Board of Governors of Union Bank Inc and from 1931 on held the same post in the Bank of Helsinki. Due to his activities in various other confidential posts, Mannerheim, however, gave up his Banking appointments in the early 1930’s. Despite new arrangements, Mannerheim continued as chairman of the Board of Governors of Union Bank Inc, established in 1924, and from 1931 on in the same post in the Incorporated Bank of Helsinki. In the 1930s economical conditions gradually stabilized. Due to his activities in various other confidential posts, Mannerheim, however, gave up his mission in the bank.
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Mannerheim as a civilian Banker

Mannerheim’s experience as Chairman of the Union Bank gave him business and financial experience and contacts which proved valuable in the mid to late 1920’s as he initiated the Maritime Initiative we have previously looked at, sparking of the rapid growth of the Finnish Maritime Industrial Complex with beneficial effects for both business and workers. Mannerheim also initially supported the aims of the anti-communist Lapua movement, but declined a post in its leadership. Previously, we have mentioned the 1930 Rapproachment that Mannerheim was instrumental in organizing between the Social Democratic Party and the Suojeluskuntas. This was a seminal event in Finnish history, leading as it did to reconciliation between the two major opposing forces of the Finnish Civil War, and as such, is worth readdressing to ensure the importance of the event and of the part played by Mannerheim in engineering the reconciliation is emphasized.

Much of the politicking around the maritime initiative and associated legislation that Mannerheim had been largely instrumental in orchestrating “behind-the-scenes” took place from 1926 to 1930, and for the first two years of this period, 1926-27, the government was a Social Democratic Party minority government headed by Vaino Tanner. Mannerheim, ably assisted by Rudolph Walden (more on him later), successfully negotiated all-party support for the initiative and worked closely with Vaino Tanner to do so. This working relationship led to the slow building of respect and what was to prove to be a lasting professional and personal relationship between the three. It was not an amicable relationship at all times – the political gulf between Tanner on the one hand and Mannerheim and Walden on the other was wide – but there was a slow building of respect for each others capabilities and a deep mutual trust built that had lasting ramifications.

And one of these ramifications was the rapproachment between the Social Democrats and the Suojeluskunta in 1930. This came directly from the working relationship that Mannerheim, Walden and Tanner slowly built. Walden and Risto Ryti were often dinner guests of Mannerheim’s, and as their working relationship grew closer, Tanner was added to the small and informal dinners. Mannerheim and Tanner in particular were eager to heal the wounds of the Civil War, and the SDP was also involved in an ongoing and bitter struggle for control of the Trade Union movement with the Communists. And while Walden strongly opposed Unions, he was even more opposed to the Communists. And Tanner and the SDP in general were concerned about the influence of the far-right within the Suojeluskuntas – a fear that was grounded in the hostility of the Lapua Movement to both the SDP and to Trade Unions in general. Out of discussions on these issues among others came the suggestion that a rapproachment be engineered between the Suojeluskuntas and the SDP, de-politicising the Suojeluskuntas and allowing SDP members to join and actively play a part in the defence of Finland.

Through the 1920’s, the Suojeluskunta and the Social Democrats had largely seen each other through the prism of the Civil War, in which many Social Democrats had fought as Red Guards. After the Civil War, the hostility had continued, although the Social Democrats had to a certain extent moved away from the Communists. There were still, particularly in the industrial city of Tampere, running brawls between the so-called Lahtarit (the Butchers) and the Punikit (the Reddies). Mannerheim and Tanner saw a rapproachment as step towards healing the wounds of the Civil War and building national unity while at the same time helping to take some of the heat out of the ill-feelings that the Lapua Movements actions were creating. While hot-heads at both extremes of the political spectrum agitated towards a replay of the Civil War, Mannerheim and Tanner were moving in the opposite direction, wanting to coll things down and draw the extremes closer together.

The rapproachment itself was largely orchestrated behind the scenes by Vaino Tanner and Mannerheim and its public announcement was one of the more epochal moments in Finland’s history (and not incidentally, one that also happened to subsequently remove a major obstacle to increased defence spending in reducing the opposition within the SDP to spending on the military). In February of 1930, at the urging of Tanner, and with the active support of Mannerheim, the SDP party committee had first made private contact with the Suojeluskunta leadership, and the two organisations found common ground very fast. When, in March 1930, Mannerheim, Major-General Malmberg (the head of the Suojeluskuntas, Lotta-General Fanny Luukkonen and SDP Leader Vaino Tanner publicly and jointly announced in both press releases and on a live radio broadcast (that was listened to by more than half Finland’s population at that time – in other words, everyone with access to a radio) that the Suojeluskunta and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) shared a common vision of the need for a spirit of national unity within Finland, jointly saw the dangers of the rising move towards totalitarianism in Europe and encouraged Finnish citizens of all political persuausions to join the Suojeluskunta or Lotta Svärd, this was a momentuous and earth-shattering political event that captured headlines across Finland.

Tanner had done his behind-the-scenes prepartions within the Social Democrat organisation well, and Mannerheim’s allies and supporters within the Suojeluskunta and the rightist political parties had also done their groundwork. There was little publicly voiced opposition in the Press, indeed the Press generally hailed the rapproachment in the spirit with which it was made. The Communists reviled the move, but they were on the verge of becoming an illegal and underground movement, and the actions of the Lapua Movement in destroying their printing presses and publications had ensured that they were unable to voice their opposition publicly although the Unions they controlled or influenced were quick to make their opposition known. Within the Suojeluskunta, members were ready to take the first step in removing hostility between the SDP and the Sk-organization. A formal event welcoming both Social Democrats into the Suojeluskunta, and Sk-members into the SDP was held on the 15th of March1930. The symbolic significance was large, but the actual results for members of both organizations were not immediately so. By the 10th of April 1930, only about 1,000 Social Democrats had joined the Suojeluskunta. However, with Mannerheim, Vaino Tanner, other SDP politicians and party leaders and Suojeluskunta leaders working together to emphasis the need for Finland’s defences to be strengthened, and continually emphasizing that the Suojeluskunta was a “Finnish” organisation, and not a “political” organisation, membership of the Suojeluskunta began to grow significantly from 1931 on. An added incentive were the new financial incentives for Suojeluskunta training included within the State Budget from 1931 on, as well as the support offered by both state-owned and private businesses for Suojeluskunta membership. While there was still Union opposition, it became ever more muted over time as more and more Union members joined.

The Appointment of Mannerheim as Chairman of the Defence Council in 1931

After being elected President, P.E. Svinhufvud asked Mannerheim to take the post of the chairman of the Defence Council (1931-1939). Mannerheim accepted after negotiating various conditions, including the appointment by parliamentary consensus of Rudolph Walden as Defence Minister, securing control over all Defense Spending for the Chairman of the Defence Council, negotiating increased levels of defense spending for 1931 and yearly increases thereafter and also giving him command authority over the Armed Forces, allowing him to implement changes and reforms as he saw fit. It is relevant to note at this point that the support of the Social Democratic Party, and of Vaino Tanner in particular, was a crucial factor in the granting of the powers requested by Mannerheim and the meeting of the conditions requested (such as the appointment of Rudolph Walden as Defence Minister, a post he held by an all-party consensus from 1931 to the end of the Second World War). With the close personal relationship and trust between Mannerheim and Vaino Tanner that had been built up during the negotiations leading to the Maritime Initiative legislation and the Rapproachment between the Social Democratic Party and the Suojeluskuntas, it is doubtful that the SDP would have agreed to the awarding of what was in effect complete control of the military and of all military spending to Mannerheim.

As we will see in later Posts, under Mannerheims’ chairmanship, and working hand-in-glove with the Defense Minister, Rudolph Walden (1931-1944 – appointed as Defense Minister in 1931 by an all-party consensus at Mannerheim’s request, concurrent with his accepting the position of chairman of the Defence Council) and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Military, the Defence Council steered and managed the expansion of the Finnish military industry and the ongoing expansion of capabilities of the Finnish Armed Forces. In this position, Mannerheim also organized campaigns to strengthen the positive attitudes of the general public towards matters of defence, supported the Scandinavian trend in foreign policy and sought close cooperation with Sweden, for example in matters concerning the defence of Åland and the development of arms production. The strengthening of the defence-relationship with Sweden did not, however, entirely proceed in the direction Mannerheim had hoped for (this, and foreign policy in general, will be covered shortly in a further post).

At this point, a brief introduction to Rudolph Walden is in order given that he served continuously as Defence Minister from 1931-44 under different governments and working closely with Mannerheim, Vaino Tanner and Risto Ryti throughtout this entire period. While Mannerheim can be seen as the great architect, strategist and war-time commander of the Finnish military and Risto Ryti can be seen as the financier who worked monetary magic to make the necessary funding available, Walden was the guiding hand behind the development of the Finnish military-industrial complex from 1931 to 1944, a positon from which he worked miracles in driving research, development and productionalisation of the Finnish armaments and munitions industry on a limited budget. It was Walden who ensured that the Finnish military were equipped with sufficient weapons and ammunition to fight first the Russians, and then the Germans. It was Walden who drove the design and introduction into the military of some of the more innovative Finnish weapons (as we will see when we look at the Finnish military-industrial complex, it’s development and the weapons produced in a later post). It was Walden who ensured the Ilmavoimat had a locally-based construction capability which ensured that through the length of the Winter War, the Ilmavoimats aircraft could be maintained and repaired, as well as new aircraft continuing to be constructed.

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Rudolph Walden (December 1, 1878, Helsinki – October 25, 1946) was born the second eldest son of the Ähtäri District Court Judge Walfrid Walden and his wife, Mathilda Christina nee the Sommelius family. He started school at Jyväskylä Lyceum, but had poor success at school. Every summer he failed to pass his classes in Finnish and Swedish language. His father then made a decision; both of the younger sons, Rudolf and Nils, were sent to the Hamina Cadet School in 1890. The Finnish Hamina Cadet School then had seven grades, four general and three special. The former corresponded with the upper grades of Secondary School, and led to the Matriculation Examination, while the special grades prepared officers for the military. Rudolf was 11 years when he arrived at Hamina. He transformed himself into a diligent student, and before long he was the best in his class. His talent expressed itself in mathematics and military sciences, and he became ambitious. After having completed the general grades, Rudolf continued into the special grades, having decided to become an officer. The teachers and his circle of friends educated the youngster in a positive manner.

As the Cadet Sergeant Major and the best of his Cadet course, he would have been entitled to get into a Russian elite regiment, but because of Russification measures being taken in Finland he refused, and joined the Finnish Guard as an officer with the rank of Junior Lieutenant in August 1900. In the summer of 1901, the military force of the Grand Duchy of Finland was abolished, with the exception of the Guard's Battalion. Being loyal to the military of the Grand Duchy of Finland, Walden submitted his resignation, but it was not approved, and he was ordered to serve as a military member of the Kuopio Conscription Board. Walden refused and was threatened with punishment, with the case eing processed in the Military Supreme Court. Thus his case became part of the legality battle of the so-called Years of Oppression, and this is also how Walden viewed it. Walden was condemned to lose his post and also to lose the salary benefits associated with it. His short military career ended and s long career as an industrialist began.

In the village of Borskoye Tatarovo in Russia there was a paper mill owned by Finns, where an accountant and office clerk was needed. Walden was neither, but the maverick convicted and sacked Junior Lieutenant decided to take the position as there was a post and an offer of a salary. He bought a textbook on accounting and boarded a train. Within a year the company went bankrupt. The superintendent of the Jämsänkoski Factories then offered Walden the post of Office Chief of the Slovo Company in St Petersburg. The new Office Chief quickly noticed that the economy of the company was in the red, the workers stole company property, and there was a sluggish rate of work at the printing press and the agency. Walden returned discipline, and soon the company was succeeding. Within a couple of years, Walden was the CEO of Slovo. Business went well and customers trusted him.
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Patalankosken paperitehdas ja hiomo Jämsänkoskella 1900-luvun alussa / Patalankoski paper mill - early 20th century

In 1911 he took a further position as the representative of the Simpele Paper Mill, the products of which he also began to sell in the Russian market. He also bought some of the company's shares and was elected as a Board Member of Simpele in 1910. The value of the shares began to quickly rise as WW1 went on – and Walden bought all available shares. By 1918 he owned about 28 per cent of the stock of Simpele. At the end of the same year, he bought a good third of the stock of Myllykoski Träsliperi Co. and in May 1919 was elected to the Board of Myllykoski and made its Chairman. At this time, co-operation within the Finnish paper industry between the families of Björnberg and Walden began, a co-operation which continued until 1952, when Myllykoski split off the United Paper Mills.

Walden's third move was due to both Simpele and Myllykoski needing a cellulose factory of there own. It turned out that the majority of shares of the Jämsänköski Company was available and a deal was made in November 1919, with the company transferred to the joint ownership of Simpele and Myllykoski, with Walden again as the Chairman of the Board. In the summer of 1920, Simpele, Myllykoski, and Jämsänkoski were merged into one conglomerate, Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat Oy (United Paper Mills), with Walden as the Chairman of the Board and owning a good quarter of the stock. Walden's fourth lucky strike took place in Valkeakoski in the Sääksmäki parish, where a minor paper mill and wood grinding plant had been built in the 1870's. The industry had later been expanded with the construction of the first suphate cellulose factory in Finland. Aktiebolag Walkiakoski was owned by Helsingin Osakepankki Bank in the early 1920's, and the bank was looking for an industrialist who could get the company back on its feet again. Walden was chosen to head Valkeakoski in 1925. After many negotiations, United Paper Mills acquired the majority of Valkeakoski shares in 1929, and the formal merger took place in 1934. From interests in forests, rapids, sulphite and sulphate cellulose and paper factories there developed a logical and economical entity. The history of the company remembers the Jämsänkoski "million-summer" of 1920, which was a remarkable bloodletting, as a great deal of money was spent on grandiose renovations that proved useless. When Walden returned from the Dorpat (Tartu) peace negotiations and familiarized himself with the situation, a radical reform of management followed; more than 30 men left Jämsänkoski.

On 27 January 1918 Mannerheim ordered his troops to disarm the Bolshevik troops in Ostrobothnia. On the same day Rudolf Walden returned to Helsinki from St Petersburg. On the next day, Kullervo Manner ordered the mobilization of the Red Guards. The Finnish Civil War had begun. Within a week Walden had reported to the service of the White Army in Seinäjoki, when he met Mannerheim for the first time. Walden knew what sort of a man Mannerheim was, but Mannerheim only knew that Walden was a businessman who spoke Russian like a native, had gone to Cadet School and had served briefly as a Lieutenant but was now aged 39 years. After their meeting, Walden was ordered to serve as an assistant to the Commander-in-Chief (Mannerheim) in the General Headquarters, and two weeks later he was promoted to Major. Long hours were worked at the General Headquarters, as there was more to do than here were men to do the work. This suited Walden, who had always slept poorly and worked effectively at night. Among his first tasks was achieving a reconciliation between the views of Mannerheim and of the Jägers. The dispute in views was escalating to the point where the White Army was about to lose either its Supreme Commander or the Jägers. Walden worked out a solution to the situation, which had far-reaching consequences for the whole war.

Because of his organizing skills, Walden was then assigned to act as the Commandant of Seinäjoki, the District Chief of Vaasa and the Chief of Depot Command. Major Walden's job description included among others handling issues related to foodstuffs, horses, vehicles, material, hospitals, railroad transport, postal and police matters. The businessman had the task of creating from the logistical capabilities of the White Army from nothing and in this he achieved outstanding success. After the capture of Tampere, Walden was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and awarded the Liberty Cross, Second Class. After the war, Mannerheim and Walden submitted their applications for resignation. Mannerheim approved Walden's resignation one day before Regent P. E. Svinhufvud accepted Mannerheim's resignation. Mannerheim thanked his men, but forgot about Walden's promotion. The new Supreme Commander, Major General Karl Fredrik Wilkman, announced after a few weeks that Walden was entitled to wear a uniform and had been promoted to Colonel.

After the Civil War, Walden returned to managing his industrial interests and satisfactory results were soon achieved. Trade with Russia, where most of exports had gone until 1917, had ended in 1918. Germany had surrendered in the autumn of 1918. Britain and the United States still lived in war economy. Finnish paper producers tried to get trade started, but they had no information on how to conduct successful trade with Western countries as prior to WW1 there primary market had been within Russia. Walden saw that the weak economic basis of the country had to be strengthened quickly: industry must get up and running, exports must get going, and money must move. With Gösta Serlachius, he quickly created the Finnish paper mills association, took its chairmanship in July 1918, and thus rose to the number one position within the Finnish paper industry.

However, even before the year ended, Mannerheim and Walden were again carriers of state responsibility as the Regent and the War Minister respectively. One of Walden’s first tasks as War Minister, acting also as the Supreme Commander in command of the troops, was to escort the German soldiers in the country outside the national borders. From the beginning of 1919 the Supreme Command was transferred to the Regent Mannerheim, and the Chief of the Army with command tasks became Major General Wilkama. Along with the creation of the Finnish military, Conscription was instituted, the Law on Conscription and the Decree on the Suojeluskuntas were passed and the Officer School (Kadettikoulu) and Staff College (Sotakorkeakoulu) were established. The country had an energetic and precise War Minister who did not tolerate procrastination. When he gave an order, a report on how the matter had been dealt with had to be ready in short order. As a businessman, Walden took Army purchasing under his personal control. The status of the imprisoned Reds after the battles of 1918, now in camps, also had to be solved. Walden's view was that those imprisoned must be set free and people allowed to return to their families and back to work. Also Mannerheim had spoken at length about this, and in the spring of 1919 a decree was passed to end the action of the Courts of State Crimes and award a general amnesty. In 1919, on the first anniversary of the capture of Tampere, Walden was promoted to Major-General, thus he had risen from Lieutenant to General in 14 months.

While Walden was War Minister, Finnish troops were involved in the Aunus Campaign when Britain intervened, demanding that the Finnish soldiers in Repola return to Finland. The Cabinet decided that relations with London should not be put at risk. Action to assist the Karelians was forbidden, but individual initiative was permitted. According to the foreign press at the time, Finland was preparing to march an Army of 40-50 000 men on St Petersburg. Britain and Finland denied the rumor vigorously but the damage had already been done and Soviet Russia sent a protest note to Finland. In June 1919. eleven municipalities in Viipuri Province were declared to be in a state of war. Certain domestic pressure groups bombarded the War Ministry with demands to send troops to Aunus and Admiral Kolchak, who had set out from Siberia to march on Moscow, telegraphed direct to Mannerheim requesting him to join in a pincer movement against St Petersburg. The Chief of the Army Wilkama resigned and Walden submitted his own resignation. When the Cabinet announced that no commitments had been made to Kolchak and there was no planned campaign against St Petersburg, Walden took back his request for resignation.

After having lost the Presidential elections to K. J. Ståhlberg, Mannerheim had retreated into private life. After the Dorpat (Tartu) peace treaty had been signed in 1920, Walden also retired from politics and moved back to business. At the same time however, Walden thought about the international status of Finland, the rise of bolshevism in the East, the internal disputes within Finland and especially the status of Finland’s military forces. In Walden's opinion, Mannerheim had to be returned to lead the military and he pushed this opinion forcefully and with all the sizable influence at his disposal. After Svinhufvud became President, the Defence Council was reorganized, Mannerheim became its Chairman, and Walden became both Defense Minister and also, at Mannerheim’s demand, a member of the Defense Council.

Foreign diplomats sent dispatches: “Finland has an out-of-Parliament Cabinet ready, should the country get into a state of emergency”. Mannerheim and Walen almost immediately found themselves in the midst of internal rows within the Army Headquarters over the massive shortcomings in armament and equipment. Mannerheim and Walden worked closely with Risto Ryti, J. K. Paasikivi and Väinö Tanner to determine on a course of action. Paasikivi was the first to agree, Ryti worked on various financial alternatives to fund increased defense spending while Tanner agreed with the defence initiatives in general while demanding improvements in the status of the labor class simultaneously with arms acquisition. With the support of the rightist parties as well as the SDP, defence spending increased significantly in 1931 and therafter, every year saw further increases in the budgetary allocations (something we will examine in detail, together with the development of the military-industrial complex) in a subsequent post.

In the middle of these early problems the Mäntsälä rebellion took place. Walden had supported the Lapua movement in its early stages but now its leaders demanded the President dissolve the Sunila Cabinet and nominate “Walden's Cabinet” instead. Walden was emphatic and vocal in his public condemnation of the Mäntsälä rebellion and its proposals, publicly stating his complete support for Svinhufvud and the current Cabinet and government and his statements helped seal the collapse of the rebellion. We will follow Walden’s career, the development of the Finnish military industrial complex and the specifics of Finnish armaments in a later post (as mentioned earlier). Suffice it to say that through the 1930’s, Walden and Mannerheim followed the development of events in Germany and Hitler's consolidation of power with concern, whist simultaneously doing their best to hasten the building up of Finland’s armaments and military strength. At the same time they tried to engineer closer relations with the other Nordic countries, especially Sweden. There was some response, even though the language row caused difficulties. Walden was annoyed by the dispute, but one target for the blame for feeding the language row was the newspaper Uusi Suomi, the board of which Walden was a member of.

Walden held a conservative view on the politics of the labor market. Labor organizing themselves into trade unions and collective agreements on wages were like a red rag to a bull for him. His view was that on wages and conditions of employment, the employer should have the right to agree directly with the employee without the interference of any outsider. The solutions should also be personal: a good worker must get more pay than a poorer one. For their level, the wages were very low for a long time, so much so that in August 1933 his son Juuso, who was a chief clerk at Valkeakoski, wrote his father a long letter advocating a general pay rise for the labor force. Walden’s reply letter to his son was as long, as he explained the grounds for his most important decisions. Mild pay rises were now allowed, however, with some considerations. Walden's view was that only a Suojeluskuntas member was a good worker irritated many workmen and the labor movement. This battle was spearheaded by a columnist of the Suomen Sosialidemokraatti (The Finnish Social Democrat), Sasu Punanen (the alias of Yrjö Räisänen), whose columns specifically criticized Walden among others.
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Yrjö Räisänen, a left-wing columnist who wrote under the alias of Sasu Punanen:

The insults angered others as well, and the Central League of the Wood Refining Industry contacted Tanner to ask him to calm down the columnist’s bad mouthing. As Defense Minister and a member of the Defence Council, Walden found himself working almost on a daily basis with Vaino Tanner and this and the rapid growth in SDP members joining the Suojeluskuntas following the 1930 Rapproachment all combined to influence Walden into accepting the justification for organized labor and an egalitarian contracting mechanism in the mid-1930’s. The fatherhood of the idea of "the engagement of January 1934" between the STK (Suomen Työnantajain Keskusliitto: The Central League of Finland's Employers) and the SAK (Suomen Ammattijärjestöjen Keskusliitto: The Central League of Finland's Labor Unions) is generally ascribed to K. A. Fagerholm. Colonel Lehmus has later claimed he owns notes that prove Mannerheim and Walden playing key roles behind this engagement. The idea and the preparatory work were Fagerholm's, but without the duo of Mannerheim and Walden backing the initiative, the agreement would never have got the signatures of the STK leaders.

As Defence Minister through the decade of the 1930’s, Walden also commited his own industries to supporting the ongoing improvements in Finnish defence. Workers were encouraged to join the Suojeluskuntas, with paid leave for attendance on training courses and annual exercises and preference was given to hiring Suojeluskuntas members. In the early days, before the Maavoimat provided individual weapons to the Suojeluskuntas, Walden’s companies paid for Rifles for his employees who wished to join and contributed financially to the local units to which they belonged. Walden also made significant financial contribitions to the Lotta Svard organisation and encouraged female employees and the wifes and daughters of employees to join the Lottas. Walden’s companies made substantial purchases of Finnish Defence Bonds annually, and encouraged workers to contribute via matching employer contributions. Following the decision to purchase modern artillery for the Finnish Army in the mid-1930s, Walden established at his own expense a shell lathe plant with five lathes at the Valkeakoski Mill. Initial production was 300 shells per day, but this was soon increased to 500 shells and then, following the Munich Crisis, a further five lathes were installed and production was increased to 1,000 shells per day. At the same time, an additional ten lathes were purchased and installed as a “war preparation contingency measure” but were not brought on to use until August 1939.

At this time, when negotiations with the Soviet Union were not going well, these additional lathes were brought into production and by running triple shifts with the lathes running day and night, 7 days a week production soared to some 5,000 shells per day. Over the three months prior to the Winter War breaking out, this measure alone resulted in some 450,000 additional artillery shells being added to the war reserve (at a not insignificant personal cost to Walden’s company as this was undertaken on Walden’s personal initiative and was not funded by the Defence Budget in any way, although it must be added that after war broke out, Walden was reimbursed at cost). At Walden’s urging, other companies undertook similar initiatives, largely from the mid-1930’s on – the larger companies following Walden’s example and establishing these at their own expense while smaller companies did so at cost, forgoing any profit margins to contribute towards Finland’s defence. In the late 1930’s as the threat of war loomed ever larger, Walden also ordered the United Paper Mills to order and stockpile foreign raw materials much in excess of need as a war preparation measure. In his position as Defense Minister, he had regulations passed requiring other large industrial organisations to undertake similar measures.
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Rudolph Walden – Finnish Industralist (picture from 1929). Walden was known as a tough and cool negotiator. He represented Finland in the negotiation of all peace treaties between Finland and Soviet Union: The Treaty of Tartu of 1920 and the Moscow Peace Treaty of September 1940; also in the Norwegian Neutrality Agreement with Germany (November 1940); he represented Finland in the 1943 Tehran Conference where it was agreed that Finland would enter the war on the Allied side and again at the February 1945 Yalta Conference where Europe’s post-war reorganization was discussed between Churchill, Roosevelt and Malenkov, who had emerged as the political leader of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death.

The wars demanded a heavy sacrifice from Walden. He lost his son Rudi in October 1941 from an accident in Eastern Karelia as he was returning on leave. In August 1944 his youngest son, Lieutenant (posthumously promoted to Captain) Lauri Walden fell fighting with the Jaeger Airborne Division as the Finnish Army fought desperately to break through to relieve the besieged Polish Home Army in the battle of Warsaw. Defence Minister and Infantry General Rudolf Walden was paralyzed in November 1944 at his Helsinki home, the Marble Palace of Kaivopuisto, and he died at the Rapala Estate in Sysmä on 25 October 1946. He was buried at the Hietaniemi Cemetery of Helsinki. After Karl Rudolf Walden died, Marshal Mannerheim wrote to his widow: "I will preserve his faithful friendship with gratitude in my memory. It bound us together always from the very moment, when our roads joined on the darkest days of the War of Liberty. Not the smallest cloud has shadowed it. His experience as a large scale industrialist, his imagination, when it was a question of creating the Army organization from entirely nothing, they were the factors that Finland needed right then. As a Minister of Defense hrough both peace and war and as the grand scale constructor of our war industry our country has never had anyone like him".

During his military and civilian career, Walden had received several domestic and foreign honors and awards. For his actions during and after the War of Liberty (the Civil War), Walden received the Cross of Liberty, 1st Class with a grand star. He also received the Iron Cross of Imperial Germany in 1918. In 1919 he was made Commander of the Order of the White Rose of Finland. Later he received the Grand Cross of the Order. In peace time in the 1920's Walden became a Knight of the Swedish Order of the North Star and in 1928 he was awarded the Danish Grand Cross of the Order of the Dannebrog personally from King Kristian X. The King also thanked Walden for the sacrifices for Denmark of his maternal grandfather. As the Minister of Defense during the Winter War and later, during Finnish involvement in the Second World War, Walden received several additional high decorations including the Swedish Grand Cross of the Royal Order of the Sword and on 2 December 1944, the Mannerheim Cross of the Order of the Cross of Liberty.

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When you’re an industrial magnate, you live like an industrial magnate. This is the so-called Marble Palace in Kaivopuisto, Helsinki, where Rudolf Walden lived from1937 to his death in 1946. It was originally built for the Swedish-born factory owner and art collector August Keirkner in 1918 – he was killed in the Finnish Civil War and his widow sold the house to Walden in 1937. After Walden's death, in 1947 the State of Finland rented the building. The Marble Palace was transferred to State ownership in 1949, and currently it is used by the Labour Court. The building was designed by the architect Eliel Saarinen (1873-1950), and it is protected as a significant building of Finnish architecture and cultural history. The Marble Palace is located about 300 m from Mannerheim's house, where Walden was often invited as a dinner guest.

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And a look at the “Marble Palace” from the other side

Returning Now to the Politics of the 1920’s

In the Interwar Period the politically important parties in Finland were:

Suomen Sosialidemokrattinen Puolue / Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) founded in 1899: Political Stance – emphasized Social Welfare and State Socialism

Kansallinen Kokoomuspuolue / National Coalition Party (KOK ) founded in 1918: Political Stance – conservative

Kansallinen Edistyspuolue / National Progressive Party (ED) founded in 1918: Political Stance – Liberal and Republican

Maalaisliitto / Agrarian (ML): Political Stance – represented the interests of farmers and the rural population in general

Suomen Kommusnistinen Puolue / Communist Party of Finland (SKP) founded in 1918: Political Stance: Communism and alliance with the Soviet Union (illegal from 1931 to after WW2)

Isänmaallinen Kansanliike / Patriotic People's Movement (IKL): Political Stance: Fascist, far-right

Suomen Pienviljelijäin Puolue / Smallholders Party of Finland ( ) founded in 1929: Political Stance – communist front organisation

Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue / Swedish People’s Party of Finland (SFP) founded in 1906: Poltical Stance – represented the interests of Swedish speaking Finns

Generally speaking, the main parties were the SDP, National Coalition (Kokoomus), National Progressive (Edistys), Agrarian (Maalaisliitto) with the SFP (Swedish People’s Party) consistently representing the Swedish-speaking minority. In the early 1930’s, the IKL emerged as a further and far-right minority party. Governments throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s were generally either a left-centre coalition or a centre-right coalition made up of various party groupings. Of the 19 governments that were in office in the 21 years between independance and the Winter War, 14 were minority or caretaker governments. Even the majority governments generally only lasted for a short while in office. An exception in the series of short-lived governments was T.M. Kivimäki's minority government consisting of the centre parties which stayed in office for nearly four years between 1932 and 1936. In this period it was usually the non-socialist centre and right parties who formed governments.

After the defeat of the left in the civil war and the departure of radical elements from its ranks, the SDP had been reconstituted in the same year under the leadership of the moderate Vainö Tanner, an opponent of the use of violence for political ends. Although still the country's largest political party, the SDP first entered the government in 1926-27 when the party assumed office alone as a minority government formed by Tanner. The SDP were not included in a governing coalition again until 1937, when it joined the Agrarian Party (Maalaisliitto-ML) in forming the first of the so-called Red-Earth governments (OTL - the most common and important coalition pattern for the next fifty years of Finnish political history). At that time, a tempering of SDP policy on the place of the small farmer in Finnish society permitted political cooperation with the Agrarians, although the party retained its program of a planned economy and the socialization of the means of production.

It was in 1937 that the SDP first began to demand the right of collective bargaining, and the party remained closely connected to organized labor. In 1930, for example, it had formed the Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions (Suomen Ammattiyhdistysten Keskusliitto--SAK) in an attempt to counter communist influence in the labor movement while at the same time negotiating the Rapproachment with the Suojeluskuntas. Throughout the decade of the 1930’s, the Winter War and through the length of the Second World War, the SDP contributed significantly to national unity, while resisting both far-rightist dreams of a Greater Finland and an alliance with Nazi Germany on the one hand and the desires of others on the far-left for an early truce and the surrender of Finnish territory to the Soviet Union.

Given the many different governments, it’s pointless to examine these individually. Instead, we will take a quick and very high level look at some of the major initiatives that were undertaken through the 1920’s. Agrarian Reform was a key initiative. Large scale agrarian reform in the 1920s involved breaking up the large estates controlled by the old nobility and selling the land to peasants and tenant-farmers. As a result, the farmers became strong supporters of the government. Prohibition was introduced in 1919 with the same results that other countries who tried this measure experienced. Alcohol abuse had a long history in Finland, especially binge drinking and public intoxication, which became a crime in 1733. In the 19th century the punishments became stiffer and stiffer, but the problem persisted. A strong abstinence movement emerged that cut consumption in half from the 1880s to the 1910s, and gave Finland the lowest drinking rate in Europe. Four attempts at instituting the complete prohibition of alcohol during the Grand Duchy period were rejected by the Tsar; with the Tsar gone Finland enacted Prohibition from 1919. Smuggling emerged and enforcement was slipshod. Criminal convictions for drunkenness went up by 500%, and violence and crime rates soared. Public opinion turned against the Prohibition law, and a national plebiscite resulted in 70% voting for repeal of the legislation, consequently prohibition was ended in early 1932.

While a separate Post will examine Finland’s foreign relations and the ongoing attempts to build defensive alliances, one issue that we should mention within the context of internal politics is the serious dispute over the Åland Islands, which were overwhelmingly Swedish-speaking and sought to secede to Sweden shortly after independance. As Finland was not willing to cede the islands, they were offered an autonomous status. Nevertheless, the residents did not approve the offer, and the dispute over the islands was submitted to the League of Nations. The League decided that Finland should retain sovereignty over the Åland Islands, but they should be made an autonomous province. Thus Finland was under an obligation to ensure the residents of the Åland Islands had a right to maintain the Swedish language, as well as their own culture and local traditions. At the same time, an international treaty was concluded on the neutral status of Åland, under which it was prohibited to place military forces on the islands or establish fortifications.

In an earlier Post, we looked at the development of the Maritime Industrial Cluster and the rapid growth of Finland’s economy through the later 1920’s and the decade of the 1930’s. We will not go into this in any further detail, but suffice it to say that Finland’s economy through this period experienced perhaps the greatest percentage growth rate in Europe – approximately 7% annual growth through this period – with the Great Depression having only a minor impact. The rapid growth of the economy resulted in a steadily increasing government revenue from taxation, and the establishment and rapid growth of a number of state-owned enterprises also contributed significant revenue steams. While prior to 1938, defence spending was never a large percentage of the State Budget, it did increase steadily as the financial position of the state improved.

A Financial Success Story

At the end of WW1, Finland was a little known country saddled with debt to the United States, incurred when Finland borrowed just over eight million dollars between 1918 and 1920 to ease acute post war food shortages. Finland agreed to repay the loans over a 62-year period, with an interest rate of 3% for the first ten years, and 3.5 % thereafter. Finland was not alone in owing significant relief and reconstruction monies to the United States. In 1922, the United States had negotiated loan agreements totalling slightly more than 11.5 billion dollars with 15 European countries. But Finland alone turned around an ill-deserved reputation for being a “bad debtor” with a public relations coup when it was the only country that repaid its debt in full. In 1931, in the face of the worldwide economic depression, the United States announced a one-year moratorium on all inter-governmental loans. Debtors, with the sole exception of Finland, took this moratorium to be a pardon. In 1933, only six countries made token payments on their loans. The following year, Finland earned the distinction of being the only country to continue to pay its principal and interest payments in full.

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Cartoon in Philadelphia Public Ledger. Photo: Courtesy of the Bank of Finland

Finland’s hopes for a rehabilitation of its reputation were satisfied. Between 1933 and 1936, when widespread economic hardship in the United States stoked public resentment of the European loan defaults, American newspapers published nearly 3,000 stories trumpeting Finland’s faithful repayment of the loan. Finland was widely portrayed as a small northern country willing to give the shirt off its back, while it’s more affluent neighbors left their debts unpaid. Finnish authorities were well aware of the public relations value of their resolve. In December 1934, then Governor of the Bank of Finland and later wartime President Risto Ryti remarked in a widely quoted interview that Finland could do nothing less than repay its debt in full: “It is only natural. We signed the contract. We promised to pay. It is the only honest thing to do.”

Finland continued to make regular payments on the loan until the 1940s, when a second moratorium was granted because of World War II. At that time, U.S. and Finnish authorities agreed that future remissions would be invested to benefit Finland. OTL, in 1949, the U.S. Congress passed a law allowing Finnish payments to fund travel in the United States for Finnish researchers and acquisition of American scientific and scholarly literataure and technical equipment for Finland’s institutes of higher education. Finland’s final loan payment in 1976 created the Finnish-U.S. Educational Trust Fund.

The Lapua Movement and the Emergence of the IKL

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The Finnish landscape was populated with new monuments in the 1920s, as old battlefields and cemeteries from the Civil War to the war of 1809 were given new memorials in a wave of public need to remember the past and create new heroes for the young country. But while the winners were well remembered and their deaths were politicized, the Red side was unable to mourn and remember their own fallen in public on a similar scale.

The Lapua Movement (Finnish: Lapuan Liike, Swedish: Lapporörelsen), named after the then municipality, and current town, of Lapua, was a political movement in Finland. Lapuan Liike started in 1929 and was initially dominated by ardent anti-communist nationalists, emphasizing the legacy of nationalist activism and the Civil War in Finland. The leaders of the Lapua Movement were Lapua man Vihtori Kosola and Army Major-General Kurt Martti Wallenius. With memories of the Civil War still both fresh and bitter, the movement saw itself as the badly needed restorer of what was won in the Civil War, supporting Lutheranism, nationalism, and anti-communism in a reaction to the threat of socialism and the strong Communist movement. In this situation, where both camps of the Civil War expected a new showdown, events in November 1929 were a logical outcome of the tense situation. This new chapter in the political history of Finland began when the Communist youth organization scheduled a large gathering in the town of Lapua, Ostrobothnia. This was clearly a deliberate and open provocation. Many Ostrobothnians had been active in the struggle for an independent Finland, gaining national fame in the Jaeger movement. During the Civil War the region had been one the strongest support areas for the White war effort. As the delegates of the SKP youth organization arrived at the railway station openly wearing their red shirts, things quickly got tense. As rumours begun to circulate that "an anti-religious meeting" was a part of the planned weekend program of the SKP gathering, an angry mob of locals soon surrounded the school were the meeting was to be held, and then stormed the building. Participants were beaten up and stripped of their shirts while rifles were sporadically fired towards the building from the crowd. The local police made no attempt to intervene.

The news of the event was on the frontpages of national newspapers on the following day. There was also an announcement that the "honest patriotic farmers of Ostrobothnia have founded a new political movement to defend their way of life against the growing threat of Communist infiltration." While the provocation organized by the Communists in Lapua was most likely genuinely intented to be a mere show of force, it was almost certainly used as an excuse to start something that organized right-wing forces from within the Kokoomus (National Coalition Party), elements of the Suojeluskunta and major employer's organizations, especially an anti-strike organisation known as Vientirauha (Freedom of Export) had been working towards through the whole year of 1929. In what would later be known as the founding speech of the new Finnish mass movement on December 1, 1930 an anti-communist meeting was held, attracting more than 1,000 people. A ban on all communist activities was demanded., a prominent local landlord, Vihtori Kosola, told his cheering Lapuan audience that "All communist activity will have to be effectively repressed...I doubt it will be ever be possible under the existing system of government and thus the time has come for we the people to act for ourselves...Kosola then told that the Finnish farmers, "the backbone of our nation" as he called them, "...should rise up and put an end to the futile posturings of the politicians in Helsinki...it is a waste of time to send delegations, it would indeed be better to send riflemen to Helsinki..." He ended by stating that "it may well be that the whole present form of government and the parliamentary system will have to be sacrificed if we are to be saved as an independent nation."

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Kosola and his followers praying. A remarkable feature of the Lapua Movement was the strong contribution of Pietism, a fundamentalist Lutherian sect. For many rank-and-file members of the movement, opposition to Communism was a sacred struggle against the forces of Satan himself and thus merely their duty as devout Christians

This meeting in Lapua on the 1st of December was then imitated all over Finland with many similar speeches being made and similar resolutions passed. Suddenly a new political force sprang into existence seemingly resulting from a spontaneously organized local protest. Few noticed how surprisingly soon the Lapua Movement begun to wield plenty of money and how quickly it managed to form an effective nation-wide organization. On March 1930 representatives from all over the country gathered in Lapua to set up a new national coordination body, Suomen Lukko - Finland's Lock, dedicated to anti-communist struggle and aspiring to become a unified national front for the Right. Many politicians and also some high-ranking military officers were initially sympathetic to the Lapua Movement, as anti-communism was the norm in the educated classes after the Civil War and so within this new movement prominent bankers, major industrialists, high-ranking officers and agrarian politicians joined forces with the leaders of the formally agrarian Lapua Movement. The grouping also created a new political program for the organization, stressing the "urgent need of direct action and the need to meet force with force."

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Vihtori Kosola speaking

Suomen Lukko had got off to a roaring start, as almost all of the institutions of the Right joined in. In 1930 it enjoyed the support of the great majority of non-socialist Finns and was truly a new, genuine popular mass movement. With new slogans such as "Herää Suomi!" (Finland Awaken) and "Me Teemme Mitä Tahdomme" (We do what we will), the radicals of the new movement openly stating their willingness to stir up trouble. It is however important to notice the differences between the paternal autocratism of the Lapua Movement and central European Fascism. Despite the fact that Vihtori Kosola was openly portrayed as the leader of the movement and parodic proverbs like "Heil Hitler, Meil Kosola" (They have Hitler, we have Kosola) were soon circulating in the media, Kosola had no national standing outside of Ostrobothnia and was never considered as a serious candidate for the position of future leader of Finland. He was nothing more than a figurehead for the wide right-wing coalition that sought to use the Lapua Movement to promote their own anti-Communist goals.

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Lars (Lauri) Kristian Relander was the 2nd President of Finland from 1925-1931. He had been a dark horse candidate in the first Presidential elections, and one of the youngest politicians in a torn and young republic, the job of President was perhaps too much for his abilities despite his best efforts. Since Relander was a strict opponent of Communism, he was indecisive in his critical early decisions regarding the rising power of the Lapua Movement.

Relander had been first elected to Parliament in 1910, serving until 1913, and again from 1917 to 1920 (by 1917 he had become one of the leaders of the party). After independence, his political career had gone well. He was a prominent member of the Agrarian League and was elected as Speaker of the Eduskunta for its 1919 session and part of its 1920 session. Later that year he was appointed Governor of the Province of Viipuri. However, in the 1920’s he did not have enough support in his own party to become a minister. In 1925, Relander was nominated as his party's candidate for that year's presidential election – his nomination only being confirmed just days before the election day. Relander was only 41 at the time, and his nomination came as a surprise. It was further guaranteed by the fact that some of the party's key figures, such as Santeri Alkio and Kyösti Kallio, declined to stand. Relander was elected in the third ballot of the electoral college, defeating the National Progressive Party candidate Risto Ryti by 172 votes to 109. He was elected largely due to the fact that he attracted less opposition than Risto Ryti.

According to some contemporaries, at least the Swedish People's Party electors more eagerly voted for Relander, because his wife happened to be a Finland Swede. This story may be partly apocryphal, because also Ryti had a Finland-Swedish wife. On the other hand, Ryti had campaigned as a "Finnish peasant's son." Strong right-wing opposition to the outgoing Progressive (liberal) President Ståhlberg, Ryti's membership in the same party, and at least some career politicians' desire for a more approachable and less independent President may partly explain Relander's victory. Two other important factors should be mentioned: Relander was an active member of the "Suojeluskunta" (Civil Guard) voluntary military organization and he accepted the right-wing worldview typical of White veterans of the Civil War clearly more wholeheartedly than Ryti did. Also as people, Relander and Ryti were notably different: despite having a doctorate, Relander was a much more talkative and social person than the intellectual and thoughtful Ryti.

As President, Relander was politically inexperienced and young. Politicians and other opinion leaders could not take him seriously. Relander had no political base to speak of, and he was deemed to have no particular program for his presidency, which further decreased his support. Even Relander's continual state visits and trips drew criticism, leading to him gaining the nickname of Reissu-Lasse ('Travelling Larry'). He was continually compared to his predecessor, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg and his performance as president. The cabinets during his term tended to be weak, short-lived minority cabinets, as in most European democracies of that time. All in all, Relander is remembered as a weak leader. On the other hand, Relander was an idealist who deplored the toughness of the political game and preferred minority governments of supposedly excellent individuals over majority governments of unprincipled individuals. While Relander can not be considered a strong President, he achieved a few notable things during his single term: he allowed the Social Democrats to form a minority government (1926–27), appointed Finland's first female Cabinet minister, Miina Sillanpää (as Assistant Minister of Social Welfare), dissolved Parliament twice (in 1929 over a dispute on the civil servants' salaries, and in 1930 to have the Parliament outlaw the Communist Party, which required a constitutional amendment and thus a two-thirds majority), and generally speaking supported the far-right Lapua Movement, until it started to kidnap various political opponents. He maintained a rather close friendship with the Social Democratic leader, Väinö Tanner.

In the late autumn of 1930, Relander realized he would not be re-elected, and during the winter of 1930–31 he sabotaged the prospects of his former Agrarian League colleague and rival Kyösti Kallio, so that Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, Relander's former Prime Minister, was elected. In Relander's opinion, Kallio did not talk straight to him and schemed behind his back to weaken his Presidency and help his political opponents. In Kallio's opinion, Relander was an inexperienced politician who had high ideals but not enough common sense to implement them. After his term as President, Relander served from 1931 to 1942 as the General Manager of Suomen Maalaisten Paloapuyhdistys, a fire insurance company for rural people. Relander died in 1942.

Returning now to the Lapuan Movement, marches and meetings were arranged throughout the country. President Relander and the government sought to appease this new political activity by going forward with new anti-communist legislation. A new press law was introduced in March 1930, but failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority due to the strong resistance of the Social Democrats and more moderate centrist forces in the Eduskunta, the Finnish Parliament. The response of Lapua Movement soon came. The printing presses of socialist newspaper Työn Ääni were destroyed during a nighttime raid in Vaasa, the regional capitol of Ostrobothnia. The right-wing press welcomed and approved this event, stating that "it was a proper response to parliament's refusal to pass the press law soon enough." On June 16, 1930, more than 3,000 men arrived in Oulu in order to destroy the print and office of the Communist newspaper Pohjan Voima. However, the last issue of Pohjan Voima had appeared on June 14. The same day, a Communist printshop in Vaasa was destroyed.

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Lapua Liike marchers - 1930

Riflemen in Helsinki and thugs in the streets

A so-called "Peasant March" to Helsinki was a major show of power. On the 7th of July 1930 some 12,000 men, a quarter of them armed, marched through the streets of Helsinki along roughly a similar route to the victory parade of 1918 to demand the removal of Communism from Finland. They were given a solemn public reception by President Relander, General Mannerheim, Prime Minister Svinhufvud and the rest of the government. In the speeches President Relander thanked God for the patriotic upsurge which the marchers represented, while Svinhufvud assured them that all their demands would be met and that communism in Finland would be "stamped out for ever."

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Meeting the Lapuan Liike marchers, 7 July 1930

During the Parliamentary elections the previous summer, Lapuans had openly attacked the Social Democrats and the remaining moderate right opposition on the streets. Meetings held by leftist and labour groups were also interrupted or broken up, often violently, newspaper offices were attacked and trashed and more than 400 local Social Democratic organs were forced to close down their activities. The specialty of the Lapua Movement was however a method known as muilutus, a combination of kidnapping and human smuggling. They would seize an opposition politician, trade union activist or a reporter, beat their victim up and them drive them to the Soviet border in a car trunk, sometimes even forcing them to cross to Soviet Union at gunpoint. If the victims were then not treated as spies by the Soviet authorities (as was often the case) and they managed to get back, the Lapuans issued them a stern private warning to stay out of public life in the future. During the summer of 1930 there were over a thousand cases where low-ranking public officials and, increasingly often, former members of the Eduskunta as well, were subjected to muilutus while official authorities seemingly stood by. In October 1930 twenty men marched as a delegation to the Ministry of the Interior and openly stated that they had organized several kidnappings during the summer. As a response the Minister of Interior personally came to openly assure the men that should any member of this delegation ever find themselves before a court, they could count on sympathetic consideration.

While these incidents were mainly political terrorism, for the Lapuans they were also part of a campaign to insure that the new parliament would approve their demands for new legislation. The leaders of the movement predicted that in order to succeed they would have to affect the elections to the extent that at least 134 members of Parliament could be trusted to support Lapua Liiki demands and that there would be no more than 66 Social Democrat representatives opposing them. Due this political terrorism and blackmailing it was not surprising that in the elections of 1930 the conservative Kokoomus (National Coalition) Party jumped from 28 to 42 seats, scoring a landslide victory. The Social Democrats were nevertheless able to maintain their leading position with 66 seats. When the new Eduskunta assembled for the first time, one of its first actions was to rapidly pass the so-called Lapua laws. In these laws the President was granted strong emergency powers while the government gained the right to close down "offensive associations and publications." The electoral law was also revised to disfranchise anyone adjudged to have been a member of an illegal organization and the local electoral boards were given wide discretion to decide who actually fell into this category. Similarly, in the "Protection of the Republic Act" communist newspapers were outlawed.

The Lapua Movement had seemingly won: with the new legislation in force, the Finnish Socialist Workers' Party (SSTP, the front organization of the illegal Moscow-based SKP, the Communist Party of Finland) was reduced during the 1930s to a tiny and hunted underground movement incapable of any effective political action or public demonstrations. The culmination of the political terror of the Lapua Movement came a few months later, when a group of armed men kidnapped the popular ex-president Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg and his wife on 14th of October 1930 and drove them towards the Eastern border with the clear intention of sending them to Soviet Union. This was due to the fact that Ståhlberg was viewed as the most likely Presidential candidate for the remaining political opposition. At the remote regional capitol of Joensuu in North Karelia the kidnappers lost their nerve due the fact that Ståhlberg himself had remained calm and constantly demanded that as a former President and Civil War-era leader he and especially his wife should not be treated like this. As the shocked old Presidential couple was taken to safety at the Joensuu Suojeluskunta HQ building, the entire nation was shocked to hear the news of this event on the following morning. The general sense was that the Lapua Movement had gone too far. Legal proceedings against the attackers resulted in prison sentences or everyone involved and a new political scandal followed as the former Chief of the General Staff, General Kurt Wallenius was found guilty of being involved in the plot. The more moderate members began to leave the movement and the “extremists” began to take greater control.

It was in face of this rampart imtimidation and political terrorism that the Presidential elections of 1931 were fought. Once again Ståhlberg was the candidate of the Social Democrats and many among the Agrarian Union had also rallied to his campaign that promised "a return to legality." Against him stood Svinhufvud, the candidate of the united right with the full support of the Lapua Movement. As the Lapuans had expected, the opposition rallied round the figure of J.K. Ståhlberg, the first President of the Republic, who had emerged from retirement precisely to campaign for the upholding of the Constitution and the rule of law. Ståhlberg immediately became the prime target for hostile Lapua propaganda, since he was obviously immune to the standard Lapua practice of portraying their opponents as "stooges of Moscow." Ståhlberg was nevertheless accused for his opposition to the Jäeger movement before independence, his policy of reconciliation after the Civil War and first and foremost for his signing of the "shameful peace" – the Treaty of Dorpat.

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Carl Johan Ståhlberg was an old and respected politician who had gained his experience in the Senate of the Grand Duchy of Finland before independence. His liberal opinions and support for strict legalism made him the prime opponent of the more radical nationalists and conservatives.

On the first ballot of the Electoral College, neither Ståhlberg nor Svinhufvud received a majority. Ståhlberg took the lead on the second ballot, but without the majority necessary for victory. The Agrarian Union now held the balance, and the party leaders were hard-pressed to decide which candidate they would support. In the end their choice was not made freely. Major-General Malmberg, commander of the Suojeluskunta, declared that he could not guarantee the maintenance of order in the country if Ståhlberg were elected. Despite this fact, the prolonged political intimidation and the new electoral law that all worked for Svinhufvud, he was ultimately elected by the smallest possible margin in the electoral college, 151 to 149 - and even this outcome was probably the result of the last-minute public intervention of the Suojeluskunta. The new President, Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, had now nevertheless gained all he wanted from the Lapua Movement, but instead of gracefully retiring into the background the leaders of the movement were already planning their next step.

A Mountain over which no force could pass...President Svinhufvud takes on the Lapua Movement

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President Pehr Evind Svinhufvud: Pehr Evind Svinhufvud (December 15, 1861 – February 29, 1944) was the third President of Finland from 1931 to 1937. A lawyer, judge, and politician in the Russian Grand Duchy of Finland, he played a major role in the movement for Finnish independence as a member of the Kagal secret society and as an independence activist. After being appointed as a judge in Heinola in 1906, he attempted to keep out of the front line of politics but was elected Speaker of the Parliament in 1907, largely because the majority Social Democrats considered him "the best-known opponent of illegality". Svinhufvud's parliamentary opening speeches, in which he laid emphasis on legality, led to the Tsar dissolving Parliament in both 1909 and 1910. He served as Speaker until 1912. During the First World War, when Russia replaced various Finnish officials with Russians. Svinhufvud refused to obey the orders of the Russian procurator Konstantin Kazansky, which he considered illegal, and this led to his removal from office as a judge and being exiled to Tomsk in Siberia in November 1914. In his Siberian exile, he spent his time hunting while still keeping secret contact with the independence movement. When he left Finland, he had promised to return "with the help of God and Hindenburg". When news of the February Revolution reached Svinhufvud, he walked to the town's police station and bluntly announced, "The person who sent me here has been arrested. Now I'm going home." In Helsinki he was greeted as a national hero.

Svinhufvud was appointed Chairman of the Senate on November 27, 1917, and was a key figure in the announcement of Finland's declaration of independence on December 6, 1917. He also personally went to Saint Petersburg to meet Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who somewhat hesitatingly gave his official recognition of Finnish independence. Svinhufvud's Senate also authorized General Mannerheim to form a new Finnish army from the Suojeluskunta at the beginning of the Civil War in Finland. During the Civil War, Svinhufvud went underground in Helsinki and sent pleas for intervention to Germany and Sweden. The conflict also turned him into an active monarchist, though not a royalist. In March 1918 he managed to escape from Helsinki via Berlin-Stockholm to Vaasa, where the Senate was now located. He resumed his function as Head of Government and in this role he pardoned 36,000 Red prisoners in the autumn of 1918. On May 18 1918, Svinhufvud became Protector of State or Regent, retaining this post fter he stood down as Chairman of the Senate on May 27. After Germany's defeat in World War I, and the failed attempt to make Finland a Monarchy under a King of Finland (Frederick Charles of Hesse), Svinhufvud withdrew from public life (where he was replaced by Mannerheim as Regent of Finland and was active only in the Suojeluskunta.

As a conservative who was strong in his opposition to communism and the Left in general, Svinhufvud was not embraced as President by everyone, but after his Presidency, as the amiable Ukko-Pekka (Old Man Pete), he came to enjoy wide popularity.

Returning to the outcome of the 1931 Presidential elections, Ukko-Pekka ("Old Man Pete") was now in charge, and he was not known for his willingness to share power. At the same time General Wallenius, accused of participation in the kidnapping of Ståhlberg, was acquitted of his charges and elected as the new Party Secretary of the Lapua Movement. Now back in control of the movement, Wallenius was soon devising plans for a coup where the Suojeluskunta would take over the country and bring the leaders of the Lapua movement to power. The movement would then demand the formal resignation of the government, calculating that ministers of the Kokoomus would do so when asked, thus collapsing the credibility of the government. The next step would be the formation of a new "government of national unity" with a “proper” figurehead ruling officially while Wallenius himself would be the actual ruler of the country as the new Prime Minister. It was later rumoured that Mannerheim was alledgedly discreetly approached and requested to take the lead once the moment was right, but no actual proof of his involvement to this conspiracy can be found and Mannerheim never made any comment on such an approach or his reaction (given that in 1930 Mannerheim, working closely with Vaino Tanner, had just suceeded in engineering the historic rapproachment between the Social Democractic Party and the Suojeluskuntas, it seems unlikely that Mannerheim would have been approached).

The crisis finally came in February 1932 when a group of 500 armed supporters of the Lapua Movement gathered at Mäntsälä near Helsinki in an attempted coup d'état which became known as the Mäntsälä Rebellion (Mäntsälän kapina and was led by the former Chief of Staff of Finland's army, Major-General Wallenius They issued the following statement: “Unless the present cabinet immediately resigns and the political course of the country changes, we don't consider that we can preserve peacefulness of the country. In place of the present cabinet, there must come a new cabinet which is free from party aims and petty disputes, and which depends in its action upon the support of patriotic elements of the people." General Wallenius attempted to mobilize units if the Suojeluskuntas in key cities and the League of War Veterans declared that it was time "to finish the job" begun during the Civil War. Army Chief of Staff General Sihvo expressed fears that some former high-ranking Jäeger officers would support the demands of the Lapua Movement and refuse to comply with orders to suppress a revolt should the matter turn to violence. But by now Svinhufvud had had enough. He immediately assembled his cabinet, together with General Sihvo of the General Staff and Major-General Malmberg, national commander of the Suojeluskuntas and gave an explicit order: "Not even one armed man may come...to the capital."

Two days later the cabinet ordered the leaders of the Lapua Movement arrested using the Proctection of the Republic Act which the movement itself had urged a year earlier. Army units began preparing as the commander of the army, Lieutenant-General Aarne Sihvo prepared to use force to end the rebellion. Orders were given to reinforce the defence of Helsinki with tanks and artillery in case the situation escalated and orders, which were obeyed, went out to the Suojeluskuntas to mobilise. As the tensions grew, so did the consumption of alcohol among the instigators in Mäntsälä. The situation was tense in Svinhufvud's own family as his adult son Eino declared that he would march to Mäntsälä to join the revolt. His father was furious: "What's taking place in Mäntsälä is mass psychosis and pure madness! You are not going anywhere!" After he averted a family and potential political crisis by keeping his son at his side, on the 2nd of March Svinhufvud broadcast a nation-wide radio speech aimed at the people of Finland and the rebels of Mäntsälä:

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President Svinhufvud broadcasting: "Throughout my long life, I have struggled for the maintenance of law and justice, and I cannot permit the law to now be trampled underfoot and citizens to be led into armed conflict with one another.... Since I am now acting on my own responsibility, beholden to no-one, and have taken it upon myself to restore peace to the country, from now on every secret undertaking is aimed not only at the legal order but at me personally as well - at me, who have myself marched in the ranks of the Suojeluskuntas as an upholder of social peace.... Peace must be established in the country as swiftly as possible, and the defects that exist in our national life must thereafter be eliminated within the framework of the legal order.”

The speech was skillfully crafted around its central theme, the respect for the rule of law. During the era of the Grand Duchy, the Swedish Constitution of 1772 had received an almost sacred status in Finnish political consciousness, and its defense had become one of the most important political issues. When, after Finland's independence, rebellions had taken place in 1918 and then now, the rebels' defiance of laws and constitution was the strongest argument the government could use to rally the public and the armed forces. Svinhufvud gave his radio speech, where he urged the Lapuan movement rebels to return home and promised that only the leaders would be punished. Following President Svinhufvud’s radio broadcast, followed by the news that the Suojeluskuntas were mobilizing against them, the rebels duely dispersed and the leaders were arrested a few days later. After a trial, the Lapua Movement was banned on November 21, 1932 once again utilizing the very same legislation the Lapuans themselves had promoted.Wallenius and about 50 other leaders were sentenced to prison terms. By now the Finnish far-right was splintered and all attempts to forge a unified national front of conservative and nationalist parties were abandoned. Hardcore members from the former Lapua Liike created a new political party (the Lapua Liike had never taken part in elections by naming their own candidates, but only by harassing their political opponents). The new movement was named Isänmaallinen Kansanliike, the Patriotic People's Movement or IKL.

An Estonian Sidenote: The last political scheming of the Finnish radical right was actually their support for the Eesti Vabadussõjalaste Keskliit, an Estonian radical right organization that was similarily opposed to parliamentarism. Unlike in Finland, the radical right in Estonia practically succeeded in seizing power by legal means in 1934 when President Konstantin Päts (a friend of President Svinhufvud) declared a state of emergency, dissolved the movement and began to rule Estonia as a paternal autokrat. In 1935 Finnish activists were supporting an Estonian plot to overthrow Päts.

In 1936 Finland had the first truly free elections in years. While the IKL managed to gain 97 891 votes and 14 representatives in the Ediskunta, the Social Democrats under Väinö Tanner won 83 seats and were planning for the first time since the Civil War to return to government by forming a majority coalition in alliance with the Agrarian Union, aiming at finally ending their long presence in the opposition. President Svinhufvud was initially inclined to agree, but ultimately he declined, claiming that the SDP Party program "was to Marxist." This decision woulc come back to haunt Svinhufvud during the Presidential elections of summer 1937, when Ståhlberg was once again his main opponent and the SDP campaigned against his re-election. Tanner promised his support for the candidate of the Agrarian Union should they agree to form a new coalition government with the Social Democrats. On the first Electoral College ballot Ståhlberg got 150 votes to Svinhufvud´s 94 - just one vote short of winning on the first round. On a second ballot the SDP shifted their support to the Agrarian Union candidate, Kyösti Kallio, who then won the election as a dark horse candidate, similarly to Relander in 1925.

Svinhufvud viewed Kallio as too inexperienced and weak, and stated that "a democratic system needs to be counterbalanced by strong personalities holding the reins." He neverthless gave up his position to his successor in a legal manner and stated in his farewell address to the nation: "In the coming years we must keep in mind that before we can improve our standards of living, we have to secure our borders..." With the old Suojeluskuntas activist finally gone from power, Tanner could lead the Social Democrats into a coalition government with the Agrarian Union, starting the beneficial "Red Earth" cooperation between the two strongest moderate parties. The worldwide economic hardships of the early 1930s were finally giving way to new economic growth, and the domestic situation in Finland as improving rapidly along with the average standard of living. Finnish democracy had seemingly withstood the setbacks that had brought down similar political systems elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

Under the new President, Mannerheim’s position as Chairman of the Defense Council was reconfirmed, as was Rudolp Walden’s position in the Cabinet as Defense Minister with the new government honoring the all-party defense consenus of 1931. With Vaino Tanner once more in government and firmly committed to the previous government’s policy of incrementally increasing defense spending and continued development of the military industrial complex, funding for the defense of the country was on a secure footing and SDP members continued to join the Suojeluskuntas and Lotta Svard organisations in ever increasing numbers.

The foreign impact of the Lapua Movement

In the Soviet Union, the Lapua Movement's actions were closely followed. Old deep-rooted misperceptions of Finland as a threat and as a continuation of the ancient tsarist régime were enhanced among ordinary citizens by the Bolshevist leadership, which further contributed to the conditions leading to the Winter War. In Leningrad, the old concerns over the close proximity of the border were renewed. Over that border, invasion armies had arrived right at the doorstep of the old Tsarist Russian capital twice in the 18th century and again in 1918, immediately after Finland's independence which had resulted in the alliance with Germany during the Civil War and as a result, threatened to bring the war and the Germans to Leningrad. Russian newspapers propagandized these fears, covering events in Finland and interviewing victims that had been deported to Russia by the Lapua Movement as so-called examples of terror in capitalist countries.

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The political situation in Finland was closely followed in Sweden and in the Soviet Union, but for different reasons. While the strong Finnish nationalism and critical attitude towards the role of the Swedish language in Finland worried Sweden, the Soviet Union looked at the actions of the Lapua Movement as a proof of "Finns being fascists in disguise" and the fact that Finland was not only openly hostile towards Soviet Union but also internally too unstable to sustain foreign political pressure in a time of crisis.

The Rise of the Isänmaallinen Kansanliike (the Patriotic People's Movement or IKL).

The Isänmaallinen Kansanliike (Patriotic People's Movement, usually abbreviated to IKL) emerged in 1932 as the successor to the nationalist and anti-communist Lapua Movement. It had an ideology similar to its predecessor, except that IKL participated in elections — with limited success. The IKL was founded at a conference on 5 June 1932 as a continuation of the Lapua Movement. The three major founding members were Herman Gummerus, Vilho Annala and Erkki Räikkönen. Lapua Liike leader Vihtori Kosola was imprisoned for his part in the Mäntsälä rebellion at the time of formation but the leadership was officially held for him and other leading rebels, notably Annala and Bruno Salmiala, were also involved in the formation of the IKL. Ideologically, the IKL was ardently nationalist and anti-Communist, and endorsed an aggressive foreign policy against the Soviet Union and hostility towards the Swedish language. The creation of a Greater Finland was an important goal for the party. Many of its leaders were priests or participants of the mainly Ostrobothnian Pietist movement called Herännäisyys. Its manifested purpose was to be the Christian-moral conscience of the parliament. A more hard-line tendency was also active, centred on Bruno Salmiala.

The IKL uniform was a black shirt with blue tie, inspired by the Italian fascists and also by the Herännäisyys movement, which had a tradition of black clothing. Members greeted each other with a Roman salute. The IKL had its own youth organization, called Sinimustat (Blue-blacks), members of which were trained in combat and in street-fighting. It was led by Elias Simojoki, a charismatic priest. Sinimustat were banned in 1936 (although they were immediately reformed as Mustapaidat ('Blackshirts')). The party received its main support from wealthy farmers, the educated middle-class, civil servants, Lutheran clergy and university students. Unlike Lapua Liike, the IKL participated in parliamentary elections. In 1933 its election list was pooled with the National Coalition Party (Kokoomus), and the IKL won 14 seats out of a total of 200. Kokoomus held seats collapsed from 42 to 18 seats. After the collapse, Juho Kusti Paasikivi was elected chairman of Kokoomus. He converted his party to be the voice of big business and as such had no interest in the direct action tactics of IKL, taking action to weed out the most outspoken IKL sympathizers from the party.

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Rally 'round our flags!
With closed ranks, proudly
The blackshirts march firmly with grim pace.
Come brothers, join our front of justice!
We´ll stop their lies! To victory or death!

Make way, as the black watch marches,
Mangling all obstacles in it's path.
Our eyes are bright and minds are
Filled with courage, as thousands
Look upon us with new hope in their hearts.

Warhorns are calling, the last battle is upon us,
O hear the mighty rumble of new dawn!
Now remember your oath to the Lord of Heaven:
"No longer shall Finland bewail her grief!"

Rally 'round our flags!
With closed ranks and proudly,
The blackshirts march firmly with grim pace.
Woe to those who dare to mock our colours,
As the Finnish Maiden lies wailing in her pain.

Luo Lippujen! (Rally 'round our Flags!) - Anthem of the IKL, sung to the tune of the Horst-Wessel-Lied

The IKL came under increasing scrutiny from the government and was subject to two laws designed to arrest its progress. In 1934 a law was passed allowing the suppression of propaganda which brought the government or constitution into contempt and this was used against the movement, whilst the following year a law banning political uniforms and private uniformed organisations came in, seriously impacting on the Sinimustat in particular. The IKL kept its 14 seats in the elections of 1936 but was weakened by the overwhelming win for the social democrat-agrarian coalition of Toivo Mikael Kivimäki. When the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936, the IKL in particular were vocal and active in their support for the Nationalist side. When, in December 1936, Mussolini decided to send volunteers to fight alongside the Nationalists in Spain, the IKL moved to organise and dispatch Finnish volunteers to do the same. The IKL initially raised some 1,000 volunteers in December and these left by ship for Germany and thence to Spain on German ships at the end of the month. It was at this stage that the leftist Finnish Government decided to involve itself in the Civil War discretely. The Suojeluskunta by this stage of the mid-1930’s was politically neutral, with many SDP supporters as active members, and there were mixed feelings towards the Spanish Civil War. As in the rest of Europe, most on the left saw the War as a fight against Fascism, while many of the center and the right saw it in similar terms to the Finnish Civil War of not so many years previously.

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The IKL leadership receiving a bust of Mussolini from an Italian delegation on June 7, 1933. From left: Italian special Nnvoy Gray, Italian Ambassador Tamaro, Vilho Annala, Vihtori Kosola, Bruno Salmiala, Juhana Malkamäki and Eino Tuomivaara

The Armed Forces High Command looked at the growing Soviet, German and Italian involvement and saw the war from two points of view – the first being as a prelude to the European-wide War that some saw as being inevitable, the second as an opportunity for the Finnish military to observe the "enemy" in action and benefit from practical combat experience. To this end the “red-earth” social democrat-agrarian coalition Government and the Armed Forces used the IKL as an unwitting front organisation as well as a “safety valve”. The government saw the sending of IKL volunteers to Spain as a way of ridding themselves of a difficult and vocal minority. The military saw it was a way to gain some experience to combat and to try out aspects of tactical doctrine that had been developed. Members of the Armed Forces were granted leave of absence if they wished to volunteer (although this was never stated in writing or even openly articulated. Rather, it was hinted at, and permissions were freely granted for “extended overseas travel”). Likewise, Suojeluskunta members of the “right” political (or apolitical) persuasion were discretely encouraged to volunteer. At this stage, the IKL was short of funds and there were discrete conversations (never openly acknowledged or reported on) by the Government with the Italian Ambassador whereby it was indicated to the Italians that if they funded the IKL’s efforts to raise and transport volunteers under the table, the Finnish Government would make no objection. This the Italians did, and the end result was, as will be covered in detail in a later Post, that a Division (which was actually more of a strong Brigade-sized Regiment) nicknamed Pohjat Pojan – the “Boys from the North” by its Finnish volunteer members, financed and equipped by the Italians formed a part of the Italian Volunteer Corps that fought in Spain.

Again, as will be covered in a later post, Pohjan Pojat volunteers fought with increasing effectiveness for the duration of the Civil War, and in fact saved the Italians from military defeat or indeed, disaster, on a number of occasions. In the process, the Finnish Volunteers gained a considerable amount of practical experience and learnt many lessons, which were promptly fed back to the Finnish Army for review and incorporation into tactical and doctrinal training. Not the least of these lessons were the use the Germans made of their 88mm AA Gun in an anti-tank role, the effective use of combined arms in battle, the valuable contribution of close air support and artillery support and the overarching need to always always always have good communications. Alongside them fought half a dozen squadrons of Finnish Air Force volunteers, again largely flying Italian-supplied fighters, ground attack aircraft and bombers, with which they put into practice the air combat tactics that had been in the early stages of development prior to the war.

In all of this, the IKL was an unwitting, but not unwilling, tool of the government and the military. Late in 1938, as the Spanish Civil War neared its end-game and a Nationalist victoty, the usefulness of the IKL as a tool of policy came to an end and the new government with its strong position soon moved against the party, with Urho Kekkonen, then Minister of the Interior, bringing legal proceedings against the movement. The courts did not feel that there were sufficient grounds to allow for a banning however. Despite this the prosperity experienced under Cajander's government hit the IKL and in the 1939 elections they managed only 8 seats. Following the outbreak of the Winter War the IKL was included in the all-party government that was formed, and Annala was even included in the Cabinet. The price of this recognition however was an end to IKL attacks on the system and as such an effective end to the very reason it existed. While the IKL remained in government and filled one Cabinet position for the duration of the Second World War, in the aftermath of the War, the IKL faded out of the political scene, winning no seats in the first post-war elections.
 
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And now, back to the Ilmavoimat in the 1920's

The Kirke Mission

By the mid-1920’s, Finland had begun to recover economically from WW1 and the cutting of off Russia as the major market. With this economic recovery came increased stability and the ongoing development of the military, as we have seen. The governments of both France and Britain had quickly become involved in the economic development of the Baltic littoral, and with Finland in particular. Many foreign businessmen, and sometimes even government officials, proved willing to go to extremes to win contracts, generally laboring under the assumption that an initial success would mean long-term rewards. As shown by the early French involvement with the Ilmavoimat, where there influence quickly faded, they were perhaps too optimistic.

Over the early 1920's, Great Britain had rapidly become Finland's most important trading partner. Against Somervalo’s wishes, a group of British “experts” led by General Walter Kirke were invited to Finland by the Military High Command in 1924 to “help re-organize” the Ilmavoimat (Kirke himself was not an airman and had served in WW1 as a General Staff Officer at GHQ in France and Belgium). In 1918 Kirke had become the Deputy Director of Military Operations at the War Office and in this role he had been responsible for the preparation of number of papers and memorandum on various aspects of the RAF as well as with regard to the British Army.

Arms, Influence, and Coastal Defense: The British Military Mission to Finland, 1924-25

(taken from an article in the Baltic Security and Defence Review, Vol 12, Issue 1, 2010 by Donald Stoker – but note that the contents have been “tweaked” a little here and there in line with the ATL Scenario – but the tweaks are minor)

“Finland must take some chances, and history shows that it is safer to take chances with the Russian fleet than with the Russian Army.” - General Sir W. M. St. G. Kirke

In the modern period military missions have served as an important tool for nations pursuing military development, as well as those attempting to gain influence over the political and military policies of the recipient states. Typically, a smaller country contracts with a larger power for a visiting team of expert advisors. The dispatching power might have the best interests of the smaller state at heart, but self-interest usually drives both nations involved. In the decades between the world wars, the European powers generally sought to place military missions in foreign states to achieve economic benefits, particularly the sale of arms, or to counter the political and economic influence of a rival.

In 1924, as a part of its long-running efforts to draw-up an affordable naval bill to meet the nation’s defense needs, the Finnish government asked for a British military mission. The impetus for this came from the Finns in 1919, when Commodore G.T.G. von Schoultz discussed the idea with Marshal Mannerheim. Von Schoultz brought the idea before the government, but did not get what he wanted. Instead, the Finnish government chose a French military mission and then supplemented it with a short-lived French naval mission after World War I. The French presence would be temporary, but Finland’s quest for direct foreign military advice continued.The French, like the British, used military missions as a means of pursing several diplomatic, military, and economic goals. To Paris, they were an element of France’s Eastern European alliance and influence building strategy in the immediate post-World War I period. In February 1919, at George Clemenceau’s order, a mission comprising two Air Force and two Army officers, left for Finland. To Mannerheim, the mission’s purpose was to instruct the army. But the French also had other tasks for it, some not unlike what the British would outline for their future mission. Its additional duties included intelligence gathering and conducting propaganda on France’s behalf. Similarly, the French dispatched missions to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The French hoped to tie these states to France’s post-World War I alliance strategy by having them adopt French arms and military methods, which was far more commitment than the British hoped to extract from Finland, or intended to give. The important economic advantages that it was hoped would result from such missions became increasingly important to London and Paris during the 1920s.

In late 1923, the Finnish government appointed a combined civilian and military committee to examine the state of the nation’s defenses. The proposals issuing from the group bore little relation to what the Finns could afford. For example, the amount the committee required for coast defense alone amounted to £5,000,000, a sum larger than Finland’s defense budget for two years. The proposal horrified civilian officials and worried officers of the army; the latter feared that their own requirements would be sacrificed for the needs of coast defense and indeed, sometimes this was the case. In 1923, the Finnish government had under consideration proposals to spend about 300,000,000 Finnish marks, nearly £2,000,000, on defense. The government, citing the opinion of many Finns that the nation’s military officers lacked the necessary technical experience to carry out their duties, decided to seek military advice from abroad before submitting any military spending proposals to the Eduskunta. The Finns, at least initially, wanted a British commission that would advise on coastal, naval, and air defense, a group for which the Finns would pay all expenses. Finland also wanted the mission sent in as unobtrusive a manner as possible to avoid any unnecessary comments from the Finnish press. Approaching Britain for such advice was a new turn for Finnish policy. Previously, they had sought the services of France and Germany in such matters. Major-General Walter Mervyn St. George Kirke, who eventually led the British team, viewed the shift in Finnish policy as being thanks to the efforts of Sir Ernest Rennie, the British consul in Helsinki.

To the British government, the mission Kirke was to lead had two purposes: to counter French influence, and obtain orders for British armaments firms. The initial Finnish request for the mission came on 20 March 1924. The Finns wanted the mission purely for defensive reasons and had no aggressive intentions. Moreover, the Finnish government had a strong desire to get the best value for its modest funds. Finland wanted British experts to advise on the nation’s sea defense and the fortification of the Finnish coast, particularly in regard to coastal batteries, taking into consideration the materials then available. The Finns also wanted to know how air power could be used in coastal defense and whether or not aircraft could replace some of the units then being utilized to protect the nation’s maritime frontiers. The Foreign Office gave its blessing to the mission, though expressing some doubts as to whether or not it would ever materialize. The War Office proposed a seven-member commission, one Chief of Mission, assisted by two men from each of the armed services. Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. Nosworthy, of the Royal Engineers, who was on a tour of the eastern Baltic and scheduled to be in Finland from 23-27 May, was instructed to obtain more information from Finland on its needs. The British government worried that the mission might arrive in Finland at a time of political crisis in the Finnish High Command, an allusion to infighting between the Jägers (the bloc of Finnish officers who had served in the German army during World War I) and their supporters, and the former Tsarist officers, and instructed Nosworthy to keep in close contact with the British representatives in Helsinki. The Admiralty also approved of sending British advisors to Finland—if the Finns agreed to pay all the expenses involved in such a venture.

Meanwhile, Commodore von Schoultz, the head of the Finnish Navy, met with Captain W. de M. Egerton, the British naval attaché in Helsinki, and discussed the possibility of a purely naval mission to Finland. The meeting provides insight into some of the problems within the Finnish high command. Von Schoultz was not aware that the Finnish government had requested a combined British military mission, or even that Finnish authorities had suggested it. Egerton believed that von Schoultz’s ignorance of Finnish policy resulted from the fact that the entire command structure lay in the hands of the Army. Egerton wrote that “it appears to be their policy to keep the Navy as much as possible in the background.” Egerton also commented that the planned addition of a naval officer to Finland’s General Staff might result in better communication between the service arms. On 24 May 1924, Egerton, Nosworthy, and Major R. B. Goodden, the British military attaché for Finland and the Baltic States, met with Commodore von Schoultz, Commander Yrjö Roos of the Naval Staff, Major Martola of the Finnish General Staff, and a Finnish officer assigned to the Coastal Defense Artillery, Major Talvela. They discussed Britain’s dispatch of an expert commission to study various matters related to the coast defense of Finland. Finland wanted some type of mission, but several factors greatly concerned the Finnish government. Perpetually poor, it worried about the cost of the mission and because of this asked that it involve as few personnel as possible. The British were asked to suggest the composition of the mission, the rank and number of officers needed, as well as the mission’s duration. Commodore von Schoultz said that the coastal areas that they would be considering included parts of the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, as well as the northern and western shores of Lake Ladoga. The Finnish government reserved the right to designate which ports and bases required special defense preparations because of specific military or other reasons.

The Finns eventually decided that they wanted the mission to examine the defense of Finland’s entire frontier, both land and sea, including the Karelian Isthmus. However, it was only to consider land defense that “depended on naval actions, as e.g. bombardment of the coast, landing of armed forces with the purpose of surrounding field armies, or cutting off their communications, etc.” The northern parts of Finland, meaning the frontiers between Finland and Sweden, were not considered critical, a clear indication of who F inland saw as its potential enemy. The regions of vital importance included the areafrom Turku (Åbo) on the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, and the northern and western coasts of Lake Ladoga. The Finnish authorities were to inform the commission of what locations they felt to have enough strategic and political significance to warrant fortification. The mission would be left to determine the best methods of defending these areas. After learning the breadth of the terms of reference for the mission, The British representatives agreed that they could not suggest a team smaller than ten members. They proposed that a mission led by a chairman whose rank and branch of service was determined by the British military authorities. He would be assisted by officers from the three branches of the British armed services: two from the Navy, two from the Army, and two from the Air Force. Two secretaries and one draftsman would also be needed, and it would take two months in Finland to fulfill the assignment. The Finnish Minister of Defense had had in mind a much smaller staff, perhaps two or three members, but von Schoultz agreed with the British estimate.

The officials also discussed the critical matter of expense. The British representatives estimated that the proposed mission would not cost more than £2,000 per month. They prepared an itemized salary estimate, which included a twelfth mission member, and a typist. The expected monthly cost was £1,035. The British expected the Finns to pay for travel expenses to and from Finland and to also make contributions to the pension funds of the participating officers during the time they spent in Finland. The British representatives then pointed out that if Finland spent the entire projected sum of £2,000,000, the cost of the commission as discussed would amount to only 0.1 per cent of the anticipated funds, a sum approximate to the cost of 12 modern sea mines. The British and the Finns both looked favorably upon the possibility of the mission. The French had a different attitude, or at least the British believed they did. Nosworthy reported that “French intrigue was very hot in Finland: they had somehow got to know all about our proposed Mission and were extremely annoyed about it.” Rennie informed Nosworthy that the French were “deeply disliked by the Finns” and mentioned that it was unlikely that the French would be “able to affect their [Finnish] decisions in any way.” Official notification of Finland’s desire for the mission came in early June 1924. The Finns agreed to the proposed composition, as well as to pay the salaries and travel expenses of the commission members. It was anticipated that the mission would last two months and that therefore the necessary personnel should arrive in Finland before the end of June. Hjalmar J. Procopé, the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, was “anxious” for the dispatch of the experts. The Finns wanted them to study the defenses of the southern coast of Finland as well as Lake Ladoga, including both the inland and coastal defenses. The exact details of the work they would undertake would be settled after their arrival.

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Hjalmar Johan Fredrik Procopé (born 9 August 1889 in Helsinki, died 8 March 1954) was a Finnish lawyer, politician and a diplomat from the Swedish People's Party who was elected to the parliament 1919-1922 and 1924-1926. He also worked in the Finnish embassy in Berlin from spring 1918 to the end of 1918. Procopé was a member Swedish People's Party and served as a minister on several occasions: Minister of Trade and Industry from 1920-1921 in the Erich cabinet, Minister of Trade and Industry 1924 in the second Cajander cabinet, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1924-1925 in the second Ingman cabinet and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1927-1931 in four consecutive cabinets. Procopé returned to the Foreign Ministry as Finnish ambassador in Warsaw 1926. From 1931-1939 he served as the CEO of Finnish Paper Mills Association.

Over the war years of 1939-1944 he served as the ambassador in Washington. According to Kauko Rumpunen, a Finnish National Archives researcher, Franklin Roosevelt warned Procopé about the 28 August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the contents that had been agreed between Nazi Germany and Soviet Union, including the secret protocols regarding Finland. Roosevelt's warning was taken seriously, partly because Roosevelt hinted at the original source of the intelligence being a subordinate of Joachim von Ribbentrop, and resulted in additional urgency being given to Finland’s arms construction and purchasing programs. Procopé was largely responsible for urgently negotiating the thirty million US dollar loan granted to Finland in September 1939 which was used for arms acquisition immediately priot to the outbreak of the Winter War. Procopé also used the sympathy of Americans during the Winter War to benefit the interests of Finland and was a key figure in the preliminary negotiations which led to Finland entered the Second World War on the Allied side.

The shifting nature of exactly what the Finns wanted the British to do reveals much about the confused state of civil-military relations and defense planning in Finland. The Finns expressed some concern over the official name of the mission; they disliked the terms “Naval and Military Mission” and “Commission.” Procopé said that such terms “would give an air of permanency to the body of officers” that Britain sent to Finland and that it also might “give rise to undue comments” in both the Finnish and foreign press. The War Office recommended that a high-ranking Army officer serve as the mission’s head. The Foreign Office agreed, citing as the basis for their decision the more advanced state of development of the Finnish Army when compared to the Finnish Navy and Air Force. Others in the British government possessed little enthusiasm for the project. In January 1924, the first Labour Government took office. Ramsey MacDonald, the new Prime Minister, quickly granted de jure recognition to the Soviet Union, something other British governments had previously refused (though they would trade with them), and soon embarked upon efforts to strengthen Great Britain’s political and economic ties with Moscow. C. P. Trevelyan, the President of the Board of Education protested the timing chosen to send a “large military commission to teach Finland, one of Russia’s neighbors, how to arm themselves most effectively against her.” He also contended that this constituted a “definitely unfriendly act to the Russian Government and for that reason alone I suggest to the Cabinet that it ought to be stopped.” Trevelyan also reminded the British government of the criticism it had leveled at France for the manner “in which it had been arming and instructing in matters its various vassal nations in the East of Europe. It is most objectionable that we should begin to play the same game.” The Minister’s comments, especially his criticism of armament policy, though a bit alarmist, do demonstrate the minor shift in the foreign policy views of some government officials during the short-lived Labour government. Trevelyan’s outburst might also demonstrate the influence of the pacifist wing of the Labour Party.

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Sir Charles Trevelyan was a member of the British Liberal Party, born in 1870 and first elected to Parliament in 1899. He became a member of the left-wing Fabian Society and began to develop socialistic views on social reform. H. G. Wells kew him and was not impressed: he said "undoubtedly high-minded, Trevelyan had little sense of humour or irony, and was only marginally less self-satisfied and unendurably boring than his youngest brother, George." He was opposed to Britain entered WW1 and resigned from the government in protest when was was declared, was one of the founders of the UDC – the Union of Democratic Control – the leading anti-war organisation on Britain. Trevelyan wrote articles for newspapers and gave a series of lectures on the need to negotiate a peace with Germany. As a result of this Trevelyan was attacked in the popular press as being a "pro-German, unpatriotic, scoundrel" and, like other anti-war MPs, was soundly defeated in the 1918 General Election. Trevelyan joined the Independent Labour Party and over the next couple of years he became a controversial figure with his attacks on the Versailles Treaty. In the 1922 General Election Trevelyan was elected to represent Newcastle Upon Tyne Central and when Ramsay MacDonald became Prime Minister in 1924, he appointed Trevelyan as his President of the Board of Education. His outburst against the mission to Finland was symptomatic of the British Left’s love-affair with Bolshevik/Communist totalitarianism and their role as “Useful Idiots.”

The Foreign Office considered the objections of the Board of Education unwarranted. Finland possessed only rudimentary defenses and the Foreign Office refused to believe that Finland, either with or without the temporary help of a commission of experts, could pose a serious menace to the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office also did not like having a British mission compared with a French one. They insisted, incorrectly, that similar projects undertaken by France tended to be larger and of a longer duration. Moreover, they contended, with far too broad of a generalization, that French officers serving with such missions generally held command positions within the forces for which they provided advice. In the case under discussion neither the Finns nor the British anticipated any long-term commitment; Britain was merely responding to a Finnish request. The diplomats insisted that the mission would continue despite the objections of the Board of Education—if the Army Council still agreed to the matter. The Council did, and hoped to dispatch the mission around 15 July 1924.

By 8 July 1924, the British had assembled the necessary personnel. Procopé and others in the Finnish government were pleased that the British had agreed to send the advisors, and happy with the terms concluded. Some also held the opinion that the British acted from an attitude of personal “disinterest,” a perception that the British hoped and tried to impress upon the Finns. To command the mission the British authorities selected Major-General Sir Walter Mervyn St. George Kirke, an officer of the Royal Artillery who had served in India and China, as well on the Western Front during the Great War. This proved a wise choice. General Kirke worked diligently and quickly, generally keeping the needs of the Finns in the forefront of any decision, an unusual attitude for French and British officials working in the eastern Baltic between the world wars. Aiding his endeavors were Captain Fraser and Commander Twigg, both of the Royal Navy, Lieutenant-Colonel Wighton, Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Ling, Royal Engineers, Group Captain Holt, Royal Air Force (RAF), Squadron Leader Maycock, RAF, two military clerks, and one military draftsman. The mission came to Finland about the middle of July 1924, an event kept very quiet. Neither the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish forces, General Karl Frederik Wilkama, nor the Chief of Staff, General Oscar Enckell, received official word of the arrivals. Again, the communication problem within the Finnish military and civilian structures becomes apparent.

After meeting with the Minister of Defense, General Kirke realized that no substantial political or strategic groundwork existed upon which to base the suggestions of the British mission. The Minister of Defense could also provide Kirke with no real estimate on the amount of money available for the specific service branches. Kirke suggested a comprehensive survey of the entirety of Finland’s defense problems before embarking upon any expenditure. The Finnish government agreed and the advisors began their work on this basis. General Kirke wrote: “I thus found myself in the position of Minister of Defence having to allot tasks and funds as between the three Services, each of which naturally considered itself entitled to the Lion’s share.” Six weeks later, General Kirke and his officers had reconnoitered the country and filed a report detailing their recommendations regarding the navy, coastal defense, and the air force. The British experts cautioned that the needs of the army should be considered equally and expressed their view that the requirements of the ground forces were among the most urgent. The recommendations then went to the Revision Committee. They were adopted six months later after much argument. The government was “enchanté” with the mission’s progress statements and Kirke wrote that the group’s report would not only give the Finns better coastal defenses, but also save them several hundred million marks. Some in the leadership of the Navy and Coast Defense were not so pleased with the work of the mission, or its recommendations. The inspector of coast defenses protested the cuts in the funding estimates for his service from £5,000,000 to about £500,000. The head of the Navy also pressed the Revision Committee to adjust its expenditure proposals upward. The Air Force accepted the British advice and as funding became available it moved its development along the proposed lines.

Kirke’s handling of the mission bought much goodwill for Britain. At the beginning of his tenure in Finland, Kirke made it clear that he wished to complete his work as quickly as possible in order to pass on the financial savings to the Finnish government. He sent some of the mission personnel home within six weeks, earlier than expected. He also intended to return home before his allotted time. This, according to General Kirke, was a “novel” experience for the Finns. Previously, they had had a difficult time getting rid of earlier German and French advisors, and he insisted that the French mission had been particularly difficult to dislodge. Kirke believed, in typical British fashion, that the French “having found a soft job tried to stick to it as long as possible.” The remainder of the British personnel, except for Kirke and a staff officer, sailed on 11 September 1924. The various branches of the British government and military did not always assist Kirke’s endeavors to keep the mission’s costs at a minimum. The British military wanted the Finnish government to assume the expense of the salaries of the officers sent to Finland, an outlay that the armed forces would have borne in any circumstance. General Kirke asked his government to find ways to keep Finland’s costs to a minimum and requested that they not charge the Finns expenses that the government would normally bear. Kirke
had been anxious to keep costs low in an attempt to convince the Finns of the “disinterest” on the part of the British government, hoping, in turn, that this would result in orders for British industry, an attitude that clearly reveals Britain’s hope for the mission. Rennie, the British Consul, supported Kirke’s efforts and pointed out to his superiors (incorrectly) that the French only dispatch missions if contracts are placed in France, the result being the creation of a bad impression. Rennie insisted that minimizing the mission’s costs would bring benefits to British industry that far outweighed any additional expenses the government might incur. The Foreign Office agreed with Kirke and Rennie and asked the three service heads to do as the pair recommended. The Admiralty, at least, agreed. Kirke also attempted to have the cost of instruction fees lowered for Finnish air officers to receive training in Britain. The Treasury refused to allow a reduction in these charges for any foreign officers.

Kirke’s conscientious efforts to reduce the expenses of the mission paid extra dividends for British influence. The Finns were pleased and impressed with all of Kirke’s efforts, enough so that they asked the General to remain in Finland until the end of the year. The official reason given was that he would help in the reorganization of the Finnish Army. The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff also wanted Kirke to stay. Both had only recently taken up their appointments, the former commanders having been relieved from their positions shortly after the arrival of the British mission. Possibly, the deposed soldiers were victims of Finland’s purge of non-ethnic Finns from the ranks of the government and military. Kirke accepted the offer and returned to Britain in September to bring Lady Kirke to Helsinki. The couple arrived in Finland at the beginning of October, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel P.L.W. Powell. Powell came to meet Finland’s request for the loan of an army officer for six months, with the possibility of this period being extended.

The Finns gave Kirke a free hand and he anticipated completing his work by Christmas. He attempted to have the question of army reorganization transferred from the Revision Committee to the General Staff. Subsequent to Kirke’s appointment, the Committee had spent eight months debating what should be done in regard to the army, without reaching a conclusion. Kirke’s efforts proved futile and he contributed his failure to the Chief of the General Staff, who being “new to his post, was afraid of responsibility, and had not the experience necessary to enable him to assert himself.” The Revision Committee also did not want to relinquish their control because of their own desires to do the job. The Finnish government also preferred that the responsibility for defense recommendations remain in the hands of the Committee. Its members were drawn from many of the different parties of the Finnish political spectrum and the government wanted them to be directly responsible for the conclusions reached so that their respective political groups would be committed to finding the necessary funding. On strictly military matters, the Committee invariably accepted Kirke’s advice. Kirke did not like the slow pace of the Revision Committee and his hope of departing around Christmas proved futile. But, he wrote, that this “was natural, seeing that they were all busy men and many of them with little knowledge of the subject, though intensely anxious to do their best.” Other factors also added to the extension of his stay. Army officers responsible for preparing reports on the cost of various proposals had promised them by January. These had still not arrived by the time of the General’s departure at the end of March 1925. To hurry the Finns, General Kirke proposed coming home several times, once soon after Christmas 1924. He reported that this had “an instantaneous though temporary effect.”

The Mission’s Recommendations

In the end, what were the recommendations offered by General Kirke, particularly for the Finnish Navy and Coast Defense, and did the Finns implement them? First, Kirke believed that the Finns should quickly reorganize the military command structure, as one branch of the army frequently did not know what the other was doing. He suggested that the Finns use the British War Office as a model. The British also recommended the creation of a Finnish Navy as an independent service not tied to the coastal defense command structure. Kirke also thought that placing warships under the command of Army coast defense officers would hinder naval operations and fail to take advantage of what he saw as the “enterprising nature of the Finnish character.” He also argued against placing the Coast Defense forces under the command of the Navy. He recommended this because he felt that in the event of a successful invasion defensive operations would become primarily an Army show. Kirke also did not want the navy burdened with the problems entailed in coast defense. He believed that the navy needed to concentrate on its own development so as to emerge as an efficient force. To him, this was burden enough. To Kirke and his staff the naval forces of Finland had several objectives: 1) forcing the concentration of enemy units, which would hurt any efforts at blockade and make enemy ships susceptible to submarine attack; 2) attacking single enemy vessels; 3) launching naval attacks in combination with aircraft; 4) forcing the enemy to devote resources to convoying unarmed vessels – “in short, hamper his freedom of action on the seas.” To accomplish these tasks the British argued that Finland needed air and naval forces, but not at the expense of the Army. The Army was seen as the most important arm, and rightfully so. Aircraft were considered useful to the army, naval forces not as much so. Kirke did believe that the Finns needed some naval units and felt that they would utilize them effectively. He wrote that the Finns were “naturally a sea-faring people, possessing numerous small craft and the knowledge of how to use them, and an endeavour should be made to put these factors to good use.”

The British mission also filed exhaustive reports evaluating the extensive coastal fortifications that the Finns inherited from the Russians. Elements in the Finnish military wanted to arm most of these sites with the numerous artillery pieces acquired upon the collapse of the Tsarist regime. Kirke believed that making an effort to erect fixed defenses to protect the entire coast was not only impractical, but also unnecessary. Enacting such a plan would, in his opinion, result in a “useless diversion of funds” that could be better spent on the field army. It would also contribute to making Finnish defenses weak everywhere. Kirke argued for the installation of coastal batteries at strategic points along the coast in order to protect Finland’s ports and other important installations. Kirke also pushed for the standardization of the coastal defense weapons.

The Finns had a myriad of old Tsarist artillery, some of which had been purchased from American firms, ranging from light 47mm pieces to 12-inch guns. Kirke suggested that in the interest of efficiency the shore guns should be of three types: 75mm (these could also act as anti-aircraft guns), 6-inch, and 10-inch. The British mission also argued against the creation of an extensive network of coastal fortifications because of the amount of personnel that manning such installations required. The coast defense forces already suffered from a shortage of officers, and the expansion of this service’s duties would only exacerbate the problem. The construction of batteries at strategic sites would allow the concentration of scarce personnel. Kirke also recommended that most of the servicemen assigned to coastal defense duties be Suojeluskuntas members wherever possible. This would release additional men from the younger and more-fit classes for service in the regular army. This desire to prevent the dissipation of Finland’s manpower resources in order to provide the Finnish Army with sufficient cadres was one of the dominant elements that continuously influenced the recommendations that Kirke offered the Finns.

Kirke also believed that the Finns had inordinate fears regarding a Soviet amphibious assault and the shelling of Finnish cities by the Red Navy. He wrote: “Finland must take some chances, and history shows that it is safer to take chances with the Russian fleet than with the Russian Army.” He argued that Finland’s best defense against a Russian amphibious assault was the use of mobile reserves and aircraft. A railway runs along the southern coast of Finland and Kirke believed that the Finns would have no problems massing sufficient strength to throw back any Soviet invasion force that made it to shore through a gauntlet composed of coastal guns, the Finnish Navy, and the Finnish Air Force. Similarly, attacks launched across the ice during winter would also be very vulnerable to attacks from the air. Kirke also argued that the possibility of coastal bombardment on the part of Soviet warships would be at best slight, an assessment that the Winter War would later prove correct. The many islands that dot the coast of Finland force any bombarding warships to take up stations a great distance from the intended target. Before radar, this prevented accurate observation of the site under attack, except by the use of aircraft. Unless aircraft can stay over the target, the bombardment proves very ineffective. Coastal guns, which generally have greater accuracy than those on board ship, would also make getting too close to a Finnish port a dangerous proposition for a Soviet warship. These same islands also inhibit the movement of enemy warships along Finland’s shores. The confined waters force the vessels to operate singly or in small groups. These units would be very vulnerable to Finnish naval attacks.

The British also offered advice on the composition of the Finnish Navy. The main element would consist of three gunboats, or more accurately, armored coast defense ships. The British recommended 2,500-ton vessels with a shallow draft (12-14 feet), with 6-inch guns for the main armament. Kirke advocated three such vessels so as to always have one at sea. The British also arrived at this number because the best information that Great Britain then possessed on the Red Navy led Kirke to believe that at the most, the Soviets would only be able to have three destroyers on station at any one time. Additionally, if the Soviets armed their available merchantmen, they might be able to muster an additional three vessels. It was felt that the armored ship would be able to deal with any threat from enemy destroyers as well as protect coastal shipping. Kirke’s commission recommended that one armored ship be built immediately so that the lessons learned from its construction and use could be utilized in the building of its sister ships. The British plan foresaw at least three 400-ton submarines complementing the armored ships. Kirke recommended buying these abroad, preferably from Great Britain, in order to take advantage of British experience. British builders were more knowledgeable than those in any “available” nation. This would result in a larger expenditure for the submarines, but the Finns would reap the benefit of British experience. Kirke advised the construction of subsequent vessels in Finnish yards. Additionally, the Finns also had the old Russian submarine AG.16, which the Finns had raised and upon which they had already spent 19,000,000 Finnish marks for hull and machinery repairs. Because of its age and condition Kirke did not believe that the Finns should seek to make it an active part of their navy. As a complement to the submarines, the British recommended the purchase of a submarine parent ship.

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AG16 in 1917 (During World War I Russian and British submarines operated from bases in Finland. The Russian submarines of the Holland type (AG 11, AG 12, AG 15 and AG 16) were scuttled in the harbor of Hanko on April 3, just prior to the German landing there. These submarines had good sea going qualities and were easy to handle. When the German troops advanced on Helsinki, the British submarine group sailed out and scuttled their submarines outside the city, on April 4, 1918. The Squadron consisted of the submarines E-1, E-8, E-9, E-19, C-26, C-27 and C-35. The British crews returned to Britain via Murmansk. AG 16 had been completed in 1916, commissioned on 21 July 1917 and was scuttled on 3 April 1918. Ag 16 was stored on land while repairs were made, but never completed due to the overall cost. In 1929 the AG16 was finally scrapped).

Kirke’s mission also advised the construction of barges that would be equipped with 12-inch cannon left in Finland by the Russians. Inspired by the British experience in the Dardanelles in 1915 and along the Flanders coast in 1917-18, these weapons were meant for defensive use against attacking enemy warships under the cover of Finland’s many islands. Kirke argued against the purchase of new Coastal Motor Boats (CMBs), believing that the money would be better spent on aircraft capable of carrying torpedoes, something that he believed, correctly, would become increasingly efficient in subsequent years. The British recommended that the Finns equip 50 vessels for minesweeping and that they purchase the paravanes necessary for this, as well as numerous extras. Defensive mine laying played a role in the British plans and included sowing the areas around Bjorkö, Vyborg, Vasa, and Kotka. A field would also be laid between the Åland Islands and Sweden in order to protect Finland’s communications. At the time of Kirke’s tenure, the Finns had 1,834 mines in storage. Kirke recommended the purchase of an additional 5,000 mines. In the end, the British concluded that the Finns should spend 423,914,340 Finnish marks over a six-year period for the improvement and expansion of their navy. This figure included money for personnel expenses, maintenance, and work on a number of bases, as well as the moving of one. The latest Finnish program drawn up for the navy and coast defense before Kirke’s arrival had called for the expenditure of 684,974,840 Finnish marks.

The Aftermath

General Kirke left Helsinki on 24 March 1925. The Finns were very pleased by his work, especially his businesslike approach. They regretted his departure and offered their hopes that he would soon return. Kirke, as well as officials of the British government, believed the mission a complete success, and their comments on this subject demonstrate the primary purposes for dispatching the mission: influence and contracts. Kirke believed that the mission had produced an “invisible gain to British prestige” and that it had established good relations with the military leaders in Finland, particularly the Jäger officers, who had previously been perceived by the British as pro-German, and who were also the most important group in the Finnish military. In regard to the navy he wrote that “The extent to which British influence predominates will depend entirely on the extent to which the British Admiralty is prepared to help in training officers.” The Finns were particularly eager to send young officers to the United Kingdom for submarine training and Kirke wrote that “This is probably the only chance of getting any share for British yards in the work of the new Naval programme.” Kirke felt that relations between Finland and Britain would continue to improve steadily, the result being “good effects on commercial relations” between the two states. He proved overly optimistic. Despite his positive hopes for the future, Kirke was convinced that “the scales are heavily loaded against British firms.” He identified several obstacles, the first being the cost of French goods, which tended to be less than those from Great Britain. General Kirke also noted the French government’s policy of sometimes providing financial support to firms doing business with foreign countries, as well as the strong official encouragement from the French government. He also noted some additional past elements that weighed against the British: the French tactic of awarding medals to influential military and political personnel as well as “the propaganda of French officers who are practically agents for armament firms.” Finally, Finnish officers had often only seen French material.

General Kirke’s complaint regarding the French policy of awarding medals had particularly strong merit. During the 1920s, the French gave numerous Legions of Honor to important Finnish official, many of them naval officers. Included among these were Commander Einar-Wilhelm Schwank, 11 January 1923, and Commander Yrjö Roos, 23 July 1924, both of whom were future heads of the Finnish Navy. Important dignitaries receiving the medal included Dr. Rudolf Holsti, 22 April 1920, and Hjalmar Procopé, 22 November 1928. Commodore von Schoultz also held the Legion of Honor. But this did not win France the influence it desired. Despite the threat to the British from French competition, Kirke did not believe that the French represented the greatest danger. He saw the Italians and Swedes, both of whom had their advocates in Finland, as Britain’s most dangerous competitors. France, Italy, and Sweden had all accepted Finnish officers in to various military training schools and the Italians had even allowed the Finns to serve in command positions. But the real threat, which Kirke never realized, was Germany. Kirke’s presence and Finnish satisfaction with his activities and those of the other British officers did not prevent the Finns from also looking elsewhere for military advice. In early September 1924, near the end of the tenure of the British mission, Finland dispatched a group of leading Finnish naval officers to study the naval situations in Germany, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries. A British observer commented that Finland had “determined to have recourse to as many countries as may be for guidance in their task of reorganizing the defensive forces of their country.” During this same period, the Finnish Minister of Defense asked for permission to retain five foreign military experts for the new Army staff school scheduled to open on 3 November 1924. Included among these were one French, one Italian, and one Swedish officer.

Kirke’s intervention did prevent the appointment of a French advisor to the Finnish Air Force. Under an old agreement, General Enckell of the Finnish Army went to Paris sometime around Christmas 1924 to arrange for a French air officer as an instructor and air advisor to the Finnish government. Kirke, when he learned of this through the Finnish Air Force, pointed out to the Minister of Defense, as well as to the Foreign Minister, that simultaneously seeking the advice of two nations would be useless and “fatal to the efficiency of the Finnish Air Force, and that if they were definitely committed to the French, it would be best for us to go at once.” Rennie, the British Minister in Helsinki, supported Kirke’s view. A meeting of the Finnish Cabinet followed and its members voted unanimously that Kirke should stay and the French should be sent Finland’s regrets. Moreover, the Cabinet decided to request the services of a British air officer for two years. The British government agreed and Squadron Leader Field arrived in March 1925. In an effort to strengthen Britain’s economic chances, General Kirke advocated the granting of preferential treatment toward Finnish officers regarding invitations to British maneuvers. In Kirke’s view, the Finnish Army and government would greatly appreciate this and “it would probably lead to practical results when new equipment had to be purchased abroad.” Foreign Office officials had similar views. They believed that the appointment of a British air advisor indicated that the Finns were looking increasingly toward Britain. They also believed that if Finnish naval officers sent to Britain for training received a good welcome the “commercial results may very well be considerable.” A Foreign Office minute summed up in one sentence British hopes for General Kirke’s mission: “There is no doubt that the mission has enhanced our prestige & let us hope that commercial results will follow.”

The recommendations of the mission had a limited effect on the development of the Finnish Air Force, Army, and Navy, but little effect on the Coast Defense forces. In general, the British advice received a “harsh reception” from the naval officers. The mission’s recommendation that Finland remove many of the coastal defense guns was rejected. The Finnish high command could not understand why Kirke’s mission had made such a decision and refused to accept it. The Finns also disagreed with the British recommendations regarding the caliber of the guns for the planned coast defense ships; they believed the suggested British caliber insufficient for their needs. The Finns also did not like Kirke’s conclusion that CMBs were useless to Finland. The Finnish Navy considered them very necessary. Moreover, the torpedo boats, as well as the armored ships and submarines, were weapons that the Finns had the potential to construct, at least partially, in their own yards. This too was an important factor in their defense considerations, and correctly so. In the end, the impact of General Kirke’s mission in regard to the Navy and Coast Defense was minor and the Maritime Industrial Complex initiative that Mannerheim was instrumental in driving through superceded the Kirke Mission’s naval recommendations within a couple of years. But while the naval high command generally rejected the British proposals, the Army and the High Command took many of them to heart, overruling Somervalo’s opposition to many of the recommendations concerning the Air Force in doing so.

The mission likely did succeed in changing Finnish attitudes toward Great Britain, therefore increasing British influence, and probably did soften the views of the Jägers toward the British. The French viewed it as a great success for their British opponent. Despite this, the British continually assumed, incorrectly, that the pro-German feelings of the Jägers equated to anti-British attitudes. This was in no way a correct assessment. The British cause was also dealt a severe blow by the resolution of the language dispute in Finland. In the early 1920s, many factions in Finland complained bitterly that many high political, military, and governmental positions were occupied by Finns of Swedish ancestry. This resulted in a campaign to remove many of the influential Swedish-speaking Finns from their jobs and replace them with Finnish speakers. The Swedish-speakers in the military also tended to be former Tsarist officers, another group that the more radical of the Jägers disliked. The Jägers played a key role in the campaign to remove these older officers and some of those who lost their positions were sympathetic to Great Britain and also the very men with whom the British were accustomed to dealing. Important among these was Commodore von Schoultz. Von Schoultz, the head of the Finnish Navy in the first half of the 1920s, was a former Tsarist officer and veteran of the Imperial Russian Navy. During World War I, he had served as a liaison officer with the British Grand Fleet. Present at the Battle of Jutland, Schoultz made comments on the fight in his memoirs that caused uproar in Great Britain (Von Schoultz G. Commodore: With the British Battle Fleet: Recollections of a Russian Naval Officer, London: Hutchinson 1st ed ND c1920). Schoultz criticized Admiral Sir John Jellicoe for breaking off the engagement in the evening, failing to take precautions to enable the British fleet to maintain contact with the enemy, and not sending his destroyers to launch night attacks against the Germans. Schoultz believed that these mistakes cost the British the opportunity to continue the battle the following day. Though many in Britain did not appreciate his remarks, Schoultz had maintained excellent relations with the British officers with whom he had served. The Commodore still had many friends in the Royal Navy and was generally well liked by British officials, no doubt his fluent English helped in this respect. Schoultz’s presence helped further the cause of good relations between Britain and Finland. Perhaps because of his German-appearing name, some French observers accused him of being a “germanophile.”

In Finland, in 1926, a law requiring knowledge of the Finnish language to hold a military post came into force. Officers were required to take a rigid language examination, which Commodore von Schoultz failed. The Commodore spoke excellent Russian, English, German, and French, but did not speak Finnish well enough to pass the exam. He was forced into retirement as were a number of other naval officers. A Finnish observer lamented Schoultz’s departure by writing that “there is nobody to take his place.” The Finns filled the recently vacated command posts with younger officers who would not normally have been awarded such senior slots. Commander Yrjö Roos moved into Commodore von Schoultz’s position in May 1925 when he was only thirty-five. Roos died in August 1926, his untimely death a result of a carbon monoxide leak in a minesweeper, the noxious fumes being accidentally pumped into the unfortunate officer’s cabin. Commander Achilles Sourander replaced Roos. In 1929, Commander Einar Schwank became the head of the Finnish Navy.

The retirement of von Schoultz cost the British one of their greatest allies. The Jäger victory in the linguistic struggle resulted in many of them filling positions of power that they had not formerly held. Though they were not necessarily pro-German, they were more inclined to deal with Germany than their predecessors. Kirke’s mission did produce an increase in British influence in Finland, but it was a short-lived bounty. Not long after Kirke’s mission, the Admiralty began to take the appointment of naval missions and naval advisors more seriously. The effects of the 1922 Washington naval treaties and lower governmental spending on ship construction began hurting Britain’s ability to produce the naval armaments that it needed. Obviously, in the eyes of the Admiralty this was an enormous security issue, and they began searching for ways to alleviate the problem. First, they tried granting subsidies for new construction, but by the mid-1920s it had become clear that this would not solve the problem. Soon, the Royal Navy saw Britain’s declining naval armaments industry as the greatest threat to British sea power, even more so than the Royal Navy’s true enemies: France, and most dangerous of all, the Treasury. The Admiralty began to see foreign orders as the solution. To protect its naval arms industry the Admiralty became very supportive of pursuing foreign orders. They believed that the best way to win them would be to send naval missions, naval advisors, and naval attachés, and even provide subsidies, to the potential customers. Moreover, naval missions could counter French influence, and the Admiralty’s agreement to send a mission to Romania was partially motivated by a desire to keep the French from sending one. Also, Romania, like the Baltic States, was seen a portal to Russian trade. This was a clear reversal of the 1919 Royal Navy policy against the dispatch of missions. The worsening economic conditions of the interwar period would force even more changes in Admiralty policy.

Later, in a lecture delivered after his return to Britain, General Kirke stressed his confidence in the Finns ability to defend themselves against the Soviets, stating that “one may reasonably conclude that the defence of Finland’s coasts and essential sea communications is by no means an impossible, nor even a very difficult task.” The results of the Winter War would prove him correct. The Finns did do some of the things that the British recommended, starting with the acquisition of a number of submarines. But this would not be done with British help. German experts, the most important of whom was a former submarine officer named Karl Bartenbach, were already quietly working in Finland. Puppet German firms built vessels for the Finnish Navy in Finnish yards, laying the foundation for a modern Finnish Navy, and incidentally, Nazi Germany’s U-boat arm. But rather than the three coastal defence ships the British had recommended, they then concentrated on building a destroyer flotilla based on the Polish Grom-class design, and smaller Anti-Submarine Corvette’s based on a simplified Swedish Goteborg-class design. They also went ahead, against the British recommendations, and built a sizable torpedoe boat flotilla in the last half of the 1930’s. The British sent a mission to keep Finland from the camp of French influence. London should have been worrying about the Germans, Poles and Swedes.

And on the Ilmavoimat.....

While the primary aim of the Kirke Mission had actually been to help in redesigning and reconstructing the Finnish coastal defences, they were also involved in making recommendations regarding the Ilmavoimat (Air Force). They suggested a temporary plan that downplayed fighter aircraft, advising that Finland simply could not afford to have a strong land-based air force. Their recommendation was that maritime aircraft, bombers and recconaisance aircraft should form the majority of the Ilmavoimat instead. Somersalo took the plan and more or less ignored it, following which, in the 1930's, the defence reorganization and rearmament plans resulted in the adjustment of the structure and organization of the Ilmavoimat to a more heavily fighter and tactical ground-attack oriented air force.

The Ilmavoimat through the 1920’s and 1930’s seemed also to make a practice if purchasing single examples of different models of aircraft for evaluation. Given that these were one-offs and more or less irrelevant to this ATL, these aircraft won’t be gone into in any detail. Examples were:
Fokker D.X – 1 purchased in 1923, out of service 1924
Avro 504K – 1 purchased 1926, retired in 1930
IVL C24 – 1 built in 1924
IVL C25 – 1 built in 1925
IVL D.26 Haukka I – 1 built in 1927
IVL K1 Kurki – 1 built in 1927
Potze 25 A2 – 1 purchased in 1927, retired in 1936

Following the reorganization in the mid-1920s, the Ilmavoimat’s sole fighter type for a number of years was the Martinsyde F4 Buzzard. The Ilmavoimat purchased 15 F.4s in 1923, the date of the order preceding the Kirke Mission, and operated them until 1939.

Martinsyde F4 Buzzard Fighter - 15 ordered in 1923, retired 1939

The Martinsyde F4 was derived from the Martinsyde F3, a single seat biplane fighter powered by a Rolls-Royce Falcon V-12 engine. Six F3’s were ordered by the RFC in 1917, with the first flying in November that year. While its performance during testing was impressive, demonstrating a maximum speed of 142 mph (229 km/h) and described in an official report as "a great advance on all existing fighting scouts", all Rolls-Royce Falcon production was required to power the Bristol F.2 Fighters, so no orders for the F.3 were actually placed. To solve this problem, Martinsyde designed a new fighter based on the F.3, but powered by a 300 hp (224 kW) Hispano-Suiza engine, the F.4 Buzzard. The F.4 Buzzard, like the F.3, was a single seat biplane powered by a water cooled engine. It had new lower wings as compared with the F.3 and the pilot's cockpit was positioned further aft, but otherwise the two aircraft were similar. The prototype F.4 was tested in June 1918, and again demonstrated excellent performance, being easy to fly and manoeuverable as well as very fast for the time. Large orders followed, with 1,450 ordered from Martinsyde, Boulton & Paul Ltd, Hooper & Co and the Standard Motor Company. It was planned to equip the French Aéronautique Militaire as well as the British Royal Air Force, and production of a further 1,500 aircraft in the United States of America was planned.

Deliveries to the RAF had just started when the Armistice between the Allies and Germany was signed, with 57 F.4 Buzzards delivered before the end of World War I, but these did not reach operational squadrons. Martinsyde was instructed to only complete those aircraft which were part built, while all other orders were cancelled. The F.4 Buzzard was not adopted as a fighter by the post war RAF, the cheaper Sopwith Snipe being preferred despite its lower performance. Martinsyde continued development of the F.4 Buzzard on its own account, buying back many of the surplus aircraft from the RAF, and producing two seat tourers and floatplanes. After the Bankruptcy of Martinsyde in 1924, these aircraft were obtained by the Aircraft Disposal Company, which continued to develop and sell F.4 variants for several years.

While the post war RAF did not want the Buzzard, Martinsyde had more success selling the Buzzard overseas, with single and two-seat versions being sold to a number of air forces, including those of Spain (30 aircraft), Finland (15 aircraft) and the Soviet Union (100 aircraft). Some of these aircraft had long careers, with six of the Spanish Buzzards remaining in service at the start of the Spanish Civil War. Following the bankruptcy of Martinsyde, the Aircraft Disposal Company managed to sell eight Jaguar engined versions, the ADC.1, to Latvia, two of these remaining in sevice until 1938. Performance of the Martinsyde F.4 was fairly typical of an early 1920’s fighter – a crew of 1, a maximum speed of 146mph powered by a single Hispano-Suiza 8Fb inline 300 hp (224 kW) engine, a service ceiling of 24,000 feet, endurance of 2.5 hours and an armament of 2x 0.303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers machine guns.

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Ilmavoimat F4 Buzzard

In this alternative scenario, this history remains unchanged, except that the Buzzards are retired a couple of years earlier, in 1937, as greater numbers of advanced trainers and more modern fighters with higher performance enter service.

Morane-Saulnier MS50.C Trainer – 5 ordered 1925, retired 1932

The Morane-Saulnier MoS-50 (also MS.50) was a French trainer aircraft of the parasol type from 1924. The twin-seat monoplane aircraft was of wooden construction and was one of the last aircraft to have a rotary engine - a 130 hp Clerget 9B. In 1925 six o the MS.50Cs were sold to Finland, where they were used as primary trainers until 1932. It was very popular in service.
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Suomen Ilmavoimat Morane-Saulnier MS.50 Primary Trainers

In this alternative scenario, this history remains unchanged.

Koolhoven FK.31 – 12 purchased 1926, retired 1931

The NVI Koolhoven F.K.31 was a Dutch designed, two seat reconnaissance-fighter, which was developed in the 1920s by Frederick Koolhoven. The aircraft was equipped with an enclosed cockpit and single-strut landing gear and the prototype became the sensation of the Paris Air Show of 1922. Only a small number of aircraft were produced. However, the production of the F.K.31 met with many difficulties.

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Koolhoven FK.31 at the Paris Air Show, 1922

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The Koolhoven Factory. In 1938, N.V. Koolhoven Aeroplanes had grown to 1200 employees and the factory had a floor area of 8000 square metres

The aircraft was purchased for the Finnish Air Force with twelve FK.31s in service between 1925-27. The aircraft had been purchased while the development was still being carried out. The Finnish pilots disliked the aircraft and it has been considered the worst aircraft ever of the FAF. The F.K.31s flew for fewer than 6 hours in total in the Finnish Air Force. As Commander-in-Chief of the Ilmavoimat, and having signed off on this purchase, Somersalo recieved a great deal of adverse feedback from his subordinates on this purchase, with some heated conversations taking place. He would never make another such mistake.

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Koolhoven FK.31 at Utti, 27th July 1927

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Koolhoven F.K. 31 in summer 1930 at the factory at Suomenlinna

Aero A.11 Light Bomber and Reconnaisance Aircraft – 8 purchased 1927, retired 1939

The Aero A.11 was a biplane light bomber and reconnaissance aircraft built in Czechoslovakia between the First and Second World Wars. It formed the basis for a large number of other Czechoslovakian military aircraft of the inter-war period. Around 250 were built, with some remaining in service at the outbreak of World War II. Designed by Antonin Husnik, it was a development of the Aero A.12 (despite what the numbering of the designs might suggest). A Hispano-Suiza 8Fb-powered version, the A.11H-s was built for the Finnish Air Force, the only foreign operator of the type. The Finns had eight aircraft of this type and operated them between 1927-39. With a maximum speed of 150 mph, a range of 470 miles, a service ceiling of 25,000 feet and an armament of 1 forward firing .303 Vickers + 2× .303 in (7.7 mm) Lewis machine guns in a flexible mount for the observer and 441 lbs bombload, it was a fairly typical light bomber of the period.

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Aero A-11 a biplane light bomber and reconnaissance aircraft

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The Aero A-11 won a competition against the more expensive yet better Fokker CV (which the Ilmavoimat ended up buying later). The "Hispano Aeros" initially flew with the Army Cooperation Squadron, but were soon relocated to the Aviation School at Kauhava in 1929; a decision that was made based on the aircraft's unsuitability for combat operations.

In this alternative scenario, this history remains unchanged.

Fokker CV – 1 purchased 1927, 13 purchased 1931, retired 1945

The Fokker C.V was a twin-seated light reconnaissance and bomber biplane aircraft designed by Anthony Fokker and manufactured by Fokker. The C.V was constructed in the early 1920s by Anthony Fokker. When shown to the public in 1924, the C.V was the first multi-role combat aircraft available and it was manufactured in a variety of versions; the customer could choose from five different wing types (which varied in wing span), radial engines could be selected between 336-723 kW (450-970 hp). The landing gear could be changed from wheels to pontoons. The aircraft became an export success for Fokker, it was sold and/or license manufactured in Bolivia, China, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the Soviet Union and the US. Sweden purchased two different versions to use as models for their license manufacturing of the S6 reconnaissance version and a J3 fighter version. The Dutch Air Force used the C.V in front line service against the German Luftwaffe during World War II. After the Dutch surrender, the aircraft were taken over by Luftwaffe and used on the Eastern front until 1944.

The Ilmavoimat used both C.V-Ds and C.V-Es. One C.V-E was purchased in 1927, with delivery on 20 September of the same year, and a further 13 were purchased on 17 March 1931, arriving in the winter of 1932. During the Winter War, Sweden donated three more C.V-Es. The aircraft were used as reconnaissance and light bomber aircraft between 20 September 1927 and 1945. During the Winter War, the Finnish C.Vs flew extensively on reconnaissance and harassment bombing sorties without suffering any losses.

As we will see when we get to the Norwegian Campaign of 1940, a large number of Norwegian Army Air Service Fokker CV’s were taken under the wing of the Ilmavoimat for the duration of the Campaign. Those that survived were returned to the Norwegian Army Air Service on the conclusion of fighting in Norway. (The Norwegian Army Air Service had bought its first C.V-Ds and C.V-Es in 1926. The two versions were designated as long-winged (-E) and short-winged (-D). The initial purchase agreement with Fokker included license production rights, and over the period 1929-1931, 27 C.V-Ds were manufactured at the NoAAS' aircraft factory at Kjeller. After the production of C.V-Ds ended, a further 15 C.V-Es followed between 1932 and 1939. In total, the NoAAS operated 72 Fokker C.Vs, 40 of which were license built in Norway. When the Germans invaded Norway on 9 April 1940, 40 Fokker C.Vs were still in Norwegian service. The C.Vs were based at several air bases in different parts of the country and mostly saw service as reconnaissance and light transport aircraft. Although the planes were hopelessly outdated as combat aircraft, they still saw extensive and successful service in the bomber role during the 1940 Norwegian Campaign, supporting Norwegian and Finnish ground troops fighting on the Narvik front and then points South).
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Finnish Fokker C.V-E's. Performance data: Maximum speed of 155mph, Range of 500 miles, Service Ceiling of 22,000 feet, Armament consisted of 2 × 7.9 mm (.31 in) fiorward-firing FN synchronized fixed machine guns and 1 × 7.9 mm (.31 in) Lewis machine gun on a flexible mount in the rear for the observer. 440lbs of bombs could be carried under the wings.

OTL Note: In reality, one CV-E was purchased in 1927, with delivery 20 September 1927, and a further 13 were purchased on 17 March 1934, arriving in the winter of 1935. For this ATL, I have moved the purchase of the additional 13 aircraft forward to 1931 – one of the first aircraft purchases made as the budget for the Ilmavoimat was increased from 1931 on, with the purchase of additional aircraft being based on the successful use of the single model purchased in 1927.

VL D.27 Haukka (Hawk) II Biplane Fighter - 17 ordered 1927, 23 ordered 1929

In 1927, the Ilmavoimat had been considering the purchase of Gloster Gamecock Fighters from Britain. The Gamecock was a single-seat British bi-plane fighter with a fixed under-carriage, built on a wooden framework with a fabric skin. Powered by a single Bristol Jupiter VI 9-cylinder radial, 425 hp (317 kW), the Gamecock had a maximum speed of 155mph, a range of 365 miles, a ceiling of 22,100 feet and was armed with 2×0.303 inch (7.7mm) Vickers machine guns. On 23 March, 1927 the State Aircraft Factory (VL) received a single Gamecock from England for evaluation.
At the same time, IVL (Valtion Lentokonetehdas, the State Aircraft Factory) had been experimenting with moving away from building aircraft under license to designing and building a series of trial aircraft,.With Kurt Berger as the designer, these started with the underpowered IVL C.24 and C.25 in 1924 and 1925. Learning from these aircraft, a prototype of the IVL Haukka, the Haukka I, was built and made its maiden flight on March 17, 1927. This was immediately followed by the VL D.27 Haukka II - a further developed version of the D.26. Two aircraft were manufactured at the aircraft factory at Suomenlinna (which now had shortened its name from IVL to VL).

In evaluations, the Haukka II turned out to have similar characteristics to the Gamecock, indeed, it proved to be the Gamecock’s equivalent in all regards and a decision was made that the Haukka would be ordered to equip a single Fighter Squadron, augmenting the single squadron of Martinsyde Buzzards then in service. An order for 17 aircraft was placed, with the Haukka’s to be manufactured at the VL aircraft factory at Suomenlinna. These were manufactured between 29 Oct, 1928 and 15 May, 1929. A further 23 Haukka’s were ordered in January 1929 and were manufactured between May 1929 and April 1930. The Haukka II’s were relegated to use as an Advanced Fighter Trainer from the mid-1930’s as more modern fighters entered service and eventually retired in 1944.

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The Gloster Gamecock Biplane Fighter: Powered by a single Bristol Jupiter VI 9-cylinder radial of 425 hp (317 kW), the Gamecock had a maximum speed of 155mph, a range of 365 miles, a ceiling of 22,100 feet and was armed with 2×0.303 inch (7.7mm) Vickers machine guns.

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Powered by a single Gnome-Rhone Jupiter IV radial engine of 480hp (358 kW), the Haukka II had a maximum speed of 154mph, a range of 365 miles, a ceiling of 22,100 feet and was armed with 2×0.303 inch (7.7mm) Vickers machine guns.

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The Haukka II in Ilmavoimat service

Out of interest, here's a link to filmclip showing the Gloster Gamecock in Ilmavoimat service.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EXfFll8TiN0
A collection of scenes from Meidän Poikamme Ilmassa propaganda movie (1934). These excerptions highlight the use of the Gloster Gamecock in Ilmavoimat service.

To be continued…….
 
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