Es Geloybte Aretz Continuation Thread
- Thread starter carlton_bach
- Start date
In addition to that and Germany, any of the following have varyingly been considered Central Europe:
The BeNeLux, Denmark, Poland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Romania, even Greece, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, the baltics, and Finland, at times.
Now in a Mitteleuropa-esque world, it's quite likely that some of what we may consider eastern Europe after its Russian orbit, here might be considered central Europe in the German orbit.
If the TL leads to an alt eu forming, and we know france and Germany are not going to war with each other how will rapprochement happen? as the normal imperial german tl solution is to do a reverse ww2 in which germany occupies france and rebuild them and gets ride of the nationalist and militant parts of society, a role reversal of the de-nazifitcation of germany, with france germany instead.
Neither of these will happen. Moreover the leaders of both nations are fine hating each other. So will it be 2 EUs? German mittleuropa, latin based french led EU i don't see why Italy, Spain, Portugal would not op for a french led one over a german led one.
Neither of these will happen. Moreover the leaders of both nations are fine hating each other. So will it be 2 EUs? German mittleuropa, latin based french led EU i don't see why Italy, Spain, Portugal would not op for a french led one over a german led one.
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If you reread the Clemenceau narrative and Carlton's commentary in the main timeline, it's pretty clear that things get real tense for a long time. War scares are going to be common through Russo-German War Pt. 2, and I can easily envisage long periods of crisis. Instead of the war-shy 1920s of our world, it could easily look more like the early 1930s; arms races, demagogic politics, and fiercely accelerating border crises among the minor powers.
Two mitigating factors, though; one, fewer nations have actually fought a WWI-like conflict, and what the bystanders saw - massive casualties for the attacker, enormous inherent advantages for the defender, tremendous strain on the national economy - they don't like. And the fate of Russia is a big, shiny warning that if you start one of these things and lose, you're going to be bled dry by the victor as a matter of necessity, to recoup the enormous expense of fighting an industrial conflict. It's a gamble, and the stakes are high. Add to that, your proposed target just got done learning all the lessons of how to fight one of these new modern wars and win - you're going to be learning on the job.
So you have enormous incentives to sit back and funnel cash into R&D in the hopes of coming up with and deploying some game-changer of your own, as Carlton has said *France does - pouring money into things like rockets and electronics. And in the mean time, you tone down your war propaganda. People who remember A-L being integral French territory die off. And by the time Round Two rolls around, maybe there's a cry to go for it from some quarters, but it's not what it would have been forty years earlier.
Two mitigating factors, though; one, fewer nations have actually fought a WWI-like conflict, and what the bystanders saw - massive casualties for the attacker, enormous inherent advantages for the defender, tremendous strain on the national economy - they don't like. And the fate of Russia is a big, shiny warning that if you start one of these things and lose, you're going to be bled dry by the victor as a matter of necessity, to recoup the enormous expense of fighting an industrial conflict. It's a gamble, and the stakes are high. Add to that, your proposed target just got done learning all the lessons of how to fight one of these new modern wars and win - you're going to be learning on the job.
So you have enormous incentives to sit back and funnel cash into R&D in the hopes of coming up with and deploying some game-changer of your own, as Carlton has said *France does - pouring money into things like rockets and electronics. And in the mean time, you tone down your war propaganda. People who remember A-L being integral French territory die off. And by the time Round Two rolls around, maybe there's a cry to go for it from some quarters, but it's not what it would have been forty years earlier.
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First of all, yes, much of Central Europe is Austria-Hungary and that is where a large number of the immigrants come from. This is an advantageous setup - many of them already speak a degree of German, they are used to a similar pattern of administration, the two currencies are exchangeable easily (neither being on the gold standard due to the effect of the war) and infrastructure connections are good. You can get to Vienna from anywhere in the kuk monarchy, and anywhere in Germany from there.
Then, there is the new countries: Poland, Ruthenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Finland doesn't count as Central Europe, obviously, but there is also migration from there, just not in such large numbers. Poland is a major source of temporary migrant labour on terms very advantageous to Germany, but also many permanent immigrants. Those are the two big ones.
There are migrants to Germany from many other places - the Ottoman Empire (mostly the Balkans parts), Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, the Balkan countries, Germany's African colonies and China. But the numbers are much smaller. The bulk of immigrants come from the countries directly to the east and southeast, and many of them assimilated fully within two generations. Globowski and Januschek are now simply German surnames.
There is no EU. there is not going to be one. This Europe will continue to consist of several 'blocs' the most important ones are the German and the French sphere, respectively encompassing East/Central Europe and the Western Mediterranean. Britain is the odd one out, with Norway, Denmark and Portugal falling more or less into its orbit, and then there is Russia and the Ottoman sphere. Many countries are not fully integrated into any of these spheres - the Netherlands, Sweden and Romania are on the edge of the German sphere, Portugal hangs between Britain and France, Greece between France and Germany, and Switzerland is deliberately straddling the divide.
What is going to happen is that as the colonial empires recede and Germany's control over its satellites weakens, it is simply no longer advantageous to uphold customs barriers and maintain great military establishments peering at each other over fortified borders. A war would be pointless anyway, turning much of the continent into radioactive rubble within hours, and business turns out to be better across open borders than within separate spheres. After that, all it takes is a generation or two of peace. but even so, nothing nearly like the EU will exist. At best something approaching a free-trade zone with relatively unhindered migration
Will there be something like the UN/league of nations? The way I would see it, there would be some international organizations in areas where cooperation is financially advantageous and there are little drawbacks. But the UN in it's current form with it's universalist (if practically dysfunctional) setup is a very American idea that was on top of that hugely influenced by also fundamentally internationalist communism. Without the rest of the world being so utterly dependent on the US and USSR and the nation state remaining the untarnished gold standard of political organization, I can't really see the internationalist idealism that underpins so much of modern politics gaining much traction outside of intellectual circles.
That said, if there was a version of the UN in this timeline, who would be part of it's security council? There would have to be a lot more members with veto power to get people onboard in TTL. In Europe alone Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy (maybe even the Ottomans and Russia?)
That said, if there was a version of the UN in this timeline, who would be part of it's security council? There would have to be a lot more members with veto power to get people onboard in TTL. In Europe alone Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy (maybe even the Ottomans and Russia?)
I suspect that Finnish and to lesser extent Estonian migrants will mainly end up in Sweden.
Denmark I find more likely to be in German orbit especially as the local Social Liberals (who was very pro-German) and Social Democrats (who was pro-SPD) comes to power. The movement to British orbit was caused by UK turning into the biggest Danish export market after WWII (and of course the other reason). Here the German need for Danish goods under the war have made the Danish economy orbit the German even more. The Danish minority in Schleswig also mean that ideas are easier transported across the border to Denmark from Germany, but also that Denmark have de facto lobbyists in the German parliament.
I could see something like the Council of Europe being created and maybe also with a Central European EFTA mixed with the Nordic Council. Being created between Germany, AH, Poland, Benelux and the Nordic Countries.
In the absence of an organisation like the LON, it might not be impossible that the IPU could evolve to cover some of the aspects that would have been covered by the LON and later UN in our world.
sorry it seems you know danish stuff so can i ask what is the driving factor behind the danish economy what do they produce? Also wouldn't the de-facto Lobbyist be really small to the extent they are have no real influence, and constantly shrinking if danes leave for denmark?
Medium to high value food stuff (as example something of 1/3 of the animal products consumed in the Greater German Reich under WWII came from Denmark[1]), specialised industrial goods and aluminium. Beside that Denmark also have a large merchant marine.
Historical the Danes of Schleswig had a higher birthrate than the Germans thanks to being poorer, there wasn't a significant higher emigration rate than for the Germans. The main population loss was the fact that Danes moved to Flensburg, where they became German working class in similar manner to what we saw with the Poles of Upper Silesia, but they stayed Danish speakers. We only saw a significant loss in the Danish minority in Schleswig in the Interbellum, where the loss of North Schleswig meant that Danish minority in South Schleswig loss much of the funding for its institutions it had gotten from the majority Danish areas in North Schleswig. The loss of North Schleswig also meant the poorer Danes didn't emigrate to Flensburg anymore, the result was that the Danish speaking working class was assimilated into German culture.
Without a loss of North Schleswig, Flensburg keep growing (likely staying equal size to Kiel) and the working class will keep receiving Danish rural migrants, which will keep the Danish language more widespread[2]. These people will keep voting SPD as long as its the dominant party, but when SPD weakens the Danish minority party will make gain among this group. We can also as Flensburg grow see a local Danish minority Social Democratic party be created, we saw that happen after WWII in Flensburg. Beside that the Danish vote will likely unite into one party, like SSW or Swedish People Party in Finland, it will likely be center left social liberal party. In the Reichtag it's likely too small to ever join governments, but its connection to a friendly neighbor likely mean it won't bve ignored either.
[1]Denmark while a small country have a massive food production and had even before the Green Revolution.
[2]While 25% of modern Flensburg's population are members of the Danish minority, they mainly speak German as their first language today, only using Danish in schools, churches and minority organisations.
The sectarian political chaos that characterises so much of the former and current Ottoman Empire is frequently thought of as a relic of the medieval era, but much of it is the outcome of twentieth-century politics. At its root lies the failure of the Ottomanisation policies supported by the Young Turk revolutionary government.
The first great misconception often voiced with regard to Ottomanism is that it was doomed to fail because it was trying to create an artificial identity. In fact, it did precisely what many other states were doing at the same time: Creating a national consciousness for a pop0ulation whose allegiances were religious, tribal, and local. It did not fail because it sought to obliterate the 'natural' affiliations of the Empire's peoples, but because the identity it offered was in many ways undesirable and perceived as inferior to the alternatives.
Partly, this was due to the prevailing fashion of the Western world. At a time when ethnic nationalism, race theory and linguistic purity were in fashion throughout the world's most successful powers, an ideology that embraced a multi-ethnic, multilingual and multireligious state faced an uphill struggle among the intelligentsia. In addition, Ottomanism's basis in the concept of allegiance shared too many features with the kind of impositions made on colonial subjects. The difference between the deference an African tribesman was to have for the King-Emperor or a reservation Indian to the Great White Father and that expected of a Sinai Bedouin to the Sultan was difficult to explain in short, simple words. This became increasingly problematic as the significance of the monarchy was eclipsed, the ruler himself reduced to a figurehead and most real decisions placed in the hands of parliament, military councils, and elected regional assemblies.
Thirdly, the influence of outside interest must not be discounted. Promoting ethnic nationalism inside the empire was a winning strategy for its enemies. Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Russia and Persia deployed it in the border regions, most effectively in the Balkans whose twenty-year civil war was stoked by such rival identities instilled with a serious deployment of money and effort. However, we also know now that the rise in Arab consciousness that marked the 1920s and 1930s was funded to a significant extent by French intelligence services.
Finally, allegiance to the Ottoman state was a concept that looked attractive only in areas where the state was effective. This was the case in the urban core and many of the wealthier agricultural areas, but less so in the sparsely settled and inhospitable periphery. That is why it never presented a serious rival to Arab, Albanian, Kurdish or Bulgarian identities in the woollier fringes despite holding on well in places like Damascus, Mosul and Adrianople.
The solution that the Empire eventually settled upon to stem the tide of ethnic nationalism proved not the broken reed of Ottomanism, but a deliberate resurgence of political religion. This, too, is frequently mischaracterised as evidence of the empire's backwardness, a throwback to the ancient system, by which the Ottoman Turks had ruled their Christian subjects. In fact, the old millets had been thoroughly emasculated in the course of the revolution and though Islam remained a powerful propaganda tool in the hands of the Porte, it was never considered central to the empire's identity the way that e.g. Orthodoxy was to Integralist Russia. It was not until the late 1920s that religious parties began to play a major role in politics. This was mainly due to their efficacy at mobilising rural and lower-class voters who took little interest in politics, but could be reached through their mosque or church communities.
The religious vote – mainly represented by the Christian and Sunni Islamic blocs – proved an effective countermeasure to ethnic nationalism in many areas, but it came at a price. The modernising zeal of the Young Turk revolution, associated with the secular, national symbols of military victory and technological modernity, was stopped in its tracks by local interests. Landowners, bazaaris and clergy used it to dominate regional assemblies, voting down any measures that they felt threatened their economic and social dominance. The Empire made internal peace – often requiring considerable autonomy to ethnic blocs and losing a number of areas in the process – but it condemned itself to a generation of stasis. Much of the purported backwardness, the corrupt dealings, obscurantism and nepotism that is today considered typically Ottoman – whether charmingly Oriental or infuriating depends on the observer – is in fact the outcome of political choice made in the 1920s and implemented through the 1930s that put church, synagogue and mosque at the heart of the political establishment and privileged traditional elites to enforce an uneasy truce with encroaching modernity.
The first great misconception often voiced with regard to Ottomanism is that it was doomed to fail because it was trying to create an artificial identity. In fact, it did precisely what many other states were doing at the same time: Creating a national consciousness for a pop0ulation whose allegiances were religious, tribal, and local. It did not fail because it sought to obliterate the 'natural' affiliations of the Empire's peoples, but because the identity it offered was in many ways undesirable and perceived as inferior to the alternatives.
Partly, this was due to the prevailing fashion of the Western world. At a time when ethnic nationalism, race theory and linguistic purity were in fashion throughout the world's most successful powers, an ideology that embraced a multi-ethnic, multilingual and multireligious state faced an uphill struggle among the intelligentsia. In addition, Ottomanism's basis in the concept of allegiance shared too many features with the kind of impositions made on colonial subjects. The difference between the deference an African tribesman was to have for the King-Emperor or a reservation Indian to the Great White Father and that expected of a Sinai Bedouin to the Sultan was difficult to explain in short, simple words. This became increasingly problematic as the significance of the monarchy was eclipsed, the ruler himself reduced to a figurehead and most real decisions placed in the hands of parliament, military councils, and elected regional assemblies.
Thirdly, the influence of outside interest must not be discounted. Promoting ethnic nationalism inside the empire was a winning strategy for its enemies. Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Russia and Persia deployed it in the border regions, most effectively in the Balkans whose twenty-year civil war was stoked by such rival identities instilled with a serious deployment of money and effort. However, we also know now that the rise in Arab consciousness that marked the 1920s and 1930s was funded to a significant extent by French intelligence services.
Finally, allegiance to the Ottoman state was a concept that looked attractive only in areas where the state was effective. This was the case in the urban core and many of the wealthier agricultural areas, but less so in the sparsely settled and inhospitable periphery. That is why it never presented a serious rival to Arab, Albanian, Kurdish or Bulgarian identities in the woollier fringes despite holding on well in places like Damascus, Mosul and Adrianople.
The solution that the Empire eventually settled upon to stem the tide of ethnic nationalism proved not the broken reed of Ottomanism, but a deliberate resurgence of political religion. This, too, is frequently mischaracterised as evidence of the empire's backwardness, a throwback to the ancient system, by which the Ottoman Turks had ruled their Christian subjects. In fact, the old millets had been thoroughly emasculated in the course of the revolution and though Islam remained a powerful propaganda tool in the hands of the Porte, it was never considered central to the empire's identity the way that e.g. Orthodoxy was to Integralist Russia. It was not until the late 1920s that religious parties began to play a major role in politics. This was mainly due to their efficacy at mobilising rural and lower-class voters who took little interest in politics, but could be reached through their mosque or church communities.
The religious vote – mainly represented by the Christian and Sunni Islamic blocs – proved an effective countermeasure to ethnic nationalism in many areas, but it came at a price. The modernising zeal of the Young Turk revolution, associated with the secular, national symbols of military victory and technological modernity, was stopped in its tracks by local interests. Landowners, bazaaris and clergy used it to dominate regional assemblies, voting down any measures that they felt threatened their economic and social dominance. The Empire made internal peace – often requiring considerable autonomy to ethnic blocs and losing a number of areas in the process – but it condemned itself to a generation of stasis. Much of the purported backwardness, the corrupt dealings, obscurantism and nepotism that is today considered typically Ottoman – whether charmingly Oriental or infuriating depends on the observer – is in fact the outcome of political choice made in the 1920s and implemented through the 1930s that put church, synagogue and mosque at the heart of the political establishment and privileged traditional elites to enforce an uneasy truce with encroaching modernity.
Sorry im confused can someone who isn't a idiot like me explain what happened please.
Correct me if im wrong doesn't this go against the last ottomans update ottomanism is dead now political islam vs secular turkish identity. then the triump of the second generation of young turks one of the great stories.
Correct me if im wrong doesn't this go against the last ottomans update ottomanism is dead now political islam vs secular turkish identity. then the triump of the second generation of young turks one of the great stories.
Why cant they not continue the pan-islamic policies with the arabs they love that stufd while turkification of the balkans and anataolia remain.
Isn't islam generally one of the central identities of the empire. Abdul hamid in the islamic world is generally seen as the last great ottoman ruler. Also ottoman sultans constantly used islam to legitimise there rule.
ottomans ans military victories truly an alt tl
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The Empire still exists as a functioning entity. This is the triumph of the Young Turks. Seriously, whio would have thought it possible?
It is not what they wanted to do. The approach was obviously failing to deliver, and they hoped that Ottomanism would work better. It did not, but how were they supposed to know in advance? These are by instinct modernisers, mostly brought up in the French school of how government works. There is no traditional institution they do not heartily distrust.
Yes. That is part and parcel of the legitiomacy of the monarchy, but the monarchy is increasingly under pressure on this count. The state needs a new glue. It found one, but the deal had a price. The alternative would have been letting the Empire fall apart under external pressure. They might have saved a rump state in western Anatolia, or nothing.
It will come, though not immediately after the war and only in fits and starts (beginning with unmarried women on the principle of household suffrage). But Wilhelm himself is not a friend of the idea. He does not think highly of women, and this will unfortunately only get worse as time progresses.
Does that have anything to do with his Habsburg wife?
How's the imperial couple getting along these days?
Increasingly poorly. Wilhelm was in love for a brief spell, but ultimately the two are too different in character and each too invested in their way of seeing the world to get along. They produced, in short order, two more sons and a daughter, securing the succession, but by the birth of Friedrich Wilhelm Eduard in 1913, they barely spoke to each other outside formal contexts. Both agreed to leave the other to their own devices, and this caused a degree of scandal, but the empress was circumspect enough not to damage the imperial dynasty's standing beyond repair.
Wilhelm had a brief reunion with Fanny zu Reventlow, but again, the old flame proved hard to rekindle. The war had made him hard, and she was always flaky and high-strung. Having no more worldly wisdom to teach him, her attraction paled. They parted in mutual disappointment, but not on hostile terms. She remained influential in Berlin's artistic circles until her death, but was not received at court again.
The strain of running a modern state could kill a healthy man, and Wilhelm was never healthy again. He suffered chronic headaches from his injuries and recurring bouts of inflammation that threatened his eyesight and life. though he was probably never physically dependent on opiates, he used both painkillers and 'uppers' with scary abandon to treat his discomfort. This put him into touch with social circles whose ideas of moral was very different from the oldfashioned Prussian elite - people to whom winning was the sole goal in life, all pleasure was permissible, and modernity was a joyride. Most of them were men, many of them veteran officers (Germany's upper and middle classes are replete with people who pride themselves on their goal-oriented toughness and need a half pint of liquor to banish the memories at night). They have little use for 'female softness' and womanish values.
That mix of iron-willed duty and guilt-free hedonism appealed hugely to the emperor. As he aged, he became increasingly open about his lifestyle in the company of industrialists, film producers, media stars and a never-ending stream of decorative, available young women. He came to view female companionship and sex as the same thing and classed it with drugs, alcohol, movies and tobacco as a consumable pleasure. By the time he hit fifty, women were something you put on a shopping list. He formed long-lasting friendships with a few influential men over time, but never again with a woman. Even the few women he felt admiration for - film director Helena Riefenstahl, physicist Lise Meitner and aviatrix Hannah Behrend - he kept at arm's length.
Wilhelm died a lonely, bitter man. He was perhaps the best emperor Germany ever had, but the personal cost was huge.