Improve the Singapore Strategy

[Cryhavoc101]

Spend money on rain water collection as when the Japanese took the water catchments Singapore was stuffed. Improve the border defensiveness. Build hardened air craft hangers buy more modern planes lots of them and tanks that more than a stupid 2 ponder gun that could not use any rounds on troops.

Spend what’s left on training and training. Singapore was doomed as soon as that idiot Percival was appointed along with then RAF fellow who for the life of me name I forget.

When you look at most tanks being built in the period 1936-1941 then very few are using a gun bigger than a 2 pounder / 40mm

PzIII? - 37mm
BT7? - 45 mm
Sauma S35? 47mm
Type 95 Ha Go? 37mm
M3 Stuart? - 37mm

The 2 pounder was by comparison a pretty effective gun - and while some of those had an HE round it was about the explosive effect of a hand grenade at that calibre

I agree that a 6 pounder would have been better earlier though!

Percevils problems was that he knew what was required to defend Malaya and he was only given about a 3rd of it.

He was also surrounded by defeatists who urged him to surrender once the water works were captured despite many commonwealth units still having cohesion and ammo etc

A very detailed report detailing all of the failings and short comings of the Malayan defences was sent back to London in mid 41 (?) and by an incredible stroke of misfortune the weighted secret bag containing said report fell into German hands when a raider captured the ship carrying it (the ship started broadcasting the raider alert message over morse and the raider shelled it killing and wounding everyone on the crew who knew to ditch the bag overboard!) - And they only passed it on to the Japanese the dirty underhanded swine. So at a stroke the Japanese knew 'all of the failings and shortcomings of the Malayan defences'

That would be considered ASB/Axis wank if it happened in story written here!

 

[CalBear]

Politically acceptable without hindsight or what I would do now?


If you can plan for a siege then why actually accept it on Singapore? Would it not be far better to simply spend the effort holding far to the north? Isn't Singapore just to small and close to be realistically defended? Or go for something isolated like Nancowry?

Would the IJA be able to deal with large trench systems if they where built pre war?

What's the use as they will just be sent West come WWII.....


I think this hits what I would do with hindsight, that much money could buy a lot and I would focus on stopping FoF not the disaster that came from it.....

Simply backing France over Rhineland would probably cost less than Singapore.....

Yamashita would deal with fixed fortification on the Peninsula the same way that he did with strong point IOTL, he'd turn them with amphibious landings. That is why I stressed the boat guns to the degree I did. They are a logical addition to making the Island the "Gibraltar of the Pacific" in truth, although it requires more infrastructure (bunkers, cisterns) than The Rock (mainly due to, well, less available rock). They can also be placed over a period of years, reducing the budget cost, and most of labor can be done by the garrison (better to hold down costs) with some Royal Engineers as supervisors.

 

[Father Maryland]

Yamashita would deal with fixed fortification on the Peninsula the same way that he did with strong point IOTL, he'd turn them with amphibious landings. That is why I stressed the boat guns to the degree I did. They are a logical addition to making the Island the "Gibraltar of the Pacific" in truth, although it requires more infrastructure (bunkers, cisterns) than The Rock (mainly due to, well, less available rock). They can also be placed over a period of years, reducing the budget cost, and most of labor can be done by the garrison (better to hold down costs) with some Royal Engineers as supervisors.

Boat guns?

 

[CalBear]

Boat guns?

3" or 4" guns, ideal to kill barges and landing craft. Take them off older ships that are being scrapped and use them for the same role, except now instead of a secondary battery to kill torpedo boats on a BB they can kill 'Phibs.

Sam as the USN did on Wake and Midway with 5" and 7" guns taken off pre-dreds.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Yamashita would deal with fixed fortification on the Peninsula the same way that he did with strong point IOTL, he'd turn them with amphibious landings. That is why I stressed the boat guns to the degree I did. They are a logical addition to making the Island the "Gibraltar of the Pacific" in truth, although it requires more infrastructure (bunkers, cisterns) than The Rock (mainly due to, well, less available rock). They can also be placed over a period of years, reducing the budget cost, and most of labor can be done by the garrison (better to hold down costs) with some Royal Engineers as supervisors.

Was there not limitations on placing gun batteries as part of the Treaties except in certain places?

I agree some 6" and 4" guns and coastal forts at Kota Bharu and other places would make landings more difficult.

But before Sept 1940 when they invaded FIC the Japanese are not a direct threat to Malaya / Singapore and until that time there are other places that would be better served by having more ex battleship guns and engineering efforts - such as the British coastline, Malta etc

 

[jsb]

Was there not limitations on placing gun batteries as part of the Treaties except in certain places?

No Malaya/Singapore is fine,

Article XIX


The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

1. The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except
   1. those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and
   2. the Hawaiian Islands;
2. Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110º east longitude, except
   1. those adjacent to the coast of Canada,
   2. the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and
   3. New Zealand;
3. The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.

All of Malaya, Singapore is west of 110 so not regulated.

 

[trurle]

Firstly there is a fair amount of hindsight in this as before the occupation of French indo china a Japanese land invasion via the Kra Isthmus was impossible and a direct attack from the Japanese highly improbable

So things I would do once I found out the Japanese were moving on FIC - so late Sept 1940 is the trigger!

• Keep the air bases away from the coast - assume that landings will be made to capture them
• Improve the railway logistics in the Malayan Peninsula including the support said airbases
• Stand up a chain home system plus a Fighter Command style system for fighter control
• Massively increase the Malaysian Militia / Armed forces and intelligence services / police
• Plan for any defence to be based around the 2nd AIF so as soon as Japan makes an aggressive move start replacing Australian (and New Zealand?) units in the North African and Middle East theatres with British units from the UK and shift those Aus/NZ units East- there was at least 6-8 UK divisions that were good enough to be sent to replace them.
• Send FC Spitfire Squadrons to North Africa/Malta earlier (Send Kieth Park to Malta earlier while they are at it) - thus freeing up P40 and Hurricane Squadrons for duties in Malaya and elsewhere.
• Send as much of the HK garrison as can be withdrawn to Malaya including the 3 old destroyers, 2 insects and the 6 MTBs. 1 Of the DDs was converted into a minelayer which might prove useful
• Ask for Force C to reinforce the Malayan 'Garrison' rather than HK. The loss of HK is irrelevant to the conduct of the war. Expand the HK Regiment and HK Artillery Rgt but withdraw as much of the Regular forces as possible.
• The last 2 with at least 5 infantry and 1 Machine gun battalions and 2 Brigade HQs should allow the 2 Indian divisions in Malaya to each become 3 Brigade affairs
• Send 300 Covenanter tanks to allow the Australians to form the 1st Australian Armoured Division - yes they are just about the worst tanks the British built but they are probably still better than the Japanese tanks and better than nothing and available. And what better tank to learn AFV maintenance eh? Better tanks will follow.
• From Sept 1940 involve the Dutch and US in any plans - ie fwd planning for any defence of places like Rabaul, Ambon, and Timor?
• Try to send additional MTB/MGB Squadrons to defend the East coast - a 'littoral flotilla' - these can come from Coastal Forces in the UK and be based in places like Kota Bharu
• Improve Submarine facilities in Singapore - plan to support Dutch and US boats
• Send an aggressive commander - some one like Ironsides or even that young chap from 3rd Division - bad bedside manner but good a lighting fires under people

I think this all is pretty reasonable from military standpoint, but would not you have with this strategy a Malay Rebellion even before Japanese arrival (or may be rebellion with token Japanese support)? A.f.a.i.k., Malayan locals were leaning to Japanese side before invasion, even without additional pressure and capabilities your strategy will put on them.

 

[jsb]

Yamashita would deal with fixed fortification on the Peninsula the same way that he did with strong point IOTL, he'd turn them with amphibious landings. That is why I stressed the boat guns to the degree I did. They are a logical addition to making the Island the "Gibraltar of the Pacific" in truth, although it requires more infrastructure (bunkers, cisterns) than The Rock (mainly due to, well, less available rock). They can also be placed over a period of years, reducing the budget cost, and most of labor can be done by the garrison (better to hold down costs) with some Royal Engineers as supervisors.

I just think its hopeless, once Malaya and Sumatra & Borneo falls you will be bombarded by air and land. Its just to close to the Malayan shore, to much like river crossing rather than a true amphibious invasion and RN cant get any supplies in unlike Malta, the city will only make it worse due to all the civilians to feed. Boat guns can simply be suppressed by IJA guns.

A couple of options,
Could you,
- buy (or trade territory to hide the money part since its not the 19th century) the Dutch islands south of singapoor that are far more distance offshore and fortify on of them? (Batam or Bintan)
- fortify one of the west cost Malay islands? (Langkawi more likely than Penag)
- go defensive Nancowry and the entire Andaman and Nicobar Islands chain (could add a number of other small bases


With hindsight I think spending the money on industrial and R&D in UK would make more sense as anything else is wasted or will be moved to fight in Europe come 39.

 

[MatthewB]

Politically acceptable without hindsight or what I would do now?


If you can plan for a siege then why actually accept it on Singapore? Would it not be far better to simply spend the effort holding far to the north? Isn't Singapore just to small and close to be realistically defended? Or go for something isolated like Nancowry?

Would the IJA be able to deal with large trench systems if they where built pre war?

What's the use as they will just be sent West come WWII.....


I think this hits what I would do with hindsight, that much money could buy a lot and I would focus on stopping FoF not the disaster that came from it.....

Simply backing France over Rhineland would probably cost less than Singapore.....

One of the big challenges was that the rubber plantations paid a lot more for labour than the British government, causing constant manpower shortages. Also the land needed for roads, railways and fortifications was being used to grow rubber. So, those plantation owners (themselves British nabobs) are needed to get on side.

 

[MatthewB]

He was also surrounded by defeatists who urged him to surrender once the water works were captured despite many commonwealth units still having cohesion and ammo

Last year I visited the Battlebox in Singapore, and they have wax models of Percival and his Generals and you can imagine the debates in that very bunker about surrender.

 

[Barry Bull]

I agree it does seem backward to build a massive fortress and naval base but to send no defenders or ships.

My thinking, use Ceylon for your primary Indian Ocean base, with additional fuel/support points in Austalia and Singapore, limiting investment all around. And then focus on keeping ships at Singapore and Ceylon. And for god sakes force the rubber plantation owners to pay for it - it's a British colony, it's time to coerce the business owners to take part. Use £10 million of the £28 million spent on Singapore to instead build the Singapore-class CVL (assuming we can around or out of the Washington Treaty).

What was the point of the big guns at Singapore, to defend an empty base? Or was it to shelter a fleet in the base - but the RN would come out and fight.

Fund German liberal opposition to prop up a UK friendly Germany, so that the "Main Fleet to Singapore" strategy can realised. There is no point in reinforcement the Singaporean garrison if a fleet is not there to take advantage of the Naval Base. One cannot "hold" SLOCs, one need to actively engage the enemy to ensure that own SLOCs are not interfered. For that, the fleet must be sent to Singapore in even of war with Japan.

The problem is that the British Empire was stretched thin.

 

[Jellico]

Singapore is more than fortress. It is a strategically placed oil tank positioned to let a large navy control the Indian Ocean and South East Asia. Ceylon and Australia are too far from the action. Check any of those Victorian trade routes maps that accounts for volume and the citing of the base is pretty obvious.


A friendly Germany means no WW2, which means no fall of France, which means Japan doesn't get Vietnam, which means no worries for SEA because even 1940s Japan isn't nuts enough to take on the Europeans without the German distraction.

Personally I am partial to the old "no WNT" POD because the butterflies should leave the RN better able to counter the European threats earlier (but not win the war) and send more East. Better yet the US would be allowed to invest in some Pacific bases if it so chose creating more butterflies. Maybe not war ending but it all slows down Japan's initial lunge.

 

[Riain]

Singapore is more than fortress. It is a strategically placed oil tank positioned to let a large navy control the Indian Ocean and South East Asia. Ceylon and Australia are too far from the action. Check any of those Victorian trade routes maps that accounts for volume and the citing of the base is pretty obvious.

I agree, its a protected, forward naval base akin to Pearl Harbor rather than the Maginot Line. The guns cover the narrows and defend the base from seaborne attack, not keep land armies at bay: there was several divisions for that.

All in all as concieved the idea was sound enough. Further, given the major changes in circumstances bought about by the war the strategy was executed at a political-strategic level well enough. It was at the operational-tactical level that it all fell apart: Force Z sunk for no result and the army defeated on land too easily.

 

[Barry Bull]

Singapore is more than fortress. It is a strategically placed oil tank positioned to let a large navy control the Indian Ocean and South East Asia. Ceylon and Australia are too far from the action. Check any of those Victorian trade routes maps that accounts for volume and the citing of the base is pretty obvious.


A friendly Germany means no WW2, which means no fall of France, which means Japan doesn't get Vietnam, which means no worries for SEA because even 1940s Japan isn't nuts enough to take on the Europeans without the German distraction.

Personally I am partial to the old "no WNT" POD because the butterflies should leave the RN better able to counter the European threats earlier (but not win the war) and send more East. Better yet the US would be allowed to invest in some Pacific bases if it so chose creating more butterflies. Maybe not war ending but it all slows down Japan's initial lunge.

Can UK afford a larger RN in a No WNT world though?

 

[Jellico]

It is not so much larger but more modern and more capable. The classic example is swapping a QE for a G3 in a Bismark match up. There are a couple of threads about it around here, but you get a bit more industrial capacity because of the steadier construction drumbeat and more capable ships earlier which means more time off (less wear) for ships like the Hood or older cruisers, and you can send older ships like the Rs into reserve. You can build trade protection carriers in the 20s instead of the 40s. It is % stuff, a little bit better here and there, but the mad scramble in the first two years of the War isn't quite as bad. How much better is up to whoever is imagining it. But given the OTL end result in the west you are probably looking at more capable forces being free to be sent east at the end of 1941.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I think this all is pretty reasonable from military standpoint, but would not you have with this strategy a Malay Rebellion even before Japanese arrival (or may be rebellion with token Japanese support)? A.f.a.i.k., Malayan locals were leaning to Japanese side before invasion, even without additional pressure and capabilities your strategy will put on them.

There will of course be difficulties with independence groups in any nation that is ruled from afar - but I was not aware of a large groundswell of Japanese support?

But then you have Perceval - and he is somewhat of a COIN expert - which is why I suggested improvements to the Intelligence services and 'Police' as part of 'what to spend the additional money on'

Bring in an arse kicking ground forces commander - let Percival sort out the Tigers and other groups that threaten the ability of Britain to hold Malaya

Other things that are not as apparent was for example the wages that the British were offering the locals for laboring work and dock working - was well below the civilian norm and so they had difficulty employing enough local 'muscle' to get stuff done.

So someone needs to be in place with the authority to make the decision to pay higher wages.

In itself this is not such an issue but it did delay unloading some important ships and building new roads etc which often required the Garrison forces to be used as labor and this obviously impacted their training.

No Malaya/Singapore is fine,


All of Malaya, Singapore is west of 110 so not regulated.

Fair enough - cheers for the clarity jsb

Then the only problem remains - when does this happen as between 1939 and Dec 41 there is many more important locations where installing shore battery's is probably more important.

Malaya is a backwater - until it isn't

I just think its hopeless, once Malaya and Sumatra & Borneo falls you will be bombarded by air and land. Its just to close to the Malayan shore, to much like river crossing rather than a true amphibious invasion and RN cant get any supplies in unlike Malta, the city will only make it worse due to all the civilians to feed. Boat guns can simply be suppressed by IJA guns.

I agree - to defend Singapore Island from a ground assault Malaya needs to be defended first possibly from as far north as the Kra Isthmus while having sufficient Littoral and submarine forces to make amphibious ops difficult

If the IJA overruns Malaya then its too late.

And that needs decent troops and decent equipment in sufficient numbers.

 

[jsb]

It is a strategically placed oil tank positioned to let a large navy control the Indian Ocean and South East Asia. Ceylon and Australia are too far from the action. Check any of those Victorian trade routes maps that accounts for volume and the citing of the base is pretty obvious.

What about building floating docks, tenders & repair ships and subsidising fast civilian tankers rather than a single base create a fleet train that could be moved to any anchorage?
This will of course be used in the west come 39 but might sufficiently help GB that come 41 more stuff is available to hold the east and at least it will not all fall into IJN hands?

All in all as concieved the idea was sound enough. Further, given the major changes in circumstances bought about by the war the strategy was executed at a political-strategic level well enough. It was at the operational-tactical level that it all fell apart: Force Z sunk for no result and the army defeated on land too easily.

Not sure that you cant put a lot of the blame on London, to suggest that the forces in Malaya where sufficient is I think is stretching it a long way. I would add that the instructions & priorities given to the local leadership could have been clarified and improved significantly..... ie if Force Z is to act as a British Tirpitz the Churchill/London needs to order it not to actually do anything....

Can UK afford a larger RN in a No WNT world though?

Yes, especially as it doesn't have to be larger just not actually over age and obsolescent like 13 out of 15 of the OTL RN come 1939 and it can be bought slowly over nearly 20 years using plenty of capacity that did do anything productive for long periods in the depression.

(ie everything pre N&R and even they need refits 2/15, admittedly Hood, R&R and the 3 QE rebuilds where still probably acceptable but that's 6/15, Leaving the Rs and unrebuilt QEs 24 year old ships making up nearly half your fleet is not good 7/15.)

 

[jsb]

And that needs decent troops and decent equipment in sufficient numbers.

That sums up the problem finding spare anything when GB is fighting two european powers is going to be hard.....

 

[Cryhavoc101]

That sums up the problem finding spare anything when GB is fighting two european powers is going to be hard.....

And Vichy France!

And sending as much as it can to Russia

"The first deliveries (to Russia) of tanks took place already in 1941, namely 487 Matilda II tanks, Valentine and Tetrarch from UK as well as 182 M3A1 Stuart and medium tanks M3 Lee from the USA2

I am sure that those tanks might have been of greater use to the Western Allies in Malaya and the Philippines but propping up Russia was seen as being more important than defending the far east

 

[Riain]

Not sure that you cant put a lot of the blame on London, to suggest that the forces in Malaya where sufficient is I think is stretching it a long way. I would add that the instructions & priorities given to the local leadership could have been clarified and improved significantly..... ie if Force Z is to act as a British Tirpitz the Churchill/London needs to order it not to actually do anything....

Without looking it up there were 3 or 4 divisional equivalents in place, a pair of Capital ships with 2 cruisers a couple of days behind and somewhere around 180 planes. During the 10 weeks of the campaign 1 or 2 more divisions and 50 fighters arrived, as it happened the defeated outnumbered the victors. As for the overall strategy, IIRC that the plan was to send a main fleet to Singapore in ~120 days and the Eastern Fleet was in Ceylon in March, close enough to the planned schedule.

The problem was that the ~5 divisions, capital ships, cruisers and planes were thrown away without result, when reasonable expectation would be for the enemy to suffer serious damage defeating such forces. Instead of the Eastern Fleet coming to Ceylon to relieve Singapore, Southern Malaya and Sumatra held with the remnants of Force Z/ABDA, several divisions, a rump air force helped by the big guns of Singapore it found itself alone against the worlds most powerful carrier striking force backed by virtually intact Japanese forces.