AHC: Better Strategy on the Western Front? [WWII]

[RedTerra]

Lately I've been reading about military theories and strategists like Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Sherman, and so on, and I'd like to hear what the Allies could have done different or better? Whether when WWII started, or after Britain was ejected out of mainland Europe, D-Day, etc.

Eisenhowever I heard was great for bringing Monty, Patton, Bradley, and others more or less on the same page. But his broad front strategy seems to be rather... uninspired?

The goals seem to be defeating the Germans all along the front, making sure their flanks are left unexposed (of course the Ardennes offensive happened) and hammering the point that the Germans were being grinded down on all sides. The other perceived upside is that it was 'safer and therefore fewer casualties'

But could the war have ended sooner if Eisenhower was more bold? Either prioritizing Monty or Patton, or doing something entirely different?

 

[Karelian]

The postwar borders were already settled by diplomacy, and in late 1944 the Western Allied leadership was surprisingly pessimistic in their estimations of Nazi capabilities to continue the war. Thus the gradual approach was rational from their point of view.

 

[Richardson]

I always thought the General Devers strategy should have been used. He wanted to cross the Rhine River in southern Germany in December, 1944 and had a credible plan. Devers was then going to head north on both the east and west banks of the Rhine. Many people believe this would have pre-empted the German offensive in the Ardennes, and Hitler would have never undertaken this offensive.

Eisenhower refused. I think Eisenhower thought of Devers as a rival and did not want Devers to get the credit for this.

 

[Derek Jackson]

Bypass Italy Invade Southern France late 43

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I always thought the General Devers strategy should have been used. He wanted to cross the Rhine River in southern Germany in December, 1944 and had a credible plan. Devers was then going to head north on both the east and west banks of the Rhine. Many people believe this would have pre-empted the German offensive in the Ardennes, and Hitler would have never undertaken this offensive.

Eisenhower refused. I think Eisenhower thought of Devers as a rival and did not want Devers to get the credit for this.

I've gamed this out & it can shorten the war a few weeks, maybe two months. Its actually fairly difficult to execute. The forested hills of Bavaria, Swabia, ect... make for slow going. It could make the advance of the 12th & 21st AG easier, IF the defense redeploys its reserve southwards to stop 6th AG advance. Counter attacking 6th AG in force waives away the Ardennes offensive as we know it, & can even allow the 12th & 12st AG to clear the Rhineland weeks earlier and cross the Rhine in February of even January vs March.

 

[Ian_W]

.

Eisenhowever I heard was great for bringing Monty, Patton, Bradley, and others more or less on the same page. But his broad front strategy seems to be rather... uninspired?

Yep, but it was also lower risk.

If you loaded all the supplies into either of Monty or Patton's forces - which they both wanted, as long as it was them who got the supplies - and their flank gets hit by the equivalent of the Bulge counter-attack, then if things go badly they could go very badly.

 

[Aber]

Lately I've been reading about military theories and strategists like Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Sherman, and so on, and I'd like to hear what the Allies could have done different or better? Whether when WWII started, or after Britain was ejected out of mainland Europe, D-Day, etc.

Eisenhowever I heard was great for bringing Monty, Patton, Bradley, and others more or less on the same page. But his broad front strategy seems to be rather... uninspired?

Suggest you have a look at:
http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=641846

The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944
An Operational Assessment
John A. Adams

mainly because it tries to look at the campaign with fresh eyes.

There were not many different campaign options for the Allies; a single strong landing, followed by a battle of attrition to the point where the Germans could no longer hold a continuous front, and an advance to the culmination point; rinse and repeat. Minor differences will generate different German responses but not change the overall picture.

There is also the distorting effect of history - before the landings IIRC Churchill was talking about the liberation of Paris in 1944 as an improbable event. The campaign while uninspiring in hindsight was seen differently at the time.

The major Allied weaknesses were probably not enough concentration of force, and lack of understanding the importance of logistics.

Ending the war sooner really depends on the timing of a Rhine crossing (you don't want to attempt it in the winter months) and so the delay of D-Day from early May made a huge difference.

 

[Michele]

There were not many different campaign options for the Allies; a single strong landing, followed by a battle of attrition to the point where the Germans could no longer hold a continuous front, and an advance to the culmination point; rinse and repeat.

That seems to neglect minor landings that exploited the commitment of the defenders' forces in countering major landings. Everyone remembers Avalanche and not Slapstick; everyone remembers Overlord and not Dragoon.
The problem is that there was a hard limit to a land-all-around strategy: the availability of landing craft and landing ships was always limited. So it's not as if the Western Allies can add an infinite number of landings.

 

[Aber]

That seems to neglect minor landings that exploited the commitment of the defenders' forces in countering major landings. Everyone remembers Avalanche and not Slapstick; everyone remembers Overlord and not Dragoon.
The problem is that there was a hard limit to a land-all-around strategy: the availability of landing craft and landing ships was always limited. So it's not as if the Western Allies can add an infinite number of landings.

The main counter-argument to multiple minor landings is that if you've got spare amphibious capacity it should go to the major landing as it is simply more efficient.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

. The campaign while uninspiring in hindsight was seen differently at the time. ...

I used to think so too. Following all the critical comment & analysis it seemed the Allied efforts 1944-45 were a mess. After a 23 year hands on education in military operations, more than a little school training, and a seperate study of the planning and execution of the 1944 campaigns in Europe, the Allied efforts look pretty damm good to me, both in the east and west.

 

[Michele]

The main counter-argument to multiple minor landings is that if you've got spare amphibious capacity it should go to the major landing as it is simply more efficient.

I know, but I'm not convinced. The enemy is less mobile than me, so why should I help him by placing as many forces as I can in the same spot?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

That seems to neglect minor landings that exploited the commitment of the defenders' forces in countering major landings. Everyone remembers Avalanche and not Slapstick; everyone remembers Overlord and not Dragoon.
The problem is that there was a hard limit to a land-all-around strategy: the availability of landing craft and landing ships was always limited. So it's not as if the Western Allies can add an infinite number of landings.

The main counter-argument to multiple minor landings is that if you've got spare amphibious capacity it should go to the major landing as it is simply more efficient.

Studying these things on the game board is tricky. Trying to keep things aligned with reality in our military map and field exercises was always a problem. During my own career in amphibious/littoral warfare there was a ongoing debate over concentration vs dispersed operations. It was never settled. In that venue & in gaming out a invasion of Europe the sucess is strictly situational, & depends heavily on how wrong the enemy is about your intent and capability. Part of the sucess of OVERLORD (the string of campaigns, not the landing) was the German expectation there would be multiple landings, and their locations. Allied deception ops worked very well in that regard. The residual German reserves were very much in the wrong places when Op DRAGOON was executed. On the game board it appears earlier, smaller, and more invasion points work better than a single 'colossal crack' later. BUT, this depends in part on how the defending player miscalculates the attackers intent & capability.

I strongly suspect the same applies to the latter portions of the campaign in western Europe. What SHAEF & others sometimes refered to as OVERLORD II, or after D+90. On the game board I've pulled off Montys '40 Division Full Blooded Thrust', entirely because the defender thought the Allied team was going for a broad front strategy & entirely failed to see the single axis attack coming. Generally its easier to organize & pull off a series of multiple axis attacks across the entire front. The defender has some really tough choices about the proportion of response & can swiftly screw himself with too much or too little in different sectors.

I'm not at all certain either is superior. its wholly dependant on what Hitler & Co were thinking at the moment & how they react. I strongly suspect that with a sucessful deception operation either will work equally well.

 

[Scott Washburn]

I think the most straightforward change the Americans could have made would be to put the Pacific on hold and concentrate more in Europe. Yes, Europe did have priority, but a third of all US divisions still went to the Pacific. Sending another 15 divisions to Europe would have meant devoting more ship building capacity to transports and supply ships, but having another 10 or 15 divisions in France (with the means to supply them) in September '44 would have made a huge difference. With what they did have OTL, the strategy they used was probably the best one, except for various operational tweaks.

 

[Post]

and lack of understanding the importance of logistics.

In general they had a MUCH better understanding of the importance of logistics than the Germans.

 

[Michele]

In general they had a MUCH better understanding of the importance of logistics than the Germans.

Can I like this twice?

 

[Michele]

I strongly suspect the same applies to the latter portions of the campaign in western Europe. What SHAEF & others sometimes refered to as OVERLORD II, or after D+90. On the game board I've pulled off Montys '40 Division Full Blooded Thrust', entirely because the defender thought the Allied team was going for a broad front strategy & entirely failed to see the single axis attack coming. Generally its easier to organize & pull off a series of multiple axis attacks across the entire front. The defender has some really tough choices about the proportion of response & can swiftly screw himself with too much or too little in different sectors.

The latter point you make, IMHO, underscores my assessment: if the enemy is less mobile, and if I can afford them, why not launch multiple operations in different parts of the front? The enemy will burn fuel and waste rail capacity shifting his few precious reserves all over the place, even before beginning to actually fight me.
This is, after all, what happened in OTL, and on a much bigger scale if we don't stop at the Westerners. Think of the incredibly long journey the German reinforcements to Normandy had to do. Think of the rail capacity blocked, of the fuel burned in the final road marches, of the mech breakdowns during the same.
It is, also, Liddell Hart's theory for the main reason of the success of the Soviet offensives. Personally I don't think his grand-piano theory is fair to the late-war Soviet strategic ability, but it must have contributed, undoubtedly.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Yup. Multipule axis attacks was core Red Army doctrine. It worked.

 

[jsb]

I'd like to hear what the Allies could have done different or better? Whether when WWII started, or after Britain was ejected out of mainland Europe, D-Day, etc.

Isn't this the big opertunity for change?

Not losing the BoF in 1940 changes far more than where Eisenhower allocates resources.........

 

[GauchoBadger]

Isn't this the big opertunity for change?

Not losing the BoF in 1940 changes far more than where Eisenhower allocates resources.........

Indeed, it's actually likely Eisenhower and the US Army itself won't even be there, as such an early change in Germany's fortunes could lead to stronger non-interventionist feelings on part of the US government towards europe.

 

[Purity of Violence]

C. J. Dick's From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944, is another book covering this topic. Dick's basic premise is that the Western Allies looked any understanding of the operational level of warfare, that is the handling of armies and army groups. His companion volume on the Eastern Front for the same period is of course title From Defeat to Victory.