If Britain declares war on Germany in 1914 despite Berlin taking a Belgium-respecting, east-first strategy, British stategy would be:

If UK DoWs Germany in 1914 despite Berlin going east-first, UK strategy would be:

  • 1. Deploy the full BEF into France, and attack Franco-German border (A-L)

    Votes: 15 14.4%
  • 2. Deploy BEF to France *and* try to widen front against Germany to include Belgium and Netherlands

    Votes: 3 2.9%
  • 3. Leave ground fight in France to French, and use British forces for Balkans or Mideast campaign

    Votes: 32 30.8%
  • 4. Leave ground fight in France to French, and just blockade Germany and snatch colonies

    Votes: 19 18.3%
  • 5. Leave ground fight in France to French, and invade German coast

    Votes: 1 1.0%
  • 6. UK would be amenable to a negotiated peace w/some CP gains in the Balkans & Russia if that's all

    Votes: 4 3.8%
  • 7. Britain would accept any German offer of a status quo ante peace

    Votes: 3 2.9%
  • 8. Britain would fight to force at least an 1918 style German capitulation

    Votes: 1 1.0%
  • 9. UK would never go to conscription without being thrown onto the defensive in the west

    Votes: 3 2.9%
  • 10. Britain would go to conscription if needed to impose maximum terms on Germany and CPs

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • 11. Britain wouldn’t go to war with Germany at all.

    Votes: 23 22.1%

  • Total voters
    104

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
If Berlin took an east-first strategy in 1914, declaring war on Russia only, while respecting Belgian neutrality and not offensively threatening France's position as a great power, Britain has some choices to make. In OTL, not only did the German western offensive make the UK decision for war politically easier and seem automatic, but German successes in the west and early heavy engagement of the BEF and massive French losses meant that Britain had to devote the bulk of its war effort to the western front or invite an immediate catastrophic defeat of France.

In an ATL where Germany's opening offensive moves are to the east instead of west, Britain may or may not feel going to war is in it's best interest, but also, with Paris and the channel ports in no imminent danger (because the French are attacking and the Germans are not on the Franco-German border), Britain has much more flexibility about how heavily to commit its forces and where to commit them. Britain can go as whole hog as OTL, or try to fight more on the cheap or around the edges.

So I ask, if Britain declares war on Germany in 1914 despite Berlin taking a Belgium-respecting, east-first strategy, British stategy would be:
  1. Deploy the full BEF into France, and join the French army attacking Germany along the Franco-German border
  2. Deploy the full BEF into France and attempt to extend the front against Germany by pressuring Belgium (and maybe Netherlands) to permit Anglo-French passage
  3. Leave the fighting in France to the French, since they are not under attack, and use British forces for a peripheral campaign in the Balkans or Middle East
  4. Leave the fighting in France to the French, since they are not under attack, just blockade Germany and snatch colonies
  5. Leave the fighting in France to the French, since they are not under attack, invade the German coast
  6. Britain would be amenable to a negotiated peace with some CP gains in the Balkans and Russia if that’s all
  7. Britain would accept any German offer of a status quo ante peace
  8. Britain would fight to force at least an 1918 style German capitulation
  9. Britain would never go to conscription without being thrown onto the strategic defensive western Europe
  10. Britain would go to conscription to impose maximum terms on Germany and CPs
  11. Britain wouldn’t go to war with Germany at all.


Which of the above should Germany expect?
 
The BEF would still be sent to France. The Aim would be to support the French Army while building up the volunteer forces in the UK and drawing in those forces raised by the Dominions. These forces would then be divided between supporting the French and opening a second front elsewhere.
 
Some British contribution in France is inevitable, but it would almost certainly be acting in more of a support and reserve role to gradually build up an experienced core army. The British could also take some responsibility for holding the Channel Ports and the Belgian frontier, and thus be able to intervene in Belgium quickly if necessary. This would allow the French to concentrate on Alsace-Lorraine. Even given how brutal any attempted attacks would be there, the French would still be at least somewhat better off than IOTL, if only because the Germans wouldn't be occupying any territory and denying France a considerable portion of its industrial potential.

In this scenario, there's little reason why the British wouldn't be more interested in a peripheral strategy focused on the Mediterranean and the Middle East given how much more that plays to British strengths. The French would also be hard-pressed to argue against a strategy emphasizing the defeat of the Ottomans and the opening of supply lines to Russia if the Germans were focusing their efforts there, and weren't actually occupying any pre-war French territory.
 

Riain

Banned
Again I think a combination of 1, 3 and 4 but the strategy in the first year of the war is to have a big-ish campaign on the periphery of Europe with the newly minted European style Army while taking colonies easily enough and deploying perhaps the Royal Marine Brigade/Royal Naval Division to Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne to bolster French defences in Britain's interest.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Below I sketched out how and why some of the possibilities I mentioned might work out:



1) BEF is landed in France in accord with pre-war discussions, and to place it where it can be supplied most easily. When supply lines are extended from the channel, the BEF takes up a segment of the Lorraine front, joining the offensives there. It is hard to fit there, as the French are massing for attacks there too, and German defenses are strong.

As time goes on, Britain and France have the opportunity to develop secondary efforts against German overseas colonies and the Ottoman Empire and Salonika and the Adriatic to boost the Serbs and encourage Italian entry on the Entente side.

The limited length of the front with the Low Countries neutral limits Entente offensive prospects and German counteroffensive prospects, and will likely limit British manpower needs and possibly the need for conscription below OTL levels.


2) Deploy the full BEF into France and attempt to extend the front against Germany by pressuring Belgium (and maybe Netherlands) to permit Anglo-French passage.

The Belgians and Dutch either acquiesce, because of Entente trade, colonial, and financial leverage over them, or do not, and the Entente invades them a lot or a little to “cut corners”.

Acquiesence makes a big difference, and may shape whether and when the British and French ultimately make this move.

But if and when it’s done, it gives the BEF and French wider space in which to deploy, and threatens more of western Germany. Especially if passage through the Netherlands is granted the Ruhr can be threatened directly and Germany has to devote more of its divisions from east to west. If Belgium is a willing participant, its forces add to the Entente totals.

The center of gravity of BEF fighting would be further north, and it will be fighting closer to its supply lines while in Belgium initially, altough eventually its supply lines in this scenario will stretch east rather than southeast.

This offensive in the west with a broader front than even OTL



3) Leave the fighting in France to the French, since they are not under attack, and use British forces for a peripheral campaign in the Balkans or Middle East

The unexpected circumstances of the Germans committing ½ to 2/3 of their forces to the east, and yielding the initiative in the west to France, combined with non-violation of Belgian neutrality, makes sending the BEF to France a non-urgent issue. Instead, Britain is free to use it’s more “traditional” strategy of “peripheral operations” and “peninsular wars”, advocated as a favored alternative by historians like Liddel Hart.

With France holding it’s own, and attacking, even if unsuccessfully, and a huge expedition to Russia not being logistically feasible, Britain is free to throw it’s Expeditionary Forces against the weakest flanks of the CP and in support of the weakest members of the Entente. On the Europe contininent, this means coming to the aid of the Serbs via Salonika or Montenegro, and/or attacking the Turks at the straits. Here the British aid the Serbs and confront primarily the Austrians and the Ottomans, trying to draw off German reinforcements from the other theaters as they can.

Within Southwest Asia, they can do the same against Ottoman territories while protecting Suez and imperial interests in the Persian Gulf by attacking the Ottoman Empire’s Arabic speaking provinces like Palestine and Iraq.

4) Leave the fighting in France to the French, since they are not under attack, just blockade Germany and snatch colonies

Here Britain declares war on Germany in solidarity with the Entente, keeping its sphere of influence and naval arrangements intact, and financing and supplying French and Russian war efforts, while blockading the CP. However, Britain does the absolute minimum of military labor in Europe. Instead, it limits its land operations to “low-hanging fruit”, German overseas colonies in Africa and Oceania, which are are all successively overwhelmed by Britain, its Dominions, and Japan, sometimes with the assistance of France.

Britain fights the war to the last Frenchman and Russian, possibly subsidizing them more as they have difficulty paying, or adding naval support or pilots and aircraft. But if that does not, and it likely will not, succeed in turning the tide or saving Russia, Britain will probably try to broker an acceptable, minimal losses peace instead putting all its men into the trenches after watching what a slaughterhouse that has been.
 
My opinion:
The British Expeditionary Force will deploy to Northern France as OTL. The plan existed as a contingency pre-war, and the army will bring it up as the obvious option from their perspective simply because they have the deployment plan available.

Initially, they will be behind the French lines, theoretically guarding against a German strike through Belgium (just because it hasn't happened yet...) and pragmatically trying to build up strength and integrate reserves before entering combat. However, being in France will draw them towards the action, as French casualties mount and French Generals increasingly call for more troops.

In particular, there's a joke- difficult to source- that claims that pre-war Sir Henry Wilson asked Ferdinand Foch what the minimum useful British contribution to a hypothetical war would be, and Foch responded "a single soldier, and I shall get him killed." (one of the chapters in Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August is titled "a single British soldier" and references the alleged joke)

On the other hand, although I do expect the British to end up with an escalating commitment on the Western Front, I would expect the situation to also make them even more enthusiastic about ventures to other theaters than they were OTL- expect some kind of British efforts to help the Serbs, attack the Ottomans, and seize the German Colonies at the very least. I expect this both because the narrower front is likely to be even more obviously deadlocked than OTL and because the war is likely less popular with the British chattering classes, which will make quick victories and public ties to Serbia (now Britain's official causus belli as they can't cite Belgian neutrality) more desirable.
 

Deleted member 94680

If Germany declares on Russia, following (one would assume) some kind of Aufmarsch I Ost, they will be at War with France anyway. The joint Franco-Russian War Plans mandated French involvement if Russia was attacked by Germany.

If France attacks Germany, the Western Front will develop pretty much as OTL. If we get an *OTL Western Front, then the British will more than likely be dragged in.
 

Riain

Banned
The British Expeditionary Force will deploy to Northern France as OTL. The plan existed as a contingency pre-war, and the army will bring it up as the obvious option from their perspective simply because they have the deployment plan available.

This point is almost universally overlooked. The BEF deployment plan was worked out from 1911 and wasn't contingent on what the Germans did or didn't do; if war was declared the BEF would deploy to France.
 

BooNZ

Banned
This point is almost universally overlooked. The BEF deployment plan was worked out from 1911 and wasn't contingent on what the Germans did or didn't do; if war was declared the BEF would deploy to France.
OTL in the pre-war haggling, Churchill approached Lloyd George* with a proposal that Britain could limit its contribution to naval matters and thereby save the empire's purse. This was clearly with an expectation the German violation might only be minor and not sufficient to draw the British cabinet into deciding on war. It illustrates the relevance of German decision making and the aversion to British boots on the ground among many in the British Cabinet.
 
Britain would make a token contribution to the Western Front (one Corps growing to one Army) but would devote the bulk of it's efforts to a peripheral strategy including a larger and earlier commitment to the Italian campaign (if that happens), plus various Balkan and Ottoman adventure.
As for peace terms something less harsh than OTL but still involving major colonial concessions, A-L and restrictions on any German gains in the East would be the bottom line so long as France remains in the fight. If France is exhausted then Britain will demand major colonial gains but will have to let Germany create a new Empire in Eastern Europe.
 
This point is almost universally overlooked. The BEF deployment plan was worked out from 1911 and wasn't contingent on what the Germans did or didn't do; if war was declared the BEF would deploy to France.

The BEF is going to France, no question, it being built up to 5 Armies and the largest force Britain has ever put into the field is entirely due to the particular context of OTL, without North-Eastern France falling and the French army getting savaged the BEF is going to grow much slower and cap out in size much sooner.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Britain would make a token contribution to the Western Front (one Corps growing to one Army) but would devote the bulk of it's efforts to a peripheral strategy including a larger and earlier commitment to the Italian campaign (if that happens), plus various Balkan and Ottoman adventure.
As for peace terms something less harsh than OTL but still involving major colonial concessions, A-L and restrictions on any German gains in the East would be the bottom line so long as France remains in the fight. If France is exhausted then Britain will demand major colonial gains but will have to let Germany create a new Empire in Eastern Europe.
Any particular reason why Britain might be interested in third rate German colonial assets?
 

Deleted member 94680

The BEF is going to France, no question, it being built up to 5 Armies and the largest force Britain has ever put into the field is entirely due to the particular context of OTL, without North-Eastern France falling and the French army getting savaged the BEF is going to grow much slower and cap out in size much sooner.

How does this explain away the July Crisis in the British Cabinet?

Much of Asquith's cabinet was similarly inclined, Lloyd George told a journalist on 27 July that "there could be no question of our taking part in any war in the first instance. He knew of no Minister who would be in favour of it." and wrote in his War Memoirs that before the German ultimatum to Belgium on 3 August "The Cabinet was hopelessly divided—fully one third, if not one half, being opposed to our entry into the War. After the German ultimatum to Belgium the Cabinet was almost unanimous."
 
How does this explain away the July Crisis in the British Cabinet?

Much of Asquith's cabinet was similarly inclined, Lloyd George told a journalist on 27 July that "there could be no question of our taking part in any war in the first instance. He knew of no Minister who would be in favour of it." and wrote in his War Memoirs that before the German ultimatum to Belgium on 3 August "The Cabinet was hopelessly divided—fully one third, if not one half, being opposed to our entry into the War. After the German ultimatum to Belgium the Cabinet was almost unanimous."

The PoD requires Britain to join the war. If Britain joins the war all the war plans have the BEF being despatched to France.

Any particular reason why Britain might be interested in third rate German colonial assets?

Namibia wasn't third rate and as for the rest the same reasons as OTL, as war prizes understandable to the British population, to deny them to the Germans, because they were there, the last three centuries of British strategy etc.
 
Namibia wasn't third rate and as for the rest the same reasons as OTL, as war prizes understandable to the British population, to deny them to the Germans, because they were there, the last three centuries of British strategy etc.
In East Africa Tanganyika gives Britain a solid line of colonies running from the Cape of Good Hope in the South to Alexandria in the north.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
If the Germans are going east-first, what should *they* expect from from the British:
Deploy the full BEF into France, and attack Franco-German border (A-L)?

Or should they expect Franco-British violation or conversion of the low countries, even though nobody has voted for that? Deploy BEF to France *and* try to widen front against Germany to include Belgium and Netherlands?

If the westerners choose war in reaction to German war in the east, do the Germans need to assume commitment by three Entente powers to total victory for as long as it takes, or is it reasonable to plan to peace out holding the Russians back while Austria smacks Serbia?

@Vanvidum, @Riain, @Peg Leg Pom, @Thoresby - y'all seemed to think a Mediterranean/Balkan option was likely, and @Canuck Wingnut said a link-up with Serbia specifically was likely. Would Britain in this scenario have any better luck getting Greece to make a rapid decision to logistically cooperate with establishing a line of supply and reinforcement to the Serbs through Salonika and the Vardar valley? Could the British sponsor a coup to get this done?
 
As a note for the expansion of the front, the Netherlands was a pro-German neutral. And for expanding the front into Belgium, were there war plans for that? As are as I'm aware France was very much against that happening, as I highly doubt that Belgium would want to join the war. I don't think the UK would force it that early, as pressuring neutral countries would not be taken well with the other neutrals, and might drive them closer to Germany. In fact, if I remember right, the Netherlands had a plan that if the French went through Belgium, they would mobilize because of France likely going through Limburg to get to the Ruhr.
 
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