Could Germany have Forced Vichy France to be a Combatant During WWII?

TDM

Kicked
Also if you look at the Legion of French Volunteers, you quickly see that it not only struggled to get volunteers, but struggled full stop. They were eventually folded into SS Charlemagne. And of course was never front line troops but rearward security, (that of course theoretically freed up other troops but you reach a point of diminishing returns on that, and Germany due to it's activities needed a lot of rearward security!)

The international SS regiments were also a mixed story especially at the end of the war. Yes some recruits were die hard ideologues who fought bravely to the last, but a lot of the time they were made up of an eclectic mix of people who had more personal reasons for quickly getting out of where they were and who's motivation and fighting morale was rather less than 100%.
 
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Part of the reason why the Commonwealth forces intervened in Lebanon/Syria was because Vichy not only signed an agreement (the Paris Protocols) in May 1941 to allow Axis aircraft to use bases there, but Darlan himself put forward proposals for the Vichy forces in the Levant to advance into Iraq and securing the oilfields, and for using Vichy controlled rail links and rolling-stock in the region to transport German arms and equipment to Iraqi rebels. Hardly the actions of the a genuinely neutral state

I don't think anyone can really consider any defeated country a neutral, independent state. In this case, Vichy France survived as a rump nation because Germany allowed them to and Vichy France was never allowed to forget that. So if/when Germany came calling in 1941 for help, did they have a genuine option of refusing the Germans?

And this is after the British and their Free French stooges had attacked Vichy France repeatedly in 1940, clearly not recognising or accepting their neutral status, and the Germans are still riding high so Admiral Darlan (the Admiral part is important because the Vichy Navy really hated the British afer Mers-el-Kebir) offering resources is not so strange. They would have gotten revenge on the British, secured their own position in the Levant, gotten goodwill/leverage vis-a-vis the Germans and perhaps more territory.

As always, context is important.
 
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Same problem as with getting the French to do anything else in WWII, lack of enthusiasm and lack of resources. Every weapon you put in the hands of a French man of dubious loyalty is one less in the hands of a German soldier. Yes there were elements loyal to Vichy who would fight but the more you try to expand the French armed forces the more you have to dilute that hard core. Also Frenchman in uniform is one less who can be shipped to Germany as 'guest' labour.

For Germany, France was the historical enemy. For France, keeping Germany divided was the cornerstone of their policy for centuries. WWII was just another round in a perpetual fight for dominance between both states. So after the Battle of France, Germany wanted to humiliate and disarm Vichy France. They only relented somewhat when the British attacked Vichy France and it became clear the French needed some self-defense capability.

Vichy France as a respectable, effective junior partner to Germany requires an entirely different mindset. It requires a deft handling of defeated France and common goals for the partnership, maybe a shared hatred for the British? All of which is unlikely when dealing with Nazi Germany and its exploitive policies.

If some kind of mutual understanding had been developed, Vichy France could have provided some much needed manpower. Fighting shoulder to shoulder would have been a bit much although it happened with Vichy French and British after 1942 despite (great) animosity so it wasn't totally unthinkable. What could have happened was Vichy France taking over garrison requirements in some areas, releasing German troops and generally providing a more robust defense in North Africa, perhaps even making Gibraltar and the Western Med a no-go area for the allies.

But this requires the Nazis to not be Nazis and to be able to play well with others. Perhaps even sharing designs so the French can upgrade from 1940-equipment. All in all very unlikely IMO.
 
Perhaps leval is really in power, instead of the semi out of it marshall. He is more likely to cut a deal.
Maybe if you have someone like Leval in charge prior to 1940 and a much more Neutral France then, but that is a big POD that will have a lot of knock on effect full stop.
Interesting. Could you explain some more about Leval please?

Pierre Jean Marie Laval, Vice President of the Council of Ministers (11 July 1940 – 13 December 1940) and Chief of Government (18 April 1942 – 20 August 1944 ) of the French State, that is, the most durable and reliable (for the Nazis) Head of Government of Vichy France. Relevant politician during the French Third Republic, becoming President of the Council of Ministers twice, which would be equivalent to saying Prime Minister (although to tell the truth, for less than a month the first time, and eight months the second, which was quite common in the politically unstable France of the Third Republic), during his time in the Vichy government, he was one of the main promoters of the dismantling of the parliamentary democracy of the Third Republic, as well as the one of the best known/representative figures of collaborationism with the fascist cause in general, and the Third Reich in particular. So much so that when Petain removed Laval from office (as he had earned the ill will of the entire government, Marshal included), the Nazis pressed to restore him to his position.

As others mentioned, Laval not only would have been willing to make an agreement with Germany to offer the support of Vichy France in military actions against the British, even to enter the war as a full-fledged co-belligerent. Precisely, he went so far as to convince Pétain to make exactly such an offer to Hitler in the Montoire Interview, which was organized at Laval's own initiative.

Of course, two main aspects must be taken into account:

First, the collaborationism of Laval and the majority of the Vichy hierarchs was mainly motivated (except for some cases where there was already a previous ideological affinity with fascism and/or a staunch anti-communism that considered a secondary position in the new Nazi order to be better than Bolshevism, or any kind of post-defeat disorder) by the strong psychological impact of the collapse that was the Fall of France, the impression that Britain would throw in the towel in the same way very soon, and by hostile acts carried out by the British, for example, the battle by Mers el-Kebir. The Axis victory seemed immediate and inevitable, so the one thing to do was keep your head down and try to ingratiate yourself with the victor. Before the disaster of defeat, their perspective was very different, so someone like Laval in charge before 1940, long enough to make an impact, would not have really changed things. Laval himself, as Prime Minister in 1935-1936 promoted a policy of rapprochement with Italy to control Germany. Germany represented the threat to what France had built with its victory in the Great War, so it had to be controlled or appeased, but few saw it as a possible ally in anything other than the fight against Communism.

Second, the problem was not to force Vichy France to be a combatant. Pétain and Laval's definition of collaborationism may have been summed up in the phrase "to collaborate means to give up the least possible to get the most in return.", but OTL demonstrated that that they were willing to accept that in practice it meant to give up the most possible to get the least in return. (For example, in the Montoire Interview, Pétain made several offers to increase the degree of collaboration in the political and economic, as well as to deliver the gold reserves of Belgium that were protected in French Western Africa, but the only concrete thing that he obtained from Hitler was the shipment of the remains of Napoleon II to Paris.) . In exchange for concrete concessions, which formed part of the basis of the justifying propaganda of Vichy France towards its population such as the liberation of several tens of thousands of French prisoners of war (mostly conscripts still held in Germany for forced labor), streamline the transit of people and goods along the "demarcation line" (the "internal border" imposed by the Wehrmacht between Vichy France and France occupied since July 1940), as well as allow the reinstatement of the French Government at Versailles if not in Paris, Laval and Pétain would have gladly fought the British alongside Germany. OTL Case Anton and the Paris Protocols demonstrated that if Hitler had wanted to force them to participate in exchange for nothing or near nothing, Vichy could not have done anything to oppose him.

The problem, as others have previously said, is that, although there are historians who say that Hitler wanted a declaration of war on the British by Vichy France in 1940, in practice, the Nazis showed no interest in Vichy as a combatant in the war, and they were unwilling to grant them the rank of respectable, effective junior partner that Vichy France willingly wished to be. Again, I brought up the Montoire interview as an example. In exchange for Belgian gold, Hitler agreed to release a few hundred imprisoned French officers to garrison the French African colony of Chad against British incursions, though without setting a date for this. This despite the fact that it was convenient for the Third Reich to keep the French colonies in Africa in neutral or friendly hands, and therefore, that Vichy could defend its possessions from the Allies.

Nazi policy towards France was to subject it to exploitation and humiliation. For Hitler, it was better for the soldiers of the French army, to "help the cause" as prisioners of war, source of forced labor and instrument of blackmail to the Vichy government, than as co-belligerents. All resources and equipment had to be used to directly serve Germany and its military forces: a resource destined for France to sustain a war effort against the British, or for its own defense, would be a resource that would not be destined for Germany, therefore wasted from the Reich's point of view. A co-belligerent Vichy France would ruin the fiction of neutrality that still had some usefulness until 1942, and would generate suspicion in Mussolini, a much more valuable ally in Hitler´s opinion. It is also possible that such action would force Germany (as Vichy believed) to finally make the Peace Treaty establishing the definitive political and economic status after the hostilities, which the Nazis did not want because they were getting the most out of the "provisional" situation generated by the Armistice, which allowed them many freedoms in their exploitation and blackmailing of France.

Under both Laval and Darlan, the opportunity existed to gain active military support from Vichy France for the Axis. It was even possible that such support had a certain level of enthusiasm behind it. (Mers-el-Kebir and the Allied invasion of the French protectorate in the Levant could well serve to inflame the desire for vengeance against Perfidious Albion) . But this required Germany to grant certain minimal concessions, at least to justify the collaborationist policy in the eyes of the French people, and Hitler always refused to do anything more than grant barely symbolic crumbs in leonine deals, far below what Vichy requested.
 
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Pierre Jean Marie Laval, Vice President of the Council of Ministers (11 July 1940 – 13 December 1940) and Chief of Government (18 April 1942 – 20 August 1944 ) of the French State, that is, the most durable and reliable (for the Nazis) Head of Government of Vichy France. Relevant politician during the French Third Republic, becoming President of the Council of Ministers twice, which would be equivalent to saying Prime Minister (although to tell the truth, for less than a month the first time, and eight months the second, which was quite common in the politically unstable France of the Third Republic), during his time in the Vichy government, he was one of the main promoters of the dismantling of the parliamentary democracy of the Third Republic, as well as the one of the best known/representative figures of collaborationism with the fascist cause in general, and the Third Reich in particular. So much so that when Petain removed Laval from office (as he had earned the ill will of the entire government, Marshal included), the Nazis pressed to restore him to his position.

As others mentioned, Laval not only would have been willing to make an agreement with Germany to offer the support of Vichy France in military actions against the British, even to enter the war as a full-fledged co-belligerent. Precisely, he went so far as to convince Pétain to make exactly such an offer to Hitler in the Montoire Interview, which was organized at Laval's own initiative.

Of course, two main aspects must be taken into account:

First, the collaborationism of Laval and the majority of the Vichy hierarchs was mainly motivated (except for some cases where there was already a previous ideological affinity with fascism and/or a staunch anti-communism that considered a secondary position in the new Nazi order to be better than Bolshevism, or any kind of post-defeat disorder) by the strong psychological impact of the collapse that was the Fall of France, the impression that Britain would throw in the towel in the same way very soon, and by hostile acts carried out by the British, for example, the battle by Mers el-Kebir. The Axis victory seemed immediate and inevitable, so the one thing to do was keep your head down and try to ingratiate yourself with the victor. Before the disaster of defeat, their perspective was very different, so someone like Laval in charge before 1940, long enough to make an impact, would not have really changed things. Laval himself, as Prime Minister in 1935-1936 promoted a policy of rapprochement with Italy to control Germany. Germany represented the threat to what France had built with its victory in the Great War, so it had to be controlled or appeased, but few saw it as a possible ally in anything other than the fight against Communism.

Second, the problem was not to force Vichy France to be a combatant. Pétain and Laval's definition of collaborationism may have been summed up in the phrase "to collaborate means to give up the least possible to get the most in return.", but OTL demonstrated that that they were willing to accept that in practice it meant to give up the most possible to get the least in return. (For example, in the Montoire Interview, Pétain made several offers to increase the degree of collaboration in the political and economic, as well as to deliver the gold reserves of Belgium that were protected in French Western Africa, but the only concrete thing that he obtained from Hitler was the shipment of the remains of Napoleon II to Paris.) . In exchange for concrete concessions, which formed part of the basis of the justifying propaganda of Vichy France towards its population such as the liberation of several tens of thousands of French prisoners of war (mostly conscripts still held in Germany for forced labor), streamline the transit of people and goods along the "demarcation line" (the "internal border" imposed by the Wehrmacht between Vichy France and France occupied since July 1940), as well as allow the reinstatement of the French Government at Versailles if not in Paris, Laval and Pétain would have gladly fought the British alongside Germany. OTL Case Anton and the Paris Protocols demonstrated that if Hitler had wanted to force them to participate in exchange for nothing or near nothing, Vichy could not have done anything to oppose him.

The problem, as others have previously said, is that, although there are historians who say that Hitler wanted a declaration of war on the British by Vichy France in 1940, in practice, the Nazis showed no interest in Vichy as a combatant in the war, and they were unwilling to grant them the rank of respectable, effective junior partner that Vichy France willingly wished to be. Again, I brought up the Montoire interview as an example. In exchange for Belgian gold, Hitler agreed to release a few hundred imprisoned French officers to garrison the French African colony of Chad against British incursions, though without setting a date for this. This despite the fact that it was convenient for the Third Reich to keep the French colonies in Africa in neutral or friendly hands, and therefore, that Vichy could defend its possessions from the Allies.

Nazi policy towards France was to subject it to exploitation and humiliation. For Hitler, it was better for the soldiers of the French army, to "help the cause" as prisioners of war, source of forced labor and instrument of blackmail to the Vichy government, than as co-belligerents. All resources and equipment had to be used to directly serve Germany and its military forces: a resource destined for France to sustain a war effort against the British, or for its own defense, would be a resource that would not be destined for Germany, therefore wasted from the Reich's point of view. A co-belligerent Vichy France would ruin the fiction of neutrality that still had some usefulness until 1942, and would generate suspicion in Mussolini, a much more valuable ally in Hitler´s opinion. It is also possible that such action would force Germany (as Vichy believed) to finally make the Peace Treaty establishing the definitive political and economic status after the hostilities, which the Nazis did not want because they were getting the most out of the "provisional" situation generated by the Armistice, which allowed them many freedoms in their exploitation and blackmailing of France.

Under both Laval and Darlan, the opportunity existed to gain active military support from Vichy France for the Axis. It was even possible that such support had a certain level of enthusiasm behind it. (Mers-el-Kebir and the Allied invasion of the French protectorate in the Levant could well serve to inflame the desire for vengeance against Perfidious Albion) . But this required Germany to grant certain minimal concessions, at least to justify the collaborationist policy in the eyes of the French people, and Hitler always refused to do anything more than grant barely symbolic crumbs in leonine deals, far below what Vichy requested.
Wow, thank you so much for this well though out reply! So I see that there was some want to collaborate, but Germany frequently did not give France as much as it wanted.
 
Part of the reason why the Commonwealth forces intervened in Lebanon/Syria was because Vichy not only signed an agreement (the Paris Protocols) in May 1941 to allow Axis aircraft to use bases there, but Darlan himself put forward proposals for the Vichy forces in the Levant to advance into Iraq and securing the oilfields, and for using Vichy controlled rail links and rolling-stock in the region to transport German arms and equipment to Iraqi rebels. Hardly the actions of the a genuinely neutral state
So Vichy France is then more so a "controversial case", similar to Ethiopia being officially neutral in WWI, but going to notable extents to support the Central Powers?
 
I think one should not forget that Vichy France was a lot more useful to the Axis the more it was perceived to be neutral and at peace. Britain, fighting essentially alone except for various refugee forces in exile from mid-1940 to mid-1941 (when their new ally would become the Soviet Union, at the time on the ropes and apparently collapsing) was free to attempt to seal off the commerce of Axis nations. But with France purportedly out of the war, the British would have to treat Vichy shipping as neutral rather than out and out enemy. The Vichy regime claimed and generally got the allegiance of French colonists, thus France could obtain colonial goods--and Germany could then plunder what they wanted from that. For Britain to try to take control of French colonies or interfere in any way put the appearance of being the bad guy aggressor on Britain.

For various reasons Vichy had limited potential as an active wartime sidekick of the Axis. Certainly a minority of rightwing extremists of various kinds could be useful--if only Naziism was not essentially Hitlerism, and Hitler did not have the personal hatred of the French that he did.

Making Vichy a mask behind which the Axis could prepare for more war screened by the pretense of a nonexistent peace was far more valuable to Hitler, if he could but see it--and surely he did, to some extent. If we could ASB replace Hitler with Notler whenever it was a matter of policy toward governing France, and give Herr Notler surpassing, Bismarckian or Tallyrandish wiles, the really clever thing would have been to appear as much as possible to leave France truly free--defeated, disarmed, but apparently independent. In fact there is no way Hitler could leave France truly independent, but doing a better job of maintaining the pretense would serve the Reich better. As things were, what with Paris under direct occupation along with a huge swathe of the nation, Vichy was a farce. Even so, it served certain purposes; French ships could steam for the USA (where they were interred when the USA entered the war) and trade there for instance. The USA extended diplomatic recognition to the Vichy regime, accepting it as the power French colonies were ruled by, maintained an embassy in Vichy, etc. In fact Vichy could do nothing Hitler opposed so this was a farce, but one that allowed Hitler to project power a lot farther than if everyone outside Axis direct control had regarded Vichy as what it was, a mere form of provincial governance by Hitler.

So a "Notler" policy that made the appearance of independence more convincing would perhaps have been more effective, in terms of resources available to a racist Reich that did not trust French people to be loyal to it anyway.
 
All of those battles were fought because they were attacked. Other than that they were really neutral. (The fight against Bolshevism was a volunteer force like Persephone said.)

I am more so referring to Vichy France actively going out to fight other battles. For example, sending out ships to help in the Battle of the Atlantic, trying to take over Free France in Central Africa, etc.
The French Navy (assuming they were actually willing to fight alongside the Germans) might have been of some use to the Germans but I suspect they would have had issues providing them with enough fuel for a sustained campaign. The Luftwaffe would also likely have needed to help provide air cover.
 
Vichy fought, in North Africa and Madagascar, in addition to sending volunteers to the eastern front. The problem is that it could not contribute to its full potential because it is difficult to convince the population to fight alongside the recent enemy and also Germany had cannibalized almost all of France's military resources by confiscating vehicles, tanks and fuel and keeping 2 million prisoners of war in the arms industry.
They also fought in Syria.
 
I’ve read this thread with great interest. There is one intriguing possibility that I believe could have turned the tide of the European Theater in Hitler’s favor – the annexation of France and marshalling its manpower and resources against the USSR. This would of necessity, be a decision by Hitler on the spur of the moment, a possibility not completely out of character.
In general, I have always believed that ultimate victory by the major Axis Powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) in the Second World War was impossible. Strategic direction by each nation was myopic – short sighted, unimaginative, and indifferent to the logistics of a long-term conflict. All made too many enemies for their resources in manpower, raw materials, industrial production and weapons design to ever exceed those of their enemies. A great challenge to the alternative historian is how to get around such obstacles, which usually forces a change in the personalities of highly self-righteous dictators. It is difficult to make that case convincing.
For example, a successful invasion of the British Isles would require a conscious decision to develop, thoroughly test and produce amphibious landing craft in sufficient time to be transported via canal or rail to Continental Channel ports in the summer of 1940. This requires a decision probably no later than the Sudetenland Crisis in the autumn of 1938. At that time, Adolf Hitler firmly believed Great Britain would never engage in a continental war again. Indeed, Hitler was mildly surprised the Allies went to war over Poland. He was even more surprised at the sudden collapse of France in 1940. Needless to say, improvisation could not make possible in two months what needed a years’ proper preparation.
I base all of my analysis on a few fundamental assumptions. Unless there is a compelling reason for changing historical outcomes of battles or campaigns, battlefield results should not change. However, Newton’s Third Law of Alternative History is in play: a change or an action may provoke a non-historical reaction.

The initial timeline marking the change (from 21 June 1940 onward) from historical events follows:
Midnight 15-16 June 1940 – Marshal Philippe Petain becomes French Premier.
16 June – Through the Spanish Ambassador, the Petain Government seeks armistice terms from the German Government.
18 June – Petain makes a radio address announcing he was seeking an armistice.
– Charles De Gaulle makes a BBC address from London urging the French to fight on.
19 June – Germans agree to meet at Compiegne Forest.
21 June – Germans shock the French with their armistice terms. France is to unconditionally surrender and be incorporated into the German Reich. The French Navy is to return to French Continental ports. Severe, catastrophic reprisals are threatened if France declines.
22 June – Although stunned by German demands, Petain’s broadcast four days earlier has undermined the French Army’s will to resist – no soldier wanted to be the last one killed before peace came. During the first 15 days of June, the Germans suffered more casualties than in the 21 days of fighting in May 1940, but that level of morale could not be resurrected. None of the French leaders were willing to unleash a reign of terror on their own civilian population, even Admiral Francoise Darlan was willing to accept the dishonorable betrayal of their British allies instead.
23 June – Hitler visits Paris, examining Napoleon’s tomb, and meeting senior French leaders on the future of France in the Reich.
24 June – Armistice reached with Italy. Savoy and coastal areas near Nice, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon and French Somaliland are ceded to Mussolini. The Germans give up Tunisia because they will require the help of the Italian Navy to send troops to French North Africa.
25 June – The Armistice terms go into effect at one minute past midnight, and announced by radio during the day. Afterwards, Hitler broadcasts a speech in which he announces the creation of three new political entities within the Reich. The first is the Nederland, the former Netherlands with the addition of five predominately Flemish provinces from Belgium (West Flanders, East Flanders, Antwerp, Brabant and Limburg). The second is Elsass-Lothringen consisting of the remaining four provinces of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the former French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. The third is Frankmark, the remainder of France. Hitler announces the populations of all are Aryans, who should never have fought against one another. He specifically decried the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 and both World Wars as historical injustices.
– ADM Darlan sends a coded recall message to French ships to return home. The British refuse to allow departure from their ports, and ships in the West Indies, Indian Ocean and Pacific lack sufficient fuel to return. Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF) efforts to intercept are generally unsuccessful. A small number of French ships defect to the British.
27 June – The last objectives in France are occupied by German troops.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION INTO THE REICH​

Initially, local French-speaking officials remained in place with a gradual removal of those considered politically suspect, too slow to implement “Germanisation” decrees, or incompetent. The exceptions were Jewish officials, who if they had not already fled began to be arrested in July, and Communists who were targeted shortly thereafter. The Communists were caught off-guard, they had faithfully followed the instructions from Moscow that the German-Soviet alliance in August 1939 was a good thing, and the French war effort should be sabotaged.
Many French leaders, and a significant portion of the population went along with the occupation. The sudden collapse of the national government and military in June 1940 was such a severe shock to the French people that they were initially immobilized by fear and uncertainty. Public officials feared losing positions or status and all feared not being issued ration cards or losing pensions. For decades, French society had been deeply divided, and many Roman Catholics, traditionalists, conservative military and political leaders, businessmen and journalists balked at secular policies imposed by the government. In the 1930’s many French admired Fascism and authoritarian rule as the only means of combatting the Great Depression. German officials and occupation troops were cautiously welcomed as they arrived at their new posts by these segments of French society.
Frankmark, Elsass-Lothringen and Nederland industries were taken over with the minimal possible disruption. State-owned arsenals, barracks, maneuver areas, naval docks and depots or factories were assigned to their German counterparts. The rail network became a part of Deutsches Bahn. Private shipyards, aircraft factories and other factories were placed under the administration of similar corporations in Germany on a political reward basis. One major exception was the Anteliers et Chantiers de St Nazaire-Penhoet, which owned the famous “Normandie” Dry-dock and became the Naval Dockyard St Nazaire. There were too few French or Dutch-speaking German administrators who could be readily spared from their own positions in Germany to take over completely, therefore a daily one-hour language class was instituted at vital businesses. Otherwise, conquered industry continued its current production until changes could be made, even though much equipment was incompatible with German standards. Between October 1940 and March 1941 an incremental change over to German designs began.
Former Dutch, Belgian and French currency remained in circulation at the prewar exchange rates. The mints changed coinage to German marks and pfennigs beginning with the 1941 year, and paper currency a few weeks earlier. Former coinage and currency was allowed to waste away naturally.
In October 1940, selected transfers of personnel occurred – for example, German-speaking or Polish-speaking French workers began transferring to positions in Germany or occupied Poland with their families. Similarly, French or Dutch-speaking Germans or those who had undergone basic language courses were moved with their families to Frankmark, Elsass-Lothringen and Nederland. The purpose was to break up and mix the populations. In the schools, German-language instruction commenced immediately in the higher grades, and gradually working their way to younger classes as instructors learned the German language.
One immediate action was the export of the Hitler Jugend and Deutsche Madel youth groups to Frankmark, Elsass-Lothringen and Nederland. France had burdened itself with a significant manpower disadvantage – in revulsion to the slaughter of World War I, the conscription age was raised to 20 (in Germany it was 18). Additionally, the French Army used a cohort system. Draftees were inducted twice per year (in January and July) and underwent six months training as a battalion before replacing a cohort battalion being released from active service. While this was an effective way of ensuring battalions went into active service at a high state of training and readiness, it also meant that youth born from January 1920 through June 1922 had not yet been conscripted. Once passing a medical exam, these Frenchmen were sent to Hitler Jugend camps all over Germany for political indoctrination and to learn German through personal exchange. Once assessed as ready, they were conscripted into the German Army. The practice of the German Army was for 18-year-olds to report for medical screening and induction on the first day of the month after their birthday, unless exempted. This is gradually extended to all French and Dutch-speaking draftees beginning in early 1941.

EXPANSION OF THE GERMAN ARMY​

Existing units from the Dutch and Belgian Armies were not incorporated into the German Army. Instead, their personnel were treated as replacements on an individual skills and attributes basis. The French Army was different, and POWs were segregated in camps according to their unit assignment – in essence, from the Army Group and Army level to companies and platoons, the French Army order of battle was replicated in POW camps. French soldiers desiring to enter the German Army are required to accept a one-grade reduction in rank until they requalify to German Army standards, including language ability. As these former French units are all understrength – some more than others due to heavy casualties during the six-week campaign; some are broken up to fill others, and a considerable number of conscripts are also needed. It was originally thought that Great Britain would soon make peace, and Colonial French and native North African or Indochinese troops would be discharged and repatriated home. Events caused this plan to be abandoned by mid-July 1940.
For organizational and training purposes, the Nederland forms Wehrkreis (Army Region) XXI: Elsass-Lothringen Wehrkreis XXII except Elsass proper which becomes a part of existing Wehrkreis V in Baden. Frankmark is divided into Wehrkreis XXIII (Flanders and Picardy); XXIV (Normandy); XXV (Brittany); XXVI (Paris area); XXVII Southern Loire River Valley to Limosuin); XVIII (Burgundy); XXIX (Bourbonnais and Auvergne regions); XXX (Provence); and XXXI (Aquitaine). Initially, conquered units are not assigned to a particular Wehrkreis, but as reliability improves and casualties from Russia come in in 1941-2; these units do find a Wehrkreis “home”.
Only two French tank designs were accepted into German operational service. These were the two-man turret Souma 40 with a 47mm main gun, and comparable to the PzKw III. It was designated PzKw 40t in German service. By the spring of 1942, the PzKw 40t is replaced by tooling for the PzKw IV. The other tank was the Hotchkiss H-39 with a 25mm gun, excellent speed and cross-country performance for reconnaissance. It was complementary to the PzKw II and designated PzKw 39t. All other French tank factories were retooled for various types of German half-tracks. Production of the superb Chenillette Lorraine artillery tractor was expanded in scale, and it was used for Marder I self-propelled guns as well. French towed artillery, trucks, heavy machine guns and other weapons also found their way into the German Army inventory.
A six-phase process of integration into the German Army commenced:
Phase I – one month long, concentrating scattered units into the same locations.
Phase II – simultaneously with Phase I, German training cadre is assigned.
Phase III – 1-2 months long. Assessment of captured personnel. Most are accepted into the German Army, but some released from captivity due to wounds, aptitude, etc., some assigned to civilian labor duties, and others identified for continued captivity.
Phase IV – 1-2 months long. Language indoctrination, physical fitness, etc. and with the exception of Colonial/North African units, adaptation to German organizational configurations.
Phase V – 3-5 months. Individual and small section training on equipment and German tactics. Newly trained conscripts are also assigned during this period. This was condensed to a single month for Colonial/North African units due to retention of French structure and the non-assignment of draftees.
Phase VI – 6-8 months. Combat training (only three months for Colonial/North African units.)
While Colonial/North African and mountain units would take six to 12 months to reform, infantry divisions averaged about 11-14 months, and most mechanized formations closer to 13-16 months. One major difficulty for mechanized forces was a separate decision in September 1940 to double the number of German panzer divisions by cutting their combat strength. Most panzer units underwent this conversion while still in France, and it strained the panzer leadership corps. Adopting German practice also resulted in a large reduction of the plethora of French Army unit designations as well as Category A (active) and Category B (reserve) designations.
French Infantry Divisions (DI), Fortress Divisions (DIF) both became German Infantry Divisions (Inf Div), although for the DIF this meant shedding extra artillerymen, engineers and signalers and receiving a full regiment of infantry to add to the two already assigned. The Light Chasseur Infantry Divisions (DLCh) and Light Infantry Divisions (DLI) were broken up to provide infantry, artillery and engineers to armored units. French Alpine (DLCH) and mountain trained DI are combined to form German Mountain Divisions (Mtn Div).
French Motorized Divisions (DIM) are converted straight across to Motorized Divisions, but between Oct 1942 and Feb 1943 all became German Panzer Grenadier Divisions (PzrGren Div) – which is how they will be referred. The French Mechanized Divisions (DLM) were powerful enough to become 1940 model Panzer Divisions (Pzr Div). The French Armored Divisions (DCR), wedded to the Fuller theories that tanks required no supporting infantry or artillery were huge organizations with 50% more tanks than a 1938 model Pzr Div. The three fully formed are split into two divisions each, and the partially formed fourth becomes a single Pzr Div. Specialized troops and supporting combat arms often came from Sector Fortresses (SF); artillery and engineers from DIF.
In 1940, the German Army had only one Horse Cavalry Division (Cav Div) which was used in the invasion of the Netherlands. The horsed French Light Cavalry Divisions (DLC) and Spahi Brigades (BS) are combined into two German equivalents, more to provide continuity and a holding place for their officers and men than any grand tactical utility.
The French Colonial Infantry Divisions (DIC), Light Colonial Infantry Divisions (DLIC), Moroccan Infantry Divisions (DM), North African Infantry Divisions (DINA) and Reserve North African Infantry Divisions (DIA) are all standardized as Kolonial Infantry divisions (Kol Inf Div). These units had lighter artillery pieces assigned and no motor transport. The Germans view the employment of Black or Arab African troops as a temporary expedient. Only two French Foreign Legion regiments (11er and 12er REI) went into German captivity. After being scrubbed of anti-Fascist refugees, Communist and Jewish soldiers, the two REI are broken up and personnel reassigned throughout Kolonial Infantry Divisions.
From all units, some cadre is bled off for assignment to the expanded training base. The completion of the scheduled reorganization and integration process of troops captured in France is listed in the timeline in Appendix 1. Some notable exceptions to German planning may be compelled by events.
By incorporating some 1,280,000 French soldiers to the German Army, a total of 11 panzer, seven panzer grenadier, two horse cavalry, four mountain, 22 infantry and eight Kolonial divisions were added to the Order of Battle by March 1942. Additional separate artillery, engineer, medical and logistical units were added as well to support these 54 divisions. All but a handful are engaged on the Russian Front or in the Balkans, where the steady anti-Communist propaganda and the cruelty of conditions made surrender unpalatable.

LUFTWAFFE ENLARGEMENT​

The Luftwaffe benefitted least from the assimilation of Nederland, Elsass-Lothringen and Frankmark into the Third Reich. With the exception of Dutch anti-aircraft (AA) guns there was little in Dutch or Belgian production that interested the Luftwaffe. The French Armee l’Air was formed in 1933, and was the most republican and least conservative of the French military branches. Most operational French aircraft and ground crews were evacuated to North Africa, and refused recall orders not only because of ideology, but also lack of fuel, etc. The Luftwaffe did absorb the French Army’s AA network and its gun batteries and barrage balloons, etc. The value to the Luftwaffe was not in increased personnel or units.
Although many French aircraft were obsolescent, some excellent designs were just coming into service. The Dewoitine 520 was better than the Messerschmitt Bf-109E in all respects except maximum level speed and gun armament, and if developed, could be equal to the new Me-109F. The remainder of the 2230 aircraft on order were taken over as well as all captured machines. The other fighter aircraft retained was the somewhat clunky Bloch MB 155, which had potential as a ground attack plane. Until German tooling could arrive, other fighter planes remained in production only as advanced trainers or for transfer to German allies. In bombers, the Potez 633 light bomber and 63-11 reconnaissance plane remained in production; the Bloch 174 light bomber, Bloch 175 medium bomber and Bloch 176 torpedo bomber versions continued to be developed as was the Amiot 354 medium bomber. The Luftwaffe also took over French Naval Aviation. The two primary aircraft types retained were the Nieuport-Loire 130 flying boat and the Latecoere 298 seaplane torpedo bomber. The biggest stumbling block to French aircraft design process and production was adequate engines, which German engineers were able to improve and resolve. A number of French aviation factories were retooled for German designed training and transport planes. Fokker aircraft in the Netherlands and Fairy Aircraft-Belgium were also retooled for proven German designs.
The French Armee l’Air, Dutch or Belgian pilots seeking acceptance into the Luftwaffe had the same one-grade reduction, language and qualification standards as the German Army. Those pilots accepted were initially assigned to training units in Eastern Germany or Poland to prevent planes from being flown to Great Britain. Most non-pilot aircrew were dealt with similarly in order to expand the training structure. Non-flying crews were more easily absorbed. Beginning in early 1941, French youths from Hitler Jugend training who were medically qualified for flight training were accepted, and by early 1942, trained crews were available from both German and French backgrounds to fly the planes coming out of French factories. This allowed the Luftwaffe to avoid declining in strength during 1942-43 and to expand in mid-1943 as young men with longer exposure to Nazi ideology and resentments towards Allied bombing raids on Frankmark began enlisting. Consequently, no field divisions are formed from excess Luftwaffe personnel in 1942-3. The Herman Goring Panzer Div was formed by the Army.

DOUBLING OF THE KRIEGSMARINE​

The Kriegsmarine simultaneously had a most difficult, yet linguistically and culturally the easiest task of absorbing the French fleet. Sailors are often more devoted to their way of life than to a particular ship or flag. Their duties are more regimented by standard routines and battle drills, with less room for improvisations requiring complex verbal communications. Once retrained on basic German nautical terminology and battle drills they can function effectively while full language proficiency through shipmates comes later.
At the same time, German naval personnel are quite unfamiliar with French or Dutch manufactured equipment and their officers ignorant of both capabilities and limitations. The number of French regulars at 80,000 also outnumbered German professional career sailors by 5,000. Additionally, the complex machinery and high pressure boilers introduced to German ships in the mid-1930s are not yet mastered by German crews (and were not fully as late as May 1945), and quite different from the few installations of advanced machinery in French warships – primarily large destroyers. Most French officers, engineers and technicians had only a theoretical basis in the metallurgy and high pressures involved. Merging training establishments, pay rates, logistical and supply systems, specifications for manufacturers, standardized fuel and victualling procedures all combined to form endless headaches.
Grandadmiral Erich Raeder divides German Navy operational theaters into four commands. They were the Baltic; North Sea (from Norway to the coasts of Ostfriesland and Nederland); Atlantic (including the English Channel); and Mediterranean. Admiral Darlan was appointed to command the latter, a one-rank demotion all defeated officers and sailors had to endure. The Baltic and Mediterranean Fleets also had significant training squadrons assigned, and the Atlantic Fleet a small one – all of which required protection from operational warships. These training squadrons were vital to the rapid return of former French ships to operational status, with priority to the most modern or useful ships. In general, German ships trained former French Navy personnel, while former French ships were used for at-sea training of German conscripts who had completed shore basic training and technical schools.
To prevent sabotage, former French warships were reduced to 10% manning levels, key personnel only being retained in all departments, with German-language fluency a critical requirement. Excess personnel went to shore barracks for a processing similar to other French POWs done by the German Army. Ships at Brest or Lorient also had full AA crews. Each former French warship also had a minimum 5% of its complement reassigned from Kriegsmarine vessels. In every instance, at least two of these German sailors were fluent in French. Some German ships were sacrosanct, the battleship KMS Bismarck, pocket battleship KMS Admiral Scheer and heavy cruisers KMS Admiral Hipper and Prinz Eugen did not lose a single man. KMS Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, both repairing torpedo damage were raided for about 40% of their crews, while pocket battleship KMS Lutzow lost 90% of hers.
The mass shuffle began in July 1940, with the Baltic Training Squadron. The pre-dreadnaughts KMS Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein had been reboilered in 1934-36 for service as training ships, but became operational just before the invasion of Poland, and remained so through the occupation of Denmark in April 1940. These operational duties and the fact that no warship larger than a U-boat commissioned since the outbreak of the war was a major reason for the backlog of Kriegsmarine sailors lacking sea training. Both pre-dreadnaughts lost 60% of their crews at the beginning of July, and took aboard the first batches of former French sailors in their place about two weeks later. At the end of the 60-day training cycle, a handful of former French sailors remained aboard, while an equal number of Germans went with the graduates to Brest or Toulon for reassignment.
The light cruisers KMS Emden, Koln and Nurnberg were also assigned to training, as was KMS Leipzig when she completed repairs in October 1940. Because of their cruising diesels, KMS Koln, Leipzig and Nurnberg were used for training submariners. KMS Emden is used in the same manner as the two pre-dreadnaughts, but the other three cruisers are on a 90-day instructional cycle for German conscripts who included those fast-tracked for eventual promotion to petty officers or selection as midshipmen. The fast “F” class minesweepers are frequently poached for personnel for German new construction because of their advanced machinery. The torpedo boats KMS Wolf, Iltis, Jaguar, Falke, Greif, Kondor and Seeadler; plus U-boats U-25 and U-26 are used to train French personnel on the 60-day cycle. The 250 ton Type IIA (six boats) and Type IIB (13 boats) U-boats were raided for one-third of their crews (one officer, seven ratings) in July 1940, and then resumed their normal training duties with replacement personnel without any sea time. Initially, just under 1900 former French sailors began the first 60-day cycle in July 1940.
A portion of the Mediterranean Training Squadron operated under the same training curriculum as the 90-day Baltic cycle. The battleships KMS Provence, Bretagne, large destroyer KMS Tiger (ex-FS Tigre), three older ex-French destroyers, and five former French submarines are assigned to this flotilla. The other flotilla had the ancient battleships Ocean and Condorcet, modern light cruiser KMS Marseilles, eight older destroyers, three torpedo boats and seven submarines were assigned to this flotilla with a less vigorous regimen. The crews are 45% German conscripts, 40% former French sailors with less than two years of service, and 15% conscripts from Nederland or Elsass-Lothringen. The small Atlantic Training Squadron contained light cruiser KMS Wurzburg (ex-FS Primaguet), three older destroyers. Two destroyers (KMS ZF-9 and KMS ZF-10) were used exclusively for German conscripts, the other two ships had the 45%/40%/15% mix of sailors assigned.
The greatest potential additions to the Kriegsmarine were in the large number of submarines, yet Germany’s mass production of its own U-boats already stretched its supply of trained personnel to the limit. Consequently, most French submarines were maintained under dockyard control with a minimal cadre crew until they could be manned by specialists (gunnery, torpedomen, signal, machinists) from surface ships where possible, mixed with qualified submariners. The manning complexities of the former French warships are detailed in APPENDIX 2. Nevertheless, the Germans commissioned the following former French warships:
July 1940: Two modern battleships, three pre-WWI vintage battleships only suitable for training, one seaplane tender, two heavy cruisers, nine large destroyers, three destroyers (one training), three torpedo boats (training), eight submarines and one submarine-minelayer.
August 1940: Two light cruisers, one large destroyer, five destroyers, ten submarines – all used initially for training, and one submarine-minelayer.
September 1940: Two training destroyers, five submarines (two training).
October 1940: One pre-WWI vintage training battleship, five destroyers (four training).
November 1940: One modern battleship, one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, four large destroyers, one destroyer, nine submarines and one submarine-minelayer.
December 1940: One heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, one large destroyer, one destroyer, nine submarines (three training) and one submarine-minelayer.
January 1941: Nine large destroyers, two submarines.
February 1941: One large destroyer, two destroyers, and six submarines.
May 1941: One destroyer and one submarine.

SCENARIOS​

ALL SCENARIOS: During July-August of 1940, a number of French colonies choose to join the British Empire rather than be absorbed into the Third Reich. The primary reason is without Operation Catapult, the attack on the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, there is no vitriolic sense of betrayal by their British ally. Officials in Syria, Lebanon and French Somaliland will not willingly submit to Italian sovereignty. In French Indochina and Pacific territories, fear of being ceded by Germany to its ally Japan will cause them to side with the British in the hope of eventual liberation of France proper. French West Indies colonies are economically bound to non-German markets. In some colonies, such as French Morocco and French West Africa the sentiments of local officials are so decidedly anti-German, and just as important the strongest garrisons of French Foreign Legionnaires are of similar sentiment that they will join the British. In other areas, most importantly Algeria, but also from French Guinea through Togo to Gabon and Cameroons there is a passive wait and see attitude as to the probable victor before casting lots. Only Madagascar will accept German rule with any form of enthusiasm.

SCENARIO 1: Great Britain accepts Hitler’s invitation in a speech at the Kroll Opera House on 19 July 1940 to enter into peace negotiations. With Winston Churchill as Prime Minister, I consider this extremely unlikely.

SCENARIO 2: After Churchill’s rejection of peace negotiations, Hitler orders the defeat of Great Britain be given the highest priority. A powerful German army is sent via Tunisia to eastern Algeria, initially protected by the Italian navy, but later by Luftwaffe assets based in Algeria and former French ships commissioned in the Kriegsmarine from the autumn of 1940 onward. These German units, far stronger than GEN Erwin Rommel’s historical Afrika Korps will defeat whatever British forces can be sent and occupy Morocco by the spring of 1941. Gibraltar and Malta will be neutralized, allowing Mediterranean forces to move to French Atlantic ports; and submarine bases in Morocco will stretch RN antisubmarine forces past the breaking point. By May 1941, combined sorties by KMS Bismarck from Norway, and KMS Frankmark, Dunkerque, Strassburg, Scharnhorst (Gneisenau has been damaged by RAF) and consorts permit strong panzer units to follow airborne and air landing troops in an invasion of Ireland. The Irish defenses are negligible, and even if the British hold Ulster, German airfields in Ireland cut Britain’s last sea lanes and will force her capitulation.
Hitler then directs his attention towards Russia at the first opportune moment. I would not rule out a Soviet pre-emptive strike in late 1941.

SCENARIO 3: Hitler places defeat of the British on the backburner, sending the historical Afrika Korps and the eight Kolonial Divisions to hold the British at bay in Western Algeria. The Italians are left on their own in Libya, but Wavell cannot do much more than Operation Compass in December 1940-February 1941 due to diversion of virtually all Army, RN and RAF reinforcements from the UK to Algeria. Intervention in Greece is unlikely by either Germans or British, it is a sideshow for both. Instead Hitler launches Operation Barbarossa in late May 1941, knowing the huge reserve of 46 French divisions will be available once the offensive is well under way. Their arrival will allow German units in the initial attack to be rotated for rest and reconstitution as required, and will match the Soviet commitment in manpower from Siberian reserves in late 1941 through early 1942. I consider this the most likely option.

Comments, criticisms, etc are welcome.

APPENDIX 1

Feb 1941: 807th Kol Inf Div – formed from 1er DINA, 3e DINA and 87e DIA.
Mar 1941: 808th Kol Inf Div – formed from 5e DIC, 2e DINA, 85e DIA (-) and 3 DLI (-).
815th Kol Inf Div – formed from 7e DIC, 5e DINA, 85 DIA (-) and 3 DLI (-).
Apr 1941: 816th Kol Inf Div – formed from 4e DINA, 7e DINA and 82e DIA.
12th Mtn Div – formed from 29 DI (-), 30e DI (-) and 44e DI (-).
May 1941: 819th Kol Inf Div – formed from 4e DIC, 13e DI (-) and 31e DI (-) – although regular units, these last two DI had regiments from Algeria assigned.
Jun 1941: 2nd Cav Div – formed from 2e DLC and 5e DLC.
3rd Cav Div – formed from 3e DLC, 1er BS and 3e BS.
10th Mtn Div – formed from 64e DI, 14e DI (-) and SF Dauphin.
11th Mtn Div – formed from 65e DI, 28e DI and SF Alpins-Maritime.
Jul 1941: 822nd Kol Inf Div – formed from 6e DIC and 8e DIC.
Aug 1941: 32nd Pzr Div – formed from 3e DCR (-), 102e DIF and SF Rohrbach (-).
13th Mtn Div – formed from 2e DLCH, 11er DI (-) and 70e DI (-).
800th Inf Div – formed from 10e DI and 60e DI.
802nd Inf Div – formed from 4e DI and 23e DI.
806th Inf Div – formed from 21e DI, 61e DI and 240e DLI.
826th Inf Div – formed from 19e DI and 54e DI.
827th Inf Div – formed from 27e DI and 57e DI.
821st Kol Inf Div – formed from 2e DIC and 6e DINA
Sep 1941: 30th Pzr Div – formed from 1er DCR, 101er DIF (-) and SF Farquemont (-).
35th Pzr Div – formed from 1er DLM and SF Thionville (-).
42nd PzrGren Div – formed from 12e DIM and SF Bouley (-).
829th Inf Div – formed from 238e DLI and 239e DLI.
818th Kol Inf Div – formed from 1er DIC and 3e DIC.
Oct 1941: 34th PzrGren Div – formed from 3e DIM and SF Bouley (-).
48th PzrGren Div – formed from 25e DIM and SF Farquemont (-).
41st PzrGren Div – formed from 15e DIM and SF Thionville (-).
804th Inf Div – formed from 36e DI and 53e DI.
805th Inf Div – formed from 22e DI and 43e DI.
811th Inf Div – formed from 7e DI and 41e DI.
824th Inf Div – formed from 16 DI and 35e DI.
Nov 1941: 38th Pzr Div – formed from 2e DLM and SF Thionville (-).
39th Pzr Div – formed from 3e DLM and SF Rohrbach (-).
40th Pzr Div – formed from 4e DLM, 1er DIM and SF Hagenau (-)
801st Inf Div – formed from 14e DI and 28e DI.
810th Inf Div – formed from 42e DI and 55e DI.
814th Inf Div – formed from 26e DI and 45e DI.
Dec 1941: 31st Pzr Div – formed from 2e DCR (-), 101er DIF (-) and SF Farquemont (-).
33rd Pzr Div – formed from 4e DCR, 103e DIF and SF Bouley (-).
37th PzrGren Div – formed from 9e DIM and SF Thionville (-).
813th Inf Div – formed from 2e DI and 56e DI.
809th Inf Div – formed from 8e DI and 71e DI.
812th Inf Div – formed from 20e DI and 58e DI.
Jan 1942: 45th Pzr Div – formed from 2e DCR (-), 105e DIF and SF Hagenau (-).
817th Inf Div – formed from 11er DI (-) and 52e DI.
823rd Inf Div – formed from 24e DI and 31e DI (-).
Feb 1942: 44th Pzr Div – formed from 1er DCR (-), 104e DIF (-) and SF Hagenau (-).
46th Pzr Div – formed from 3e DCR, 104e DIF (-) and SF Rohrbach (-).
43rd PzrGren Div – formed from 5e DLM and SF Farquemont (-).
803rd Inf Div – formed from 18e DI and 29e DI (-).
820th Inf Div – formed from 44e DI (-) and 47e DI.
825th Inf Div – formed from 62e DI and 70e DI (-).
Mar 1942: 47th PzrGren Div – formed from 7e DLM, 2e BS, SF Rohrbach (-) and SF Bouley (-).
828th Inf Div – formed from 13e DI (-), 30e DI (-) and 66e DI (-).

APPENDIX 2

(Note: A copy of Jane’s Fighting Ships 1939 or wartime edition, or Conway’s 1922-1946 would be invaluable for this section.) Although tedious, the following section displays the ability of the Kriegsmarine to provide manpower for absorbing a fleet larger than its own. Admittedly, tremendous shortcuts are taken in wartime that would not be tolerated in peacetime. The individual manning patterns of the “new” Kriegsmarine warships are outlined below, beginning with battleships:

KMS Schlesien: One 60-day cycle of training former French sailors, then in October 1940 changed to the 90-day 45%/40%/15% mix of trainees for the remainder of the war.
KMS Schleswig-Holstein: Training former French sailors until July 1941, then changed to the mix of conscripts. Both she and her sister ship contained 317 crew and 473 trainees during each training period.
KMS Condorcet: launched in 1909, and used for harbor training from 1934 until the surrender, she required a refit in Toulon from July until October 1940 before being sufficiently seaworthy. A number of German pattern guns, mostly AA were fitted along with directors for training. She retained 92 of her French crew, received 26 instructors from each of KMS Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein plus 62 from KMS Nurnberg in September 1940; and another 123 crew from KMS Schleswig-Holstein with the first batch of 554 recruits the next month. She remained on training duties until hulked in November 1942.
KMS Ocean: used by the French for training from 1936 onward, her heavy guns were removed in 1938. In July her skeleton crew of 111 French were augmented by 122 instructors from each of KMS Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein; and after a month of integration received her first 753 trainees in August. She remained on training duties.
KMS Provence: Her 117 French cadre were joined by 273 from KMS Schleswig-Holstein in July and 778 trainees arrived in August. She remained on training duties until May 1941 when she was given a short refit at Toulon. With her last group of trainees still aboard, she began working up in July 1941, and became operational three months later.
KMS Bretagne: Manned with instructors from KMS Schlesien, her schedule was identical to her sister until refitted at Toulon from Feb-May 1941. She then took aboard another cycle of trainees, and began working up to operational status in August 1941.
KMS Dunkerque: A modern battlecruiser completed in Dec 1937, her cadre of 143 French were joined by 673 officers and men from KMS Gneisenau, 100 from KMS Lutzow, 300 survivors from KMS Blucher (sunk in April 1940) and 252 from various “F” class minesweepers. Her French 37mm and 13.2mm AA guns were replaced by German 37mm and 20mm guns and increased in number. After a month of dockside familiarization with the ship at Toulon, she began working up in August and was declared fully operational in December 1940.
KMS Strassburg: As her sister except personnel from KMS Scharnhorst vice KMS Gneisenau.
KMS Frankmark (ex-FS Richelieu): In July her skeleton crew of 167 officers and ratings were joined by 100 each from KMS Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and 605 from KMS Lutzow. With this partial crew, she went into refit at Brest to correct the inevitable defects that arose from her high speed dash to Dakar and back. Her light AA guns were exchanged for German models, and radar installed. Since the French electrical cabling was not compatible with German cabling, the radar set was connected to its own small diesel generator squeezed into the superstructure. In October, former French personnel retrained aboard KMS Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein (150 each) arrived, nearly all had been a part of her original crew. In November, she emerged from Brest with the last of her crew (398 ratings fresh from KMS Ocean) aboard and began working up between St Nazaire and the Gironde Estuary. She became operational in April 1941.
KMS Ostmark (ex-FS Jean Bart): returned to Naval Dockyard St Nazaire for completion. Her AA suite was upgraded with limited re-cabling for radar and a German fire control system prior to completion in March 1942. She was manned under a centralized system after the existing French Navy was already absorbed which selected officers and ratings from ships in service, from shore duty, and from training establishments.
KMS Nederland (ex-FS Clemanceau): Only 10% complete at Brest when captured, her construction continues at low priority until the end of the war.

Aircraft Carriers:

KMS Graf Zeppelin: Completed in April 1942, and was manned in the same way as KMS Ostmark with the exception of a Luftwaffe contingent to support the air group.
KMS Von Richthofen (ex-FS Joffre): Laid down at St Nazaire in November 1938, she was little over 20% complete when captured. Her design was modified to include German electrical cabling, messing and accommodation standards, and her 5.1-inch guns were replaced by German 4.1-inch. Launched in May 1942, she was completed in June of the following year.
KMS Commandant Teste: Perhaps the world’ best and most capacious seaplane tender, her residual crew of 69 was joined by 112 from KMS Emden, 48 from “F” class minesweepers, and 457 Luftwaffe personnel, who now man the air group and also many other shipboard functions in support. After a month of crew integration she began sea training in early August and completed it in ten weeks, largely because German experience with catapults and hangers aboard their own ships.

Heavy Cruisers:

KMS Lutzow: Torpedoed off Norway in April 1940, her crew was reduced to 116 in July 1940 during her long repair at Kiel until 31 March 1941. She received an additional 38 specialists from KMS Emden in December, 320 trainees from KMS Schlesien in January, 344 officers and ratings with a wide mix of experience in February from KMS Provence, and finally 343 new conscripts in March. She began her work up in the Baltic in mid-April 1941.
KMS Karl der Grosse (ex-FS Colbert): She underwent refit at Toulon between August and November 1940 in which general maintenance was carried out, and German light AA guns were mounted. Her eight inch-guns and 21.7-inch torpedoes were well liked by her new German masters. The 75 caretakers were joined by 52 from KMS Schlesien in July; followed by 137 advanced trainees from KMS Koln in September: and in November a total of 141 from KMS Ocean and 347 from KMS Wurzburg. Because 83% of her crew had less than a year of naval service, her workup was a full six months. She was named for the Emperor Charlemagne.
KMS Blucher (ex-FS Foch): Also refitted at Toulon, but at a slightly lower priority which extended the work until January 1941. Her manning was similar to her half-sister KMS Karl der Grosse except her September sailors came from KMS Nurnberg, 58 from KMS Ocean in November, and then 153 from KMS Schlesien, 130 from KMS Nurnberg and 167 from KMS Emden.
KMS Moltke (ex-FS Dupleix): Her entry into service was expedited by the availability of 677 survivors of KMS Karlsruhe, sunk off Norway on 10 April 1940 by a submarine. After their return to Germany for debriefing, they were given 30 days’ survivors leave until late May. They began to disburse of various shore stations, but this was cancelled, and replaced by orders to KMS Moltke by the last week of June. With a residual French crew of 75, they went to sea for day trips by the middle of July, and her full workup was completed by late October.
KMS Admiral Graf Spee (ex-FS Algerie): Manned by 672 survivors of KMS Konigsberg, sunk the day before her sister KMS Karlsruhe, her workup took a month longer than KMS Moltke because of her more advanced design and equipment.

Light Cruisers:

KMS Emden: Commenced training former French sailors on a 60-day cycle in August 1940, and remained so employed until June 1941 when she retained her trainees as permanent crew. She was then used for shore bombardment of Russian positions until November 1941 when she paid off for a six month refit at Kiel (originally scheduled for November 1940-February 1941). She then began training new conscripts on a 90-day cycle. Her crew was 260 plus 390 trainees.
KMS Koln: Assigned to train German conscripts beginning in September 1940, her last group brought on board in March 1941 remained with the ship which then engaged in Operation Barbarossa until an extensive refit from February through June 1942. With the bulk of her crew returning from school assignments and leave ashore, she departed for Norwegian waters in July 1942. Her crew as a training ship numbered 340 plus 510 trainees.
KMS Leipzig: Torpedoed by submarine HMS Salmon on 13 December 1939, her four smaller boilers were destroyed in the explosion, leaving only two larger ones and her cruising diesels for propulsion. As full repairs would take too long, her boiler spaces were converted to accommodation spaces for officer cadets. Assigned a low priority, the work was expected to take from 27 February until 1 December 1940; but after the acquisition of the French Navy, work was hastened and completed two months early. Her training crew was the same as KMS Koln, and she was used for German conscripts.
KMS Nurnberg: As KMS Koln. Her 1942 refit lasted until August, and she did not reach Norway until November.
KMS Wurzburg (ex-FS Primaguet): Although 14 years old with antiquated AA armament, this cruiser’s mechanical condition was excellent as a result of an extensive refit in 1936-7, and the design robust and simple. Her nucleus of 58 former French were joined in July by 173 men from KMS Emden and 347 mixed conscripts at the beginning of August, training mostly in the Gironde Estuary. After three months, the trainees transferred to KMS Karl der Grosse, and new batch intended for permanent ship’s company received. She began operational workup, often in company with KMS Frankmark in February 1941.
KMS Marseilles: One of five sisters in the Mediterranean, she was designated as a training ship to assist the commissioning of the other four. As was the pattern, 115 crew from KMS Lutzow and 114 from KMS Karlsruhe joined the residue of 77 of her former crew for a month of dockside training, then 458 trainees came aboard for three months. As with KMS Wurzburg, the second batch of trainees became permanent crew, and proper workup began in February 1941.
KMS Berlin (ex-FS La Gallissoniere): With only 13 specialized ratings from KMS Lutzow and 41 from KMS Konigsberg joining her nucleus crew, KMS Berlin refitted at Toulon from July until November 1940. Prior to the surrender, the French Navy planned on improvements to the six-inch guns previously tested in FS Gloire that will sustain a rate of fire of 8-9 rounds per minute. AA armament is also improved, but no other major changes. The Germans admired the capacious hangers, telescopic catapult and long-range of the Loire 130 flying boat. Her crew filled out with 139 from KMS Schlesien and 81 from KMS Emden in October, and finally 146 specialists from KMS Marseilles and 267 trainees from KMS Bretagne in November. She then began her workup alongside the Dunkerque sisters.
KMS Dresden (ex-FS Jean de Vienne): Refitted in the same manner as KMS Berlin, and manned in similar fashion, with one fewer sailor from KMS Lutzow and one more from KMS Emden. Her 267 trainees came from KMS Provence.
KMS Munchen (ex-FS Gloire): Although in dockyard hands from July until December, little work was done other than normal upkeep and AA upgrades. Although examined carefully, latent defects in her Rateau-Bretagne geared turbines were not detected. Her legacy crew of 77 was joined by 56 from KMS Karlsruhe in July, 62 from KMS Schleswig-Holstein in October, 83 from KMS Marseilles the next month and a commissioning influx from KMS Schleswig-Holstein (160) and KMS Koln (326) in December 1940.
KMS Danzig (ex-FS Georges Leygues): Given the dockyard attention diverted from KMS Munchen, and refitted to the standard of KMS Berlin, she was manned in identical fashion to KMS Munchen until commissioning when only 111 sailors from KMS Koln arrived, the remaining 215 were transferred from KMS Nurnberg.
KMS Hamburg (ex-FS De Grasse): Laid down at Lorient in November 1938, she was 28% complete when captured intact with neither boilers nor engines installed. The Germans suspended her, then changed her design to include German auxiliary diesels, electrical cabling, radar, and fire control systems. Her AA armament was changed from six 3.5-inch to eight 4.1-inch, which required a rearrangement of ships boats and reduction of catapults from two to only one. These changes entailed a delay of eight months from scheduled delivery of September 1942, but the ship was hit by two bombs in an RAF raid, which further delayed her launch until 11 September 1942 and completion 51 weeks later on 3 September 1943. She was manned as KMS Ostmark.

Large Destroyers – armed with 5.5-inch guns (Tiger class 5.1-inch) and up to twice the size of their foreign contemporaries, they were rated as light cruisers by the Kriegsmarine and all given names instead of numbers:

KMS Luchs (ex-FS Lynx): Paid off into dockyard control, but no real work was done until after heavy and light cruisers exited Toulon in November 1940. Finished in January 1941 with only minor AA gun modifications, she was not fully manned until the following month. Her caretaker crew of 20 was matched by 20 sailors from KMS Falke in July 1940 to become thoroughly familiar with the ship, but no others until 35 trainees arrived from KMS Jaguar in October, followed by levies from KMS ZF-12 (20), KMS Iltis (34) and KMS Condorcet (30) in January, and a final 34 from KMS Provence in February 1941. With such a high percentage of sailors fresh from training, her workup was stretched to five months before joining the fleet.
KMS Panther (ex-FS Panthere): Similar service entry to KMS Luchs except her refit lasted until February 1941. Her only differences were 34 sailors from KMS Iltis’ sister KMS Jaguar, 20 from KMS Leipzig (December 1940) and her final batch upon commissioning from KMS Bretagne. Her workup lasted until May 1941.
KMS Tiger: Her skeleton crew was given 24 survivors of the Battle of Narvik, 31 from KMS Falke and three officers from KMS Greif in July; joined by 117 German conscripts in August. She thengraduated three classes of trainees before commencing a workup as an operational warship in May 1941.
KMS Guepard: Lead ship of the second group of large destroyers, KMS Guepard was in Toulon Dockyard from August 1940 until January 1941 with typical light AA modifications. Her cadre was 23 French and 24 Germans from KMS Greif until augmented by 38 sailors from KMS Emden in December, and 27 from KMS Leipzig, 42 from KMS Iltis and 76 from KMS Condorcet in January 1941. Her four month workup was uneventful.
KMS Valmy: Her restoration to service followed the pattern of KMS Guepard, except KMS Jaguar supplied sailors instead of KMS Iltis.
KMS Verdun: Similar to her two sisters, although only 17 sailors from KMS Greif and another ten from KMS Kondor came in July, and only 24 from KMS Leipzig and 42 from KMS Z-4 in January 1941.
KMS Leopard (ex-FS Vauban): As with KMS Guepard, except her German cadre in July 1940 numbered 27 from KMS Kondor; her November allotment was 38 from KMS Nurnberg, and in January only 24 sailors came from KMS Leipzig and 42 from KMS ZF-3. With choice personnel from KMS Nurnberg, her workup lasted only three months.
KMS Lowe (ex-FS Leon): The newest of the Guepard class, she was commissioned in July 1940. 23 of her original crew, plus 34 sailors from KMS Kondor, 71 from KMS Seeadler, 76 from KMS Wolf and 26 from KMS Iltis took her over, and went to sea before the end of the month. Her workup was finished a remarkable nine weeks later, and she was used continuously as an escort for larger ships training their crews off Toulon.
KMS Toulouse (ex-FS Aigle): The first of her class, she also had to wait until the labor pool at Toulon was able to get to her, and her refit was finally completed in January 1941. Her 23 French crew were joined by 23 veterans of Narvik; in December came 56 sailors from KMS ZF-7; and in January 1941, 23 from KMS Leipzig, 41 from KMS ZF-3 and 66 from KMS Condorcet. She was operational three months after commissioning.
Regensberg (ex-FS Milan): Entered refit and manned in July 1940 as her sister KMS Toulouse, she obtained 37 crew from KMS Nurnberg and 19 from KMS Greif in December; and part of her January allotment came from KMS ZF-4 instead of ZF-3. She worked up in company with KMS Toulouse.
KMS Prag (ex-FS Epervier): Similar to KMS Regensberg and Toulouse from July to October 1940; levies from KMS Wolf (30) and Iltis (17) were added that month; 36 from KMS Tiger in November; and 24 from KMS Leipzig and 77 from KMS Condorcet in January 1941. It took her a month longer to work up than her two sisters.
KMS Linz (ex-FS Gerfaut): She recommissioned at the highest priority because of the installation of a British Type 128 Asdic (sonar) in March 1940, which the Germans wished to gain experience with. Her 23 French Navy residue were joined by 207 veterans of Narvik, and she went to sea with KMS Lowe.
KMS Antwerpen (ex-FS Vautour): Already in dockyard hands at the time of the Armistice, another Type 128 Asdic having arrived in late May for her. Her refit continued until November 1940, and in addition to the 46 mixed ship’s cadre and Narvik veterans, 41 sailors came from KMS Iltis and eight from KMS Jaguar in October; and finally 41 sailors from KMS Nurnberg plus 15 from KMS Falke on commissioning.
KMS Amsterdam (ex-FS Albatros): Hit in the aftermost boiler room by an Italian shell during a raid on Genoa on 14 June 1940, KMS Amsterdam was under repair at a private shipyard in La Seyne. These lasted until January 1941, after repair defects had emerged during her first trials in November. Her manning was the usual French/Narvik mix in July 1940; 24 from KMS Seeadler and 23 from KMS Wolf in October; 36 from KMS Tiger in November and final drafts of 24 from KMS Leipzig and 77 from KMS Condorcet. Her boilers proved troublesome during workup, and she did not join the fleet until July 1941.
KMS Wiesbaden (ex-FS Kersaint): Fitted with Type 128 while at Greenock in the UK during April 1940, she was also rapidly commissioned with 207 Narvik sailors joining her 23 French cadre in July 1940. She was operational by mid-October 1940.
HMS Calais (ex-FS Cassard): Refitted at Toulon from August until December 1940; her manning after July’s cadre assignment was 33 men from KMS Jaguar in October, eleven from TF-3 in November, and upon commissioning 86 from KMS ZF-10 and 54 from KMS Greif.
KMS Orleans (ex-FS Chevalier Paul): One of four ships whose French component came from sister ships, KMS Orleans was under dockyard control from July until November 1940, but due to delays in deliveries did not receive a new AA armament. Her original crew, having served off Norway with the RN was vehemently opposed to the demise of the French Republic – had fuel been aboard, probably would have sailed from Toulon to Malta, and were dispersed. Her cadre of 46 mixed French/Germans were augmented by 24 from KMS Seeadler and 23 from KMS Wolf in October; 36 from KMS Tiger, 41 from KMS ZF-6, and 52 from KMS TF-3 in November 1940.
KMS Lorient (ex-FS Tartu): Considered to have an unreliable crew like KMS Orleans, her refit and recommissioning was similar – only 23 levied from KMS Seeadler and 24 from KMS Kondor in October and 45 from KMS ZF-6 and 48 from TF-2 in November. She commissioned that month and worked up with others.
KMS Liege (ex-FS Vauquelin): Also given a four month refit, keeping her French 37mm AA guns but receiving German 20mm in lieu of 13.2mm, she was one of the few French ships found sabotaged, although the damage was minor. Her cadre was joined by 47 sailors from KMS Kondor in October, then nine from KMS Tiger, 86 from KMS ZF-5, 27from KMS ZF-8 and 15 from KMS TF-2 in November 1940.
KMS Breslau (ex-FS Le Terrible): Lead ship of what were reputed to be the fastest class of ships afloat, her 21 French specialists were joined by 189 survivors of the flotilla wiped out at Narvik. As with her sisters, workup was carried out in company with the Dunkerque class.
KMS Salzburg (ex-FS L’Indomptable): As KMS Breslau.
KMS Ludwigshafen (ex-FS L’Audacieux): As KMS Breslau.
KMS Aachen (ex-FS Le Fantasque): As KMS Breslau.
KMS Lyon (ex-FS Le Malin): As KMS Breslau.
KMS Bordeaux (ex-FS Volta): The largest “destroyers” in the world at about 4,000 tons full load, these ships were admired by the Germans for their robust machinery, economical range, rapid acceleration and high speed. The French had solved problems with the shell hoists by the spring of 1940, and their twin 5.5-inch gun-houses were roomy and weather tight. Their weaknesses were poor AA armament and a 5.5-inch ammunition supply that would last perhaps 20 minutes in a sustained battle. Taken over immediately in July, their 29 French crew were joined by 126 survivors of Narvik, 20 sailors (each) poached from destroyers KMS Z-8, Z-10 and Z-14 plus 33 from KMS Z-20.
KMS Rotterdam (ex-FS Mogador): As with her sister, except 20 sailors each from KMS Z-15 and Z-16, and 53 from the flotilla of “F” class minesweepers.

Destroyers:

KMS ZF-1 (ex-FS Tempete): Designed in 1922 and completed between 1926 and 1928, the ZF-1 class were considered too old and short-ranged for fleet operations. Unable to be manned immediately, she was sent to La Seyne, but little work was done by her mixed French/German crew of 28. In October 1940 she was manned by 23 from the first training cycle aboard KMS ZF-8. A month later, 17 experienced sailors were transferred from KMS Falke, 11 from KMS Greif, and 62 conscripts from shore. She was used thereafter for training.
KMS ZF-2 (ex-FS Tornade): Retaining 14 of her original crew, 14 Narvik veterans and 27 sailors transferred from KMS Jaguar in July 1940, her consignment of 86 trainees were received in early August. Thereafter she graduated three cycles of mixed conscripts, before refitting in May-July 1941 in La Seyne and resuming training duties.
KMS ZF-3 (ex-FS Tramontane): Already under refit at Toulon at the Surrender, she was commissioned in late August 1940. A single German pattern 5-inch gun was fitted in place of “Y” mount, and ammunition hoists adjusted. Manned as ZF-2 except only six sailors from KMS Jaguar, she received 20 instructors from KMS Nurnberg and 86 trainees at the beginning of September. Used exclusively for training at Toulon.
KMS ZF-4 (ex-FS Typhon): Also repairing at Toulon, her two after 5.1-inch guns were removed and replaced by a single 5.5-inch in “Y” position for training crews of light cruisers. The platform of “X” gun was fitted with German 37mm and 20mm AA guns, and the after torpedo tubes by a classroom topped by a director for the AA guns. The forward tubes were replaced by a bank of German triple 21-inch. Her cadre of 28 were joined by 27 seasoned sailors from KMS Falke and 83 conscripts in October.
KMS ZF-5 (ex-FS Trombe): As KMS ZF-3.
KMS ZF-6 (ex-FS La Palme): Although improved over the previous class, the short legs remained a liability, while stability limits required the removal of one 5.1-inch gun in 1940 while still under the French flag; and all eight were used for training. In July, the 14 French cadre of ZF-6 were joined by 42 Narvik veterans for familiarization, and 86 trainees the following month. She trained for an entire year before refitting at La Seyne in August-October 1941.
KMS ZF-7 (ex-FS Le Mars): As ZF-6 except a grounding in June 1941 cut short her fourth training cycle and advanced her planned refit.
KMS ZF-8 (ex-FS Brestois): As ZF-6 except operating from Lorient, and not refitted until October 1941-February 1942.
KMS ZF-9 (ex-FS Bordelais): As ZF-6.
KMS ZF-10 (ex-FS Fougueoux): Lightly damaged by the Luftwaffe off Dunkirk, this ship led a leper-like existence, repairs being attempted at Cherbourg and then Casablanca before being recalled by ADM Darlan. In July she began repairs at Lorient with 14 of her crew and 14 Narvik survivors assigned; and upon commissioning in September received 28 personnel from the “F” class and 86 trainees.
KMS ZF-11 (ex-FS Frondeur): As KMS ZF-10 except repaired at Brest.
KMS ZF-12 (ex-FS Boulonnais): Hard-worked, especially off Norway, KMS ZF-12 urgently needed a refit begun in late June 1940 at La Seyne. Her machinery was overhauled, and her after guns modified as KMS ZF-2. In October 1940, she was given 28 ships crew from KMS Iltis and 86 trainees and fell into the instructional routine.
KMS ZF-13 (ex-FS Le Hardi): Lead ship of the most modern class of French destroyers, she had run acceptance trials in November 1939, but was not yet fully commissioned due to the usual delays in a newer, more advanced design. Machinery defects had been worked out, but gunnery issues remained before she escorted FS Richelieu to and from Dakar. Manned with 10% of her French crew (19 officers and chief petty officers) and 104 Narvik survivors, the crew filled out with 64 veteran destroyermen poached equally from KMS Z-4 and Z-5. After thorough examination of the ship, she began an extended workup marred by problems with the director and main armament and necessitating frequent periods alongside at Lorient. Damaged slightly by a near miss during an RAF raid in December, her AA armament was tripled from two to six 37mm guns. Declared operational in March 1941.
KMS ZF-14 (ex-FS Fleuret): Completed acceptance trials in February 1940, and manned in similar fashion to KMS ZF-13, with KMS Z-6 and Z-7 being raided for personnel. Her new commanding officer was promoted too early, and prone to dismiss complaints about her gunnery. After four months at sea, he persuaded his superiors in the Mediterranean Fleet to accept his ship as battle-worthy at the end of November 1940.
KMS ZF-15 (ex-Epee): She completed initial builders’ trials, but still lacked some equipment before escaping to, and from Dakar. She was returned to her builders at Bordeaux for final outfitting with 19 of her pre-commissioning crew and 38 from the Narvik Flotilla assigned. Commissioned in October, she was manned with 70 sailors poached from existing “Z” type destroyers and 60 new trainees from KMS Greif. KMS ZF-15 then began her workup that benefitted from lessons from KMS ZF-13, and took two months less time than her sister.
KMS ZF-16 (ex-FS Casque): About four months behind KMS ZF-14, her acceptance trials were cancelled and she steamed to Mers-El-Kebir before being recalled. Only her AA guns were operational. Completed at La Seyne and commissioned in November 1940, her manning was 19 men from KMS ZF-14’s original crew, and 63 from KMS TF-2.
KMS ZF-17 (ex-FS Lansquenet): Still incomplete, with machinery and boilers installed, she was in drydock having her propellers and shafts aligned and hull painted when the Germans captured Paris. With no armament, she was undocked, had her guns installed (but not functional) in a single day, and with two boilers fired for the first time and no turbines tested, she joined FS Jean Bart on her voyage to and from Casablanca. Returned to her builders as KMS ZF-15, she was finally completed in February 1941. Given a cadre of 19 from KMS ZF-13’s original crew, and 19 Narvik veterans, her commissioning crew included 100 novices from KMS Bretagne, 25 from KMS Tiger and 24 from KMS ZF-4. It was intended that a substantial number of her crew come from KMS Wolf, but that ship was mined off Dunkirk while en-route to Brest on 8 January 1941. With trainees aboard, KMS Wolf was not a part of the escort to her convoy, and went down with heavy loss of life.
KMS ZF-18 (ex-FS Mameluk): Having completed initial trials, but not acceptance trials, she still had no difficulty accompanying ZF-17 to and from Casablanca. Upon her return, her 19 French cadre were joined by 19 from the Narvik Flotilla, and she was returned to her builders at Nantes for completion. Upon commissioning in December 1940, she received levies from KMS ZF-9 (86), KMS ZF-2 (17) and KMS Falke (56). With such an inexperienced crew, she took a full six months to workup.
KMS ZF-19 (ex-FS Le Corsaire): She followed her sister ZF-16 two days later, and was recalled while still en-route. She had no armament installed, and returned to La Seyne for completion in March 1941. To give her an adequate AA armament, her twin torpedo tubes were replaced by platforms for 37mm guns. As was the German practice for pre-commissioning crews, 19 sailors from the original crew of KMS ZF-13 were joined by 19 Narvik veterans. In February 1941, 89 sailors joined from KMS Provence (17), Bretagne (18), Tiger (42) and ZF-8 (12), and upon commissioning 60 trainees fresh from KMS ZF-7 arrived. As with KMS ZF-18, her crew took longer to “jell” than normal.
KMS ZF-20 (ex-FS Le Filibustier): Unable to escape from La Seyne in June 1940, orders to scuttle her were countermanded in time, and she remained under construction essentially without interruption. In July 1940, 19 Narvik veterans were assigned to her, and after loyalty checks, 19 from her sisters in November 1940. As she approached completion in May 1941, her crew was assigned by the new centralized system of manning.
KMS ZF-21 (ex-FS L’Intrepide): Lead ship of four modified “Le Hardi” class, they were to be armed with dual-purpose (DP) 5.1-inch guns to improve their survivability against aircraft. As all four were laid down in August 1939, and ranged from 10% to 20% complete when captured. The Germans insisted on re-cabling their electrical systems, and as the DP guns were versions embarked in the “Dunkerque” class, there were doubts as to top weight, and a back-up plan entailed 3.9-inch AA guns. The Kriegsmarine opted for each 5.1-inch mount to be replaced by their 4.1-inch mount. The superstructures were welded to begin transitioning the shipyards to that new technology. KMS ZF-21 was launched at La Seyne on 26 June 1941, and completed in November 1942. The new centralized system of manning provided her crew.
KMS ZF-22 (ex-FS Le Temeraire): As ZF-21 except launched 7 November 1941 and completed in April 1943.
KMS ZF-23 (ex-FS L’Opiniatre): Built at Bordeaux, her launch was delayed until July 1943 due to diversion of labor to repair of other vessels. Not completed until February 1945.
KMS ZF-24 (ex-FS L’Aventurier): Also built at Bordeaux, launched 20 April 1942, and commissioned in October 1943.

Torpedo Boats:

KMS TF-1 (ex-FS La Bayonnais): Displacing only 600 tons standard, and designed to take advantage of a clause in the London Naval Treaty exempting ships of 600-tons or less from numerical limits, these vessel were as singularly unsuccessful as their counterparts in the Japanese Navy. The Kriegsmarine removed their two torpedo tubes to improve their suspect stability and relegated them to training duties. KMS TF-1 kept 20% of her French crew (11 total) and with 31 crew from KMS Iltis began training 63 mixed conscripts on a 90-day cycle out of Toulon.
KMS TF-2 (ex-Baliste): As KMS TF-1.
KMS TF-3 (ex-FS La Poursuivante): As KMS TF-1.
KMS TF-4 (ex-FS Le Fier): 50% larger than their predecessors, this class carried two twin 3.9-inch DP guns (both aft) and two twin torpedo mounts. A much more promising design, all were built at Nantes from two different shipyards. KMS TF-4 was launched 12 March 1940, and 60% complete when captured. An attempt was made to tow her to Morocco, but an air attack caused the tugs to cast of lines and she drifted onto the river bank of the Loire. Undamaged, she was taken back to her builders. After examining other armament options, in November 1940 the Kriegsmarine ordered them completed to the original design to avoid delay. KMS TF-4 was completed a year later, and manned under the centralized system.
KMS TF-5 (ex-FS L’Agile): As KMS TF-4, except launched 23 May 1940; sunk pierside by an RAF raid in April 1941; salvaged and not completed until September 1942.
KMS TF-6 (ex-L’Entreprenant): Launched 25 May 1940, and completed in October 1941.
KMS TF-7 (ex-FS LeFarouche): Launched at shipyard initiative on 19 October 1940, she was sunk in the same raid as KMS TF-5, but more severely damaged. Salved and resumed, she was sunk a second time on 16 September 1942, and this time scrapped as beyond economical repair.
KMS TF-8 (ex-FS L’Alsacien): Launched in March 1941 and completed in May 1942, she was partially welded above the main decks.
KMS TF-9 (ex-FS Le Corse): Launched 4 April 1941 and completed in August 1942, she was also partially welded.
KMS TF-10 (ex-FS Le Breton): Bombed beyond repair in April 1941, she was broken up on the slip.

Submarines:

KMS UF-1 (ex-FS Requin): Although intended for colonial service, launched in 1924-27, and having poor handling characteristics on the surface; this class of first-class submarines all had major refits to hulls and machinery between 1935 and 1937; and were considered excellent training platforms as well as possessing good habitability for the tropics. KMS UF-1 kept 11 of her own crew, added 12 more from the “U-7” class in July 1940; and with 33 trainees went to sea from Toulon in August 1940. She remained on training duties the remainder of her career.
KMS UF-2 (ex-FS Souffleur): As KMS UF-1 – she was torpedoed by submarine HMS Parthian on 25 June 1941.
KMS UF-3 (ex-FS Marsouin): With UF-5 at Algiers at the surrender, she escaped to Toulon but did not commission until December 1940 due to her low manning priority. With no crew assigned, she was initially given a caretaker crew of six from the “U-7” class, and 11 French from her sisters after their accession into the Kriegsmarine in October. Her commissioning crew comprised a mixed bag from KMS U-26 (five), KMS UF-16 (four), KMS Nurnberg (18), KMS Seeadler (seven) and KMS Kondor (five). After four months of workup, she began patrols in the Equatorial regions of the Atlantic.
KMS UF-4 (ex-FS Phoque): Upon arrival from Bizerte in July 1940, she was refitted at Toulon until commissioned with KMS UF-3. Her manning was identical, except she retained 11 of her own crew, and 12 sailors came from KMS Kondor and none from KMS Seeadler.
KMS UF-5 (ex-FS Caiman): Refitted at Toulon as her sisters until January 1941, delayed three months by an accidental battery explosion. Her caretaker crew had been joined by six specialists from KMS Koln in September when it was intended she have a training role; but after the damage her role was changed to operational, and in January she was given 15 sailors from KMS Leipzig, 15 from KMS UF-1 and three gunners from KMS Condorcet. She then began her workup.
KMS UF-6 (ex-FS Espadon): Upon arrival from Bizerte, her crew was reduced to 11; then they and six submariners from the “U-1” flotilla and six more from KMS U-25 began training 33 novices in August 1940. She kept her second cycle of trainees as part of her crew, underwent a seven-week refit at Toulon and began working up for operational use in late March 1941.
KMS UF-7 (ex-FS Sirene): Also past their prime, having been launched in 1925; this class of second-class boats were well-armed and maneuverable with good diving abilities, but so cramped internally as to make ordinary maintenance difficult and crew conditions miserable. A fourth sister, FS Nymphe was scrapped in 1938 primarily for these reasons. With eight of her own crew joined by eight from the “U-1” class, she began training 25 apprentices in August 1940, and remained on training duties for the rest of her career.
KMS UF-8 (ex-FS Naiade): As KMS UF-7.
KMS UF-9 (ex-FS Galatee): As KMS UF-7.
KMS UF-10 (ex-FS Ariane): Half-sister to KMS UF-7 from a different builder, much more habitable and more successful in service. Manned as KMS UF-7.
KMS UF-11 (ex-FS Eurydice): Refitting at Toulon June-December 1940, she was cadred the same as her sisters, and took up training duties in December 1940.
KMS UF-12 (ex-FS Danae): As KMS UF-7.
KMS UF-13 (ex-FS Circe): Half-sisters to KMS UF-7 and UF-10 from a third builder, and as unsuccessful as KMS UF-7 in French service. Used for training and manned as KMS UF-7.
KMS UF-14 (ex-FS Calypso): As KMS UF-7. Her first training cruise was considered the most successful of all former French boats.
KMS UF-15 (ex-FS Thetis): As KMS UF-7.
KMS UF-16 (ex-FS Redoubtable): Lead ship of 31 large, first class submarines designed for long patrols, with a range of over 10,000 miles at ten knots. Although the first was launched in 1928, the last took to the water nine and a half years later. Consisting of two prototypes and three major production sub-groups, with improved machinery, stability and habitability at each stage, they were arguably among the best in the world. Despite these qualities, their large crew size acted against early mass commissionings, as the Germans own U-boat expansion was in full swing and quality over quantity was chosen by the Kriegsmarine. UF-16 underwent a short refit at Toulon from late July to the end of August 1940 – her initial crew of 13 French and six “U-7” class veterans augmented by seven more instructors from KMS Nurnberg and 41 trainees at the beginning of September. She remained on training duties thereafter.
KMS UF-17 (ex-FS Venguer): The other prototype with a career mirroring KMS UF-16.
KMS UF-18 (ex-FS Fresnel): Refitted at Toulon from August until February 1941, her cadre was drawn as her sisters. Upon commissioning she received 26 submariners from KMS U-25 and 22 more from KMS UF-2.
KMS UF-19 (ex-FS Archimede): Refitted as KMS UF-18, her commissioning crew was a hodgepodge from KMS UF-1 (33), UF-2 (nine), UF-10, UF-12 and UF-13 (two each). As with her sisters, she worked up and deployed to the tropics, and Indian Ocean beginning in May 1941.
KMS UF-20 (ex-FS Henri Poincare): As KMS UF-18, final manning was 26 sailors from U-26 and 22 from UF-14.
KMS UF-21 (ex-FS Monge): This boat remained at Diego Suarez on Madagascar, and retained her former crew. Retained for local defense by the governor of the colony, she never returned home.
KMS UF-22 (ex-KMS Pascal): Initially manned and refitted as KMS UF-18, she was commissioned with 25 men from KMS UF-8 and 23 from UF-13. Her workup was exceptionally quick, and she passed the Straits of Gibraltar in mid-April 1941 to operate in the North Atlantic.
KMS UF-23 (ex-FS Poncelet): Also stationed at Diego Suarez, her captain obtained sufficient supplies to attempt a voyage home in September 1940, but was retained at Libreville, Gabon due to threat of Allied attack. This materialized two months later, and UF-23 was damaged by two 100lb bombs from a Walrus aircraft from HMS Devonshire, and unable to submerge, finished off by gunfire from sloop HMS Milford.
KMS UF-24 (ex-FS Ajax): Another unlucky boat. Her inspection at Brest found her in excellent material condition, and her cadre was 20 of her crew, plus six from the “U-7” flotillas, and 41 trainees embarked in late July. On 22 September, nine additional civilian technicians from German shipyards came aboard for a four-day examination for possible ideas for Type XB and Type XIV submarines. Her departure was spotted by RAF Sunderland aircraft, which vectored destroyer HMS Fortune from a Force H convoy into the Bay of Biscay. Approaching at sunrise on 24 September 1940, the hunter was still cloaked in darkness, while KMS UF-24 was bathed by the morning light. Closing the range, one of the first 4.7-inch shells failed to explode, but passed through a ballast tank, knocked an electric motor off its mounts and broke the propeller shaft. This left the boat cavitating on the remaining shaft as weight shifted, and with a partially trained crew, UF-24 was abandoned without loss of life. Upon interrogation as POWs, the British were shocked to know how quickly her French personnel had accepted the inevitability of German victory, and none opted to join the Free French.
KMS UF-25 (ex-FS Acteon): As with many others, UF-25 was in dockyard hands from August 1940 until February 1941. Her caretaker crew was augmented by 23 crew from UF-12 and 25 from UF-13.
KMS UF-26 (ex-FS Argo): As UF-25, with 25 submariners from UF-9 and 23 from UF-10.
KMS UF-27 (ex-FS Sidi Feruch): The newest of the UF-16 class, her six-week refit at Toulon was limited to installing German communications equipment. At the beginning of September 1940 she commissioned with 48 officers and ratings from KMS Koln, and had a cautious workup until late January 1941, when she was sent to the West Indies on her first patrol.
KMS UF-28 (ex-FS Persee): “Refitted” at Toulon until January 1941, her cadre was joined by 30 crewmen from KMS Leipzig and 18 from KMS UF-1.
KMS UF-29 (ex-FS L’Espore): With the usual cadre manning, UF-29 was in dockyard hands at Toulon until December 1940. She was then blessed by a large manning draft from KMS Nurnberg (18), plus 19 from KMS Seeadler, six from U-26 and five from her near sister UF-16. Her workup was quick, and she was dispatched to the West Indies with KMS UF-27.
KMS UF-30 (ex-FS Le Glorieux): The only submarine able to escape from Diego Suarez and return to France, UF-30 refitted and manned in the same fashion as KMS UF-29. She remained in the Mediterranean, patrolling off the Libyan coast to guard against convoys carrying troops to Tripoli until April 1941. After re-provisioning, she was the first of her class sent to the Indian Ocean.
KMS UF-31 (ex-FS Le Centaure): Refitted at Lorient with minimum modifications between August and November 1940, her cadre crew reflected the turbulence of assimilating two navies. Her original prospective commanding officer came from the “U-7” Flotilla, but doubts arose during her refit and he was demoted to Executive Officer, and replaced by the captain of UF-14. The rest of the crew consisted of seven submariners from U-25 in October; five from UF-1, 25 from UF-2, and ten from UF-15. After three months workup she went to the North Atlantic on her first patrol.
KMS UF-32 (ex-FS Le Heros): As UF-21.
KMS UF-33 (ex-FS Le Conquerant): In refit at Toulon until November 1940, upon commissioning she received seven crew from U-26 in October, and 14 from UF-1, eight from UF-2 and 19 from UF-6. She deployed to the east coast of South America after workup.
KMS UF-34 (ex-FS Acheron): Another vessel looked at closely by Atlantic Command after emerging from refit at Lorient in November 1940. Her senior engineering chief petty officer was demoted for poor performance, and replaced by that of UF-14. As UF-31, she obtained seven veteran submariners from U-25 in October; 14 from UF-1, 14 from UF-6, and a dozen raw seamen from KMS Ocean. After a long working up, she joined her sisters in the African tropics in April 1941.
KMS UF-35 (ex-FS Sfax): One of the newest of the class, she commissioned in July 1940 with 13 of her former crew and 54 transferred from the “U-7” Flotillas. In late September she left the Mediterranean and passing north of the British Isles arrived in Emden, Germany for the first of several visits to German U-boat yards. Resuming her workup she sailed to Lorient, and then in early December began a patrol near the Azores. In an experiment of replenishing at sea, she met the former French naval tanker KMS Rhone, but was observed by KMS U-37; uncertain of their identity. As a result of her deception training on 19 December, KMS Rhone broke out a large Union Jack as a ruse, and KMS U-37 responded by torpedoing both vessels. There were no survivors from KMS UF-35.
KMS UF-36 (ex-FS Casabianca): In Toulon Dockyard until November 1940, she was one of the few seriously modified, with her 3.9-inch and twin 13.2mm guns replaced by one 4.1-inch and a single 20mm AA gun. Her cadre was joined by seven submariners from U-26 in October; and the next month by two key petty officers from KMS UF-13, 24 crew from KMS 14, and 15 more from UF-15. After workup she joined her sisters in the tropics in March 1941.
KMS UF-37 (ex-FS Beveziers): Also refitted at Lorient until November, she received 19 crew from KMS U-64 (lost in Norway) in October; then six from KMS UF-6 and 23 from KMS UF-13 upon commissioning. Her first patrol was in company with UF-31.
KMS UF-38 (ex-FS Nautilus): First of four minelaying submarines, she kept nine of her own crew, and was joined by 18 crewmen from the “U-1” and 15 more from the “U-7” Flotillas. After workup was completed in October 1940, she was primarily employed on laying defensive fields. Her first minefield, laid off Bizerte accounted for the Free French submarine FNFLS Narval.
KMS UF-39 (ex-FS Diamant): Already under refit at Toulon when captured, she was modified by the removal of her external 15.7-inch torpedo tubes (intended for merchant targets) in favor of increased submerged performance and maneuverability. Manned with a cadre of nine of her own crew and six from KMS U-25, upon commissioning in December 1940; 13 from KMS Koln, five from KMS Seeadler, five from U-25 and four from UF-16. Highly successful in service, her first three patrols were in the Eastern Mediterranean and battleship FS Lorraine struck one of her mines off Alexandria on 14 April 1941, and required extensive repairs in the United States.
KMS UF-40 (ex-FS Saphir): Given only minor attention at Toulon from July until September, her cadre of nine of her own personnel and 12 from “U-7” Flotillas were joined by 21 from KMS Koln in September 1940, when she commissioned. With two patrols completed between December 1940 and April 1941, she paid off for a longer refit as UF-39 scheduled to last until November 1941. She was bombed in Lorient by the RAF on 17 March 1941. Her age mitigated against further repairs, and she was used for dockside training until paid off on 15 September 1943 and hulked.
KMS U-41 (ex FS Turquoise): Refitted at Toulon from August to November 1940 as KMS UF-39; and manned in identical fashion except personnel from KMS Koln, not KMS Nurnberg. On her first patrol in May 1941 she was damaged by RAF aircraft off Tobruk, and with heroic efforts was able to make Taranto, Italy for temporary repairs. Completely repaired at Toulon from October 1941 to June 1942, she returned to service.
KMS UF-42 (ex-FS Argonaute): A much improved version of the UF-13 class, with a cadre of eight of her own crew and five from the “U-7” Flotillas, she was refitted at Toulon until January 1941. She retained her 15.7-inch torpedo tubes, but replaced her 3-inch gun with a 3.5-inch German model and fitting a 37mm AA gun. Her crew filled out with 28 sailors from KMS Leipzig.
KMS UF-43 (ex-FS Atalante): Having completed a refit at Mers-el-Kebir in late May, 33 personnel from the “U-7” Flotillas joined her to give the Germans early sea experience with this type of second class boat. Employed in the Mediterranean against British convoys.
KMS UF-44 (ex-FS Arethuse): Refitted as KMS UF-43, her commissioning crew in December 1940 consisted of five submariners from KMS U-25/U-26 and four from KMS UF-16; and 15 ratings from KMS Koln and four from KMS Seeadler.
KMS UF-45 (ex-FS La Psyche): Improved version of the UF-10 type, refitted and manned as KMS UF-44.
KMS UF-46 (ex-FS Diane): As UF-45.
KMS UF-47 (ex-FS Meduse): As UF-45.
KMS UF-48 (ex-FS Amphitrite): Sister to UF-45, her refit was completed in November 1940. Cadred as her near sisters, she received six submariners from KMS U-25/U-26 in October 1940 and ten from UF-8 and 12 from UF-12 the next month. With a crew of trained submariners, her work-up was very smooth.
KMS UF-49 (ex-FS Oreade): As UF-48 except six submariners each from KMS UF-9, UF-10 and 13 from KMS UF-12.
KMS UF-50 (ex-FS La Sybille): Refitted and manned as UF-48 except ten submariners from KMS UF-9 and 13 more from KMS UF-10 upon commissioning.
KMS UF-51 (ex-FS Ceres): Much improved successors from UF-42/UF-45 types completed between 1936 and 1939. KMS UF-51 was refitted at Toulon and manned as UF-50 except nine crew from KMS UF-9 and 13 from KMS UF-10.
KMS UF-52 (ex-FS Pallas): Given only a short refit at Toulon from July-September 1940, retaining her French 3-inch gun. In addition to her cadre, she received 29 sailors from KMS Nurnberg.
KMS UF-53 (ex-FS Venus): As KMS UF-52.
KMS UF-54 (ex-FS Aurore): 33% larger than the UF-51 class, she was completed as recently as March 1940, and not yet operational when captured. Manned by ten of her original French crew, and 34 officers and men from KMS U-25/U-26 she underwent extensive testing by the Germans. Her internal layout was good, the operational depth of 330 feet was an improvement on her predecessors, and equipment was proven and reliable. By November 1940 it was decided to complete her surviving sister ships. She transferred to the North Atlantic in January 1941.
KMS UF-55 (ex-FS La Favorite): Laid down in December 1937 at Le Harve and launched in September 1938, she was suspended for four months and finally completed in May 1941. She joined UF-54 after her workup. She was manned under the centralized training system.
KMS UF-56 (ex-FS La Bayadere): Laid down at the same time and progressed as far as UF-55, workers at Cherbourg so thoroughly sabotaged her on 18 June 1940 that she was scrapped.
KMS UF-57 (ex-FS L’Africaine): Laid down at the same time and same yard as UF-55, she was launched in December 1940 and completed in October 1942 after delays by RAF air raids.
KMS UF-58 (ex-FS L’Astree): Laid down at Nantes in November 1938, she was launched in May 1941 and completed in April 1942.
KMS UF-59 (ex-FS L’Andromede): Laid down at the same time and place as KMS UF-58, she was launched in November 1941 and completed in February 1943.
KMS UF-60 (ex-FS Antigone): Laid down at the Schneider yard far up the Loire River in November 1938, little progress had been made due to French Army contracts for artillery and Souma tanks. Although contemplated for completion, little work was done and she was scrapped postwar.
KMS UF-61 (ex-FS L’Artemise): Laid down at Nantes in May 1939, she was launched in July 1942 and completed in April 1943.
KMS UF-62 (ex-FS L’Armide): Laid down at Le Havre in May 1939, she was severely damaged by the RAF and scrapped on the slip.
KMS UF-63 (ex-FS Emeraude): A minelaying version of UF-54 laid down at Toulon in May 1938. Also suspended from July until November 1940, it was decided to complete her at a lower priority than the numerous refits at the yard. Consequently, she was not launched until September 1941 and completed in March 1943.

Not all French warships came under German control. The following ships were seized by the Italian Navy at Bizerte, Tunisia in July 1940.
Destroyer: FS L’Alcyon.
Torpedo Boats: FS Bombarde, FS LaPomone, FS L’Iphigenie.
Submarine: FS Dauphin (refitting).

The following vessels were in ports under British control:
Pre-World War I Battleships: FS Paris, FS Courbet – both at Portsmouth, FS Lorraine – at Alexandria.
Aircraft Carrier: FS Bearn – at Martinique.
Heavy Cruisers: FS Tourville, FS Duquesne, FS Suffren – all at Alexandria.
Light Cruisers: FS Lamotte-Picquet – at Saigon, FS Duguay-Trouin – at Alexandria, FS Jeanne d’Arc, FS Emile Bertin – both at Martinique.
Large Destroyers: FS Leopard – at Plymouth, FS Le Triomphant – at Portsmouth.
Destroyers: FS Ouregan, FS Mistral – both at Portsmouth, FS Le Fortune, FS Basque, FS Forbin – all three at Alexandria.
Torpedo Boats: FS Le Melpomene, FS Branlebas, FS Bouclier (refitting), FS La Cordeliere, FS La Flore, FS L’Incomprise – all six at Portsmouth.
Submarines: FS Protee – at Alexandria, FS Pegase – at Saigon, FS Surcouf, FS Orion, FS Ondine, FS Junon, FS Minerve – all five at Portsmouth, FS La Creole (incomplete) – at Swansea.

The following vessels defected to the Free French Navy (FNFL) at British ports rather than return to Toulon:
Light Cruiser: FS Montcalm (Gibraltar).
Submarine: FS Narval (Malta).
Submarine-Minelayer: FS Rubis (Dundee), FS Perle (Malta).

Destroyers FS Simoun, was under normal maintenance at Algiers, and unable to return to France before blockaded by the RN.
The following five submarines were unable to put to sea, and consequently became marooned in French North Africa’s uncertain political situation – not German, not British, not FNFL, but not exactly neutral. They can best be described as a residue of the French Republic awaiting the arrival of the first claimant on their services.
FS La Vestale, FS La Sultane, FS Orphee – all three re-provisioning/repairing post-patrol at Casablanca, and unable to put to sea
FS Antiope, FS Amazone – both refitting at Oran, unable to put to sea

Two submarines were interned in Spain:
FS Le Tonnant – damaged by British aircraft from Gibraltar, en-route to Lorient.
FS Iris – interned due to indecision on the part of her officers, and a trumped story of mechanical difficulties.
 
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Wow, that is a very detailed and well researched post. However, I feel there is a flaw right at its heart.

The whole point of keeping the Vichy state around was to keep the French Empire neutralized. If Hitler announces his intention to end the French state, then at very minimum he has handed the Allies the entirety of the French Colonies and likely the French Fleet as well. He has also wiped his list of possible collaborators in France down to a small number of diehard fascists and anti-communists as well as the regular opportunists while simultaneously giving life to a resistance movement that now includes a significant portion of the French population.

In short, I think Hitler may have just shortened the war by several years in his opponent’s favour.
 
ArtosStark is correct on (more than one) fundamental flaw(s) in my thesis, although I disagree with his main one. In general, German occupations were of two types. The first was integration into the Reich as with Austria, Sudetenland, Moravia, Bohemia and the General Government of Poland where all functions were taken over by German officials. The second was “on the cheap”, relying on local collaborators, such as Slovakia, Quislings in Norway, King Leopold II in Belgium, or the continuation of the pre-war Danish government. France fell into this latter category.

I do not believe the reason for Vichy was to preserve the French Empire as neutral. Hitler was simply disinterested in what happened outside of Europe proper. Otherwise he would have sent a Panzerarmee to Libya in February 1941 instead of an understrength Korps, and conquered the Middle East as a strategic prerequisite to Operation Barbarossa. As I stated in my introduction the fatal flaw is “strategic direction by each nation was myopic – short sighted, unimaginative, and indifferent to the logistics of a long-term conflict.”

The retention of Vichy France was predicated on preservation of stability on the cheap. It is often forgotten that Vichy France contained all of France minus Alsace-Lorraine, Savoy and part of Provence. Vichy France was divided into two zones, one occupied and one unoccupied. The Vichy Government paid the costs of all state functions in the occupied zone and in general ordered its officials to collaborate fully with German authorities. In this sense, comment by Xgentis on Vichy being a cash cow is justified.

My thesis postulates full incorporation of France, Netherlands and Belgium into the Reich and I believe this increases rather than decreases the number of German collaborators. Most officials now have a guaranteed future in the Reich, while joining the resistance is a one-way ticket to a KZ-Lager. Hitler’s only opponent is Great Britain, which is helpless to quickly liberate Metropolitan France. I doubt loyalty to a failed Third Republic would be a persuasive rallying call. Europe also has seen precedents to unity, the Napoleonic Empire and the much more durable Empire of Charlemagne being the best post-Roman examples. The French population was in a state of shock, in July 1940 virtually all were at best passive collaborationists. By July 1944, virtually all were secret resistance fighters all along.

ArtosStark is fully correct this will cost Germany the French Empire. In all my research, I find only officials in Madagascar eager to help Germany, and this was personality driven. I conceded that point. Hitler could not care less, so it is a moot point to him. However, this is not a known permanent state of affairs until after the Battle of Britain is won. If Great Britain is defeated as in Scenario I or Scenario II, Germany will get the French Empire back. That is, if Hitler cares by then – he still might not.

ArtosStark is on much stronger ground regarding the French Fleet. The senior officer corps of the French Navy was hand-picked by Admiral Darlan and intensely loyal to him personally. This is why VA Marcel-Bruno Gensoul at Mers-el-Kebir could not accept terms to transfer of his fleet to a French or an American West Indies port without approval from Darlan, and allowed his fleet to be shelled and over 1200 of his sailors killed. Darlan has already broken his personal commitment to the British Government not to accept a separate peace with Germany. Ambitious, Darlan was thinking of Darlan first, and therefore I believe him capable of ordering his fleet to return to German-held ports.

The flaw in this logic is that it flows only if French Naval commanders believe Darlan is not acting under duress, and in the best interests of France. But an order to return to Brest or Lorient is a crystal-clear indication of duress. Gonsoul and others may follow personal loyalty anyway. If Gensoul did perceive that Darlan was not acting in the best interests of France, and choose to honour Darlan’s previous commitment to continue fighting on the British side, then the Italians will never obtain a foothold in Tunisia and the Germans never one in Algeria. Convoys to Tripoli would be interdicted and the Italians run out of Libya by February 1941 and in East Africa no later than May 1941. The U-boat menace is considerably reduced. A German victory as outlined in Scenario II becomes impossible, German intervention in the Balkans is now a necessity, and it is probable the German invasion of Crete will be defeated.

In this sense, “in short, I think Hitler may have just shortened the war by several years in his opponent’s favour” may be spot on, but first in the Pacific Theater rather than the Atlantic. In December 1941, the initial Japanese attack will be against French Indochina rather than Malaya. This will give sufficient time for British and American forces to hold Singapore and probably Sumatra. Burma cannot be successfully conquered until after the fall of Singapore. This allows American relief forces to reach the Philippines and denies the Japanese the resources (especially oil) necessary to continue the war effectively into 1943. It also preserves Burma and Malaya as resources for the British Empire.

The war in Europe depends on whether or not the Soviets survive the influx of French troops in 1941-2 as outlined in Scenario III. If the Germans prevail, then even with the entry of the United States the war will be prolonged and bloodier until the use of the atomic bomb. If the Soviets survive Stalingrad, then ArtosStark is correct there as well regarding a shortening of the war.

This is beyond the original query, which was “could Germany have forced Vichy France to be a combatant during WWII?” The answer: unquestionably yes. But the caveats of Newton’s Third Law of Alternative History remain in play.
 
Easily but there would be problems
Morale would be extremely low troops immediately surrendering to the Allies would not be so much of a problem as troops defecting to the allies.
Every allied unit encountering Vitchy French forces would have free French recruiting officers assigned to them
 
The international SS regiments were also a mixed story especially at the end of the war. Yes some recruits were die hard ideologues who fought bravely to the last, but a lot of the time they were made up of an eclectic mix of people who had more personal reasons for quickly getting out of where they were and who's motivation and fighting morale was rather less than 100%.
The ones that were created for anti-partisan duties fell apart the fastest.
Ironically, by defecting and joining the partisans.

And it didn't matter which front they were on either.
Foreign SS units composed of people from Eastern Europe were sent to the Western Front after a series of mutinies and defections, only to have more mutinies and defections occur, except this time it was to the French Resistance.
And then there was that case in Holland at the end of the war, where the Georgian Legion slaughtered Germans soldiers on Texel until their uprising was defeated.
 
...In short, I think Hitler may have just shortened the war by several years in his opponent’s favour.
Liked because you said succinctly what I was saying. I really don't think Eric C. Johnson's scenario would actually shorten the war, but it would make the severance of France's entire colonial system starting with Algeria and Tunisia pretty immediate and decisive; quite a few French colonists would be ambivalent and even treacherous, not believing the Allies would prevail and being reactionary themselves, plus most French colonials, especially officers, soldiers and administrators, have hostages of fortune under Hitler's thumb, not to mention the terrorism of Hitler threatening to do terrible things to France generally. But against this, among these strata we have French patriotism and a certain degree of republican liberalism offended by Hitler's regime. Meanwhile the British control the high seas and all their commerce. Similarly Hitler issuing a Fueher-order as lord of a Reich France is suddenly declared a subject part of might be obeyed by some captains and crews where defeatism and intimidation and even reactionary sympathy hold the upper hand--but others might defy the return and regroup for incorporation into the Kriegsmarine orders and join up with RN units immediately. They might be able to persuade the British not to sink their Quisling compatriot ships, or they might endorse such a move. Either way, crews are going to be divided, but any defeatist officers or seamen in the Free France camp will come around to loyalty to the Alliance eventually, whereas crewmen (I would imagine fewer officers, but on the other hand these few would have no leftist ties, and be Resistance out of French patriotism) uneasy at serving Hitler would grow more subversive over time, not less, in the Reich's "service." And they are liable to be sunk by the British anyway.

The war is still a long hard slog and the Allies at least know it. France will not rise up in a spontaneous levee en masse to defeat the Reich with their bare hands unfortunately. But it will be sullen in occupation, perhaps as resistant as say Norway was, though I suppose that is a bit much to hope for, especially before the tide turns between '42 and '43.

Meanwhile, British blockade of Hitler's neo-Napoleonic Continental System will be effective. It is 100 percent clear immediately upon France's surrender they are captive combatants on the Axis side, under duress to be sure, but all French shipping (that doesn't surrender to and actively join a British promoted Free French government in exile and go unambiguously to Entente service) shall be intercepted, interned or confiscated, or sunk. The USA immediately recognizes the British-backed Free French regime which formally speaking is recognized as the government of all French colonies, receives their ambassador; all Hitler can do about that is break diplomatic relations with the USA unilaterally, which only helps FDR's case for preparedness for war against the Reich. French Indochinese governors, whether they might actually have some pro-fascist sympathies or not, ignore all orders from Europe and if Japan wants to horn in there, they have to fight their way in against not only Indochinese force resistance but interference from the British and Americans. Neither of whom might be formally at war with Japan yet, and the British really hope not to be, so it becomes a Bad Cop Good Cop dynamic with USA in the former role and the British in the latter. The Japanese will know they can't strike at Indochina without triggering general war in the Pacific they are not quite ready for--whereas British "good cop" mediation with the Yankees might get Japan some concessions, such as guaranteed access to "southern resources" of Dutch East Indies and the other European colonies, rubber and so forth in addition to vitally needed oil, despite American interests to the contrary. So weakening their motives to set off the general Pacific war. Against that of course the Japanese decision makers are hardly known for their cool rationality and they really were spoiling for a fight they believed they could win with typical fascist logic. Basically that all societies that were not warlike and aggressive as they prided themselves in being were weak and irresolute and would cravenly seek peace if kicked in the teeth hard enough. Despite the privations American influence imposed on them in the form of embargoes, between their investments in armed force and general political will, Japan did in fact have what it took to kick the Europeans and even USA in the teeth in the Pacific. They decimated what was available to resist them, given European preoccupation with European disasters and the limited basing of US force in the Pacific, and with the European Axis were riding high through 1942 OTL. So quite possibly even if the British mollify them they will go for it anyway, with superior resources to boot.

But their error was in underestimating the resolve of the Anglo-Americans to fight a long fight. That is no different here, even if their victories are all the more sweeping--whereas even with more resources to fight with, now they have to slog through subduing Indochina as well as the Philippines and Dutch East Indies and Malay and Singapore British holdings, and will have been in a far worse position to arrange Thai assistance in advance. They are actually likely to wind up less advanced than OTL and on the back foot a bit sooner.

I do not believe the reason for Vichy was to preserve the French Empire as neutral.
Of course not. A great strength of your approach is that you are realistically asking us to deal with Hitler, not Notler. I hold the opposite of your broad claim, that the rational thing for Hitler sporadically possessed by a Bismarckian-Tallyrandish genius of diplomacy, subordinate to his ultimate egotism of course, but in short run service to it, would be to make actually occupied, captured France look as neutral as possible as a several-years ruse, to take maximum advantage of France's global reach. As you say the real Hitler did not give a damn for that, but the more fool he. Germany was defeated in a long war o f attrition when he was a Bavarian forces corporal, and if he didn't understand that surely the General staff and perhaps someone like Goering did. But of course they too liked to believe in the "stab in the back" myth and of course Hitler believed it to his racist core. Mere material limits cannot conquer the Triumph of the Will! Exactly the kind of fascistic logic the Japanese leaders believed in of course.

Certainly even my Bismarckian Notler would not intend for France to be really free. But Hitler did mean in fact to rule the whole world, by and by. Letting this great big resource rich chunk of it under the French Tricolor slip out of his hands right now in 1940 might seem acceptable if he figures he will rule all of Russia (or anyway the western part of it that matters the most, though I think if Axis forces actually got to the Urals they'd just keep going east until they met zones under Japanese control) and that the scuttling perfid will surely seek terms then, which open the world to trade by Reich merchants and thus to Axis subversion softening it up for the eventual hammer blow at sea when he builds up a really gigantic Fleet in the Baltic to unleash by 1950 at the latest. That's Hitler's mentality, that in a series of Blitzkriegs taking his foes out piecemeal while the others stand aside and dither ineffectually, he shall prevail. Because his Reich is unified in Will under his own infallible command, and his foes are degenerate and vacillating catspaws of clever but cowardly Jewish schemes.

But the OP question is, "could" Germany coerce Vichy into active war immediately? Of course, we agree, they could. But OTL even Hitler was Notler-Bismarckian enough to see that that was not the wisest course for him to follow, in the short run. In the long run, yes, that is where he was headed. But in the short run, it seems plain enough he saw some wisdom in some plausible deniability, for the time being. He fell between stools in this as it was obvious enough to anyone with eyes to see Vichy was under his thumb and would be aiding him, but Vichy's ambiguous status was of service to him in the short run.

You say he should have mustered France to support his anti-Soviet crusade. I say, he bloody well did. But got some benefit from being able to pretend otherwise he'd unilaterally toss away by straightforward and immediate annexation of France to the Reich.

Don't forget his racism either. To Hitler, all French people were racially degenerate. Why grab them into the Reich? Same was true of Poland and Bohemia, you might say, but these were rather smaller in population--Bohemia much so, Poland larger but less developed and so easier to dispose of. He figured.

In fact the Reich was able to commandeer essentially all French, Belgian and Dutch productive capability immediately, and did so. At least the Dutch and a good part of Belgium were "Germanic" albeit of a corrupted sort, by his racist thinking. France I think he'd want at arm's length until the Gestapo and SS had a good long time to sort out the more promising Aryans and Germanize them.

So, France incorporated under the Reich formally would have a status somewhere between Bohemia and the wholesale overlordship of the "General Government" attempting to wipe the very name of Poland off the map. And the French would know this.
Hitler was simply disinterested in what happened outside of Europe proper. Otherwise he would have sent a Panzerarmee to Libya in February 1941 instead of an understrength Korps, and conquered the Middle East as a strategic prerequisite to Operation Barbarossa.
So you tell me...why didn't he? Why the facade of Vichy at all?
Because you say, he didn't think the world south of the Med existed as anything to concern himself with? But if so, why give the French this shred of empty sovereignty at all, if not to try to maintain some flow of goods from the colonial sphere?

Prior to the war, the Germans had been dealing rather desperately in barter, because the Reichsmark was worthless paper outside of his rule, to get access to such goods.
As I stated in my introduction the fatal flaw is “strategic direction by each nation was myopic – short sighted, unimaginative, and indifferent to the logistics of a long-term conflict.”
Now as a bothsides, that is ludicrously overstated!

There was an important distinction. Hitler wanted war, as an end in itself and means to total world conquest, and wanted it long before Hindenburg made Chancellor. The Entente powers desperately did not want war; the British had made military preparedness policy on the premise of "no major war for the next ten years" back in the '20s and kept pushing that deadline back until Hitler forced them to revise it in the late '30s. France too sought to avoid it

I think you are likely correct that even as late as September 1939 when they issued their ultimatum to Hitler to cease and desist from bothering Poland, they had no well thought out plan to defeat the Reich. But by then they at least knew Hitler was likely to be forcing war on them anyway. And both of them spent the time they bought with the Munich Accords, at least after Hitler violated them, scrambling to rearm. The Entente was deficient in detailed strategy because they didn't want war in the first place.

Hitler on the other hand was oozing out his ears with "strategy." Which he followed, and by summer 1940 and as late as late 1942 it seemed to have worked brilliantly. Judging the liberal powers weak in will and the Soviets of course as inherently rotten due to their racial bankruptcy, the plan was as noted to muster a blitzkrieg quick victory against one foe while their allies stood around dithering, incorporate that conquest into his Aryan machine, then strike another such quick blow and eat another conquest, and so on, bang bang bang. Rhineland, denouncing Versailles openly, anschluss with Austria, Bohemia and puppetizing Slovakia thus securing communications with allied Hungary as well, all fell without the Entente powers firing a shot. Then Poland, while the flatfooted Anglo-French tried for containment and a methodical muster and musing on possible strategy, procrastinating actual action. Then overnight, Denmark, Norway and suddenly Britain's command of the sea has a hole in it; before the dust settles in Scandinavia--Netherlands, Belgium, and France herself. That accomplished the British had nowhere left to strike from in Europe, Sweden and Finland were in a strategic and logistical full Nelson, Italy was openly on side tying up RN forces, and exactly as you say he "should" have, French naval forces called back from RN supervision and French as well as Low Countries seaports hosting U-boats while Condor airplanes flew out of both France and Norway to harry Atlantic commerce in conjunction with the subs. The next step was in fact to attack the Soviets and Hitler's track record to that point pointed to a quick defeat of that power and incorporation of former Soviet resources wholesale.

What he lacked here was not "strategy" unless you define that as including the logistic thinking demanded only if he could anticipate the hardening of Allied resistance, that the Soviets would not in fact simply collapse but rally and use Russia's great strategic depth as they had done before against Napoleon, that Britain would remain as tenacious in the struggle as they had been against Napoleon, that with this resolution the British would again, as in the previous great war, seek to choke off his empire's ability to sustain this sequence of knock outs by depriving them of access to vital resources that could only come from outside. Per Hitler's notion of strategy this would be not much of a problem once Russia fell. That's where he tripped up of course--that and supposing he could knock the British out.

The British, I know, and the French perhaps, may have lacked for a laid out map to victory in strict strategic terms--but they clearly recognized from before September '39 that their alternatives were either to come to terms with a Reich ruling all Europe, or hunker down logistically for the long haul and defeat the Reich by attrition once again. And they acted immediately toward the latter goal. Before September they had still to cling to the hope that maybe Hitler was satisfied already with his vast Reich incorporating all Germans (well, except for in Alsace-Lorraine, southeast Europe and Soviet territory anyway) and let things be, but they were no longer trusting to hope alone and frantically moving to develop more modern weapons and stockpile them, and plan for total war. When war did come, Britain at least went over on a proper total war footing, recruiting all available young men including say servants in wealthy and better off middle class households, imposing rationing, deveimloping logistic reserves and contingencies, setting people to growing Victory Gardens to try to reduce their vulnerability to being literally starved out by U-boats, integrating and rationalizing industrial production focused on war materiel while with rationing guaranteeing a meager but nutritionally healthy diet per the best medical advice.

The Reich on the other hand disdained this sort of total war mobilization until the Soviets were advancing on their former borders. Until then, the factories were not staffed with women; the rich retained their household servants, rationing was something impthis osed only on the conquered.

There is no both sides about it at this point of decision in mid-1940. The British are already mobilized to and planning on a long war still to come; the Germans think it will all be over soon once Hitler's master plan of conquest is complete, any time now.
Vichy France was divided into two zones, one occupied and one unoccupied.
But the "occupation" telegraphed the nature of the regime as a whole, all supplicant at German pleasure. And the "unoccupied" zone was still subject to German requisition as well as German direction, just via the mask of "advice" offered Vichy authorities.
Most officials now have a guaranteed future in the Reich, while joining the resistance is a one-way ticket to a KZ-Lager.
I could not resist writing a lot about how I think a France under more permissive seeming covert German control might look, but I decided I could omit to post it. I think your reasoning is backward here anyway. The more Hitler is Notler and pretends to be conciliatory, tolerant, uninterested in messing with internal French affairs, undemanding about French assistance of the Axis cause---the more this sort of logic holds. In fact the men who were in charge before the war generally would not be deposed, though certainly some must be. France has a fair number of conservatives and outright reactionaries and fascists to be sure, and these fellows would be gratified, but their position is stronger the less the Germans are obviously interfering. The key men to keep placated are those who would be offended by your scenario of overt takeover. The Gestapo is not going to let Communists or radical social democrats stay in office, but there are men who are more like Charles deGaulle--conservative, but republican and patriotic. These are the men to lull.

It doesn't mean the Germans give the French genuine freedom of action. It does I think mean a velvet glove on the iron hand, and avoidance of any appearance of German authority overriding French, and instead leaning on French officials to do their work for them in the ostensible name of French security and French interest.
I doubt loyalty to a failed Third Republic would be a persuasive rallying call.
But France has been defeated before. They fought each other about the nature of what it is to be a patriotic French citizen, but neither the Communards in Paris nor their reactionary butchers were a pro-German faction! Both figured they were the authentic and proper incarnation of loyal French patriotism.

The failed Republic is a bitter sore. It doesn't mean the defeated will thank the Germans for rubbing salt in the wound. As with the Germans cherishing their stab-in-the-back myth, both reactionaries and left radicals have plenty of recourse to blaming the other French factions for their debacle. If the Germans remain as blended into the wallpaper as possible, if they insist on quiet but not on the French pretending praise of the Fuehrer, just not slandering him openly, it is easier for the permitted French factions to backbite each other while clinging to their separate passionately held convictions they are in fact true patriots. They shall be firmly prevented from organizing a front against Germany, but otherwise permitted to backbite each other to their heart's content.
ArtosStark is fully correct this will cost Germany the French Empire. In all my research, I find only officials in Madagascar eager to help Germany, and this was personality driven. I conceded that point. Hitler could not care less, so it is a moot point to him.
Again, you might be realistic about Hitler who is not Notler. He apparently did have this disregard for the sort of strategy he needed actually. Then again had he had a realistic sense of logistics that would have told him no, he could not conquer and rule the world. Not what he wanted to believe.

But it does not follow as you seem to convince yourself he could therefore win by this defiance of reality-based thinking. Boldness and arrogance and refusal to admit defeat can win victories, but if they are unbalanced by judiciousness, tact and diplomacy, sooner or later one rushes into a trap mere bluster cannot get out of so easily. Cause and effect; his persistent arrogance won him victories but then the increasingly virulent existential threat he posed caused opponents to hunker down and resolve to bring him to heel.

He would not need the resources the French empire could get him if final victory were within his grasp within say 2 years. For a longer game, he was doomed cutting himself off like that.

This is again why I think if Hitler wanted to improve his odds versus OTL, he'd do better to play softer than harder with France.

Meanwhile, it hardly seems likely that gouging France more deeply than he already did under Vichy OTL would win him any sort of resources sufficient to either conquer Britain or the USSR.
If Great Britain is defeated as in Scenario I or Scenario II, Germany will get the French Empire back. That is, if Hitler cares by then – he still might not.
"If" as the Spartans said to Alexander.

Hitler was in a far less likely position to force Britain to surrender than Alexander was to overwhelm the Spartans.

I did notice you had some ATL speculation about him setting about developing landing craft in 1938 or so. Among many reasons why "Sea Lion" is deemed pretty much impossible in retrospect is that the Reich was effectively devoid of such landing craft. Ordinary boats pressed into service are less useful, but have some value if you have enough of them I suppose. So we could try to make the conquest of Britain by the Reich more plausible by postulating Hitler had the foresight to anticipate a need for this fleet of landing vehicles to be ready by 1940. Either specialized landing craft optimized to make it to the beaches and efficiently and rapidly discharge suitable mixes of forces to seize beachheads and then advance, or unspecialized boats that have the virtue of being more generally useful thus less of a sunk cost, but with a dire need to have a lot more of them.

You do realize either way this is a major investment; it took the Allies, with the unimpeded production power of the USA able to commit to the project in massive quantities, quite a few years to design them, then build, test, practice with them and finally deploy and use them.

But meanwhile, aside from the obvious fact this investment in such specialized craft could only divert production from other anticipated needs and thus leave the Axis forces weaker in their successive campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France where such craft would only have limited use, and be largely useless in the aimed at war on the USSR, there are yet other objections. Take the logistical diversion from his main line of attack over land he counted on for most campaigns as point 1.

2) OTL, Hitler was careful to avoid antagonizing the British too much, and more than a bit puzzled why they opposed him so tenaciously. He slow walked the buildup of the Kriegsmarine in general to avoid triggering British opposition, including severely limiting U-boat production. Presumably he understood British intelligence was a serious factor to reckon with and there were limits as to how secret he could keep anything from them, at least during peacetime. The same objection would apply with equal or greater force to a concerted effort to design and build large numbers of landing craft of course. The British could hardly doubt his dangerous intentions if they knew such a project was underway, and would, in addition to taking more alarm and tipping over toward firmer diplomatic opposition, also perhaps even declare war before he was ready, or take measures such as orchestrating a general embargo of the Reich in the League of Nations that he might feel forced him into war prematurely. You assert your claim that Hitler being Hitler could not be expected to care about the French colonies, regardless of whether some ATL Bismarckian in his place would have due concern about that or not. Yet in this case Hitler is Notler and throws caution with regard to Britain to the winds?

3) Hitler being Hitler and not Notler, his ambition is to conquer Russia. Britain for him is a regrettable and puzzling sideshow he'd like to avoid by not rousing them or conciliating them into a ceasefire. He does not need landing craft to conquer Russia. Insofar as he was dreaming of cleaning Britain's clock, the plan was to do so after securing Russian resources, at which point he figured he'd have the means to build an unstoppable fleet to wipe out the RN. The time to design landing craft would be after seizing the eastern resources.

4) He may have been convinced, on his own or with Goering's urging, that the might of the Luftwaffe, which would be useful on all fronts and in which he invested a great deal, could bring Britain to terms by massive bombing. He certainly tried this OTL.

5) the lack of landing craft is just one of many objections to Sea Lion. The fact that the Allies were able to carry off a landing, indeed a series of them, first in Italy then Dragoon in parallel with Overlord, does not show the Reich could do it even with the landing craft. In addition to having a fleet of landing craft, the Allies had pretty good superiority of sea power and the ability to concentrate great air power for local air superiority as well to cover their landing forces. The Germans had nothing to put to sea to interfere with these operations. Turn the tables around, and see that in their bid to achieve air superiority over Britain, the Luftwaffe failed, and without air superiority they could hardly neutralize the RN from the air. In 1940 the RAF was the Luftwaffe's equal, at the ranges needed to threaten Britain and give cover to boats crossing the Channel, and meanwhile the Germans had damn little to oppose the RN on those waters, nothing but their limited ability to strike with U-boats, motor attack boats and aircraft, all which exposed these assets to RN and RAF counterattack. Nor was time on his side; at the time of the Battle of Britain the Axis was near its highest ebb overall and Britain near her lowest. Had he held off and mustered forces, the British also were hastily building up theirs, and British blockade of the Continent would be more and more effective in inhibiting Axis productive potentials.

If we keep on wanking Hitler, make him Notler when that is helpful, switch his priorities around with hindsight so he focuses on knocking out Britain from the get-go (but in so preparing, probably hardens British resolve to oppose him, so that they refuse to cut him the Munich deal for instance and I suspect clean his clock with the forces the Entente has in 1938--versus the embryonic state his recently rebuilt forces were in in that year)--so we wank it more by postulating an extra layer of British blindness perhaps, and then pretend that the Soviets could easily have been pushed over with just a little more effort, which seems as unreality based as Hitler's own belief he had enough in hand to do the job handily, and so on, eventually we reach a point where he wins, because we have tied his enemy's hands with extra Idiot Balls beyond the numerous ones they admittedly juggled OTL, and have Mary Sued the hell out of Hitler and his gang.

I think pretending victory in Sea Lion was just a matter of designing some landing craft, while ignoring your own principle of reaction to action in an ATL, is going way out on a Reich wank limb sticking far into the air with a weak foundation liable to come crashing down. It might be sane to expect Hitler to devise that noose for himself and stick his head in it, but not because it would be sane for Hitler to try but because Hitler was a nut.

So to come back finally to the rationality of dragooning France with an open and unambiguous annexation as another Reich possession, or even to take a much harder line than the OTL Vichy facade, I don't see it gains Hitler anything he wasn't able to extort from the French OTL anyway, and whether he himself had the wit to realize it or not (and OTL, he did allow the Vichy charade for a while, which suggests maybe he had more wit and concern in these matters than you credit him with) Vichy gained him some useful confusion and misdirection and friction among the Allies in addition to what economic value it had as a plausibly deniable channel for Axis supplies. I think if he had been more duplicitous and wily about it, he had better prospects of exploiting opportunities of a more quietly and subtly puppetized France--but actually I think the British were going to interfere with clear pretexts or not. I suspect he chose the happy medium for him between gratification of German pride with humiliation of France, versus getting use out of the farce of a purportedly neutral Vichy. And the balance was largely one of practically exploiting France about as much as she could be looted.

So, the marginal gain of openly swallowing up France without pretense and ruthlessly, systematically squeezing for all France was potentially worth would be low; with a little bit of effort toward charm and diplomacy, Hitler already had gutted France about as much as he could anyway. He was able to do all you say pretty soon anyway, and recruit Waffen-SS and other such French stooges for the Eastern Front and for upholding the Axis in general. He was able to seduce French reactionaries to support the legitimacy of a state that rolled over and did his bidding. He could hardly hope gain more with open conquest and what he could gain could hardly be expected to knock out either Britain or the Soviets.

If he did not knock out at least one of them, his doom was sealed, and with him, any French collaborators.
 
Wow, that is a very detailed and well researched post. However, I feel there is a flaw right at its heart.

The whole point of keeping the Vichy state around was to keep the French Empire neutralized. If Hitler announces his intention to end the French state, then at very minimum he has handed the Allies the entirety of the French Colonies and likely the French Fleet as well. He has also wiped his list of possible collaborators in France down to a small number of diehard fascists and anti-communists as well as the regular opportunists while simultaneously giving life to a resistance movement that now includes a significant portion of the French population. ...

I think there is a middle way. That is negotiate a peace treaty that first established France as a neutral. Then allows France to build all it needs to defend ints empire. To prevent a double cross by France its home defense is relatively immobile and entirely oriented to defense of the coasts. Relatively static ground forces with tanks & other mechanization distributed in small tactical units. Air forces in France are confined to short ranged aircraft for the western zone of defense. To further ensure French honestly the Germans keep a mobile group in eastern France, ready to reinforce the ? French defense and strike at anyone Threatening Frances neutrality, either internally or by invasion. This leave France as a neutral shield, that can defend itself, and which is 'free' to provide Germany with the arms and other resources that can be wrung out of it. 'Volunteers are also free to fight on the Eastern Front.
 
I do not believe the reason for Vichy was to preserve the French Empire as neutral. Hitler was simply disinterested in what happened outside of Europe proper. Otherwise he would have sent a Panzerarmee to Libya in February 1941 instead of an understrength Korps, and conquered the Middle East as a strategic prerequisite to Operation Barbarossa. As I stated in my introduction the fatal flaw is “strategic direction by each nation was myopic – short sighted, unimaginative, and indifferent to the logistics of a long-term conflict.”
I do not have access to my sources at the moment, so this is based on a fallible memory. However, every source I have ever come across that even mentions the German reasons for seeking the armistice have listed 2 major things that the armistice accomplished for Germany:
1. It drastically reduced the manpower necessary to police and control Metropolitan France.
2. It keeps France from fighting on from North Africa, effectively removing it from the fight.

I doubt loyalty to a failed Third Republic would be a persuasive rallying call.
Here is I guess where our disagreement lies. Sort of. My contention with this statement is that Hitler has not just threatened "A failing Third Republic" (who some people might die for but many would not) he has announced the end of France herself (which I think a significantly greater portion of the population might be willing to resist over). Petain , as well as many other military and civilian leaders, may have been underwhelmed with the democratic system of the Third republic and supported a more authoritarian regime. In that light, it makes perfect sense for a Military/Civilian leader like the Maréchal to take over the nation in its time of crisis, while negotiating an end to the ordeal. It makes considerably less sense if that leader immediately hands over his own position and the entire French state to a particularly disliked foreign power.

IMO, in this scenario Petain himself likely leaves for North Africa. There was discussion even after he took power of moving the entire government there. If Hitler's terms are as draconian as total annexation then I think this would be followed through with. If he does not, then the rest of the Government probably does and Petain is declared to be captive. The President (who's position had not yet been abolished and is not likely to be ITTL) would then choose a new Prime Minister from North Africa. In this case there is no recognized legitimate government within Metropolitan France. The recognized, legitimate government of France is based in NA and is probably led by Reynard, Daladier and Georges Mandel. They, and the rest of the world, I expect, would view Metropolitan France as being under occupation and not legitimately transferred to Germany. Control of the Fleet, Colonial troops, and any forces that can escape Metropolitan France would be in their hands.

In Metropolitan France, the Germans would then be considered an occupying force. They are therefore not likely to get any more out of France than they did in OTL and could get a fair bit less. As you mentioned, a quiet occupation was a priority for Hitler in OTL. ITTL I doubt he gets that. Best case scenario for the Germans they get much the same sullen, halting and resigned compliance that they got in OTL, with small, disorganized resistance groups occasionally making trouble. Worst case scenario they now have 1/3 of their expanded population effectively wanting to break away from their new masters, requiring large numbers of troops to be maintained there.

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(https://www.jstor.org/stable/23249188?read-now=1&seq=14#page_scan_tab_contents)

Its a rough estimate but you can see that in 1943 (post Case Anton) the number of troops necessary to occupy France increased substantially over 1942. ITTL it would likely never reduce to the OTL 1942 level. That is (at minimum, IMO) an extra 150-200,000 troops tied down in France throughout the war. And it is possible it could be more. If the French are not effectively blackmailed from the start with the occupation of the rest of France, there may well be a quicker and more coordinated resistance movement as French officials that are replaced or French military men that are not captured and cannot flee to NA give the resistance a level of leadership and coordination it did not have in OTL, I think it would likely enjoy a greater level of support not being seen as (mostly Communist) bandits that were jeopardizing France's position.

Basically I think in this case Germany has lost out on both counts. They have lost the French Empire to the Allies and they do not have a relatively quiet occupation of France freeing up men and material to be used elsewhere.

I think there is a middle way. That is negotiate a peace treaty that first established France as a neutral. Then allows France to build all it needs to defend ints empire. To prevent a double cross by France its home defense is relatively immobile and entirely oriented to defense of the coasts. Relatively static ground forces with tanks & other mechanization distributed in small tactical units. Air forces in France are confined to short ranged aircraft for the western zone of defense. To further ensure French honestly the Germans keep a mobile group in eastern France, ready to reinforce the ? French defense and strike at anyone Threatening Frances neutrality, either internally or by invasion. This leave France as a neutral shield, that can defend itself, and which is 'free' to provide Germany with the arms and other resources that can be wrung out of it. 'Volunteers are also free to fight on the Eastern Front.
True, this does meet the OP. However, as has been mentioned by others up-thread, Germany then loses:
-use of the French occupation payments
- their ability to directly take French machinery, material and skilled workers (at least to the same extent)
- a fair amount of their ability to rest and resupply their new or hurting divisions in France, and on France's franc.
All to equip a sort-of neutral ally they don't really trust and who could be more of a liability than a help if fighting breaks out again. Not sure if the allies would consider them neutral if there is a German army reinforcing them?
 
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True, this does meet the OP. However, as has been mentioned by others up-thread, Germany then loses:
-use of the French occupation payments

Those can be built into the peace treaty. Petains government expected such when they signed the armistice

- their ability to directly take French machinery, material and skilled workers (at least to the same extent)

Replacement of that can be built into the reparations system. Probably better than the haphazard and very wasteful looting of out OTL.

- a fair amount of their ability to rest and resupply their new or hurting divisions in France, and on France's franc.

That would be one of the several role of the mobile reserve retained in France. Again the cost is built into the reparations system.

All to equip a sort-of neutral ally they don't really trust and who could be more of a liability than a help if fighting breaks out again. Not sure if the allies would consider them neutral if there is a German army reinforcing them?

Of course the Allies would consider such neutrality suspect. But OTL they were already blockading France & its colonies so little changes here. The advantage for Germany and France is the window of vulnerability of the Colonies closes faster than OTL. With France better able to rebuild its overseas military There are larger limits on what the Brits can attempt. A big political score would be a lack of German permission to the Japanese to enter Indo China. That was a major morale blow to many French men and loss of credibility for Petains government. The other gain for Germany is a better organized draw on the resources of France and its Empire, vs the poorly organized smash and grab of 1940-41.
 
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