Indeed. One can make the same argument about the Germans. Why on earth did they start all that, given there was no way they could win?Nazi Germany had rolled over everyone from Poland to France in a stunning series of away wins. The early favorites France had been crushed because their old fashioned WM tactics, elderly management and demotivated players had no answer to the military tika takka of a modern, high press, blitzkreig system. This meant we had no European allies left and only plucky Britain was left for the Nazi machine to knock over before they could be crowned champions of Europe for the 1939/1940 season. At Dunkirk ( played on neutral ground due to crowd trouble) we had lost the first leg but we did not do so as badly as the pundits predicted and luckily, as it turned out, we had scored a crucial away goal but with a squad depleted by injuries and captures it looked unlikely we could overturn the deficit on home ground.
It turned out that the coaching and management of the Nazi team was not quite as good as we thought and that their system of play was suspect at best........................
Honestly: people at the time ( especially but not limited to normal people) did not have the benefit of hindsight or access to the complete strategic picture, the complete Nazi order of battle, the competence or otherwise of the Nazi invasion plans, access to Nazi stores and logistics records, accurate intelligence on the make up of the nazi military, know that the Battle of Britain would be won or really have had time to asses why the recent blitzkrieg approach had been, apparently, so successful and how to counter it. It looked like the Nazi war machine would crush anyone in their way and we were next.
I get, entirely, why people were worried!
Also it was something new so the Generals had no idea how to combat such attacks and deal with the fact they could be launched anywhere.And don't forget the shock caused by the german paratrooper assaults in the Dutch/Belgian campaign.
Also it was something new so the Generals had no idea how to combat such attacks and deal with the fact they could be launched anywhere.
the Ministry of Information was not that far behind Gobbels on the PR front
Prior to the Battle of Britain the R.A.F was perceived as having utterly failed to protect the B.E.F, the primary RAF assets for attacking any German landing and supply convoys (the light bombers) had been hacked from the sky in France, the Luftwaffe and in particular the Stuka's had gained a vastly overblown reputation so there were grave doubts about the RN being able to interfere with an invasion (in daylight). We now know the true capabilities of both air forces to interfere in any naval action in the channel, in 1940 they didn't. In truth the skies would have been neutral which would have ensured the defeat of any German invasion attempt before it reached England.Sealion was impossible. River boats going through a standing Royal Navy without naval and air superiority was impossible.
What got US attention was the thought that if Britain either gave up or fell the Royal Navy could fall into German hands. Up until that became a possibility (however unlikely) US voters, and thus politicians mostly didn't give much of a damn what happened in Europe other than to not get involved.Hype up the german threat, best way to get attention of US
And shortly upon them realising that could very likely occur ... Well the USN got a big pile of cash and was told to go on a building bonanzaWhat got US attention was the thought that if Britain either gave up or fell the Royal Navy could fall into German hands. Up until that became a possibility (however unlikely) US voters, and thus politicians mostly didn't give much of a damn what happened in Europe other than to not get involved.
The Norway experience was probably more influential on (especially RN) thinking than a lot of people now give it credit for. The Germans had been able to land significant forces all along the Norwegian coast, right under the noses of the RN. On the other hand, the Norwegian coast was basically defenseless, especially when the Germans had such overwhelming air superiority, which ties into the importance of the RAF's performance in the Battle of Britain.Well, IIRC, part of it is that at the time, few people really understood the thorny logistical problems involved with such an audacious amphibious invasion.
The issue I'm looking at with the British Army was that they were equipping forces specifically for a last ditch defense. The 2-pdr AT gun was more or less obsolete after the Battle of France, but it was still being produced in huge numbers because the gap to switch production to the 6-pdr was unacceptable. Fifty thousand flame fougasses were emplaced in defense positions along the British coast. Large numbers (possibly more than a thousand) of Armadillo and Bison improvised armored vehicles were deployed to defend airfields from German paratroopers. These were not the actions of a force rebuilding itself to fight in North Africa, and certainly not a force planning to undertake offensive operations. The British Army at the time had plenty of organized combat units; what they lacked was the heavy equipment that had been left behind in France.Further, The British had to rebuild their forces regardless, whether it was for defense or offense.
And don't forget the shock caused by the german paratrooper assaults in the Dutch/Belgian campaign. Even amongst higher ranks, some were concerned about massed airborne assaults.
The small assaults on fortifications and bridges in Norway, Denmark, and Belgium certainly would have been concerning, but the big airborne assault on the Hague in the Netherlands was convincingly defeated on the ground. The Germans had demonstrated an ability to conduct airborne assaults, but only on a small tactical scale with immediate support by ground forces. Did the British have any idea of how badly damaged the German transport fleet was after the Netherlands? If the Germans had attempted to replicate the Hague assault against a port town on the South East coast, how would the British have fared compared to the Dutch?Also it was something new so the Generals had no idea how to combat such attacks and deal with the fact they could be launched anywhere.
Much of that gold was gonna be spent in the US anyway. So sending it somewhere closer to it's likely long term destination and safe should the highly unlikely worst case happen does make sense.
A lot of this seems to tie into Churchill's political situation after the Battle of France. Churchill had been brought in to replace Chamberlain over the failure to defend Norway, and had subsequently supervised the failure to defend France. As a politician, he had never been well-liked by the British elite so his position was always threatened. I imagine Churchill would have thought the situation quite similar to his own position after the failure at Gallipoli.Lots of what is described as worry was the general public and measures to reassure them. It has to be noted it was in Britain's interest to appear weaker/more desperate than it was ( rather cynically either to get the Germans to launch Sealion so it could be crushed or increase the chance of the US getting more involved ). Let's also remember during the Battle of Britain , North Africa was getting reinforced by armored troops from Britain so there was not that much real belief by those who were making the decisions of an invasion being practical.
A lot of the Home Guard stuff does seem to be for morale purposes and to foster a "all doing their bit" image. Stuff was done for Newsreels, the Ministry of Information was not that far behind Gobbels on the PR front
The uk had a perfect knowledge of german naval assets and they had inflicted heavy losses on the kriegsmarina in the norway battle, so I guess they didn't need a lot of hindsight to know that the threat was limited on that point. Of course, maybe there was no such insight regarding the possibilities of the luftwaffe gaining air superiority and to what extent this could upgrade german possibilities in the cross channel?
What was the Stuka's anti-ship reputation based on? They certainly sank a lot of ships in port or during evacuations (no different from any other point target), but performance against warships at sea was far more mixed. The British response to the Luftwaffe threat off Norway also seems to have been more cautious than at later events like Crete, so I have no doubt that the RN would have pressed for the Channel regardless of any Stukas if the Germans were crossing.Prior to the Battle of Britain the R.A.F was perceived as having utterly failed to protect the B.E.F, the primary RAF assets for attacking any German landing and supply convoys (the light bombers) had been hacked from the sky in France, the Luftwaffe and in particular the Stuka's had gained a vastly overblown reputation so there were grave doubts about the RN being able to interfere with an invasion (in daylight). We now know the true capabilities of both air forces to interfere in any naval action in the channel, in 1940 they didn't. In truth the skies would have been neutral which would have ensured the defeat of any German invasion attempt before it reached England.
Irrational fear IMHO on the part of US politiciansWhat got US attention was the thought that if Britain either gave up or fell the Royal Navy could fall into German hands. Up until that became a possibility (however unlikely) US voters, and thus politicians mostly didn't give much of a damn what happened in Europe other than to not get involved.